Backfires in Hamadan: Russia's Deployment of Strategic Bombers in Iran is Unprecedented

The photo at left dominated he Internet today: a five-year-old child pulled from the rubble of a building collapsed by Russian or Syrian regime bombs in Aleppo. It is indeed a powerful symbol.

But the bombing of Aleppo just became even more intense this week with word that Russia was flying bombing missions using Tu-22MR Backfire strategic bombers from Iran's Hamadan Air Base, some miles north of the city of Hamadan.

Some hasty accounts described the bombers as Tu-22s, but the Tu-22 (NATO reporting name Blinder) is a very different aircraft than the Tu-22MR (NATO reporting name Backfire). The former was a subsonic bomber that proved ineffective in service in Soviet days; the latter is a supersonic, intercontinental strategic bomber, rarely deployed outside Russia. The precedent deserves attention.

Even at the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union, after the end of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, almost ever deployed strategic bombers outside the Soviet Union, its Warsaw Pact allies in Eastern Europe, and Afghanistan. The deployment of Russian fighters and ground attack aircraft at the Hmeymim airbase near Latakia in Syria was itself a break with precedent. But operating from Iran, a country whose 1979 Revolution denounced foreign influences, is a dramatic departure for both countries.

Russia says the Backfires are too heavy to use bases like Hmeymim in Syria, and that flying from Hamadan is much shorter an thus more efficient than flying from southern Russia, with greater tie over target, but the real news is that Iran permitted it. There may be implications in Iran's domestic politics; it also indicates that despite international criticism, Russia is prepared to increase the bombloads it is dropping on Syria.

Below: map, and two Russian propaganda clips.

Brilliant

Said to have been photographed on the Berlin subway:"This text has no purpose other than to terrify those who are afraid of the Arabic language."

Turkish Media Figures it Out: Gülen Must Be Armenian. Or Jewish. Or Better Yet, Both!

Note; I'm actually on vacation this week, but due to my surgeries and such I've been neglectful of the blog, so I plan to play catch-up this week.

The Turkish government's war of words against Fethullah Gülen faces some limitations since Gülen and President Erdoğan were friends and allies until fairly recently. Now that Gülen is accused of being the mastermind behind the July 15 coup and most of the other problems Turkey faces (any day now they may prove he was on the Grassy Knoll in Dallas as well), it could be awkward if Gülen is in fact the good Sunni cleric and philanthropist he claims to be. So there must be a more sinister explanation. As Pinar Tremblay at Al-Monitor notes, some of the more creative columnists have figured it out: he's not even Turkish; he's secretly Armenian! Or maybe Jewish! Or — wait for it — he's Armenian with a Jewish mother!

There's some mention of the Vatican and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) as well. The Illuminati do not (yet) appear to be involved.

A Photo that Provokes Some Obvious Questions

How did that get there?

Sorry for the lapse in blogging. More tomorrow.

Prof. John D. (Jack) Ruedy: Historian of Algeria, Great Teacher, Mentor, Friend

No matter how many degrees one may accrue, most of us are lucky to have two or three teachers who truly formed us and our way of thinking, writing, and teaching. I was saddened to learn last week of the passing of one of the best teachers I have ever encountered, my graduate school advisor and the chairman of my doctoral dissertation committee, Emeritus Professor of History at Georgetown John D. (Jack) Ruedy. He died August 1 at the age of 89.

Professor Ruedy was a recognized scholar of the History of Algeria, and author most notably of Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation. A revised second edition brings the history into the present century.

His published work is well known among Maghrebists, and also deals with broader regional issues, but his true forte was teaching, inspiring generations of students. I first encountered him in my sophomore year as an undergraduate in a survey course on Modern Europe, and that persuaded me to take his undergraduate course on Islamic Civilization. The rest is history I guess. In graduate school his courses on the Maghreb and Islamic Spain were equally great despite a lot of reading required in French, neither then or now my strongest language. He believed in making his lectures entertaining, but he also believed in lots of assigned reading and the essential role of languages as a tool for historians.

While I think he was a little disappointed that most of his Ph.D. candidates (at least those of my era) chose dissertation subjects outside the Maghreb, he was always a positive but rigorous guide.

A native Californian, he took his doctorate at UCLA under Gustave von Grunebaum, and then took the position at Georgetown, where he spent his entire career. I am grateful for his teaching and guidance, and his friendship, and the role model he provided as both scholar and teacher. My condolences to Nancy and the children and grandchildren, and my profound gratitude.

The Battle of Romani, August 4-5, 1916: Part II

In yesterday's Part I, we discussed the forces engaged and the initial deployments before the Battle of Romani in the Sinai a century ago. The advancing Ottoman and German force had been closely tracked by the British in their trek across Sinai, thanks to the new tool of aerial reconnaissance. the  The Turkish force had an extended logistical line, while the British fortifications were at the railhead of the line they were building across Sinai, and could be quickly rushed reinforcements from Qantara on the Canal. They had had the time to fortify the defensive position at Romani. While the Turco-German force slightly outnumbered the British Imperial forces (mostly ANZACs), they faced the challenges of being on the offense and far from potential reinforcements. Both the head of the German Military Mission, Liman von Sanders, and the local German commander on the scene, Kress von Kressenstein, complained about the decision to advance against the well-entrenched British forces.

As the British lines were anchored on the left by the sea, the Turkish attack was aimed at turning the right of the lines, in the desert. The hope was to drive in the flank and attack the rail line.

This was exactly what Harry Chauvel expected. Initially his main force consisted of the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade; the 2nd Brigade was scattered in outposts and on patrol.

At around midnight on August 3/4. the Turkish advance force suddenly encountered the Light Horse on the right of the line. Fire was exchanged, and the Turks fell back to regroup. They began an organized attack around 1 AM. Through the night the Turks advanced, and the 1st Light Horse was forced to steadily fall back to a sand ridge they called Wellington Ridge. Various dunes and sandhills had been given names (Mount Meredith, Mount Royston) which appear in the battle narratives.

With first light around 4:00, it became clear that the 1st Light Horse was in a tenuous position, with its right being outflanked. At 4:30 Chauvel ordered two regiments of the 2nd Light Horse into the line to the right of the 1st, extending the flank. He also moved troops from the left of the line to extend his right, replacing them with troops of the 52nd (Lowland) Division, a British Territorial (or Yeomanry) unit intended got home defense. The Ottoman 32nd and 39th Regiments continued to try to outflank the Australian right, while the 31st Infantry pushed forward against the Territorials. As the morning wore on, the Light Horse were forced to fall back until they threatened to reach the ANZAC camps. But the horse artillery of the Light Horse stopped their advance. The Australians were reinforced by the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade and the 5th Mounted Yeomanry, with the 42nd (Lancashire) Division of Territorial troops arriving by train.

As the day wore on and the Anglo-ANZAC line was reinforced, the Turkish and Germans, who had no reinforcements available or convenient railroad, and ho had marched all night and fought all day in August in the Sinai with little water, found their advance blocked and many began to surrender. By evening, the reinforced ANZACs and British counterattacked against enemy positions on the sandhill they had named Mount Royston.

As darkness fell, the battle had clearly shifted to the British side, By the next day, the reinforced British and ANZAC force would swell to some 50,000, vastly outnumbering their adversaries.

Tomorrow: Pursuit.

The Battle of Romani, August 4-5, 1916, Part I

On July 19 we discussed the Turkish advance into Sinai a century ago. This week marks the centenary of the Battle of Romani, a small but key turning point in the Middle Eastern campaign in World War I: Britain's first victory against the Ottomans after the retreat from Gallipoli and the surrender at Kut. It has also conventionally been seen as the transition between the Defense of the Suez Canal and the beginning of the Palestine Campaign.

Kress von Kressensten

The July post described the beginning of the Turkish advance, largely tracked by aircraft. The advancing column of Turkish and allied forces consisted of the Ottoman 3rd Infantry Division (31st, 32nd and 39th Regiments), veterans of Gallipoli, plus the German "Pasha" Force, including a German aircraft detachment, German light and heavy artillery and mortar, and one Austrian artillery unit. The German Forces were under the command of Freiherr Friederich Kress von Kressenstein, the German Chief of Staff to Jemal Pasha's Fourth Army. As they had advanced toward the British lines, they had established a series of defensive lines in case of falling back.

The British were under the overall command of Egyptian Expeditionary Force Commander General Sir Archibald Murray, at Cairo, and under him the commander of the northern (Number 3) Sector of Canal Defenses, General Herbert A. Lawrence, headquartered at Qantara.

But the man at the front, in the forward defense lines, was Maj. Gen. Harry Chauvel, an Australian commanding the ANZAC Mounted Division, consisting of the 1st and 2nd Brigades of Australian Light Horse with the British Territorial 52nd (Lowland) Division, and soon reinforced by the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade and other units.

A Young Harry Chauvel

Any readers from Down Under will need no introduction to the Light Horsemen, or to Harry Chauvel. Already bloodied at Gallipoli, where they had fought without their mounts, the Light Horse would ride into fame in the Palestine Campaign, from Beersheba to the victory at Megiddo and the capture of Damascus.

Chauvel After the War

Harry Chauvel would go on to become the first Australian to command a Corps and was later Chief of General Staff.

Kress von Kressenstein might be the Prussian professional soldier,  with a name to match, but a horse soldier from New South Wales was going to be master of the coming battle.

The British front line was at Romani, to which the British had built a rail line, and which lay near the ruins of ancient Pelusium.

By the battle, British and ANZAC forces would number some 14,000, Ottoman/German/Austrian some 17,000.

The British were entrenched with their left on the Mediterranean and the Bardawil lagoon, the main force on a ridge they called Wellington Ridge, and built a line of fortifications along sand hills to a large dune called Katib Gannit.

The action would begin the night of August 3, and develop on August 4 and 5. We'll pick up the story tomorrow.

Light Horse Encampment at Romani

Algerian Darja Notes from Lameen Souag; Also Issue of French in Schools

It's been a while since we've done anything on Arabic colloquials and related language issues. So here are some links. Algerian linguist Lameen Souag at the Jabal al-Lughat blog has been visiting his hometown of Dellys, and as usual has been writing linguistic notes on Algerian darja (colloquial Arabic usage in his home town. Here are his three posts so far:

"Darja notes: Elms and kids' morphology"

"Sara, Sara" (about immigrant language usage in Dellys)

"More Darja notes: oath complementisers, free choice indefinites, kids' morphology, finger rhymes"

Algeria not only faces the usual tensions between fusha (Modem Standard Arabic) and colloquial, but also wrestles with tensions between Arabic and the Amazigh or Berber languages, and the lingering cultural and social dominance of the colonial language, French. Recently it was suggested that math and science courses in secondary school be taught in French, to prepare students better to cope with university, where the subjects are taught in French. Here's a piece on the resulting controversy:

"Algeria's identity debate over adopting French teaching"

İncirlik Under Pressure Again: Will US Keep its Nukes There?

Yesterday, more than two weeks after Turkey's failed coup, Turkish troops and demonstrators again surrounded the joint NATO base at İncirlik. After the July 15 coup attempt, Turkey had surrounded the base and cut power. After nearly a week since the coup with external power cut off, the US confirmed that power had been restored to the base on July 22. The power had been cut at the time of the coup, after at least one Turkish KC-135 was used to refuel Air Force aircraft used to attack Ankara. The Turkish commander at İncirlik was arrested (photo at left).

As the purges (no other word quite works) have deepened, Turkish rancor towards the United States has deepened, as demands for extradition of Fethullah Gülen and vague accusations of US responsibility for the coup have accelerated, and President Erdoğan has been saying NATO and the US are not Turkey's friends. But İncirlik is a NATO base, and is home to a store of nuclear weapons, the only US nukes permanently deployed in the Middle East. The weapons are part of a nuclear sharing program under which NATO deployed weapons in allied countries, under full US control in peacetime, but which would be available to the allied power in a nuclear war. of some 200 weapons still stored with NATO allies in Europe, the largest number, estimated somewhere between 50 and 90, are at İncirlik.

The weapons are stored in storage bunkers under the control of the US Air Force and are equipped with Permissive Action Links (PALs), which prevent their use without express authorization by US National Command Authority. How secure are the PALs in an age of cyberhacking of secure computer networks? The US Air force assures that they are foolproof, but if a hostile power came into possession of the weapons, some observers are not sure how unbreakable the codes may be?

When the Turkish Army sealed off the base and cut off electrical power, USAF raised the Force Protection Condition to FPCON Delta, the highest possible. But with continuing threatening gestures from Turkey, like yesterday's on the eve of a visit by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine General Joseph Dunford, a certain jitters about the security of the nuclear arsenal seems appropriate.

The weapons are B61 thermonuclear gravity bombs with a variable adjustable yield with an upper limit of an estimated 340 kilotons, two to three times the yield of the Hiroshima or Nagasaki bombs, which means they are now classed as tactical rather than strategic weapons, though it has long been assumed that the use of tactical nukes would inevitably escalate to the use of multi-megaton strategic weapons.

The B61s are aging and only tactical, but they could still destroy a city. The number at İncirlik is estimated at 50 to 90, increasingly outdated or even obsolete. That's between 50 and 90 goddamn fucking H-bombs.

If Turkey were to leave NATO the US would presumably withdraw these weapons, but what if the coup had succeeded and a hostile force gained control of the weapons. Or if Erdoğan quit NATO and seized the base? How confident are we the PALs cannot be compromised. Many voices are warning the nukes are in some jeopardy, They are unlikely to be used for their original purpose, to defend Turkey. Is it time to get them out?

Bear in mind where İncirlik is located. It is just outside Adana in southeastern Turkey.

The larger map below emphasizes the importance of this. The base is perhaps 100 miles from the Syrian border, In the map below, Adana is the conurbation in southeastern Turkey at the upper left; the city in the lower right is Aleppo. Of all the places in Turkey to store nuclear weapons, we store ours as close to the ISIS front lines as possible. I suspect the US is having second thoughts about this deployment.

Erdoğan Go

Probably no comment needed:

AUB's Art Exhibition on "The Arab Nude: The Artist as Awakener"

Beirut has always been a city that has seemed more cosmopolitan than much of the Arab World, and the American University of Beirut (AUB) has often been in the forefront. As part of AUB's 150th anniversary celebrations, AUB has been hosting an art exhibition called The Arab Nude: The Artist as Awakener. It closes this week, so I'm a bit late in writing about it. There was a conference held on the subject as well. At a time when puritanical censorship is growing in many Arab countries, the willingness to address artistic nudity, both male and female (though from the photos mostly the latter) is what still makes Beirut distinct.

From the reviews (a few: here and here and here and here) it's clear this is not about the Orientalist fantasy nudes, erotic harem girls who existed only in European sexual imaginings of the exotic East, so prominent in 19th century art (a subject for another post), but nudes in the work of Arab artists, and an attempt to situate their appreciation of the nude in the context of the broader Arabic cultural awakening, the nahda. The reviews emphasize that the exhibit did not minimize the obvious masculine viewpoint of the artists. A summary from the exhibition's Facebook page:

The Arab Nude: The Artist as Awakener examines the way in which artists and intellectuals of the Mandate era engaging in a double struggle against imperialism, Ottoman and European, resorted to an ideal form or pictorial device to concretize their visions of Arab modernity. For them, to be “Arab” was as much a matter of ambiguity and ambition as was the quest to be an artist. In fact, both labels required leaps of imagination over local conditions and imperial plans. What claims for identity, community, and political society were invested in the divesting of Arab bodies of their clothes? Our exhibition documents the debates that met the genre of the Nude in exhibition halls and newspapers. It situates artistic practices in relation to ongoing, urgent discussions about the meaning of citizenship, urbanity, and internationalism carried out amid movements for women’s rights, pan-Arabism, and various nationalisms, as well as educational reform, militarization, the scouting movement and nudist colonies. Without espousing the role of awakener for artists, our subtitle foregrounds the social, political or cultural motivations for these artists to embrace and adopt the genre of the Nude in their artistic careers.

Or as the last of the reviews linked above says:

More importantly, perhaps, it addresses the idea that these artists used their work to express liberation from Ottoman and European colonisation. As the title suggests, the exhibition, curated by Octavian Esanu and Kirsten Scheid, seeks to establish to what extent these artists used their artistic explorations of the nude as a means of promoting social change in line with the spirit of the nahda – a period of modernisation known in Arabic as the “awakening.” In the context of discussions about the meaning of identity, community, citizenship and internationalism, and of what it meant to be “an Arab,” what was the significance of the Arab form laid bare?

64 Years Ago Today

July 23, 1952 (second clip in Arabic):

There's Nothing Loaded About This Question

Not "Did the US support the coup?" but "Which agency?" Daily Sabah is considered a supporter of Erdoğan's AKP.

A Seemingly Credible Account of What Went Wrong in the Turkish Coup

An unidentified "correspondent in Turkey" writing at Al-Monitor's ''Turkey Pulse" offers an account of "How They Blew the Coup."

It seems credible: basically, Turkey's National Intelligence Organization (known as MIT in its Turkish acronym) got wind of the plot and this forced the plotters to move their plans up by six hours.That information failed to reach the unit tasked with arresting President Erdoğan, and he had escaped by the time they arrived. The change in timing also accounts for the failure to coordinate between military units. Of the accounts I've read, this seems to explain the collapse of the coup as credibly as any.

July 19, 1916: Turkey Begins Advance in Sinai

In January and February 2015 I posted a detailed account of the Ottoman advance on the Suez Canal a century before. After that campaign British forces in Egypt and their Australian and New Zealand colonial troops remained in the defenses east of the canal, while heir Ottoman opponents remained in eastern Sinai, with both sides conducting forward reconnaissance by air and ground forces.

With the end of the Gallipoli campaign, both sides were able to redeploy forces on the Sinai/Palestine Front. In June of 1916 the Ottoman Fourth Army in Syria and Palestine held forward positions at Bir el-Mazar in eastern Sinai, while the forward British lines were around the wells a Romani (near the ruins of ancient Pelusium, about 42 miles to the west. The British commander. General Sir Archibald Murray, had been constructing a railroad and water supply eastward into Sinai as support for a move toward El Arish. The position at Romani was commanded by Maj. Gen. H.A. Lawrence,The Turks, with the 3rd Infantry Division fresh from battle experience at Gallipoli were under pressure to move closer to the Suez Canal, where artillery could threaten shipping.

Both sides were using the new tool of airborne reconnaissance to track the others movements. The British 5th Wing of the Royal Flying Corps had two squadrons in Egypt, mostly in Sinai and a a few in the Western Desert.

B.E.2C

Most of these were B.E.2Cs with a few De Havilands.

Rumpler C.I. model

Opposite them on the Ottoman side was the German 300 Fliegerabteilung ("Pasha"), operating initially from Beersheba and by June from El Arish. It deployed 14 Rumpler C.I. aircraft, though the British histories call them Fokkers. The Germans had several advantages: their planes were faster and equipped with interrupter deices which synchronized their machine guns with their propellers. By mid-July, the British were detecting more German reconnaissance flights.

Gen. Chaytor

On July 19, a century ago, a British aircraft with Brigadier General E.W.C. Chaytor, commander of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, aboard as an observer, discovered an advance force of some 2,500 Turkish forces at Bir Bayud, a comparable force plus 6,000 camels were found to the north at Bir al-Abd, and a smaller force at Jamiel. By the morning of the 20th, Turkish advance forces had reached Oghratina and Mageibra. It was clear the Ottomans were advancing.

The British quickly reinforced the position around Romani and moved all their aircraft in Egypt (including those in the Western Desert) to Ismailia and prepared a forward landing strip at Romani.

This was the beginning of what is often called the second Ottoman attempt on the Suez Canal, though it never came near that waterway. It would end in a battle at Romani in early August.

Neither the senior German officer in Palestine, Djemal Pasha's Chief of Staff Freiherr Kress von Kressenstein, nor the head of Germany's Military Mission, Otto Liman von Sanders, thought the advance could succeed against a superior British force. Liman von Sanders, in his memoirs, says:

The instructions of the expeditionary corps (they came by way of Constantinople, but I do not know who originated them) required an advance so near to the canal that the long range guns could stop the passage of ships.

The instructions I have never understood. The question arises at once how long this interruption by artillery was to last. If it was to be a prolonged one, which alone was of substantial value, it entirely depended on whether the British would tolerate it, or whether the Turko-German troops could enforce it. The former as well as the latter had to be answered in the negative, without question.

The instructions were neither fish nor fowl; they reminded one of washing the hands without wetting the fingers.

He was right. In early August, we'll return to this story for the anniversary of the Battle of Romani.

Further Thoughts on the Turkish Coup as Purges Intensify

The more we learn about the Turkish coup, the more improbable it seems that the coup was staged, since it seems clear that the attempt was real. It does seem possible, however, that the government had gained some prior knowledge of the coup plans, allowing it to outmaneuver the plotters. The Air Force was clearly involved, and the Navy's role is unclear, with some naval vessels reportedly unaccounted for. 

But the sheer scale of the purges goes far beyond the actual participants in the coup, including some 35,000 people from the military, government officials, and academic institutions. If all these people were involved in planning a coup, it would have succeeded. Clearly the government had a target list ahead of time.

Why it failed is still being debated, but my suspicion that the government had foreknowledge of some sort seems likely, given the fact that President Erdoğan evaded capture despite a reported assault on his hotel, and that the plotters were unable to take key command centers in Ankara.  The failure to seize private broadcasting centers (which are more popular than the state-owned media) has been much remarked upon. Clearly, the coup failed to ensure sufficient unanimity in the chain of command. Its execution was a disastrous mess.

The what-went-wrong argument is interesting and I may have more to say as we learn more, but clearly the excessive purges have rapidly become the main story.

The Coup that Couldn't Shoot Straight: Whatever Really Happened, Erdoğan Can Now Consolidate Control

It's no surprise that yesterday's failed coup (if that's what it was) in Turkey is being used by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as an excuse to purge not only the Army but the judiciary as well, perhaps clearing the way to achieve the strengthened Presidency he has been seeking. Given the haphazard execution of the coup, it is hardly a surprise that some have speculated it was staged, a burning-the-Reichstag moment. That may be overly conspiratorial, but it could hardly have worked so well for Erdoğan if he had scripted it. (One person suggesting it might have been staged is Fethullah Gülen on whom Erdoğan is blaming the coup.)

If we reject the idea it was staged, then we're left with having to explain the incompetence of the plot. The plotters seized the state television station according to the classic coup playbook, but neglected to seize private TV stations or cut social media for several hours, allowing  Erdoğan to rally support and retake the airport. It was a 1960s coup in 2016. The plotters seem to have been unaware of  Erdoğan's whereabouts, and lacked the support of most of the general staff. It's been suggested that the authorities knew it was coming and were prepared for it. Was this just a classic case of incompetence and military fuckup? Whatever it was, Erdoğan seems intent on capitalizing on it.

Turkey

The apparent coup in Turkey is still unfolding, and I'm hesitant to comment on the implications until it's clearer what is happening. I'll post more soon.

For Nice . . .

What else is there to say?

NYT Updates the Ongoing Gilles Kepel vs Olivier Roy Feud: The Debate in France over the Nature of Islamic Radicalism

Gilles Kepel

This week The New York Times offered a piece on the increasingly bitter personal feud between France's two best-known experts on Jihadist Islam. .
It's a fight that erupted late last year after the Paris terrorist attacks and that has grown increasingly heated, with two longtime scholar-experts and onetime friends resorting to names like "ignoramus." I've started to write about this particularly Gallic intellectual feud between Olivier Roy and Gilles Kepel more than once but my surgery delayed the post so I'll use the NYT article as an excuse..

While the US Presidential campaign spouts a lot of ill-informed rhetoric about the dangers of radical Islam, real or imagined, France, which has had much first-hand experience, is also witnessing a debate over the nature of Islamic radicalism. The difference is that the main proponents on each side actually know what they are talking about. In fact, they have long dominated the conversation.

Olivier Roy

When it comes to the study of political Islamic movements, radical and otherwise, Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy have dominated the field in France, and arguably in Europe, for decades. Both were once fixtures at Sciences-Po in Paris, though Roy is now at the European University Institute in Florence. And many of he best of the younger generation of specialists in political Islam and jihadism came out of Sciences-Po had studied under one or both. (Off the top of my head, Jean-Pierre Filiu, Stephane Lacroix, and Thomas Hegghammer, but there are many more.)

For those who don't read French, the NYT piece provides a short introduction, as does this Washington Post column. 
Subscribers to The Chronicle of Higher Education will find a good summary behind a paywall here.

If you read French, however, you might as well go to the source. Last November, in the wake of the Paris terror attacks, Roy published an article in Le Monde called "Olivier Roy: « Le djihadisme est une révolte générationnelle et nihiliste »."

His argument, oversimplified of course from its Gallic precision, is that the radicalized Muslims of the Paris suburbs are not really motivated by religion but by nihilism and anarchism, and that Islam is a rationalizing overlay, or, in Roy's aphoristic summary, "the Islamization of radicalism."

By December, Gilles Kepel was taking exception in articles such as this interview in the conservative Le Figaro: "Gilles Kepel: «L'objectif de l'État islamique ? Déclencher une guerre civile en France»." An English summary of the objections to Roy can be found in this piece by Francois Burgat. Kepel and his supporters take a more  traditional approach, seeing  European Islamists more traditionally, as radicalized Islamists.

After the Brussels attacks, Kepel emphasized his views:'"Molenbeek français': la mise au point de Gilles Kepel." Roy reiterated his views in other articles, and in March Kepel struck back with a provocatively titled article in Libération: "«Radicalisations» et «islamophobie»: le roi est nu."
"Le roi est nu," or "The king is naked," is an obvious pun (roi/Roy) on Olivier Roy's name.

And that only brings the back-and-forth up to March. The rhetoric has gotten increasingly personal.

Now, while I am generally familiar with the literature on Jihadism, I am no expert, and certainly not in a league with Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy, nor have I studied radical Islam in Europe, as both men have.  As a historian rather than a political scientist, I tend to be skeptical of theory and rigid structural analysis, and I tend to be pragmatic. From that perspective, the difference between "the Islamization of radicalism" and "the radicalization of Islam" seems to be the question of which you address first. But it also seems that both Islam and a nihilistic desperation play a role. Do we really need a Manichean dichotomy, a zero-sum construct where either one formula or the other is sacrosanct? or could we learn more from reading both Kepel and Roy?

But what do I know? I'm not even French.

Capture of Airbase from ISIS a Stepping-Stone to Mosul

The Air Base on Google Earth

Even as the Islamic State has stepped up terrorist attacks, it continues to lose ground steadily on the battlefield. The capture July 9 by Iraqi and coalition forces of the Al-Qayyarah West Air Base could prove to be a major stepping stone en route to the recapture of Mosul, some 75 kilometers to the north. The base could provide, if cleared, a base of operations for helicopter gunships and ground attack aircraft.

The capture of Mosul is still distant, however. ISIS remains in control of the town of al-Qayyarah, on the Tigris to the east of the airbase, and also of the town of Shirqat farther south on the river.

What Time is It? In Egypt, it's Complicated.

Egypt was supposed to begin Daylight Savings (Summer) Time this week, but on Monday, just days before it was due to begin, the Cabinet voted to abolish it. The result is some confusion, and EgyptAir is warning there is likely to be much confusion in coordinating airline connections and could face losses of $2 million.

The recent history is just as confusing. In the wake of the Revolution of 2011, the summer time change was abolished. In 2014 it was restored, but suspended during Ramadan. In 2015, President Sisi temporarily suspended it.This year it was announced by the Cabinet that it would begin after Ramadan. The Parliament, however, voted to abolish it, though the Cabinet said it would begin as scheduled. Then, on Monday, the Cabinet reversed itself. So Standard Time remains in effect.

‘Eid Mubarak

‘Eid Mubarak as an unusually bloody Ramadan comes to an end.  I wish my Muslim readers a joyous ‘Eid al-Fitr, and let us remember that the attacks in Istanbul, in Dhaka, in Baghdad, in Jidda, in Qatif, and in Medina were all in Muslim cities, and many were aimed at purely Muslim targets.

Still "Not a Coup," But Now a National Holiday

June 30, 2013, three years ago today, was the first anniversary of Mohammad Morsi's election as President of Egypt. It was also the day massive popular demonstrations were called to demand the Muslim Brotherhood government accept new elections. The result was a military ultimatum that Morsi comply or face military action. On July 3, the military moved.

It still isn't a coup

The mythology promoted by President Sisi and his supporters has continued to deny that the intervention on July 3 was a coup, portraying it instead as a logical outcome of the "June 30th Revolution," which has superseded the "January 25 Revolution" of 2011 in prestige. It's still taboo to call it a coup.

In keeping with the emphasis on June 30 over July 3, Egypt celebrated today, which has become a national holiday.

I mean, is this how you celebrate a coup?

On the Lighter Side of Brexit, Karl Sharro . . .

Yesterday I posted some links about Brexit's impact on the Middle East. Those were serious assessments, whether one agrees with them or not. On the other hand, there's Karl Sharro.

Satirist Karl Sharro has been on the case, beginning last week with his piece for The Atlantic, "Brexit: A Tale of ‘Ancient Ethnic Hatreds’: What if columnists wrote about the U.K. the way they do about the Middle East?"

He traces it all  to the age-old conflict between Normans and Anglo-Saxons, of course. After interviewing the inevitable taxi driver.

Separately, he came up with this explanatory graphic;

And finally, here's a last word:

Brexit and the Middle East

In the wake of Britain's "Brexit" vote, it's hardly surprising that the move's implications for the Middle East have drawn commentary. Here are a few links:

• Juan Cole, "The Middle East Dimension of Brexit.

• Koert Debeuf,The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, "What Could Brexit Mean for the Middle East?"

• Robert Fisk,  The Independent, "What Does the Middle East Think of Brexit? A lot more than you'd assume."

Arab Authors on Brexit

From the Arabic Literature (in English) log, a useful collection of "Arab Authors on Brexit," including the inimitable Karl Sharro:

June 1916: Outbreak of the Great Arab Revolt

First let me say I'm recovering from my surgery, and let me thank the many kind wishes I received in the comments.

Sharif Hussein in 1916

Between my health and the Journal's deadlines, it's been a while since I dealt with the centennial of the First World War in the Middle East. But June marks a century since the outbreak of the Arab Revolt led by Sharif Hussein of Mecca, or the Great Arab Revolt as it is sometimes known.

We've talked about the Hussein-McMahon correspondence and the genesis of the idea on more than one occasion, Interpretations of the significance (or peripheral nature) of the Revolt have differed widely, with what might be called the British and Hashemite view of history playing up its importance. The role of T.E. Lawrence has enhanced the mythology surrounding the Revolt, and added to the emphasis on the tribal and guerrilla aspects of the Revolt, at the expense of the regular Sharifian Army. There will be plenty of time to debate the myths versus the realities; let's begin with the outbreak.

On May 28, 1916, Ronald Storrs, Oriental Secretary, left Cairo, accompanied by Lt. Cdr. D.G.Hogarth, archaeologist and intelligence agent, and Captain Kinahan Cornwallis, the latter two attached to the Arab Bureau. With them was £10,000 destined for Amir ‘Abdullah, son of Sharif Hussein and their main interlocutor with him at this time. They were also authorized to promise another £50,000 to the Sharif after the actual outbreak of the promised revolt.

Reaching Jidda on June 5 they did not find  ‘Abdullah as expected (who was in fact preparing for the revolt), but rather a message saying his youngest brother Zayd was coming instead. Zayd arrived with a message promising simultaneous attacks at Mecca, Medina, Ta'if, and Jidda. Indeed, on June 5, Hussein's sons ‘Ali and Faisal made an initial attack against Medina, and on June 6 Zayd met with Storrs and informed him of this. The main revolt had been moved up from June 16 to June 10.

But Medina was a very different target than Mecca would prove to be. A strong Ottoman garrison of 10,000 under Fakhri Pasha defended it, and it was the railhead of the Hejaz Railway, which allowed easy resupply from Damascus.

Ironically, the very same day as the attempt on Medina, far away in the North Sea north of Scotland, HMS Hampshire, en route to Russia, was torpedoed and sunk with all hands. One passenger was far more famous than the others: the Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener of Khartoum, former virtual ruler of Egypt and Storrs' former boss. A failed tribal raid on an Ottoman provincial capital would garner no headlines in London.

Kitchener was a national hero. Liberator of Khartoum, master of Egypt and, since the outbreak of war, the most famous recruiting poster. Though disliked by his subordinate officers and the rest of the Cabinet, he was idolized by the public and by Tommy Atkins in the trenches,and his death was a national shock. Egypt, where Kitchener was still known just as "the Lord" (al-Lurd) as Cromer had been before him, was also in shock.

Meanwhile, on June 10, Sharif Hussein proclaimed revolt in Mecca, declared the Young Turk regime had betrayed Islam, proclaimed an Arab Caliphate, and attacked the Turkish garrison in the Holy City. After a short siege, Mecca mostly was  under control by June 13, though resistance continued until July 9. 

HMS Fox

On June 10 also, ‘Abdullah attacked Ta'if. The town was soon taken but the garrison hunkered down in the fort.

The port of Jidda was critical as a means of supplying Mecca and the rebels. The Royal Navy moved an aging, obsolete warship, HMS Fox, and a seaplane tender, HMS Ben-My-Chree, a converted Manx packet steamer.

HMS Ben-My-Chree (note hangars)

The rebels attacked Jidda with support from Fox's guns and air cover from Ben-My-Chree's seaplanes, and the garrison surrendered on June 16.,

Once Jidda was taken, the British began creating a series of ports along the coast controlled by the Royal Navy, provided Hussein with artillery from the Egyptian Army, and began assembling a regular Sharifian Army from Arab officers and men of the Ottoman Army assembled from POWs and deserters.The Arab Revolt had begun.






 

Egyptian Court Annuls Tiran/Sanafir Agreement

An Egyptian Administrative Court has annulled the April agreement with Saudi Arabia transferring the islands of Tiran and Sanafir to Saudi sovereignty.

The agreement had provoked widespread demonstrations and charges that the government was selling Egyptian sovereign territory to Saudi Arabia. As I noted in April, the history of the islands is complex, and further complicated by the fact that they are part of Area C in the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty.

The government has already said it will appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court, which will have the final say. Although President al-Sisi has said that there are documents proving the islands are rightfully Saudi, no such documents were reportedly introduced at the trial.

Another Round of Surgery

As I posted before, I spent Memorial Day weekend in the hospital due to foot surgery. The infection has persisted, accounting for my sparse blogging, and tomorrow I will go in for another surgery to remove the infected toe and adjacent bone. I hope to resume regular blogging soon.