Hamalawy and Others on Revolution and Counter-Revolution

You know things are bad when some of the most sensible analysis is coming from self-declared Marxists, but Egyptian leftist activist Hossam Hamalawy has a piece at Jadaliyya, "The Troubled Revolutionary Path in Egypt: A Return to the Basics," which makes the valid point, among others, that the military coup didn't take place yesterday but in February of 2011. Hamalawy has long urged more attention and organization to the labor movement and strike movements that actually proceeded and continued throughout the revolution. It's one of the better of a large array of what-went-wrong pieces we're starting to see.

There are a lot of think pieces out there right now focusing on how the revolutionaries' lack of unity allowed the revolution to be railroaded, but I suspect the lack of a clear focus and agenda that could rally the vast Egyptian countryside was part of the problem. When the workers and peasants are struggling to find bread, the revolution got sidetracked into other issues: and the Islamists in particular, who had a real grass-roots base that could have been used to rally a real revolution, got focused on debates on Shari‘a, "booze and bikinis," and covering up mermaid statues while the economy spiraled downward. Nobody really sought to fix the country's real problems: they were too intractable, so they went after soft targets: arresting key figures of the old regime, or in the Islamists' case going after issues such as women's rights and public behavior, which deepened the split between the secular revolutionaries and the Islamists. Everybody was posturing, but no one was baking more bread for the hungry, who are going to be the source of the real Egyptian revolution if things keep spiraling downward. A relevant tweet:

Oddly, it was the old establishment, the old NDP elite, along with the Muslim Brotherhood on the other side, who seem to have done a better job of using the old patronage networks to rally the countryside, than did the revolutionaries who no doubt saw themselves as the vanguard of the workers and peasants, Shafiq used the old patronage networks to carry the Delta in round one (no doubt there was some rigging, but he also had real support); the old Sadat/Mubarak home base of Menufiyya went for him overwhelmingly. In Upper Egypt he, like the Brotherhood, understood how to manipulate the tribal alliances. Shafiq may be the military's man, but he used the old NDP power base to get this far.

And neither the young folks in Tahrir nor the Muslim Brotherhood noticed what was happening, nor did the outside analysts, because all were watching Tahrir, or Parliament, or arguing about what tourists could wear to the beach. Though the Brotherhood, at least, was handing out flour on the countryside.


Whether Shafiq wins or SCAF lets Morsi pull out a victory, we may be back to square one, or back to "January 24, 2011" as some of the revolutionaries are lamenting. But not entirely. The revolutionaries have seen both their power and, in the end, their lack of unity and organization. And they are no longer afraid to challenge the regime.

Writing Levantine Colloquial on Facebook

My readers know that Arabic diglossia and the spoken Arabic dialects are a persistent interest of this blog, so here's a post that has nothing to do with Egypt's politics (or the death thereof), Iranian nukes, or whether Syria is in civil war: a paper on "Facebook Written Levantine Vernacular Languages."

It's in the first issue of a new e-journal called Levantine Review, It deals with the ways Facebook posters using Roman script write Levantine colloquial Arabic online, creating what the author describes as "electronic amiyya" using Latin script. The author describes herself thus:

Dua’a Abu Elhij’a is a Fulbright Scholar and Ph.D candidate in the department of linguistics at Indiana University Bloomington. She holds an M.A. in Linguistics from the University of Haifa, Israel, and her article is based upon her M.A. research and thesis.

This article isn't for everyone but it happens to interest me, and hey, it's my blog. The link above will allow you to read the paper online, or you can download the PDF here.

SCAF Tells Parliament to Shut; Takes Legislative ande Budget Authority

Anyone who was clinging to a lingering hope that SCAF would reject or overrule yesterday's court rulings can take off the rose-colored glasses now: SCAF has told Parliament to close and  will take legislative and budgetary authority to itself,.

Ahram Online has found a constitutional expert to say SCAF can't take back legislative powers: it's unconstitutional. But the Supreme Constitutional Court just said Parliament was unconstitutional, And then there's the question for the ages: How can anything be unconstitutional when you haven't written the constitution yet?

No, this is exactly what it looks like. The elections will be held and the Muslim Brotherhood is running, but even they now realize that the deck is stacked in favor of Shafiq. It remains to play out the election itself, and if Morsi wins then we can reconsider the question. But even then, absent a Parliament, SCAF isn't going back to the barracks anytime soon,

1954 and All That: SCAF Now Has More Power Than the Army Has Had Since the 1950s

You might have thought that Al-Tahrir newspaper would have thought to put the Chief Justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court on the cover, given the bombshell rulings today. But then, there are reports that Field Marshal Tantawi has already replaced him. So they chose well.

It is possible that Egypt's Supreme Council of the Armed Forces will go back to the barracks at the end f the month, as frequently promised, but since SCAF seems to have been given the powers of both Parliament and the Constitutional Assembly, I wouldn't hold my breath.

In fact, right now, SCAF seems to have more power than the Egyptian military has held at any time since the 1950s. Nasser, and after him Sadat and Mubarak, always kept a balanee between the Army and the Interior Ministry with its police, State Security, Central Security, and other forces, so each counterbalanced the other. Now Mubarak's Interior Minister, Habib al-Adly, is in prison, and Mubarak's Defense Minister, Field Marshal Tantawi, is in charge. In fact, with SCAF appointing the judges and controlling the Interior Ministry by naming the Minister, and with Parliament dissolved, SCAF seems to be in charge of virtually all the instruments of the state, at least for the moment. And yesterday's ruling allowing Military Police to arrest civilians — by an astonishing coincidence introduced the day before today's court rulings — seems to have re-introduced the recently ended State of Emergency through the back door.

The last time the Egyptian Army wielded this much power was probably in 1954, when Nasser pushed Muhammad Naguib out of the Prime Ministry and then the Presidency, crushed the Communist Party and then, when a Muslim Brother fired shots at him, crushed the Brotherhood for a generation. I saw someone tweet that a military coup against a revolution was unheard of. Even if you quibble about 1954 (1952 was also a coup though it called itself a revolution), the words "Napoleon Bonaparte" are sufficient answer, though many Latin American instances can also be cited.

That doesn't mean 1954 is about to repeat itself — watch a video of Nasser giving a speech, and then one of Tantawi doing so, and you'll see little in common except the uniform, which Nasser soon after abandoned. But right now SCAF seems to be calling all the shots.

On the other hand, SCAF has often flinched and reversed position when violently challenged. But the Muslim  Brotherhood has now indicated that it will go through with this weekend's election, so the confrontation may not erupt right away. But a Shafiq win (which now seems likely) could produce an explosion.

In this Karagöz Shadow Play, What Will the Outmaneuvered Brotherhood Do Now?

For the past year SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood have been playing each other, with SCAF often behaving in such an incoherent and contradictory manner that it was easy to conclude that the MB was the clever manipulator and SCAF was dancing to their tune. I suspect some of the Brothers themselves believed that, But now, two days before their candidate thought he was set to win the Presidency, the Brotherhood-dominated Parliament is dissolved and Ahmad Shafiq, a Mubarak clone (even to being an ex-Air Force commander accused of dubious business dealings) seems set to claim the Presidency,

Speculation about what the Brotherhood does next is somewhat moot since they're expected to make an announcement around 10 pm Cairo time. Some are reporting Morsi might pull out of the race, which would de-legitimize a Shafiq victory and would at least be a powerful response. But a lot of the betting seems to be that they'll stay in the race, hoping to pull off a victory on Sunday, as if the SCAF coup or whatever you choose to call it hadn't occurred. Perhaps they've gone along to get along with SCAF for so long that they feel they have no alternative but to play out the game: in for a penny, in for a pound.

It is beginning to look like the highly-organized, supposedly shrewd Muslim Brotherhood has been played like a small-town rube by a traveling con man, The timing of the judicial ruling on the eve of the elections has painted them into a corner. It seems more and more like the traditional karagöz shadow play, in which a charade has been played out while the puppeteers remained obscure.

SCAF and Shafiq are gambling that they have outmaneuvered, in turn, the Tahrir Revolutionaries and the Muslim Brotherhood, and that the bulk of ordinary Egyptians — both the "Misri Effendi" businessman and professional types and the "Ibn al-Balad " workers and peasant types — are on their side now. Whether they win the long game remains to be seen, but they seem to have trumped this hand quite skillfully, perhaps the first skillful thing SCAF has done. Or was that all part of the script?

... and Nathan Brown on the Legal Aspects

As reactions to today's dramatic developments continue, Nathan Brown brings is expertise as an expert on constitution-writing to bear in an analysis of the judicial issues: "Cairo's Judicial Coup."

Only Lower House Dissolved? A Chance to Find Out What Shura Council is For

A thought in a somewhat lighter vein: Despite earlier reports that both houses of Parliament will be dissolved under the Egyptian court ruling, many reports now say only the lower house, the People's Assembly, will be dissolved. [UPDATE: Still much confusion, but the Court seems to be saying both houses.] That would leave the Upper House, the Shura Council, intact.

There could possibly be one upside in this disaster, Someone might finally be able to figure out what the hell it is the Shura Council is actually for. No one has ever succeeded in finding a practical use for it up till now.

Marc Lynch on Today's Events

I'm sure there's going to be a lot of commentary today about the turn of events in Egypt. Besides my own preliminary take I'll no doubt have more as the situation clarifies. Meanwhile here's Marc Lynch's initial take: "That's it for Egypt's So-Called Transition." Excerpt:

What was new, and which likely emboldened this reckless behavior at the end of the transition, was its belief that it had effectively neutered revolutionary movements and protestors. The SCAF likely believes that a renewal of massive, sustained protest is no longer in the cards through a combination of its own repression and relentless propaganda, along with the strategic mistakes by protestors themselves. It doesn't feel threatened by a few thousand isolated protestors in Tahrir, and probably is gambling that they won't be joined by the masses that made the Jan. 25 revolution last year.  They may also feel that the intense rifts of suspicion and rage dividing the Muslim Brotherhood from non-Islamist political trends are now so deep that they won't be able to cooperate effectively to respond. Or they may feel that the MB would rather cut a deal, even now, than take it to the next level. They may be right, they may be wrong. But I wouldn't bet on stability. 

Egyptian Supreme Court Dissolves Parliament but Keeps Shafiq in Race: Double Blow to MB on Eve of Elections

 On a day when Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court handed down two decisions which each could have thrown the country into chaos, it chose to deliver one shocking blow to the transitional process but to avoid the second: it effectively dissolved Parliament, but it left Ahmad Shafiq in the Presidential race,so that the runoff election will take place this weekend. Had it alsl disqualified Shafiq, the whole transition would likely have collapsed. As it is, the decision not only dissolves :Parliament but also presumably the just-named Constituent Assembly named by Parliament,

Though the Court ruling only invalidated the Parliamentary election law for the 1/3 of the seats elected on an individual basis, a Court official said that it requires the dissolution of both houses of Parliament, the People's Assembly and the Shura Council.

For a backgrounder on the two cases decided today, see here. Also for background see Mara Revkin on "Egypt's Injudicious Judges."

There is no question who the big loser is. By dissolving the Islamist-dominated Parliament but leaving old regime secularist Shafiq in the race for President, the decisions will likely be taken by the Muslim Brotherhood as a double blow. Had Shafiq been disqualified Brotherhood candidate Muhammad Morsi would either have won by default or new elections would be required; and by losing :Parliament the Brotherhood risks losing most of what it has gained, One Brotherhood spokesman has already called the decision a "military coup," and Morsi is to speak soon, Former Presidential candidate Abdel Moneim Abu'l-Futuh has echoed the "military coup" judgment and linked these two decisions to yesterday's announcement that military police could arrest civilians in support of that interpretation.

And if, as some are saying, SCAF now assumes both the powers of Parliament and of the Constituent Assembly, the "military coup" judgment doesn't seem far fetched.

It's too soon to judge just how things will play out but my initial reaction is that just as this was already the worst possible choice of two candidates, this is the worst possible set of decisions: by dissolving Parliament and keeping Shafiq in the race it gives the impression of rolling back the revolution and disenfranchising the Brotherhood, through a court decision not the ballot box, while yesterday's arrest announcement seems to restore the State of Emergency.

The dangers of a renewed revolution, but this time with the Brotherhood fully supportive from the start, or a bloody, repressive crackdown seem more real than at any time since the fall of Mubarak. I think there is real danger here.

There will surely be much more to say here.

"End Sexual Harassment Day" for Bloggers and Tweeters in Egypt

Egyptian bloggers and tweeters have declared today a day to post in protest of sexual harassment, after an anti-sexual harassment march by women last Friday was broken up in Tahrir square by attacks from "thugs" (baltagiyya). Though this was technically the second blogging and tweeting day against sexual harassment — the first was last year — last Friday's attack clearly exacerbated things. Tweets today are mostly found under #EndSH; a few under other hashtags, including the Arabic  لا للتحرش, and #StopSH.
The latest wave of anger has emerged in the wake of continuing attacks on women during major demonstrations in Tahrir Square. This report by Sarah El Deeb for the Associated Press preceded the most recent outrages. Then came the women's demonstration last Friday, which was attacked by unidentified baltagiyya.  Here is Sarah El Deeb's report on that attack, for Associated Press. And a video (Arabic) from Al-Masry Al-Youm.



Some of the recent blogging in English:

"Post Jan25 Random Posts," :They were Cowards and I Shall Remain."

Zeinobia, #EndSH: Again We Face Ugly Reality"

Holly Dagres, "Fight Harassment 101: Egypt's Obstacle to Ending Sexual Harassment."

 A document from the activist group nazra.org [PDF], "[Three] Testimonies  on Recent Sexual Assaults on Tahrir Square Vicinity."

Blogger identified as "Hana," "Helplessness is How They Win."

And one by a male blogger, "Helpless."

And the interactive website HarassMap remains a tool in the battle against this extensive and widespread problem.

Hands Off! (Lit., Cut Your Hands)

 Of course Egypt is not the only country in the region where women being groped in the street is all too frequent. But what is particularly alarming is the fact that security forces have regularly used such attacks as a tactic against female protesters. The notorious "blue bra woman" incident last December remains a vivid image of sexual violence tool, which led to Secretary of State Clinton's denunciation of the "systematic degradation of women" in Egypt,.

This is not just an issue that has arisen since the revolution, nor one that stems primarily from political motives. I won't ramble on about it again here, but suggest you read the testimonies of those who deal with it every day, and consider this a voice in support from a man with both a wife and a daughter.

Egypt: And This Differs From the State of Emergency How, Exactly?

Egypt's Justice Ministry has issued a decree allowing Military Intelligence and Military Police to arrest civilians for non-military crimes. The recent lifting of the State of Emergency after 30 years was celebrated, but liberal MP Amr Hamzawy is quoted as calling this "a revival of the State of Emergency using different tools." Except it looks to me like some of the exact same tools, and the timing just days before the election runoff would seem to negate the effect of lifting the Emergency before the runoff.

Violence in Tunisia Began with Art Exhibit, Then Spread

Tunisia is reeling from a wave of clashes Monday night in the elite seaside community of La Marsa and several other parts of the capital, as well as elsewhere in the country. What began as a protest over an art exhibit which Salafis characterized as un-Islamic has turned into open conflict between apparent Salafis (though he organized movements deny involvement) and the police. Though shots have been fired, apparently with rubber bullets and teargas used, no one has ben killed, though many have been treated in hospitals, and a curfew was imposed in eight governorates. The police stations in La Marsa and other parts of the country have been attacked and ransacked., The US Embassy has issued a warning about the violence in La Marsa, Sidi Bou Said, Carthage and Gammarth, all seaside areas popular with tourists. (Full disclosure: I took my honeymoon in Sidi Bou Said.)

The building tensions over the Printemps des Arts fair at a gallery in La Marsa first led to confrontations and then to a direct attack on the gallery and the destruction of some of the artworks.

Tunisia has generally won praise as a successful transition, but growing violence from radical Salafis in one of the most secularized of Arab countries is increasingly causing concern, Cultural issues increasingly seem to be the battleground, and the attack on the Printemps des Arts Fair was reportedly organized using Facebook and other social media.

Tunisia and Star Wars After 35 Years

This is a few weeks old, but worth pointing to if you haven't seen it: "35 Years Since Star Wars Premiered and the Force is Still Strong in Tunisia."  Many of the desert scenes in the first film and various scenes in more recent prequels were filmed in southern Tunisia, and the Tunisians are capitalizing on it.

But 35 years? I feel very old.

Madonna's Deliberate Wardrobe Malfunction in Istanbul

I believe the last time (probably the only time) this  blog had occasion to discuss Madonna was when some of her Israeli fans asked Netanyahu not to attack Iran until after her concert in Israel. That concert was at the end of May, so something else must be deterring Netanyahu now.

But she's making Middle Eastern news again. (For you younger readers, Madonna was sort of the Lady Gaga of the '80's. That statement will make fans of both furious, I'm sure.) First she performed in Abu Dhabi, where before her appearance there were complaints from religious elements wanting to see the concert canceled. It wasn't. I mean, what was she going to do that was so controversial, strip on stage?

Well, not in Abu Dhabi, anyway. But in Istanbul. Over the weekend, in a concert in Istanbul, she stripped down to her bra and then pulled down the bra to reveal her right breast. Rolling Stone here. Though the crowd seems to have cheered, many news reports speak of "outrage" in Turkey. Certainly flashing the audience in a Muslim country is daring and, perhaps, crosses some red lines.

Oddly a lot of the comment from the entertainment media, British tabloids, and other such elevated sources, when not trying to find amusing headlines making breast jokes, are criticizing her for exposing herself at age 53, rather than questioning the wisdom of doing it in a Muslim country where religious/secular tensions run deep. I certainly am not going to say anything negative about the age issue. My wife is in her 50s and as alluring as the day we met, though she has never flashed a concert audience and, I trust, never will. But I do think that what might be typical superstar excess in the US or Europe is likelier to be seen as an insult and an affront in a country like Turkey, where these sorts of culture wars issues run rather deep at the moment.

And I'm not going to post the video, though the desperately curious may find it here.

The 100: Egypt's Constituent Assembly

Ahram Online has published the names of the 100 members of Egypt's Constituent Assembly, the designatio of whom has continued to provoke controversy. I'll analyze at some point, but for now (spellings as given by Ahram Online, order alphabetical by first name in Arabic:


1.         Abul-Ela Madi, leader of moderate-Islamist Wasat Party
2.         Ahmed Ibrahim El-Halwani
3.         Ahmed Diab, secretary-general of Muslim Brotherhood's parliamentary bloc
4.         Ahmed Omar
5.         Ahmed Maher Ibrahim Tantawi, April 6 Youth Movement founder
6.         Ahmed Mohamed Khalifa, cassation lawyer
7.         Edward Ghalab
8.         Osama Mohamed El-Abd
9.         Osama Yassin, MP for Freedom and Justice Party, head of parliamentary youth committee
10.       Ashraf Thabet Saad El-Din: MP for Salafist Nour Party, deputy president of People’s Assembly
11.       Ahsraf Abdel-Ghafour: Actor, head of Egyptian Actors Syndicate
12.       Ekrami Saad
13.       Amani Abul-Fadl
14.       Omaima Kamel
15.       Bishop John Paul Fatla
16.       Bishop Paul, Coptic Orthodox Church representative
17.       Ayman Ali
18.       Ayman Nour, former presidential candidate, leader of Ghad El-Thawra Party
19.       Bassem El-Sayid Hassenein Metawly
20.       Bahaa El-Din Abul-Shoka, prominent lawyer, leading Wafd Party member
21.       Taymour Fawzy Mostafa
22.       Gaber Gad Nasar
23.       Gamal Gabril
24.       Hossam El-Gherainy, head of Supreme Judicial Council, known for closeness to Brotherhood
25.       Hassan Mahmoud Abdel-Latif
26.       Hussein Ibrahim
27.       Hussein Hamed Hassan
28.       Khaled Mahmoud El-Azhary
29.       Dawood El-Baz
30.       Sameh Ashour, head of Egyptian Lawyers Syndicate
31.       Soad Kamel Rizk
32.       Said Abdel Azim
33.       Samir Marcus, liberal Christian thinker and writer
34.       Shaaban Abdel-Hamid Darwish
35.       Shaaban Ahmed Abdel-Alim
36.       Shahira Halim Dos
37.       Sobhi Saleh, MP and leading Freedom and Justice Party member
38.       Salah Abdel-Maboud Fiyad, MP for Nour Party
39.       Taher Abdel-Mohsen
40.       Talaat Marzouk Abdel-Aziz
41.       Adel Abdel-Hamid Abdullah
42.       Atef El-Banna, Cairo University constitutional law professor
43.       Abdel El-Galil Mostafa, general coordinator for National Association for Change
44.       Abdel-Diyam Mohamed Nossair
45.       Abdel-Rahman El-Bar
46.       Abdel-Rahman Mohamed Shukry
47.       Abd El-Send Yamma
48.       Abdel-Fattah Khatab
49.       Abdullah Said Abul-Ezz
50.       Essam El-Erian, MP, head of parliament's foreign affairs committee and leading Freedom and Justice Party member
51.       Essam Abdel-Rahman Sultan
52.       Atiya Fiyad
53.       Ali Fath El-Bab
54.       Emad Hussein Hassan
55.       Emad El-Din Abdel-Ghafour, leader of Nour Party
56.       Amr Daraag, leading Freedom and Justice Party member
57.       Amr Moussa, former presidential candidate, former minister of foreign affairs, former Arab League secretary-general
58.       Fouad Badrawy, vice president of Wafd Party
59.       Farouk Gowida, poet and writer
60.       Farid Ismail, MP and leading Freedom and Justice Party member
61.       Safwat Naguib, priest
62.       Maged Mamdouh Kamel Shabita
63.       Maher Ali Ahmed El-Bahairy
64.       Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, MP and leading Wafd Party member
65.       Mohamed Ahmed Sherif
66.       Mohamed Ahmed Abdel-Kader
67.       Mohamed Ahmed Atta Omara
68.       Mohamed El-Betagi: MP, parliament speaker and leading Freedom and Justice Party member
69.       Mohamed Anwar El-Sadat: MP, head of parliament's human rights committee and leader of liberal Reform and building Party
70.       Mohamed Ibrahim Hassan, prominent Salafist preacher
71.       Mohamed Khairy Abdel-Diyam
72.       Mohamed Saad Gawish
73.       Mohamed Selim El-Awa, former presidential candidate, Islamist thinker, lawyer, and Wasat Party co-founder
74.       Mohamed Abdel-Gawad
75.       Mohamed Abdel-Alim Daud
76.       Mohamed Abdel-Moneim El-Sawy, MP, head of parliament's culture, media and tourism committee and Hadara Party founder
77.       Mohamed Ali Bashr
78.       Mohamed Amara
79.       Mohamed Fouad Gadallah
80.       Mohamed Maged Kholousy, head of Egyptian Engineers Syndicate
81.       Mohamed Magdy El-Din Barkat
82.       Mohamed Mahsoub Abdel-Maguid, leading Wasat Party member and law professor at Menoufiya University
83.       Mohamed Mahmoud Abdel-Salem Abdel-Latif
84.       Mohamed Mohi El-Din Mohamed
85.       Mohamed Nagi Darballa
86.       Mohamed Yousry Ibrahim, Salafist preacher and former Nour Party spokesman
87.       Mahmoud Ghozlan, official Muslim Brotherhood spokesman
88.       Moatez Belallah Abdel-Fattah, political science professor and former prime ministerial adviser
89.       Mamdouh El-Wali, head of Egyptian Journalists Syndicate
90.       Mamdouh Shahin, lieutenant-general, defence minister's aide for legal affairs and SCAF member
91.       Manar El-Shorobagy, political science professor
92.       Manal El-Tiby
93.       Mouncif Naguib Soliman
94.       Nader Bakr, Nour Party spokesman
95.       Nasr Farid Wassel, Al-Azhar sheikh and former grand Mufti of Egypt
96.       Huda Ghonia
97.       Wahid Abdel-Maguid, political science professor
98.       Walid Abdel-Awl
99.       Yasser El-Borhami, Salafist sheikh and Nour Party co-founder
100.    Younis Makhioun, Nour Party MP

Tom Friedman, Advice Columnist

The omnipresent, unforgiving, and parody-producing Thing Known as Social Media and the Internet is joking about Tom Friedman of the New York Times again. (For an earlier example of a Friedman parody, see here.) One reason is that Friedman does sort of ask for it, with his omniscient tone and sometimes overdone rhetorical devices, so that he crashes his Lexis right into an olive tree, to use a Friedmanian metaphor; and the other reason is that Friedman probably makes more money than all the rest of us combined, so we figure he deserves it.

This time credit for starting this goes to Joshua Keating, who posted this at Foreign Policy: "When the Young Women of Egypt Need Advice, They Turn to Tom Friedman." He noted this passage in Friedman's column this past Sunday:

I had just finished a panel discussion on Turkey and the Arab Spring at a regional conference here, and, as I was leaving, a young Egyptian woman approached me. “Mr. Friedman, could I ask you a question? Who should I vote for?”

and it reminded him of this, from April 2011:

When I was in Cairo during the Egyptian uprising, I wanted to change hotels one day to be closer to the action and called the Marriott to see if it had any openings. The young-sounding Egyptian woman who spoke with me from the reservations department offered me a room and then asked: “Do you have a corporate rate?” I said, “I don’t know. I work for The New York Times.” There was a silence on the phone for a few moments, and then she said: “ Can I ask you something?” Sure. “Are we going to be O.K.? I’m worried.”

 As Keating notes, "Is Friedman just being constantly accosted by anxious young Egyptian women seeking his sage advice about the future of their country? Isn't there anyone else they could talk to?"

Perhaps the usual taxi drivers haven't been talkative enough lately. Anyway, in the age of social media, this did not stop with Keating. Now there's a Tumblr: "Mr. Friedman, Could I Ask You a Question?" Among the (illlustrated) entries: " Mr Friedman, what’s the fastest way to get from Tajrish to Narmak if the Resalat Expressway is backed up?" and  "Mr. Friedman, how much saffron should I use in my zereshk polow?"  (These would, however, suggest that it isn't just Egyptian women who have need of Friedman's advice.)

Read, and contribute if the spirit moves.

suzeeinthecity: Cairo Graffiti for the Elections

The blogger suzeeinthecity has been documenting graffiti in Cairo ever since the revolution, and I've linked to her a number of times. Now she has a new post on the graffiti relating to the presidential elections. As usual, it's worth a perusal.

Since, as I've done before, I'm going to reproduce some of her graffiti, let me also note her notice/complaint to those who have taken without attribution. I've always attributed her as the source and linked to her post, but apparently others have not been so scrupulous. She says bloggers may use her work in exchange for linkbacks, duly provided here, and credit, but print publications need to pay for rights to her photos. I'm both giving credit and adding her copyright here, and urge others to respect her rights as well. A selection follows, but by all means go to her site.

A mural:

"Forget What is Past ..."

©suzeeinthecity

"...and Focus on the Elections"
 ©suzeeinthecity

Right to left below: Mubarak, Tantawi, Amr Moussa, Ahmad Shafiq. Caption: He who names a successor never dies."

©suzeeinthecity

Her comment on the below: "My favourite stencil: Justice has been made into a belly dancer, wearing a military beret and a moustache."

©suzeeinthecity

The military as puppeteer manipulating the Presidential candidates:

©suzeeinthecity

After the above was painted over, repainted with the two runoff candidates:

©suzeeinthecity

Nationalist icon and hero Saad Zaghloul's last words in 1927 were "Ma fish fayda," "it's no use. Here Saad Pasha is repeating them and giving the finger, which has been painted over:

©suzeeinthecity

Shafiq's Attacks on Brotherhood Getting Stranger and Stranger

I'm not an enthusiast for the Muslim Brotherhood; even if I wwere a political Islamists, which I clearly am not, I'd be bothered by their secrecy, their cell organization, their deference to a "Supreme Guide," and their track record on consistency: we won't run a Presidential candidate, no, never, right up until they do.

But Ahmad Shafiq's Presidential campaign has lately been painting the Brotherhood not just as a religious threat but as something downright bizarre. Even Husni Mubarak never accused the Brotherhood of — I am not making this up — planning to move Egypt's capital to Jerusalem and planning to sell the Suez Canal. Yes, Shafiq has made both assertions,though the first on may have been intended metaphorically. I'm not clear yet on why they would sell the canal.

The Brotherhood candidate, Muhammad Morsi, is attacking Shafiq as the neo-Mubarak, and at times Shafiq seems to be cultivating that image, appealing to the law-and-order vote, attacking the revolution or aspects of it, and using former National Democratic Party cadres as his power base, especially in the Delta. In turn, he portrays the Brotherhood as an extremist group of religious fanatics.

There are many who suspect that both candidates are right: one is the reincarnation of the old regime and the other is an extremist religious group. So what are the liberal revolutionaries to do? Apparently many are deciding which they consider the lesser evil. The overseas runoff vote turnout is reportedly quite low.

I'm reminded of this:

Arabic Really Must Still Be Dying: Even the New York Times Says So

It's been a while since we've had a "death of Arabic imminent" article, which I always enjoy dissecting; purists have been complaining about the threat to the language since the lexicographer Ibn Manzur back in the 13th century, when Persian was threatening it. These days the culprits are usually English or French, or the spoken dialects. You can find many of my earlier comments on these types of articles (a surprising number of which are published in the Middle East in either English or French, apparently without a sense of irony).

But it must be true. Now even The New York Times says so.

Actually, the key point that is apparent in the article but not in the headline is that this is talking about the Gulf, where English has long been the primary language of higher education, and where Modern Standard Arabic is often neglected after the primary grades. It's not surprising that graduates of some of the (US) universities in Doha have to offer courses to train Qataris and other Arabs to speak media Arabic well enough to appear on Al Jazeera. If (Modern Standard) Arabic really is under threat anywhere in the Arab world, it's the Gulf (and maybe still Algeria, where French still holds elite dominance).  The University of Qatar is switching its language of instruction to Arabic, and the Saudis and others are placing new restrictions on English.

So I won't be as snide about the "death of Arabic" theme as I usually am: in the Gulf, the story is not so exaggerated.


http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/11/world/middleeast/11iht-educlede11.html

Egypt State TV Suspends Anti-Foreigner Ads

Egyptian State TV has suspended (apparently not "pulled" for good as some are reporting) two public service announcements that had raised controversy by warning young Egyptians against associating with foreigners who, it suggests, are probably spies. The ads struck many as an odd approach for a country depended on tourism as a major source of revenue, though they seem to play into the theme of blaming the revolution on foreign agents and plots. The public service announcements are still appearing on some private channels.

The two ads are in the tradition of "loose lips sink ships"-type propaganda; the first warns against talking with foreigners, the second against interacting with then online.  Being introduced just a week before the Presidential election runoff adds to the curious questions.  Even if you don't understand any Arabic, I think the messages comes across:

Mind-Bending Headline to Start Your Week

A real headline from the Kuwait News Agency (KUNA) from a couple of days ago: Kuwaiti Beach Volleyball Team Head to China.

Ponder that thought for a moment. Yes, Kuwait is sending a team of women players to China for the third Asian Beach Volleyball tournament. Yes, your immediate mental image was — well, you did try to picture a Kuwaiti beach volleyball team, didn't you?  And wonder about their, um, outfits?

But "out of adherence to Islam's teachings," we are told, "Kuwait players will wear modest uniform."

Oh.

"Mideast UFO" Captivates Social Media; Turns Out to Be Russian Missile Test

I think it was Ronald Reagan who once reflected that one thing that would end our geopolitical rivalries would be an alien invasion. Any hopes that Middle East tensions would be relieved by the arrival of aliens has faded, however, now that it appears the great "Mideast UFO" last night was nothing but a Russian ICBM test.

I have several things I'm working on that will turn up on the blog in the coming days, but I can't think of a better way to segué into the weekend than a good UFO story. Or even a so-so UFO story.

Actually, I shouldn't be so flippant. Many people in Syria thought the regime was launching a chemical weapons attack, a reminder that even something relatively harmless (and distant) can nevertheless cause panic in a tense situation. This Storify collection on the phenomenon, put together by Andy Carvin and giving a good view of the Twitter evolution on the story, includes tweets like these:

Now to the actual sighting. Let's start with this:


Some may recall a similar "spiral UFO" from Norway in 2009 that turned out to be a failed Russian missile test. So, apparently, is this one, though Russia claims the test hit its target in Kazakhstan, and space expert James Oberg explains here that the spiral is created by a roll aimed at dumping fuel before impact, so the test may have been successful. Although supposedly the missile impacted in Kazakhstan, it was apparently high enough above the horizon to appear nearly overhead in Turkey, Armenia, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel, among others.

You can find reportage and more videos at The Huffington Post, Zeinobia's Egyptian Chronicles blog, Zeinobia also tweeted a particularly Egyptian angle to the UFO:

So it appears this dramatic phenomenon was another Russian missile test, but it clearly caused a ruckus in the Middle East, especially in Syria, where rumors of a chemical weapons attack alarmed a great many people. But the aliens were just Russians this time.

Judith Yaphe on Maliki

I haven't been paying much attention to Iraq lately, despite the growing struggles between Prime Minister Maliki and his enemies; I've been diverted by Egypt and Syria and other places. Fortunately, Judith Yaphe has an analysis of Maliki's position at Foreign Policy, to which I refer you.

Ghassan Tueni, 1926-2012, Dies at 86

Al-Nahar

Ghassan Tueni, lynchpin of a Lebanese political and journalism family, has died at the age of 86. The son of the founder of the Beirut newspaper Al-Nahar, he himself served as its Editor-in-Chief and Publisher for half a century, before handing it off to his late son. He also served in the Lebanese Parliament and in several Cabinet positions, and as Lebanon's Ambassador to the United Nations. (Full disclosure: This obituary is partly based on those of Al-Nahar and Naharnet.)

His father, Gebran Tueni, founded Al-Nahar in 1933, seven years after Ghassan was born. A Greek Orthodox Christian, Tueni attended AUB, where he studied under Charles Malik, and was pursuing further studies at Harvard when he had to return to Beirut on his father's death in 1947. He took over Al-Nahar, and was its Editor-and Chief and Publisher from 1948 to 1999.  and again in 2003.

His first wife, the poet Nadia Hamadeh, of a prominent Druze family, died of cancer; he lost a daughter, Nayla, quite young, and a son, Marwan, in an auto accident. His son and heir, both at Al-Nahar and in Parliament, also named Gebran Tueni after Ghassan's father, was assassinated in a car bombing in 2005 in the wake of the Hariri assassination. He is survived by his second wife, Shadia Al-Khazen, and several grandhildren.

In 1951 he was elected to the Lebanese Parliament from Beirut he was its Deputy Speaker 1953-57. He sered ss Deputy Prime Minister in 1970-71 and Minister of Information and National Education. In1975-77 he was Minister of Tourism, Social Affairs, Industry, Labor, and Information. From 1977 to 1982, during the early years of the Lebanese Civil War, Tueni served as Lebanon's Ambassador to the United Nations.

After the younger Gebran Tueni's assassination, he served again in Parliament, in the "family" seat (the Greek Orthodox seat for Beirut), 2006-2009.

Though his politics, like those of any Lebanese in the civil war era and since, made him both allies and enemies, his role as one of the most prominent Arab journalists of the 20th century is indisputable.

Today's political cartoon in Al-Nahar:

New CNAS Report on Iran Nulclear Program

Colin H. Kahl, Melissa Dalton, and Matthew Irvine have a new report at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) on "Risk and Rivalry: Iran, Israel and the Bomb," which is getting a lot of attention for its apparent comprehensiveness. I haven't finished reading it but it seems a useful contribution to the debate. Excerpts from the Executive Summary:

A nuclear-armed Iran would pose a significant
challenge to U.S. and Israeli interests and would
increase the prospects for regional conflict.
Nevertheless, a preventive military strike against
Iran’s nuclear program by either the United States
or Israel at this time is not the best option, and
rushing to war would risk making the threat worse.

Although Iran could probably be deterred from
deliberately using or transferring nuclear weapons,
a nuclear-armed Iran would be a more dangerous
adversary in several respects. Believing that
its nuclear deterrent would make it immune from
retaliation, the Iranian regime would likely increase
its lethal support to proxies such as Hezbollah and
Hamas and commit more brazen acts of terrorism
abroad, thus creating more frequent arises in the
Levant. The Israeli-Iranian rivalry would be more
prone to crises, and these crises would entail some
inherent risk of inadvertent escalation to nuclear war.
Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons
should therefore remain an urgent priority for both
the United States and Israel.

Until Iran appears poised to weaponize its nuclear
capability, however, the preferable option is to
continue the current combination of pressure
and diplomacy. All options, including preventive
military action, should remain on the table, but
policymakers should recognize that the potential
risks and costs associated with using force are high.
Military action should remain a last resort, which
should be contemplated only by the United States
and only under stringent conditions.

Give it a look. The link above offers downloads in PDF, E-reader, and Kindle formats.

Minya Hoping Tourists Return to Amarna

Minya Montage (Wikipedia)

Reuters has a piece, "Egypt Province Hopes Vote Will End its Isolation," about the Middle Egyptian city and Governorate of Minya. While I doubt that the Presidential election results will directly resuscitate tourism in Minya, a return to something like normal life in Egypt may well do so.

Though I suspect a lot of non-Egypt-hands have never heard of Minya, it is a major city and university town and has been a center of radical Islamist politics; during the violence between Al-Gamalsquo;a al-Islamiyya and the state in the 1990s it was a center of frequent clashes. As a region with a high Coptic population as well as a  hotbed of Islamism, sectarian conflicts have been frequent.

As the article notes, Minya used to be a stop for tourist cruises going up the Nile, and the base for visits to the ruins of Tell El Amarna, the ancient capital (Akhetaten)  of the heretic Pharaoh Akhenaten. Amarna is of course one of the key archaeological sites in Egypt,though less visited than Luxor, Aswan, and the Pyramids around Cairo.

Akhenaten

Since Akhenaten and his queen Nefertiti are rather famous for his religious innovations and her famous bust, and he is the predecessor and usually presumed to be the father of Tutankhamen, one of the few Pharaohs most tourists have heard of,Amarna should probably be a more frequented site than it was even before the troubles of the 1990s killed the limited tourist trade that existed.

With Gun to Heads, Egyptian Parties Cut a Deal on Constitution

Laboring through the night under a drop-dead deadline this afternoon, Egypt's political parties have agreed on a formula for representation on the new Constitutonal Assembly. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) had given a 48-hour ultimatum on Tuesday, saying that if the political players did not reach an agreement by this afternoon, SCAF itself would unilaterally issue an "amended Constitutional Declaration" and do so itself.

By most accounts, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi Al-Nour party were the sticking points as they wanted to assure for themselves the same dominance of the Constituent Assembly that they enjoy in Parliament; as recently as last night the parties were said to be still at loggerheads. Many analyses saw the SCAF deadline as a sign of a growing rift between the Brotherhood and SCAF

No official results have been announced, but Ahram Online reported that:

After hours of wrangling at the meeting that began Wednesday and ended at 4am Thursday, the parties agreed that 39 of the 100 seats on the constituent assembly would be given to political parties, of which the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) would hold 16; the Salafist Nour Party eight; the liberal Wafd Party five; the Free Egyptians Party two; the Egyptian Social Democratic Party two; and one each for the moderate-Islamist Wasat Party, the Nasserist Karama Party, the Socialist Popular Alliance Party, the liberal Reform and Development Party and the Islamist Building and Development Party.

The Egypt Independent adds somewhat different details:

Wafd Party leader Al-Sayed al-Badawy, who has been presiding over the negotiations on the Constituent Assembly, announced the results of the meeting. 

The assembly has been split straight down the middle between Islamists and non-Islamists, signaling a victory for secular and liberal forces after the initial formation had a decidedly Islamist majority. The 50/50 split was reached after Jama’a al-Islamiya agreed to give up its two seats.

It was also agreed that in order to pass a proposed article for the new constitution, the article must be approved by a 67 percent vote. If the article does not garner the required percentage of votes, it would be reworded and then voted on again, with only 57 percent needed to pass it the second time.

Shades of Carrie Nation: The Salafi War on Liquor Stores and Bars in Tunisia.

Steve Inskeep at NPR is on a "Revolutionary Road Trip" across North Africa, and in his report "Once Tolerated, Alcohol Now Creates Rift in Tunisia." he tells this story of a hotel where he stopped:

Over dinner in the hotel restaurant, one of my traveling companions ordered a beer, only to have a staff member in his red blazer inform us sadly that the hotel did not serve alcohol. Later, the staff member whispered more of the story: If we had only arrived sooner, he would have been able to serve the beer.

A few days before our visit, he said, conservative religious activists came to the hotel and objected to the serving of alcohol, particularly on Friday, the Muslim holy day.

Tunisia has long cultivated a variety of decent wines, and brews a decent French-style beer called Celtia; its tourist industry is  major currency earner,  Though the Ixlamist Al-Nahda Party has a plurality in Parliament, Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali has insisted that there'll be no banning of the "booze and bikinis" being targeted in other countries. Well, the government isn't banning anything. Alcohol is still very much fully legal in Tunisia.. But as the anecdote above shows, some Islamists — the hardcore Salafis, not Al-Nahda, at least so far — are resorting to bullying, as in this story, or worse, smashing up and burning liquor stores and bars.

In recent weeks, radical Salafis have attacked establishments selling liquor in several places. On May 19 there was an organized attack on bars and liquor stores in Sidi Bouzid, where the Revolution was first sparked. Police were apparently passive, but after things got out of hand, the Justice Minister warned of harsh consequences.

Those who attacked liquor stores crossed the “red lines,” according to the minister. Bhiri said that there can be no “state within a state” and the culprits would be severely punished.
The statement came in response to the Salafist assault on bars as well as the house of a bar owner on Saturday (May 19^th) night, which resulted in an armed melee. The owner of the bar retaliated by firing on the Al-Rahma Mosque.

It sounds as if the barkeep might have been sampling his own product. Then in the northwestern town of Jendouba, sc3ne of confrontations over the wearing of niqab at the local university, masked "Salafis" attacked and burned bars, and also the police station for good measure,  There was some dispute about the identity of the attackers:

The perpetrators themselves, as well as the Jendouba residents, defined these individuals as  ”Salafists,” but Achraf believes that this may not entirely be the case. In his eyes, the wrongdoers described themselves as religiously conservative Salafists solely as a pretext to justify their actions. “These people pretend to be Salafist, but they used to be thugs. The people of Jendouba know them really well,” he asserted.

Though the government is pledging to stop such attacks, the NPR anecdote suggests many establishments are going dry out of fear.

Carrie Nation & Hatchet

Shades of Carrie Nation. The Salafis, and perhaps others of my overseas readers, may not be familiar with the singular career of Ms. Nation 1846-1911), an American temperance crusader whose formidable visage, and emblematic hatchet, appear at left. Wikipedia explains the origin of the hatchet and her attacks on saloons at the turn of the last century:

Nation continued her destructive ways in Kansas, her fame spreading through her growing arrest record. After she led a raid in Wichita her husband joked that she should use a hatchet next time for maximum damage. Nation replied, "That is the most sensible thing you have said since I married you."^[2] The couple divorced in 1901, not having had any children.^[9]
Alone or accompanied by hymn-singing women she would march into a bar, and sing and pray while smashing bar fixtures and stock with a hatchet. Her actions often did not include other people, just herself. Between 1900 and 1910 she was arrested some 30 times for "hatchetations," as she came to call them. Nation paid her jail fines from lecture-tour fees and sales of souvenir hatchets.^[10] In April 1901 Nation came to Kansas City, Missouri, a city known for its wide opposition to the temperance movement, and smashed liquor in various bars on 12th Street in Downtown Kansas City.^[11] She was arrested, hauled into court and fined $500 ($13,400 in 2011 dollars),^[12] although the judge suspended the fine so long as Nation never returned to Kansas City.^[13]

Carrie Nation, proto-Salafi?

UPDATE: I missed this post on thr Kefteji blog about the sort of down-market (what in Egypt would be called baladi) bars and liquor stores, which aren't what tourists would see on Avenue Bourguiba. Definitely read it. I hadn't seen it yet, though we seem to have used the same picture of Celtia.

For D-Day: Remembering a Decorated Moroccan Regiment in the Liberation of France

Emblem, 1er Spahis Marocains

Today is the 68th Anniversary of the D-Day Landings in Normandy. Usually when we talk of World War II, even the North African campaigns, the fighting in Syria and Lebanon, the interventions in Iraq and Iran, we picture Europeans fighting in Middle Eastern countries, and rarely think of Middle Easterners unless it is Anwar Sadat being arrested for links to a German spy, or Moshe Dayan losing an eye fighting against Vichy in Lebanon. Not only do we forget the many French colonials who fought in the Free French Forces, but so do their countrymen today, since having fought for the colonial power is often, But North Africans fought and died not only in North Africa and the Middle East, but also in the liberation of Italy and of France itself. That they fought under a colonial flag has dimmed their memory at home. I thought a suitable D-Day commemoration might be to remember one of them.

None seem to have actually landed at Normandy on June 6, but many were already on French soil, having landed with the Dragoon landings in the South of France. (The only Free French engaged on D-Day were paratroops.) But General Leclerc's Second Armored Division, consisting of many North African, West African, and Equatorial African units (not all of indigenous troops: the Chasseurs d'Afrique were largely Algerian pieds noirs, French and other European colonials, and the Foreign Legion units of course were international, but French-officered). Leclerc's troops famously took the lead (with Allied consent) in the liberation of Paris. I thought for D-Day I'd note a Moroccan unit that had a distinguished career. The 1er Regiment de Marche de Spahis Marocains not only fought well in Europe but in other theaters as well. The regiment holds the Croi de Guerre and the Liberation Cross. When the last Spahi (native cavalry) units were disbanded in 1962 with Algerian independence, the 1st Regiment of Spahis (no longer Marocains) was retained, and continues as the inheritor of the tradition of all the Spahi units. For the current unit and its history, see here (official page, in French). For its history, there is an English Wikipedia page,  and a more detailed account in French here

The regiment was created in 1914 as a light cavalry unit by General (later Marshal) Lyautey, and served on the Marne and then on the Greek front. It then was deployed to Syria and Lebanon when France occupied its mandates there. Like all Spahi units, the officers were French.

At the time of the fall of France it was stationed in Syria. At the Fall of France part of the force crossed into Transjordan and Palestine to join British forces, and became part of the Free French forces, The still-Vichy part of the force later fought against the Allies in Morocco. The Free French unit was mechanized (it had been horse cavalry up till then) and the personnel came to include more French, though it remained a Moroccan unit. It fought with the British in Eritrea and in the North African campaign, and joined Leclerc's Second Armored Division as a reconnaissance unit. It landed at Normandy August 1 with Leclerc, took part in the Liberation of Paris, and sustained heavy casualties in fighting in France and Germany, and took part in the capture of Hitler's retreat at Berchtesgaden.

After the war it served for a time in the occupation of Germany, and also saw action in the French Indochina War. Its successor unit in the French Army saw action in  Operation Desert Storm in 1991.

The regimental campaign flag:

Tunisia: Ben Ali's 50 Cars to Be Auctioned Off

The first eight of some 50 cars owned by the family of deposed Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali have been shown to the public prior to auction.

The auction included two Fiat 500s, a Berlingo, a Mercedes 200, a Cabriolet, a Patrol Nissan, a Golf4, and an Isuzu D-Max. Tunisians from a variety of socioeconomic backgrounds seized the opportunity to scrutinize the cars of their former ruling family.
According to Mohamed Lassad Hmaied, a member of the Management Commission, the remaining 42 cars — including Ferraris, Lamborghinis, and Cadillacs — will be exposed to the public at El Kram fair, held during the months of July and August.

It isn't clear how many family members used these 50 cars.


My family has a Kia and a Saturn, but can't auction them as we need then, Sorry, you'll hae to try for the Lamborghinis.