Some Takes on Egypt

 A few useful reads on the ongoing Egypt drama:

• Magdy Samaan on "Cairo's Undercover Strongman," on Murad Muwafi, the successor of ‘Omar Suleiman as head of General Intelligence.

•  Steven A. Cook, Foreign Policy, "Egypt and the United States: It's Not You; It's Me," on possible benefits of greater estrangement between the two. Also see Issandr El Amrani's own take on Cook: "US-Egypt: Time to Part Ways?"

• Cultural Antrhopology and The American Ethnologist have put together a "Hot Spots" collection of article links, multimedia, etc. on Egypt's revolution.  There's a great deal of material there.

Saharan Snow: Snowfall in Tataouine

There's snow on the Saharan sands of the southern Tunisian desert towns of Tataouine and Matmata.

www.facebook.com/tourisme.tataouine

If Tataouine sounds familiar to many Westerners, it's as the name of Luke Skywalker's home planet; the original Star Wars film's desert sequences were filmed in the Sahara around Tataouine. According to the report the last recorded snowfall was 1962, a half century ago.

Washington hasn't yet had any significant snowfall this year. Not so the Sahara, and Egypt as well. Climate change deniers?

Yale-SOAS Digital Islamic Manuscripts

Yale and the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) at the University of London have joined to create the Yale-SOAS Islamic Manuscript Gallery, which has digitized several Arabic and Persian manuscripts from the two collections, with more envisioned, and several key classical Arabic dictionaries for reference. One more step among increasingly many online to increase access to unpublished source material.

The CairObserver Website

I noted the website CairObserver last year when it was fairly new, but it has continued to be a great site for anyone interested in the Arab world's and Africa's largest city (and this past year, who wasn't?). At the moment the homepage links to articles on the city's current traffic patterns, threats to the remnants of the ninth century Ibn Tulun aqueduct, "An Ottoman Sabil with Dutch tiles," a proposed new road to the Pyramids, "restoring authenticity" to Mu‘izz al-Din Street ("Bayn al-Qasrayn," the old Fatimid city's main street), an interview with David Sims, author of Understanding Cairo, and more. In other words, for anyone interested in architecture, history, urban planning, or who is just crazy about this sprawling, fascinating, sometimes maddening city, it's worth checking in regularly.

Syria: Trapped in the Web of Geopolitics

The Russian and Chinese vetoes of the Security Council Resolution on Syria and the closing of the US Embassy in Damascus are further reminders that, more than any other "Arab Spring" case, Syria's agony is caught up in the complex geopolitics of the region. Like the Lebanese civil war a generation ago, the Syrian conflict is exacerbated, and perhaps fueled and funded on both sides, by regional players. With growing signs that the new Egypt will be estranged from, if it does not entirely abandon, its traditional strategic alignment with the US (and less overtly, Israel), some no doubt see Syria as a way to rectify the balance; lose one from "our" camp, win one from "theirs." That's bipolar, Cold War kind of thinking, but it's true that Syria's role as Iran's one Arab ally, and as the bridge through which Iran supplies Hizbullah in Lebanon, means the outcome of the struggle has implications far beyond the boundaries of Syria. As was the case in Lebanon during the war years, that is not good news for the ordinary people on either side of the struggle, since it tends to prolong the conflict. Unlike Libya, where Qadhafi had few friend left near the end (well, okay, Burkina Faso, but they're no match for NATO), Iran and arguably Russia have an investment to protect in Syria, while the West sees a chance to alter the balance.

I am not an advocate of Western intervention in Syria, not from any lack of horror at the humanitarian toll if the conflict continues, but due to the lack of practicality as well as the danger of escalation. In Libya, where most of the population and economic resources were on the Mediterranean, with NATO airbases in Sicily, southern Italy and Cyprus and French and Italian aircraft carriers in the Med, the logistics were easy. In Syria,where the major cities are inland, one would have to operate from eastern Turkey or enter from the sea via the Latakia corridor, or else overfly Lebanese airspace.  Logistically it would be a problem, and while Turkey is actively working against the Asad regime, use of Turkish bases would further complicate the geopolitical tangle.

For all the Western outrage about the vetoes, Russia and China are no doubt acting in what they perceive  to be their own interests, or those of their client. (Bear in mind that the overwhelming majority of US vetoes in the Security Council have been on resolutions involving Israel.)

The Syrian tragedy will go on, UN resolution or no, until something changes either the balance on the ground (where there are signs of gradual strengthening of the rebels) or a transformation of the geopolitical mosaic. An Israeli attack on Iran could make the Syrian civil war (or whatever you choose to call it) part of a much larger regional struggle, in which anything could happen.

Mawlid al-Nabi

Mawlid al-Nabi, the Prophet's birthday, began at sundown. Greetings to Muslim readers.

The ‘Abdin Incident After 70 Years

‘Abdin Palace (Wikimedia Commons)

King Farouq in 1948;
he was 22 in 1942

As I noted in my previous post, today was the 37th anniversary of the death of Oum Kulthum. Tomorrow, February 4, will mark a different sort of anniversary in Egypt: the 70th anniversary of the ‘Abdin Incident of 1942, a notorious turning point in British-Egyptian relations in the midst of the Second World War. The three-way balance of power in Egypt that followed nominal independence in 1922, in which the King, the Parliament (led by the Wafd Party), and the British competed for influence, came to a head in a confrontation that would lead, a decade later, to the fall of the King, the dissolution of Parliament, and the end of the last remnants of British occupation.

To set the scene a bit. In 1936 Britain and Egypt signed a new treaty which provided for British recognition of Egypt as fully sovereign, with a right to join the League of Nations, and with Britain ending its military occupation of Egypt, except for the Suez Canal Zone, where British troops were to remain. It was also a treaty of alliance, under which in the event of war, Britain could reoccupy Egypt to protect its Ally.

Three years later, Britain went to war. Threats to Egypt from Italian forces in Libya led to Egypt becoming the major front in the North African campaign. By February 1942 Rommel and the Afrika Korps had supplanted the Italians as the threat, and were advancing on Alexandria: El Alamein still lay miles and months in the future, when Rommel would be stopped only 66 miles west of Alexandria.

Hussein Sirri Pasha (Source)

King Farouq, only 22 at the time, had succeeded to the throne in 1936. The Prime Ministry at the time was in the hands of a strong supporter of the British, Hussein Sirry Pasha, and the Wafd was in opposition. Traditionally, the British had opposed the Wafd, seeing it as too nationalist, but when Sirri's government fell, the British decided that the popularity of the Wafd in the country meant there should be a Wafd government, despite their traditional opposition. Egypt's British "Ally," which in wartime behaved just as it had when Egypt was a British protectorate, decided that King Farouq must name Wafd leader Mustafa Nahhas as the new Prime Minister.

Now, Britain's civilian representative in Egypt was Sir Miles Lampson (later created Lord Killearn), Ambassador to Egypt and High Commissioner of the Sudan, but really the latest version of Britain's colonial viceroys.

Sir Miles Lampson (Wikimedia)

Lampson had clashed with Farouq before. Farouq had Italianate tastes and would eventually settle there in exile; he also surrounded himself with a variety of Italian courtiers, aides, and cronies. The problem by 1942 was, of course, that Britain (and Egypt) were at war with Italy, and Italian forces were advancing alongside the Germans. Efforts to persuade Farouq to intern his Italian nationals were to no avail. There is a wonderful story, too good not to tell even if apocryphal, that at one point Farouq said to Lampson, whose own wife was Italian, "I'll get rid of my Italians when you get rid of yours."

When the King dismissed Sirri, Britain informed Farouq that he should appoint Nahhas. The King fudged by offering a coalition government including Nahhas, but Nahhas refused. The British Defence Committee in Egypt, in communication with London, considered deposing Farouq if he did not comply. After considerable maneuvering on February 2 and 3, around noon on February 4 Lampson gave Farouq an ultimatum: appoint Nahhas by 6 pm or suffer the consequences. The King continued to seek alternatives.

By an odd chance, Sir Walter Monckton was attached to the British Embassy. Monckton had been the man who drafted the Instrument of Abdication for King Edward VIII, so he was called upon to draft another, this one for Farouq.

Finally, at nine pm, Lampson, accompanied by General R.G.W.H. Stone, Commander of British troops in Egypt, accompanied by tanks, proceeded to ‘Abdin Palace.When they arrived at the gates, they demanded to see the King. Many Egyptians have heard the story that Sir Miles demanded, in "kitchen Arabic," "fayn al-walad?": "where's the boy?" (An Egyptian would more likely say, al-walad fayn?, but the point is that referring to His Majesty the King of Egypt and Sudan as "the boy" is not exactly protocol. Other accounts say that when a chamberlain offered to show Sir Miles to the King's study, the Ambassador responded, "I know the way." I should note the British accounts suggest a bit more formality than the Egyptian side remembered.

Mustafa Nahhas Pasha
(Wikimedia)

Presented with the instrument of abdication and told he had not complied by the deadline, Farouq complained that  the instrument was written on a dirty piece of paper and said he had responded to the ultimatum by offering an alternative, but in any event, he should not have to abdicate since he had already summoned Nahhas, and would appoint him to name whatever government he chose. Lampson agreed to accept the King's essential surrender, and he retained his throne for another decade.

The British got their way; but all three major players suffered in the long run. The highhandedness of "independent" Egypt's British "Ally" simply ordering the King to abdicate or appoint a Prime Minister to their liking, removed any fig leaves about who was really calling the shots, at least in the midst of the war. The King, who had begun his reign far more popular than his father ever had been, was thenceforth seen as weak, someone who had surrendered Egyptian sovereignty to save his own throne. The Wafd, which had until now enjoyed the reputation of being a nationalist force against the British, suddenly seemed to be doing the British will. Though a Wafd government in 1951 would abrogate the 1936 treaty, this event plus growing corruption dimmed the Wafd's reputation as well. When the war ended other forces, including the Muslim Brotherhood and radical movements of left and right and, behind the scenes, the military.

One senior officer, learning of the ‘Abdin incident (though it remained a secret to the general public until the end of the war), wrote the King offering his resignation on the grounds that the Army had not been given the opportunity to defend Egypt's honor and protect the King. His resignation was not accepted. That officer's name was Muhammad Naguib. A decade later he led the coup that deposed Farouq, and when the Republic was proclaimed in 1953, he became Egypt's first President. According to Naguib in an early memoir, when the King was preparing to sail into exile, he invited Naguib to join him on the bridge of the Royal Yacht. Naguib says he reminded the King of his resignation letter of 1942, but that his loyalty then had changed because of the King's behavior, and the King had forced the Army to act. Farouq, according to Naguib, told him, "Yes. You did what I always intended to do." Naguib said he still puzzled over what the King could possibly have meant, which has become no clearer with time.

Such are the echoes of the ‘Abdin incident, 70 years after the fact.

An Oum Kulthum Interview for the 37th Anniversary the Day the "Star of the East" Left the Building

Today is the 37th anniversary of February 3, 1975, Oum Kulthum, the greatest and most popular singer the Arab world has known, died at the age of 76. On this day two years ago, I offered a full appreciation, including some clips of her music. Her reputation survives her by a full generation. Her statue in Cairo, like many other statues in the city, was given an eyepatch in solidarity with the demonstrators who lost eyes to tear gas canisters:

There is plenty of her music available on YouTube and elsewhere, but I thought for this anniversary I would instead post an interview with her done in Paris in 1967 after the Arab-Israeli War, which has English subtitles and lets you hear her speak (to hear her sing, go just about anywhere):

Back to Muhammad Mahmoud

In the wake of the Port Said disaster, demonstrators once again returned to march on the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior today. At least initially the march was supposedly led by the Ahlawy Ultras, the supporters of the Ahly team that was attacked yesterday. The veteran revolutionaries were there as well. For some time now,however, various groups have been trying to get the demonstrators to disperse; as Zeinobia notes, the revolutionary April 6 movement is trying to disperse the crowds, and the Ahlawy Ultras say they are no longer there as they are dealing with the funerals of their dead. Hundreds have already reportedly been injured, but I haven't seen any confirmed deaths. Let's hope things remain under control.

The fighting has again centered on Muhammad Mahmoud street, site of some of the heaviest fighting late last year, and one of today's events was the crowd tearing down the wall of stone blocks which the authorities had erected to block the street (it's not the only street so blocked): Something there is that doesn't love a wall.



In the Talaat Harb area crowds surrounded a riot police bus; after its driver fled, the demonstrators did help the police disembark from their vehicle and be taken safely away, as shown in this video:



I understand the police bus is now covered with revolutionary graffiti and posters, but let's be grateful the policemen were escorted to safety.

There are more accounts emerging about yesterday's events but the various accounts are contradictory; what matters most is perhaps not who is right but that emotions are running high.

The Day After: Repercussions of Port Said

Egypt remains in shock after the carnage in Port Said; the death toll is at least 79 and may rise. The government is trying to respond belatedly, declaring three days of mourning, accepting the resignation of the Governor of Port Said, sacking and investigating the security chiefs there, etc. Ahly, the Cairo club that was attacked by their Port Said rivals Masry, have decided against playing against Port Said for five years; their coach and three stars reporting they plan to retire.

As already noted yesterday, the conspiracy theories were quick to kick in. The revolutionaries for once agree with the Muslim Brotherhood on something: SCAF is somehow responsible. The security forces, though present, clearly did little to stop the violence. Security has been a problem in Egypt since the police vanished in the midst of the Revolution, and underpaid, poorly trained police are no match for the football Ultras in strength.

One of the major surprises of the day has been the fact that the Brotherhood, which up to now has supported SCAF's transition timeline, is starting to talk about an earlier transition, perhaps realizing that the growing perception of instability and of security spinning out of control could lead the masses to blame not only SCAF but the Brotherhood.  This Al Jazeera English report has a clip of the emergency session of Parliament: when Speaker Katatni, from the Brotherhood's FJP, tried to ban live television, the MPs shouted the motion down and kept it live.



Ahly supporters and the usual revolutionary protesters are clashing with police as they attempt to march on the Interior Ministry. There are injured demonstrators; how bad this clash is remains to be seen.

Two pieces by Issandr El Amrani offer his first take: one in The National and one on the London Review of Books blog. Zeinobia, in a blog post with extensive photos and videos of the trains arriving last night from Port Said, concludes that "Everybody is Responsible."

30 Years Since Hama

On February 2, 1982, Syrian forces began to crush resistance in the city of Hama, where a Muslim Brotherhood-led revolt had occurred. Much of the city was devastated; depending on whose numbers are used, between 10,000 and 40,000 may have died. In those pre-YouTube, pre-Twitter days, it took some time for the outside world to understand the scale of the massacre.

Today, for the first time in 30 years, Syrian rebels are able to mark the anniversary. While the international community debates, Syria's conflict continues.

James Dorsey Weighs in on Port Said

I mentioned earlier that the go-to person for soccer and politics in the Middle East is journalist/blogger James Dorsey. Dorsey offers his take at Foreign Policy on the Port Said violence. Key conclusions:

The violence of the ultras is directed as much against those of rival clubs as it is against the security forces. The anti-Mubarak protests of a year ago were the first time that fans of Ahly, which was founded in the early 20th century as the club of the nationalists and opponents of British colonial rule, and its fierce rival Zamalek, the club of the Brits, their Egyptian associates, and the monarchy, set their differences aside to stand shoulder-by-shoulder in Tahrir Square. Ahead of an upcoming match scheduled for Feb. 7, Zamalek's ultras, the White Knights, last week called on their Ahlawy counterparts to agree to a truce. "We are asking for an end to the bloodshed and to reconcile and unite for the sake of Egypt," the White Knights said in a statement on their Facebook page. Ultras Ahlawy replied with a smiley.

The match is now -- wisely -- suspended, but the exchange signaled awareness on the part of the ultras' leaders that the time had come to bury their war hatchets. They know that Egyptians are growing increasing intolerant of their violence and militancy, as evidenced by recent Gallup and other polls. Wednesday's violence suggests that the rank and file see matters differently, and will not take direction from anyone.

The conspiracy theorists may be on to something: The riots in Port Said will likely strengthen the hand of those in the ruling military council who want to crack down hard on the ultras, who have formed the backbone of street protests that have not quieted down even though Egypt has seated an elected parliament and will soon choose a new president. And this time, it seems, the Egyptian people will be with them.

Dorsey's blog, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer, will no doubt be on the case over the coming days. The wonder of the blogosphere is that somewhere out there someone is a specialist on everything. In Dorsey's case it happens to be the politics of football in the Middle East, so this is his moment.

Worries About Tomorrow

Tomorrow could be tense in Egypt after today's violence. The Ultras of the football clubs, especially Ahly, the targets of the violence in Port Said, are threatening revenge, and there's a demonstration planned at the Interior Ministry. Tomorrow is also the first anniversary of the "Battle of the Camel," perhaps the bloodiest day of the Revolution.

73 Dead After Football Clash in Port Said: The Intersection of Revolution and Soccer

 UPDATED with video at end.

We Americans take (our version of) football pretty seriously, as all the hype leading up to Super Bowl Sunday this week reminds us, and in some places (Texas comes to mind, and Alabama in Bear Bryant's day) it approaches a sort of civic religion, but even so, here we don't usually kill each other over it. What the rest of the world calls football, however, is another matter. In Port Said today at least 73 people are dead after fans stormed the field after a game between the popular Ahly and Masry teams, As the violence unfolded in Port Said, another Premier League game between Zamalek and Ismaily in Cairo was suspended at halftime, and then the bleachers reportedly caught fire. League play has been suspended and Parliament is going into special session.

In Egypt today, of course, nothing is apolitical. The "Ultras," or fanatical, organized supporters of the major football clubs have been involved in the Revolution from its early days. (James Dorsey's definitive The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer blog, which I think I've linked to on occasion before, is the go-to for the background, though so far he has nothing up about today's catastrophic match.) They seem to blur the boundaries between football booster clubs and street gangs, though something similar is not unknown in the UK and elsewhere in Europe. The sporadic and sometimes disappearing nature of public security in the past year adds to the problem, and one Parliamentarian from Port Said has said that police and security forces either were not present or abandoned the scene, leaving the Ultras to battle it out with no one to impose order. On Twitter the revolutionaries are blaming it on SCAF; I expect SCAF to blame it on foreign influences before the day is out. But while the absence of security may encourage conspiracy theories, the people killing each other are the Ultras and other fans, after all.

During the height of the revolution last January and February, there were only a few days (January 28 and February 2 among them) when the number of dead in one day reached or surpassed 73. And that was a Revolution, not a soccer game.

For the record, Masry defeated previously undefeated Ahly 3-1.

UPDATE: Video from Youm 7.  There are obviously police present early in this clip as the stands empty onto the playing field. The clip shows lots of running and milling about but no obvious bodies on the ground, but then toward the end all the stadium lights go out. Did somebody have the bright idea to turn off the lights? Did it cause a stampede? Stay tuned.

As Parliament Gets Down to Business, the Brotherhood Still Feeling its Way

Egypt's new Parliament has chosen its committees, with the Muslim Brotherhood heading nine of the 19 committees, fewer than its electoral strength might have allowed. Clearly the Brotherhood is still feeling its way, fully cognizant that its relatively good relations with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which is likely to seek to limit Parliament's power. (SCAF unilaterally amended the Presidential election rules before Parliament assembled, though it announced it only after; it seems to want to keep calling the shots.) The Brotherhood, some feel, is gearing up for a challenge to SCAF, and in any event Parliament as a whole, as the only elected body at the moment, is likely to try to turn its legitimacy into real authority. (For nitpickers out there, by "Parliament" I mean the People's Assembly, since the Shura Council elections are still under way. But as I've noted before, even a lot of Egyptians aren't clear why Egypt even has an Upper House. The People's Assembly is what matters.)

One theme that is turning up lately, most recently in this piece by Khalil Anani at Foreign Policy, "Old Habits Die Hard!" After 80 years in the shadows, much of that time officially illegal, the Muslim Brotherhood and, by extension, its new creation the Freedom and Justice Party, are still functioning with the mentality of an opposition underground movement, meeting in secrecy, espousing gradualism rather than revolutionary change. Even the election of the FJP's Secretary-General, Sa‘ad al-Katatni was done with no one outside the party even aware of the process (the Katatni is now the Assembly Speaker).

It's hardly the first time a longtime revolutionary movement is suddenly confronted with the challenge of governance, of course, and the results range from the highly successful to the questionable. The Brotherhood has been around a long time, with a highly organized structure and infrastructure and an Egypt-wide influence despite years underground; getting used to power, especially shared power, may take some adjustment.  Some similar themes occupy Nathan Brown in his latest paper from Carnegie, "When Victory Becomes an Option: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood Confronts Success." (PDF) (Also, here's the first part of a response to Nathan Brown on the Freedom and Justice Party website.)

Unlike their Salafi rivals in Al-Nour, the Muslim Brotherhood does not limit itself to focusing on the hijab or banning beer and bikinis; because it has long drawn its membership from the professional and entrepreneurial classes it takes Egypt's economy seriously, though doing something about it may be a challenge to defy almost any single party. Any political party, Islamist or secular, coming after three decades of corruption and drift, is going to face a formidable task, and the past year's disruptions have crippled an already damaged economy severely. The ultimate test of any party in power is whether it can meet payrolls, collect the garbage, deliver the mail and keep the trains running (if not on time, at least running).

I know there are many who think the ascendancy of the Brotherhood means Egypt is going to be another Iran, or at least break with the US and Israel, destroy its own tourism sector and impose a theocracy. That could still happen, but that sounds more like Al-Nour's platform than the Brotherhood's. They've learned to be cautious — most of the leadership have lots of jail time on their resumes — and are still behaving so. Let's see what happens.

Is Syria in Civil War? It's Starting to Look Like it on Al-Jazeera

 The debate over when or whether the Syrian conflict deserves to be called a civil war remains a subject for debate, but yesterday on Al Jazeera Arabic's Al-Ittijah al-Mu‘akis ("The Opposite Direction," a show that features controversial issues with spokesmen for both sides), a pro-Syrian Lebanese commentator and a Syrian opposition figure literally came to blows: (you really don't need to understand the Arabic: they're shouting at the same time anyway):

‘Umar Makram: The "Patron Saint" of Tahrir Square

‘Umar Makram Statue

Over the past year, as Egypt's drama has played out, I have periodically noted some of the deeper historical aspects of some of the scenes of the action. On the day Husni Mubarak resigned, I posted "A Brief Biography of Tahrir Square," and when the religious clash occurred near the Radio-TV building, popularly known as "Maspero," I explained how an innocent antiquarian/archaeologist named Gaston Maspero ended up with his name gaining notoriety.

‘Umar Makram Mosque from Tahrir

In that same vein, I thought I'd introduce another historical note: ‘Umar (or Omar) Makram. We've had occasion a number of times to mention the ‘Umar Makram Mosque, which sits on Tahrir Square and has functioned as both a prayer center and, more than once, a field hospital for the demonstrators. In more peaceful times, the mosque is a popular site for celebrity or prominent funerals (and weddings), given its prominent location on Cairo's main square (which as we have noted before, is round.) In fact, a funeral from ‘Umar Makram is a sign of prestige (a sign the departed has, so to speak, arrived.)

I have used the phrase "patron saint" of Tahrir Square in my title, but ‘Umar Makram is not even buried in the mosque named for him, but in one of the city's vast cemetery complexes. Despite its popularity and prestigious role, given its location, the mosque (left) is not an ancient one: it dates only from 1948.  The statue of ‘Umar Makram looking out at Tahrir Square (above right) is even newer, dating only to 2003.

Egyptians who paid attention in their history classes should know who ‘Umar Makram was, but I suspect most foreigners, even those living in Cairo, probably don't.

‘Umar Makram

Naqib al-Ashraf Sayyid ‘Umar bin Husayn Makram (1750 or 1755-1822) was a leading religious figure of his age, a center of resistance to Napoleon's French invasion in 1798-1800, and a key figure in winning religious support for the recognition of Muhammad ‘Ali as viceroy of Egypt, and thus the establishment of the Muhammad ‘Ali dynasty that ruled Egypt until 1952 (and reigned until 1953). Ultimately like many kingmakers, he fell afoul of the king he had made too well.

I should note that I can't post a lot of links for further reading here; there isn't that much about him on the Internet; even his Arabic Wikipedia page is pretty sparse. There is a longer account with more detail here, however, also in Arabic. So for my account I am forced to find other sources as well, and, since I'm old enough to predate the World Wide Web by a considerable margin, I still have a collection of an older information retrieval system technology, known as books. I'm drawing much of this from Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot's Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali and from various accounts of the French expedition.

‘Umar Makram was born in Asyut in Upper Egypt around 1750 or 1755. He attended Al-Azhar, and was also a descendant of the Prophet. In 1793 he was chosen as Naqib al-Ashraf, a post in Ottaman administrative system that had both religious and civil functions as head of the body of descendants of the Prophet. In effect he shared religious leadership with the Azhari leadership and the heads of the Sufi orders. He was politically active in leading resistance to high taxation even before the French arrived.

When Napoleon's French expedition landed near Alexandria in 1798, Makram helped organize resistance to the French. After the French defeated the Mamluk military forces at Imbaba, Cairo was left undefended except for local militias raised by Makram and the other religious leaders. After Napoleon took Cairo he declined an offer of a position and retreated to Bilbays, leading a resistance in Sharqiyya province. He retreated to Gaza and eventually to Jaffa, where in 1798 the French, during their invasion of Palestine, caught up with him. He was returned to Egypt and sent into internal exile in Damietta.

After Napoleon's return to France, Makram returned to Cairo, and in 1800 led a new uprising against the continuing French occupation.  With the French departure, Makram's prestige as an activist who could mobilize the religious establishment and the street (including organizing boycotts by shopkeepers and other forms of protest) enhanced his influence in the anarchic years that followed the French withdrawal.

The French occupation had severely crippled the power of the Mamluks, and struggles for power among various Mamluks and Ottoman attempts to reassert authority in Egypt led to several years of internal struggle. Makram and the religious ‘ulama'  plaid an activist role. In 1805 he and the other religious leaders to depose the Ottoman viceroy, Khurshid Pasha, and replace him with the Albanian military leader and adventurer Muhammad ‘Ali. Thus he and his allies were instrumental in bringing to power the man who would dominate Egypt for a generation and found the dynasty that would rule onto the mid-20th century.

Muhammad ‘Ali in 1840

For several years, the alliance between Makram and Muhammad ‘Ali held. The religious establishment supported Muhammad ‘Ali's rejection of the Ottoman Sultan's firmans attempting to transfer him out of Egypt, land backed his ongoing struggle with the Mamluks (which would end with the destruction of the Mamluks in 1811). When a British expedition took Alexandria in 1807 (the Ottomans were allied with France in the Napoleonic Wars, so Britain was at war with the Porte from 1807 to 1809), Makram helped organize resistance in Cairo while Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha was fighting a Mamluk insurrection in Upper Egypt.

Meanwhile, the Pasha frequently used Makram and the religious establishment for justification in his efforts to tax and control the Mamluks' iltizam feudal lands. Eventually, though, the alliance frayed, as Muhammad ‘Ali's efforts to centralize power led him to covet the rizqa endowment lands of the religious establishment. Makram's frequently demonstrated ability to organize the Cairo street and mobilize against a political figure. Kings tend to distrust the kingmakers who made them, fearing they might do it again with someone else; Pashas apparently entertained similar suspicions.

In 1809, Makram sought to lead a revolt against this taxation and was stripped of his posts. He had finally met a match he could not outmaneuver, and was retired to internal exile in Damietta and, eventually, to Tanta, where he died in 1822.

Makram's resistance to the French made him a symbol of opposition to foreign occupation, leading to a revival of interest in him during the national struggle against the British. Ironically, the now-iconic mosque on Tahrir Square was erected during the reign of King Farouq, the great-great-grandson of Muhammad ‘Ali.

A New, Bilingual Egyptian Opinion Journal: Midan Masr

A new, bilingual monthly newspaper and online site called Midan Masr has launched; they publish their content in both English and Arabic, and translate articles so that the content is the same in both languages. Their English homepage is here and their Arabic here.

They offer a lengthy statement of purpose stating that they welcome all points of view on matters Egyptian. Excerpts:

Midan Masr’s mission is to be a focal point for this rich, passionate, and heated explosion of voices and opinions. Midan Masr will commit to reflecting the full spectrum of discussion and debate taking place regarding issues that affect Egypt. 

We are a neutral and independent monthly paper that solicits and publishes opinions from a cross-section of political, religious, ideological, and philosophical persuasions that reflect the full spectrum, richness, and complexity of the debate taking place in Egyptian society.   

We strongly encourage and welcome first-time writers, seasoned writers, bloggers, photographers, cartoonists, and ultimately anyone who wishes to express his or her opinion on any of the issues affecting Egypt to submit their contributions in Arabic or English to info@midanmasr.com. The newspaper is available throughout Egypt . . .

While our inaugural site covers a broad range of topics and points of view – we are acutely aware that there are many points of view and ideologies that are not reflected in this issue. This is not for lack of attempting to cover those points of view; rather it is a reflection of the authors that we have been able to reach. We will actively continue to broaden the ideological and geographic diversity of contributors – with a particular focus on Egyptian authors from provinces outside of Cairo.

It looks promising, but I'm glad there's both an Arabic version and a print version, giving it some chance to be read outside just the Cairo intelligentsia.

Crunch Time for US-Egyptian Relations

I can think of few moments since the first Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty when US-Egyptian relations, and the fate of US aid, have seemed so much in question. A high-level military delegation is in the US to discuss aid, led by Maj. Gen. Mohammed El-Assar, the Deputy Defense Minister for US Affairs and a member of SCAF, but he will no doubt have seen this morning's Washington Post report that the US Embassy in Cairo is sheltering in place in the Embassy compound several US employees of NGOs who have been forbidden to leave Egypt due to the crackdown on pro-democracy NGOs. As everyone knows by now, one of these is the International Republican Institute's Sam LaHood,who happens to be the son of US Secretary of Transportation Ray LaHood, a rare Republican in the Obama Cabinet (and an Arab-American as well, to add to the mix). Oh, and just to make General El-Assar's visit even more challenging, over the weekend Egypt's key Washington lobbyists announced they were quitting. Hello, we're here for our annual $1.3 billion in military aid. Really, you're upset about something? Actually, General El-Assar, whom I've met on earlier visits, knows the US scene rather well, and I doubt if he has many illusions about the task before him. Whether his fellow SCAF generals understand the hole they're in (at the moment, though, they're still digging) is a lot less clear.

I know of course that the US aid relationship is unpopular in the Egyptian street, and I also know that some in the Army may feel the aid package is sacrosanct, the Army's "payment" for keeping the peace with Israel. But both the Administration and Congress still have to approve that every year. The Egyptian economy is reeling, the 10-12% of it that is tourism based is in serious doubt, and US military aid is now in jeopardy. And without the US, hopes for IMF and World Bank assistance could also be in jeopardy.

SCAF's out-of-touch, blundering approach to governance has rarely been more apparent. A breach with the US would perhaps be popular, but the Egyptian military's own self-interest would be the first victim. And if they think they can replace it with Gulf funding, they might want to look at the record of Gulf monetary pledges versus actual funds delivered.

Cairo Literary Atlas

Ahram Online notes the appearance of a Cairo Atlas of Literature (Literary Atlas of Cairo might be a moreprecise translation of the Arabic title), celebrating the topography of the city in literary excerpts. Sight unseen, it sounds like a great idea.

UPDATE: A commenter notes an English edition appeared in 2010 and is available from AUC.