Şerif Mardin (1927-2017)

I will start with the good news: I intend this post to mark the resumption of regular, possibly daily, blogging. I'm back.

The bad news is I must start with bad news: Şerif Mardin has died at the age of 90. The Turkish sociologist and public intellectual made a name for himself studying the social institutions of the late Ottoman Empire, and his work on he sociology of religion in Turkey has resonated in the debates of recent years. Mardin spent his career at a variety of institutions in Turkey, the US, Britain, and France.

New Stanford-Brookings Doha Joint Democratic Transitions Project

The Program on Arab Reform and Democracy at Stanford's Center for Democracy, Drevelopment and the Rule of Law and the Brookings Institution's Doha Center have announced a new joint "Project on Democratic Transitions." Their first paper, "Drafting Egypt's New Constitution," by Tamir Mustafa (summary at link, full PDF here) is available.

A Strange Day

How to sum up today in Egypt? Although the news channels are full of wall-to-wall coverage, not a lot is really clear at the end of the day. The government did not name the new Cabinet, though the Defense Minister appeared on TV. The Army beefed up its presence but did not crack down on the protesters. Yet two F-16s buzzed Central Cairo as the curfew began: what does that mean?

I suspect there are divisions in he leadership about what to do next. The Army does not want to jeopardize its reputation with the people, but if ordered to crack down hard, would it obey? I'm not sure anyone knows. Tomorrow may explain what's been going on.

Mohamed ElBaradei made his move today, and he and a number of respected dissidents were set up as a committee to try to negotiate a transitional unity government — if they can find anyone to talk to them. Still, at least there are faces who can provide a responsible transition. I'm not sure ElBaradei has the fire in him to lead a new government, but as one of Egypt's more experienced diplomats,he could help negotiate a transition.
The longer this goes on, the more likely I fear the hopes for a peaceful transition will fade: and then the choice becomes stark: either the government goes peacefully or we face the danger of Tahrir Square looking like Tienanmen Square. Or, the Army refuses an order and we have the Tunisian situation, which could be the best outcome.

One thing the government may have miscalculated (well, one of many): if the withdrawal of the police was intended to create anarchy and lead most Egyptians to beg for the government to come back, the resourcefulness of Egyptians in creating neighborhood committees and patrolling their neighborhoods (at least in Alexandria there are now said to be popular committees covering the whole city) has shown them something they may not have realized before: they can organize their own government services if needed. That could be the most important lesson of all.

The Curious Incident of the Wafd in the Daytime

“Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?”
“To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.”
"The dog did nothing in the night-time.”
“That was the curious incident,” remarked Sherlock Holmes.

Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, "Silver Blaze"

Egypt's Wafd Party, which has been acting lately rather like a wholly-owned subsidiary of the ruling party despite its 90 years of history as a bastion of nationalism, has seemingly done something daring. That is the curious incident.

It has, seemingly, called publicly for a national unity government, dissolution of Parliament, and a proportional representation system. Not so long ago the current Wafdist head, Sayyid Badawi, bought the vigorous opposition newspaper Al-Dostour long enough to fire its editor just before the elections, leading everyone to see him as in the government's pocket. So why is he seemingly throwing down the gauntlet?

But is he? The Arabist, who's for good or ill in Tunisia right now but still watches Egypt, has his doubts:

My gut reaction: this is either a significant break with the Wafd's behavior for over 30 years, or he is making this announcement on behalf of the regime. Why the conspiracy theory? Because he doesn't mention the question of the presidency, a chief demand of the protestors. Perhaps he should be given the benefit of the doubt.

Exactly. Nothing about the Presidency. Talk about rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. He's talking about new Parliamentary elections, a change in the electoral system, etc.: unless Parliament is given real power, reforming Parliament is like reforming the Pompeii City Council when Vesuvius is erupting. A start, maybe. But perhaps a diversion. Here's the Arabic.

So is the Wafd just a stalking horse for the ruling party, or is this actually a real proposal that deserves some credit since mentioning the Presidency would cross a red line the Wafd won't cross?

Back when I ran videos of Sa‘d Zagloul, the Wafd founder/icon, I noted that according to traditions, at least,

He is said to have used the motto in colloquial Egyptian " kulla haga mumkin," : "everything is possible," but his last words were " ma fish fayda" : "It's no use."

I hope Sa‘d Pasha would not be disappointed in whatever Badawi is doing, and I hope he's not a stalking horse for the regime.

But stuff's happening, so let's watch.

Dunne on Tunisia

I'll let you start the day with some Dunne commentary instead of Dunn commentary: Michele Dunne of Arab Reform Bulletin has a fine, concise, well-stated look at "What Tunisia Proved — And Disproved — About Political Change in the Arab World."

Anything I could add would be redundant, so just click over and read it. It's also good that her piece appears as a column in Al-Masry al-Youm's English edition, which means at least some Egyptians will be reading it.

Egypt Emergency Extended: But a Kinder, Gentler Emergency?

Egypt has yet again extended its State of Emergency by two years.

Those my age may recall a running joke back when Saturday Night Live first debuted in the 1970s: the newscast reporting that Generalissimo Francisco Franco was still dead. For Egypt, the Emergency's continual renewals are not only a reminder that Anwar Sadat is still dead, but that, almost 29 years since his assassination, the reaction to the assassination is ongoing. For indeed, that's what the Emergency stems from. Of course, Sadat would turn 92 this year and even Mubarak will presumably retire by that age, but the Emergency persists.

In the 2005 Presidential elections, the first in which Husni Mubarak competed directly against a range of opposition candidates (without any danger of losing, of course), he promised to lift the Emergency Law and replace it with an anti-terrorism law. This has not yet happened, but heck, it's only been five years, and it's not like he has a rubber-stamp Parliament. (Oh, wait. He does.) Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif explained in his speech on extending the Emergency (a speech left to the Prime Minister as Chief Technocrat, not to the President to whom, as we learn below, the law is "abhorrent"):

To that end, the President of the Republic committed himself in his electoral platform to lift the state of emergency and formulate a new counter terrorism law which would balance personal freedom with the interests and security of society. The Government reiterated this commitment a few weeks ago before the UN Human Rights Council, and today the Government restates this commitment to the representatives of the nation to lift the state of emergency as soon as a balanced law is adopted which does not permit the use of extraordinary investigation measures unless necessary to counter terrorism, and then only under complete supervision by the judiciary. The Government is committed to presenting this law for public discussion, and to deliberate on it with the National Council for Human Rights and the civil society organisations.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Previously the Government had stated that it was requesting an extension of the state of emergency even though it was abhorrent to it, because we do not wish to govern under extraordinary conditions, but at the same time we do not wish to squander what we have achieved. Our achievements may not rise to the level of our ambitions or fulfil all our hopes, but we hold on to them, desiring to improve and develop them. They were not achieved easily, surrounded as we are by an unstable region, threats of terrorism around the world, and an unforeseen severe financial crisis. Nonetheless, and notwithstanding these conditions, we have been able to implement gradual political reform, and achieved economic growth which many states failed to accomplish. We were able to create job opportunities for our youth, and we are committed to increase them and wipe out unemployment, which is our highest priority and a major weapon against terrorism.

While it would be unjust to credit the stability we enjoy, and which has permitted us to achieve so much, to the emergency law alone, it would also be unjust to ignore the fact that the application of the emergency law has spared the nation the threats of terrorism and stopped many terrorist crimes before they could be committed.

Yes, the government is again extending the State of Emergency even though it is "abhorrent to it." (Full English text of the speech can be found here.) It's purely to prevent terrorism and narcotics trafficking. (And Oceania has always been at war with Eurasia.)

Even so, Nazif went out of his way to make it clear that this would be a kinder, gentler Emergency Law. The government is sensitive to the bad reputation the law carries with it, and is trying to soften it a bit.

But if the tone of the renewal is a bit Orwellian, let's be fair to the Egyptian government here as well. In Saddam Hussein's Iraq, nobody bothered to pass Emergency Laws. There was no effort to pretend to a rule of law. Egypt at least keeps officially extending the Emergency. Yes, it restricts freedom of expression, assembly, and much else. But Egypt for all its faults is not Saddam's Iraq, Asad's Syria, or even Ben ‘Ali's Tunisia. There is an independent press which can criticize the Emergency Law, here for example, a still relatively independent judiciary which is divided over extending the law, and the renewed but kinder, gentler law will, apparently, be more limited.

Egyptians sometimes note that they come in for a lot of Western criticism even though their press and society is, in many ways, freer than a lot of other Arab countries. The criticism is accurate but, I think, misunderstands the reasons for the critique. Egypt is still the largest Arab country, the country so many others have followed and looked to; it was one of the first to defy colonial rule and one of the first to evoke pan-Arab emotions. It has also been one of the most liberal and open societies in the Arab world, outside of Lebanon at least, and it has the oldest media and the richest cinema and television culture.

Of those to whom much is given, much is expected. Egypt is arguably the oldest culture in the world, certainly the oldest unified nation. It has a deep, rich role in Arab history and in the history of Arab nationalism. Egyptians would be (rightly, I think) insulted if one compared them to Yemen or Jordan or Libya, so the government really should not be tempted by the "we're not as bad as Syria" argument.

And, precisely because the press is freer and more independent, it's easier to see the failings. I don't expect Egypt anytime soon to replicate what happened yesterday in London, when after 13 years in office the ruling party handed over power to the opposition, letting the Queen do the one constitutional duty left to her. But even though there is considerable openness in Egypt compared to its Arab neighbors, the Emergency Law remains a thorn in the side of the opposition, and its renewal, even if in kinder, gentler, form, is a constant reminder that Egypt's relatively open society (though lacking political democracy) can still be constrained and the open windows closed at any time.

Criticism of Egyptian lack of democracy is not because it is the worst Arab country in these matters, but because it is one of the best, but still falls so short of what it could be.

Cognitive Dissonance

Next Sunday the US Embassy and (not clear from post who?) are showing Mr. Smith Goes to Washington in Old Cairo, the old fortress of Babylon/Fustat area. That is an ancient, traditional, even pre-Islamic section of the city.

If any readers attend, I would love a report. Other than that, I will refrain from comment.

New Arab Reform Bulletin Format

Michele Dunne (no relation save a common interest in Egypt) over at the Carnegie Endowment's Arab Reform Bulletin E-mails that they've shifted their format from five articles once a month to one or two a week; when you subscribe by E-mail you can set your delivery preferences to daily, weekly, or monthly. (Or you can choose country-specific, regional, topical, or full RSS feeds.) The new issue has two articles, Husam Tammam on "Egypt's New Brotherhood Leadership: Implications and Limits of Change," (also available in Arabic here), and Brian Katulis, "Iraq's Elections Highlight Gap in US Policy," (Arabic version available here).

Arab Reform Bulletin is consistently good if you have any interest in following reform and democratization/election issues in the Arab world, and the new format means timelier delivery of their articles.

Kuwait: Consolidate to a Single Electoral Constituency?

This story could be, if it actually happens, extremely important. A committee of the Kuwaiti Parliament has approved a move towards creating a single electoral constituency. Currently there are five constituencies, and critics say the system is gerrymandered to support pro-government/tribal political blocs. As the article itself notes, earlier versions have had anywhere from 10 to 25 constituencies.

As far as I can think of off the top of my head, the only Middle Eastern electoral system that has a national-level constituency with no geographic districts is, well, Israel.

Worth watching, though of course little may actually come of it.

Some Weekend Diversions

A few end-of-the week referrals:

• Christopher Boucek has a new paper for the Carnegie Endowment, Yemen: Avoiding a Downward Spiral. The linked page has the summary and conclusions and links to the full .pdfs in English or Arabic.

• Thomas Hegghammer at Jihadica is going to be taking a bit of a leave until spring, which would be bad news for the jihadi tracking community except that his first guest blogger is my friend Jean-Pierre Filiu from Sciences-Po in Paris. The blog will be in good hands. Both Hegghammer and Filiu come out of Gilles Kepel's shop in Paris.

• Also from Carnegie is the September issue of the Arab Reform Bulletin, always a valuable source for democracy issues and the like. Homepage with links to individual articles is here, in English; or here, in Arabic. Full text in .pdf in English here; or in Arabic here.
  

• Podcast from MEI: Maajid Nawaz on How to Counter Radical Islam in Pakistan. (Podcast starts when you click on the link.)
  

Saad Eddin Ibrahim Sentence Overturned

An Egyptian court has dismissed a two-year prison sentence against prominent Egyptian dissident and sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim. Professor Ibrahim, well known to most in the academic community in this country, has been living in exile in the West to avoid imprisonment on the charges of damaging Egypt's reputation. Saad Eddin Ibrahim is no rabble-rousing revolutionary, but a strong advocate for democracy and reform in his home country. Some of his critics say he is actually better known in the West than he is in Egypt, but that is also why the government tends to seek to silence him: he is respected and listened to in the US. I've known him since the late 1970s, and am hardly unusual in that respect. For anyone favoring freedom of expression the court ruling is good news. Congratulations to Saad and Barbara Ibrahim, although as the article notes, the ordeal is not quite over as there are still some outstanding charges.

UPDATE: I didn't mention it, but as David Mack has noted in a comment below, voiding Saad's conviction is also well timed, given Obama's imminent visit. The civilian Egyptian courts are among the last really independent institutions in the country, but they are neither immune to nor deaf to political convenience.

For Your Weekend Reading

It's a three-day holiday weekend here in the US, and I'll be traveling on Monday so posts will resume Tuesday; so some weekend reading as usual:

• First, a couple of house plugs for MEI events: on June 1, in an event held at the Carnegie Endowment, a panel on "After the Visits: What Next for Middle East Peace?" with M.J. Rosenberg of Israel Policy Forum, Ghaith al-Omari of the American Task Force for Palestine, and Geoffrey Aronson of the Foundation for Middle East Peace. Then on June 10, following the Lebanese elections, a discussion of The 2009 Lebanon Elections: Outcomes and Implications with Graeme Bannerman of MEI and Bilal Saab of Brookings (a former MEI intern, by the way). RSVP for either at the link. Podcasts and/or transcripts usually go up soon after the events.
  

• Mossad is said to be upset about the Defense Ministry deciding to close down a unit headed by Iran expert Uri Lubnani and tasked with studying Iran; the timing does seem odd. Also in Haaretz, Yossi Melman says Israel's military option against Iran "has died" following the Obama-Netanyahu meeting.
  

• A Tony Cordesman PowerPoint-style analysis of the Afghan-Pakistan wars from CSIS (PDF). Lots of graphs and maps. If you like the sort of things Tony puts out, well, this is the sort of thing you'll like.
  

• The Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) has a new report: Looking Forward: An Integrated Strategy for Supporting Democracy and Human Rights in Egypt. (PDF)

• A RAND report, called Dangerous but Not Omnipotent, urging that "US Strategy Should Avoid Inflating Iran's Role in Middle East Instability, Exploit Constraints on Iranian Power and Seek Areas of Engagement," Press summary at the link; full document here (PDF).
  

• Al-Masry Al-Youm continues to be your key source for all swine flu, all the time, with a piece (English here and Arabic here) Killer quote: "The US Health Department announced for the second time that the number of infected people with the virus may be 100,000 people." But WHO only says 10,000 worldwide, and even this sentence in the article doesn't justify the headline "US Health Department Expects 100,000 to be infected with swine flu." I wish they'd link to that: I'm still not seeing any "Bring out your dead!" carts around here.
  

• For continuing English-language coverage of the Lebanese elections (besides, of course, The Daily Star and other papers), the blog Qifa Nabki continues to provide good, solid commentary with enough background for the non-Lebanese to follow.
  

New Arab Reform Bulletin Up

The Carnegie Endowment has a new issue of the Arab Reform Bulletin up. It's always a good survey of issues regarding elections, democratization and human rights issues.

Of particular note is a good backgrounder on the upcoming elections in Mauritania, in which the leader of the latest coup is running for President. It's a country many of us know little about so it's useful to have this for reference.

One More Take on Eric Davis' "Ten Sins": Sin #6

I've already posted several times in order to give my own riffs on Eric Davis' "'Ten Conceptual Sins' in Analyzing Middle East Politics": an introductory comment here, and longer comments on Sin # 1 and Sin # 7: all my posts on the subject are aggregated here. I don't plan to post on all of them, but I definitely want to deal with one more at least: Sin #6: Seeing the Middle East politics through binary thinking. Davis comments:

Western analyses of the Middle East is to view political events in either “black” or “white” terms. While we can be very critical of many actions of the so-called Mahdi Army (Jaysh al-Mahdi) between 2003 and 2007, when it lost much of its power, it was, and still is, one of the largest social service providers in Iraq. The fact that it, not the central government, provides a wide variety of social services, such as jobs, health care, education, and security, should make us realize the need to distinguish between its armed elements, who often engaged in despicable behavior, such as ethnic cleansing and criminality, and its social service providers, who have tried to help a population in need.

I agree with the point, but I think there's something else at work here. Americans, and our British forebears and allies, have a tendency — born of our heritage of Parliamentary democracy and relatively stable government — to expect normal governance to function within an essentially two-party system. Although Britain may technically be a three-party system the Liberal Democrats have never governed by themselves, and we essentially are used to a "Government" and "Loyal Opposition" model. This is hardly universal: it isn't even that common on the European continent, where multiple party systems and shifting coalitions are the norm.

Middle Eastern politics is obviously not functioning on a two-party model. Israel is almost a definition of multiple party coalition maneuvering. The other two countries that at least arguably have a genuinely pluralistic politics — let's agree on Turkey and Lebanon and argue about others later — have rather different traditions. They don't fit either the Anglo-American binary or continental coalition models.

Insofar as participatory politics has a history in the Arab world (a major issue in its own right) it has usually emerged not from the national level but at the local level. In the Nasser era in Egypt the regime and the security services ran the country with an iron hand, but local villages chose their own headmen. (That is no longer generally the case, so in a way things have been retrograde since Nasser, despite his strong security state.) Unions and professional syndicates had greater independence 30 years ago than they do today, and the judiciary still has an independent streak. That's one reason Egypt is not and has never come close to being Saddam Hussein's centralized and totalitarian Iraq.

There is another tradition, the old tribal concept of shura: consultation., The sheikh of a tribe might rule, but he ruled with the advice and consent of the elders and clan leaders, of his own family and other leaders. It was not by majority vote, but it also was not by dictatorial whim. It was done by consensus. Not everyone was a part of that consensus of course, not the women and children nor the uninfluential males, but it was not one-man-rule either.

There is still, I think, in much of the Arab world a preference for rule by consensus. Even in the Gulf monarchies there is still the tradition of the royal majlis, in which the ruler meets with his subjects, hears their complaints, and seeks to offer them remedies. It is a sort of benevolent despotism, a monarchy tempered by listening to one's subjects' complaints.

When Lebanon has worked best, it has worked through Shura: consultation and compromise among the various confessional, sectarian, and quasi-feudal allegiances that make up the country's varied communities. When it has worked least well (1958, 1975-1991, arguably since 2005) is when it has been drawn, either by its own internal stresses or external rivalries (the "Arab Cold War", as Malcolm Kerr called it, in 1958, the regional Arab-Israeli dynamics during the civil war, and the Western crusade for democratization since the Hariri assassination in 2005), into a binary, zero-sum, if they win we lose sort of equation. The Lebanese instinct is to be inclusive and non-zero-sum; the Western tradition is to interpret everything in a government-opposition model. Westerners have trouble figuring out how Walid Jumblatt, whose father was killed by Syria, spent years supporting Syria (though he's now against it again), or how Michel Aoun, rightwing Maronite general driven out of power by Syrian force of arms, is now an ally of both Syria and Hizbullah. But the key is it is not a zero sum game, since that leads to something like the civil war of 1975-1991. One bargains, one deals, one balances interests and finds a consensus. When Lebanon does that, it works. I have sometimes argued that not only does the Lebanese term za‘im come pretty close to the concept of "godfather" in the Mafia sense, but that the concept of the five families dividing up territory is not a bad analogy either. That may be a patronizing oversimplification, but it is not, in my personal opinion, unhelpful. (Bottom line: if the "opposition" wins in the June 7 elections, don't expect the apocalypse. If the "government" wins, don't expect it either. Left to themselves, the Lebanese will work it out. Their problem has always been that no one — regional neighbors or superpowers — leaves them to themselves.)

A binary view — one which encourages a zero-sum assessment — is not likely to work well in the Middle East, but it is the default paradigm for analysts from an Anglo-American background. I hope these thoughts add a bit to Eric Davis' wise assessment.

Light Posting Today; Some Links to Hold You Over

Today is my daughter's birthday and, due to Good Friday, she's out of school, so I will be taking her to lunch and doing other father-daughter type things. Posting will be light or perhaps nonexistent unless something major happens. I work from home on Fridays anyway, but that usually means more time to post rather than less. But not today: my wife has to work, so it's a dad and daughter thing. Meanwhile, some links to other reading for your edification:

• "To fight Iranian subversion in Egypt, Cairo is willing to help Israel prevent the arming of Hamas in the Gaza Strip." That's from Haaretz, as the drumbeats continue about this Egyptian claim of breaking a Hizbullah-backed network planning to operate in Sinai. There's still a lot of uncertainty about this Egypt/Hizbullah thing. The Arabist had some thoughts along the same line as mine, that the whole "spreading Shi‘ism in Egypt" theme is more a case of Sunni insecurity than actual intent. That doesn't mean that Hizbullah's not involved, of course, just that I don't think the motive is sectarian so much as ideological.

• Meanwhile, Hizbullah itself has its own conspiratorial spin on Egypt's relations with the "Zionist entity" (hardly anyone says that anymore, but Hizbullah does) and the accusations by Egypt; and we're also assured that Sheikh Hasan Nasrallah will explain it all today. (And, in case the mainstream media missed it, Hizbullah's al-Manar TV also informs us with a straight face that Kim Jong-Il has been re-elected!) [I'm linking to their English news pages, but if you can't access the Hizbullah website it may be because your server blocks it, or because the Israelis are hacking it again. During the Lebanon war it was constantly being hacked by Israeli hackers.]

• A new issue of the Carnegie Endowment's Arab Reform Bulletin is out. It's always got good material on democratization and reform issues in the Arab world. Pieces this time on Palestine, Egypt, Syria, Bahrain and Western Sahara. It's currently edited by Michele Dunne, who's no relation and spells Dunn with an (unnecessary) extra "e", but I have gotten phone calls intended for her: Michael Dunn/Michele Dunne look similar in the Rolodex, and we only work about a block apart anyway. We're also both Egypt hands. And Michele's heard me make all these comments before, so I hope she won't mind.

• Al-Masry al-Youm is runnng the whole Ayman Nour divorce story into the ground. As near as I can tell from this "interview" with Gamila Isma‘il (soon to be ex-Madame Nour) they seem to have been walking on the streets in downtown Cairo asking her these questions. National Enquirer style journalism indeed: it sounds a bit like stalking. Arabic story here; English here. Breaking the story on April 6, when Nour was trying to regain the center of attention, may have been justifiable, but at this point it's descending into voyeurism. (Not that Western tabloids are any better, but this is supposed to be an elite paper, the independent equivalent of Al-Ahram.) The Arabist says that "I don’t think I can take much more of the smug, self-congratulatory tone of al-Masri al-Youm anymore," notes their over-hyping of their own stories (and claiming credit for the Hizbullah story, which was publicized by the government) and says "I officially declare the al-Masri al-Youm era of Egyptian journalism over. Not sure what the new era is, but they no longer have the same authority they once did." I think he's right on target there. I also suspect that since the official government press is so staid and boring, even the "elite" independent papers are seeking to be a little sensational to gain a following. Leave these folks alone now. The initial story was news because they are national figures; but from here on, let 'em be.
  

• It's stale news now from yesterday, but Jeffrey Feltman will be the new Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs. Here's his biography; he's already made headlines as Acting Assistant Secretary by going to Syria.

Web 2.0 and Authoritarianism: Orwell Had it Backwards

My post yesterday about the fact that the Egyptian military cadets versus police clash noted that despite the fact that the government had banned not only the official media but Egypt's increasingly vocal independent newspapers from reporting on it (you can't report on anything involving the Army without crossing into taboo territory), you could watch a whole series of cell phone videos online within a couple of days of the events, leads me to reflect on the role that the information revolution has played in democratization movements. If the Iranian Revolution of 1979 was the revolution wrought by audio tapes and the August 1991 Soviet coup/countercoup was the first E-mail revolution, the "color revolutions" in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan and the "Cedar Revolution" in Lebanon were the first real Web 2.0 Revolutions. But the new political ferment is finding whole new avenues for organization: the revolutions to come will not only be televised: they'll be organized on Facebook, documented on YouTube and reported on Twitter. If the American Revolution were to occur today, Tom Paine would probably be a blogger or a podcaster or both. It's the new pamphleteering.

It's not as outrageous as it sounds. Last year during the labor troubles in the big Egyptian textile center of Al-Mahalla al-Kubra (a major city whose name literally just means "big place," but which is Egypt's cotton heartland), a Berkeley graduate student named James Karl Buck was arrested. With the government limiting contact between Mahalla and Cairo, he simply sent a one-word "tweet" to Twitter on his cellphone: "Arrested." Here's one account of the story. Once Berkeley and the US Embassy knew an American was in custody, moves were set in motion to get him out. Of course, a lot of people are arrested in a lot of places who don't have a friendly consulate they can text to, but even so they can get information out, as those videos I linked to already of the Army-police clash indicate. During the 2005 Presidential elections some underground video of polling place shenanigans turned up on Egyptian opposition websites: the security types just aren't tech-savvy enough to check cellphones.

Let me emphasize that while this works in Egypt, a country with significant international trade and communications links and an educated, tech-savvy and cellphone equipped middle class, it doesn't work everywhere. In Saddam Hussein's Iraq, if you owned a typewriter you were required to register its keys with the police. Burma and North Korea do not seem to post to YouTube. But if you choose to block out the information age, you also cut yourself off from the global economy, and only a few hermit states like Burma and North Korea will choose to do so. Egypt is not a totalitarian society; it's authoritarian to be sure, and as the regime's arteries harden, it is often heavy-handed, but it has an independent press (though as seen here, it can't report certain stories), a traditionally independent judiciary (though fighting hard to remain so), and a people who've been dealing with would-be pharaohs since, well, the pharaohs, and have developed a wry sense of humor about governance. I have plenty of qualms about Egypt's regime, but great faith in its people. The fact that Husni Mubarak is not Saddam Hussein or even Bashar al-Asad means that, for all the regime's faults, there is an openness there, though tempered with a heavy-handed security regime.

The information revolution seems to have taken hold pretty well in Egypt, and while I haven't visited for a while it seems to have a lively Internet culture, tempered as usual with the occasional arrest of controversial bloggers. There's a real trade-off between Internet censorship and global commerce, and except for a few select cases of arrested bloggers, Egypt seems to have opted for the commerce side of the equation. China and Saudi Arabia have worked hard to control Internet access without impeding commerce: it hasn't always worked. Technology clearly is undermining authoritarianism. The idea that barring the independent newspapers from reporting the Army-police story will work is a sign that the security services just don't get it yet. But if the security services are behind the curve, the young hackers will really give them a run for their money.

And thus my title: Orwell got it backwards. In 1984 technology was the tool of the state in controlling the populace: viewscreens everywhere, everyone is constantly watched, Big Brother is constantly present. But technology went the other way: we can watch government. Google Earth shows us aerial views of just about everywhere (though someday I do want to blog on the strangely blurry imagery of Israeli Air Bases while you can identify aircraft types on Egyptian and Syrian air bases); government publications are available at the click of a mouse, and when the government — any government — does something out of bounds, cellphone video is all over the world in a minute. [As an aside, during the real, not fictional, 1984, I happened to be in Cairo on the night of the US Presidential election — Reagan-Mondale — and attended a party at the Nile Hilton of US expatriate types and a lot of young Egyptians. The Americans looked normal; the Egyptians were wearing straw hats with red, white and blue decor and were far more enthusiastic about the results coming in (in the wee small hours due to the time difference, though of course there wasn't a lot of suspense in the Reagan-Mondale race) than the Americans. Looking back, that may have been my single most Orwellian experience in the real calendar 1984.]

And, as I noted the other day in my "Mukhabarat 2.0?" post, young web-savvy Egyptians are not afraid to parody their security services. If democracy breaks out in the Arab world it will not be due to neoconservative preaching, altruistic evangelization, or patronizing neocolonial paternalism, it will come because the people have gained instruments that outmaneuver, undermine, or leapfrog over the walls the governments have built. It may not look like the American system, or the Westminster system, or even the French system, but technology is increasingly empowering people.

Okay, Egypt has taken a few hits here in recent days, so let me say something positive: if indeed Gamal Mubarak is going to be the next President of Egypt, he is at least Western educated (AUC), worked in the West (banker for a US bank in London), is a free-marketeer and, so far as I can tell, understands both globalization and the information age. I'm not a fan of hereditary monarchies, but his background and environment are very different from his father's. Of the various potential candidates within the government elite, he's probably a lot more of a free-market man than the various generals, party functionaries and security men otherwise in the picture. He would, I think, understand the lessons of those videos above, and perhaps move to restrain the security state, though I doubt he would end it.

Gamal is not, so far as I know, particularly committed to democratic reforms; odd how if you get your job because you succeed your father you may not see the advantages of electoral democracy. But open economies often lead to open societies (look at the changes in Taiwan and South Korea), though not invariably (China and Singapore). And he does seem to be the advocate of a more open economy. Perhaps I'm grasping at straws, looking for good points.