Noted Belatedly: Obama Used "Persian Gulf" in Nowruz Greeting

I overlooked a subtle message in President Obama's Nowruz message to Iran the other day.

I've discussed on earlier occasions (here and here and here  and here and here) what I have called "the  [Insert Name Here] Gulf problem which has led to Iran protesting anyone referring to "the Arab Gulf,," or even, in the case of Google Maps, which tried to avoid the issue by labeling it "the Gulf," a form I sometimes use on this blog, complaining about that, as well as the airline Gulf Air. But one of the links above is to a case of a Saudi case which went the other way, in which a teacher got in trouble for using "Persian Gulf." In the Middle East Journal, I allow either, since I've learned Iranian authors will protest if you change it to just "the Gulf."

It got past me until now that in Obama's Nowruz message urging Iran to agree to a nuclear deal, he specifically appealed to Iranians "from the coasts of the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf."
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1914 Pre-War Maneuvering in the Gulf, Part II: Contesting the Shatt and the Dispatch of Force "D"

In part I of this post yesterday, I set the general strategic and political stage on which the British and Ottoman Empires played out an increasing confrontation in the Gulf in the weeks leading up to Turkey's formal entry into the Great War a century ago. In this post, I hope to detail those events. (I'm drawing on multiple sources, official and secondary.)

HMS Odin

On the day before the Ottomans (or rather the local German commander), closed the Dardanelles on September 26, the Government of India had already proposed that, with tensions rising with Turkey, a Brigade of Indian Army troops should be deployed to the Gulf to protect the Iranian oilfields and the Abadan refinery. On September 27, the local Turkish authorities declared the Shatt al-‘Arab in its entirety to be Turkish waters. HMS Odin at the time was positioned off Abadan Island, in what Britain insisted was international waters and in which a 1913 Anglo-Turkish agreement had permitted non-belligerent passage to the Persian side.

HMS Espiegle

Britain was not about to abandon access to Abadan or its right of innocent passage in peacetime, and on September 29 Odin was joined by another Navy sloop, HMS Espiegle, and an aging troopship, HMS Dalhousie. These did not constitute much firepower, but the Turks had few ships in the area, and they were a tripwire of sorts. They stayed on the Abadan side of the Shatt or in Muhammara (Khorramshahr), but also had orders to patrol that side of the Shatt to prevent any Turkish impediment to navigation.

HMS Dalhousie

From then until the end of October, the British and Turks exchanged demands and threats but each stayed clear of provoking hostilities. I'm going to tell the story of the maneuvering in the Gulf first, and then shift to what was happening with the Indian Army troops deploying for the Gulf. What needs to be kept in mind in what follows is that the British knew, and the Turks did not, that an Indian Army Brigade would arrive in the Gulf before the end of October. More on that momentarily.

In early October the Turks declared that the Shatt was inland waters and that "Guns at Fao will fire on any man-of-war disregarding prohibition"; a notice to this effect was delivered to Espiegle October 7 and the British ships were given 24 hours to leave the Shatt. The Royal Navy of a global Empire rather disdainfully replied that so long as the "Turkish Government does not intern the German War Vessels 'GOEBEN' and 'BRESLAU', His Majesty's Government will maintain a Naval Force in the Shatt-al-Arab." To this, the Turks responded with a threat to mine the Shatt. And the British fired back saying that would constitute a hostile act, and that the British would consider it as such.They alerted their three small vessels to report any Turkish activity that might be construed as minelaying.

That was on October 23. It is probably no coincidence that on that same day an old British battleship and four troopships arrived at Bahrain with the aforementioned Indian Brigade. Which brings us to the other part of this drama.

Meanwhile, Back at the Raj . . .

(Sorry, sometimes I can't resist.)

While the Government in London was treading cautiously to avoid pushing the Turks into war, the Government of India was advocating a more forward strategy. They had already endured jitters because the German light cruiser SMS Emden was loose in the Indian Ocean (soon to be sunk, but not yet), and fears that a belligerent Turkey might influence Indian Muslims. As I've noted, already in September they had proposed sending a Brigade to protect the oilfields, and this was authorized on October 2.

While Turkey's entry into the war was expected, it was not yet in the war, but Britain had the advantage of its colonies and protectorates in the Gulf region, including its informal protectorate at Muhammara, discussed yesterday. Still, the movement of ground forces to the Gulf was kept secret. to avoid a provocation.

Gen. Sir Arthur Barrett

It was decided to send one Brigade from the 6th (Poona) Division of the Indian Army. Its orders, kept rather vague, were to occupy Abadan and protect the oilfields, unless Turkey entered the war, in which case it was to move on Basra and was promised reinforcement by the remaining brigades of the Poona Division. The Division was commanded by General Sir Arthur Barrett, who would follow with the rest of the Division. The Brigade chosen for the mission was the 16th Infantry Brigade, along with associated units, under the command of Brigadier Walter S. Delamain. An Indian Army officer who had served in border wars and the Boxer Rebellion in China, Delamain was to command a force designated Indian Expeditionary Force "D". He received his orders on October 10 and the force was to sail from Bombay on October 16.

There were multiple Indian Expeditionary Forces given letter names: Force "A" was to serve on the Western Front in Europe, 'B" in East Africa where British Kenya, Uganda, and Zanxibar adjoined German East Africa (Tanganyika, with Zanzibar today's Tanzania), Force "F" for the Suez Canal.

Walter S. Delamain

Delamain's destination was secret and he was to open his orders at sea. For security reasons Force "D" was dispersed on troopships carrying Force "A" to Europe and Force "B" to East Africa, and sailed from Bombay on October 16. After three days at sea, he opened his orders. The fleet then rendezvoused with an old, pre-Dreadnought era battleship, HMS Ocean and Force "D", now concentrated in four troopships, headed to the Persian Gulf. On October 23, they arrived at Bahrain.

HMS Ocean

Still cautious about provoking Turkey and uncertain as well about the attitude of Qajar Iran, Delamain's force did not immediately proceed to Abadan. But as noted earlier, British statements on free navigation in the Shatt grew tougher.

On the very eve of Turkey's entry into the war, Britain had positioned several ships, including the aging battleship HMS Ocean, later sunk at Gallipoli, and several thousand Indian Army troops in the northern Gulf. Once they learned of the Turkish attacks on the Russian ports (October 29 : they seem to have heard on the 30th) they moved north and took position off the bar at the entrance to the Shatt on November 3. When Britain declared war on Turkey on November 5, they were ready: they landed at Fao (Faw) on November 6 and took Basra in late November.

We'll be looking at many of those events in more detail in the coming days and weeks. This map of the early days of the campaign may illuminate the geography:

Saab and Singh: One Carrier in the Gulf is More Than Enough

For those of you interested in defense debates, an area I once wrote about a lot myself, here's a challenging piece by defense analysts Bilal Saab (also a contributor to the current issue of MEJ) and Joseph Singh: "Forget the Second Carrier, It's Time to Rethink the Fifth Fleet in the Persian Gulf."

Do read their reasoning. 

A Note on Gulf "Arabics"

Regular readers know I'm interested in Arabic dialects and the questions raised by widespread diglossia, so I thought I'd toss this your way: Saqer Almarri on "Language Diversity in the Gulf: The Arabics" (sic). I'm not really qualified to comment on the specific dialects, but it seems germane to the discussion.

A Major Contribution to Gulf History: Digitizing the India Office Records

The Guardian reports on a major project that will contribute greatly to researchers pursuing the history of the Gulf: funded by Qatar, the British Library is digitizing some half million pages of India Office records, a treasure trove for reconstructing the Gulf from the mid-18th century onward. They also are digitizing some 25,000 Arabic manuscripts as part of the same project.

I envy the next generation of historians the growing wealth of digital source material. For centuries historians have had to go where the archives were, but we may finally be about to transcend that.

It's interesting that, in the article, an archivist (if quoted correctly by the newspaper) actually compares this immense undertaking to the accomplishment of J.G. Lorimer in compiling his great 5000=page Gazeteer of the Gulf, which I've discussed on this blog before. That may understate the goals of this huge project, but it does indicate an appreciation of the immensity of the contribution of John Gordon Lorimer to the history of the Gulf.

It's Not Just Iran That Ties Itself in Knots Over the Name of the [Insert Name Here] Gulf

We often comment here on the ongoing "Name That Gulf!" controversy over the body of water between Iran and Arabia. Usually it's Iran that is saber-rattling because someone, somewhere has called the body of water something other than "Persian Gulf"; recently, when Google Maps simply refused to label the Gulf, they went ballistic about that, and still say they will sue Google.

The latest incident, though, is in Saudi Arabia, where the Alice Through the Looking Glass rules apply and you get in trouble for calling it Persian, in this case in an English writing exam at King Khaled Universiity in ‘Asir, The temporary contract professor chose a passage from a book, unaware that there is a decree in the Kingdom forbidding using texts that include the term.

Ayatollah Khomeini reportedly suggested "the Islamic Gulf." But does that mean that the Gulfs of, oh, just off the top of my head, Tunis, Hammamet, Gabes, Sidra, Suez, Aqaba, Aden, and Oman, are somehow less Islamic? (For Khomeini the answer may have been yes, but it does seem a bit all-inclusive.)

Since you get in trouble with somebody for calling it "Persian Gulf," "Arab Gulf," just "the Gulf," or, like Google, for not labeling it at all,  I will for now take my cue from the Sumerians (who got there first) and simply call it "The Great Water." Or perhaps it might be more appropriate to use one of their other names, "the Bitter Sea."

Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don't, Damned if You Sit on the Fence ...

We've talked a number of times about the whole "Arab Gulf" versus "Persian Gulf" debate (if that's the right word for it). (Another post here.) While many Arabs prefer to call the body of water "the Arab Gulf," despite centuries in which they called it Khalij Fars, this makes Iranians irrational with fury. Some folks try to avoid controversy by just calling it "the Gulf," but Iranians have caught on to that as a sneaky way of avoiding saying "Persian."

So, apparently, Google Maps decided the better part of valor was just to not label the thing at all. (Google Earth, on the other hand, apparently uses both names.) But that didn't get past the Iranians either, who are now protesting.
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Archaeologists Uncovering Medieval City in Ras al-Khaimah

Archaeologists working in Ras al-Khaimah in the UAE are finding evidence of a medieval city of up to 70,000 people on the site of Julfar,the old trading port that preceded the modern town, according to this piece in The National. [Link is now fixed.]

Lorimer's Gazeteer of the Gulf

There's an interesting piece at The National about one of the more amazing works of the British imperial era in the Middle East, John Gordon Lorimer's Gazeteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia. As the article notes, the project was originally classified and intended as a handbook to the region as Britain was consolidating its power there. It grew to be a six-volume, 5000 page encyclopedic survey of the history, geography, tribal structure and topography of the Gulf and its hinterlands, complete with maps and genealogical charts of the ruling families. It is the starting point for almost any historian working on the Gulf prior to the 20th century. You can find a listing of its contents here, in a prospectus for a library reprint edition.

Sadly, in an era when so many pre-1923 works are available online, only one of the six volumes actually seems to be available,  the fifth (which is called volume IIa confusingly enough), and which is the first half of the "Geograpical and Statistical" gazeteer, and is available on Google books. Browsing through it will give you a taste of the whole, and most decent Middle East libraries should have a set.

I'm glad The National thought to write about it since it's one of those works I've used but don't own myself (the reprints are pricey) and might never have thought to blog about.

Sheikh Saqr and the Tunbs

When Queen Mary of England learned of the fall of the long-English town of Calais to the French, she reportedly said that when she died and her body was opened, "you will find 'Calais' written upon my heart."

For Sheikh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah, who died yesterday at age 92 (earlier posts here and here), the word would be "Tunbs."

If you're not familiar with the Tunbs, you probably haven't known many Emiratis, since the subject does tend to come up. The Greater and Lesser Tunb Islands (Tunb al-Kubra and Tunb al-Sughra in Arabic; Tonb-e Bozorg and Tonb-e Kuchek in Persian)(pronounced in Arabic as if spelled Tumb) are two tiny islands in the Strait of Hormuz. Since November 1971 they have been occupied by Iran, but claimed by the UAE, along with the island of Abu Musa. Before 1971 the Tunbs were administered by the Emirate of Ras al-Khaimah, ruled from 1948 until yesterday by Sheikh Saqr, while Abu Musa was administered by Sharja. (My sense is the two Wikipedia links lean to the Iranian view of the dispute, but they introduce the subject.)

As the map shows, the Tunbs are located between the main shipping lanes of the Strait of Hormuz, the key outlet for Gulf oil. Abu Musa sits just to the south. They are a strategic planner's delight: potential power bases on a key global chokepoint.

In 1971, as the British retreated from "East of Suez," what had been the "Trucial States" prepared to join together in the UAE, and Iran — Imperial Iran under the Shah, remember — claimed the islands as historically Iranian. The withdrawing British were not prepared for a confrontation and may have felt Iran would be the better steward of the Strait. (After all, Iran would always be a staunch ally of the West.)

Under the gun, Sharja reached a deal allowing Iran sand Sharja to share Abu Musa. Sheikh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah steadfastly refused to compromise on the Tunbs. Iran occupied Abu Musa peaceably, the Tunbs by military force.

Since that time, Iran has been in possession of all three islands (eventually taking full control of Abu Musa in effect) and keeps them well garrisoned (even Lesser Tunb, which historically was uninhabited). The UAE has never relinquished its claim, and has produced a lot of documentation arguing its case, but Iran has refused to take the case to the World Court. Sheikh Saqr never forgot the Tunbs. The UAE has produced reams of documents, but Iran has the islands.

I won't judge the historical claims. Sovereignty has meant different things at different times, and the two sides of the Gulf have traded and fished and pearled since Classical times. There are Arab speakers on the Iranian side and Persian speakers on the Arabian side, and no argument is likely to persuade an Iranian or an Emirati of the merit of the other case. Like the "Persian Gulf" controversy, it is a matter of firm national conviction.

But Sheikh Saqr never lost faith, and never compromised.

The [Insert Name Here] Gulf, Yet Again

The old Persian/Arab Gulf argument is back again, with the Mayor of Shiraz (Iran) going after Gulf Air because the Bahrain-based airline does not call itself "Persian Gulf Air." (Thanks to The Gulf Blog for catching this one.) You'll recall that this sort of thing keeps coming up, and even led to postponement of the (apparently misnamed) Islamic Solidarity Federation games.

It also is noted in the first link above that the Iranians have also gone after National Geographic and banned both its Atlas and its reporters.

I know from experience as an editor that Iranians, including Iranian scholars living in the West, get very insistent about this, and whereas my predecessor sought to use just "the Gulf," I let the author decide, and the Iranians of course always will choose Persian Gulf.

If we agree, will they scrap the nuclear program?

The (Insert Name Here) Gulf, Continued

Iran's latest campaign to enforce usage of the term "Persian Gulf" as opposed to "Arab Gulf" or simply "Gulf" is continuing. Iran is now saying it will ban airlines that don't use the term "Persian Gulf." This latest raising of the perennial issue apparently stems from Iran's firing and expulsion of a Greek flight attendant on (domestic Iranian operator) Kish Airlines, because the aircraft's monitor displayed the term "Arab Gulf." It isn't clear why this flight attendant was singled out, and the story also suggests the whole flight crew might be fired.

I addressed this issue just a month ago, and it remains a chip on Iran's shoulder (as if it has nothing else to confront its neighbors over).

The [Insert Preference Here] Gulf

This is an old story for most Gulf hands, but now the Islamic Solidarity Sports Foundation in Riyadh has cancelled athletic games scheduled for Tehran because Iran insisted on putting "Persian Gulf" on the medals. The Arab world is adamant in calling it Al-Khalij al-‘Arabi, the Arab Gulf, and Iranians are equally insistent in calling it the Persian Gulf, and insist it's always been so-called.

This is a heated issue for Arabs and Iranians. Some of my predecessors as Editors of The Middle East Journal sought to enforce as Journal style what I myself use in my own writing: just call it "the Gulf" and let your readers choose. But Iranian authors tend to go ballistic if you do that, seeing it as a profound insult to Iranians everywhere.

Arabs are equally consistent about calling it the Arab Gulf, and the GCC, the Gulf Cooperation Council, is officially the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council.

In all honesty, without my trying to figure out what the Sumerians or the Achaemenids may have called it (commenters are free to speak up if they like), it's true that the Classical world tended to call it Sinus Persicus or the Greek equivalent, and all the early Arab geographers either called it Khalij Fars or al-Khalij al-‘Ajami, which pretty much mean the same thing as Persian Gulf. Once in a while it was called the Gulf of Basra or some such, but Arab Gulf is a 20th-Century coinage as far as I can tell. Still, names matter to people, and I still call it The Gulf to avoid conflict or offense, unless there's danger of confusing it with some other gulf. (Actually, when there are no Iranians around to argue with, most Gulf Arabs seem to use "al-Khalij" in speech without the adjective.)

But obviously, it's still a hugely divisive issue. As to the irony of the name "Islamic Solidarity Sports Foundation" in this context, you can make up your own comment.

Oh, and I once saw a Pakistani map that showed the huge body of water south of Asia as the "South Asian Ocean", but that doesn't seem to be as big an issue.