November 1, 1954: Toussaint Rouge, The Algerian War Begins

Sixty-three years ago today, a day remembered as Toussaint Rouge, "Red All Saints' Day," the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) staged 30 or more raids against French military and police posts throughout Algeria. It heralded the beginning of the eight year war for Algerian independence, a war which would bring down the Fourth French Republic and inaugurate the Fifth with the return of Charles de Gaulle, finally leading to Algerian independence in 1962.

The war, which saw hundreds of thousands of casualties, remains an enormous event in Algerian national consciousness. Though ailing and rarely appearing in public, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika is a living reminder of those days when most of the other historic leaders have passed on. Today the median age in Algeria is in the 20s; few Algerians today witnessed the War of Independence.

NYT Updates the Ongoing Gilles Kepel vs Olivier Roy Feud: The Debate in France over the Nature of Islamic Radicalism

Gilles Kepel

This week The New York Times offered a piece on the increasingly bitter personal feud between France's two best-known experts on Jihadist Islam. .
It's a fight that erupted late last year after the Paris terrorist attacks and that has grown increasingly heated, with two longtime scholar-experts and onetime friends resorting to names like "ignoramus." I've started to write about this particularly Gallic intellectual feud between Olivier Roy and Gilles Kepel more than once but my surgery delayed the post so I'll use the NYT article as an excuse..

While the US Presidential campaign spouts a lot of ill-informed rhetoric about the dangers of radical Islam, real or imagined, France, which has had much first-hand experience, is also witnessing a debate over the nature of Islamic radicalism. The difference is that the main proponents on each side actually know what they are talking about. In fact, they have long dominated the conversation.

Olivier Roy

When it comes to the study of political Islamic movements, radical and otherwise, Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy have dominated the field in France, and arguably in Europe, for decades. Both were once fixtures at Sciences-Po in Paris, though Roy is now at the European University Institute in Florence. And many of he best of the younger generation of specialists in political Islam and jihadism came out of Sciences-Po had studied under one or both. (Off the top of my head, Jean-Pierre Filiu, Stephane Lacroix, and Thomas Hegghammer, but there are many more.)

For those who don't read French, the NYT piece provides a short introduction, as does this Washington Post column. 
Subscribers to The Chronicle of Higher Education will find a good summary behind a paywall here.

If you read French, however, you might as well go to the source. Last November, in the wake of the Paris terror attacks, Roy published an article in Le Monde called "Olivier Roy: « Le djihadisme est une révolte générationnelle et nihiliste »."

His argument, oversimplified of course from its Gallic precision, is that the radicalized Muslims of the Paris suburbs are not really motivated by religion but by nihilism and anarchism, and that Islam is a rationalizing overlay, or, in Roy's aphoristic summary, "the Islamization of radicalism."

By December, Gilles Kepel was taking exception in articles such as this interview in the conservative Le Figaro: "Gilles Kepel: «L'objectif de l'État islamique ? Déclencher une guerre civile en France»." An English summary of the objections to Roy can be found in this piece by Francois Burgat. Kepel and his supporters take a more  traditional approach, seeing  European Islamists more traditionally, as radicalized Islamists.

After the Brussels attacks, Kepel emphasized his views:'"Molenbeek français': la mise au point de Gilles Kepel." Roy reiterated his views in other articles, and in March Kepel struck back with a provocatively titled article in Libération: "«Radicalisations» et «islamophobie»: le roi est nu."
"Le roi est nu," or "The king is naked," is an obvious pun (roi/Roy) on Olivier Roy's name.

And that only brings the back-and-forth up to March. The rhetoric has gotten increasingly personal.

Now, while I am generally familiar with the literature on Jihadism, I am no expert, and certainly not in a league with Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy, nor have I studied radical Islam in Europe, as both men have.  As a historian rather than a political scientist, I tend to be skeptical of theory and rigid structural analysis, and I tend to be pragmatic. From that perspective, the difference between "the Islamization of radicalism" and "the radicalization of Islam" seems to be the question of which you address first. But it also seems that both Islam and a nihilistic desperation play a role. Do we really need a Manichean dichotomy, a zero-sum construct where either one formula or the other is sacrosanct? or could we learn more from reading both Kepel and Roy?

But what do I know? I'm not even French.

Remember Paris, But Also Beirut, Ankara, Baghdad, Sinai...

Amid the mourning over the Paris attacks, I think it is particularly important to remember that the overwhelming majority of victims of the Islamic State have been in the Middle East. The 40+ dead in Beirut the day before the Paris attacks were innocent civilians as well. Sunnis and Shi‘a, Kurds and Assyrians and Yazidis, have died in the thousands, without everyone changing their Facebook profile pictures to the colors of the Lebanese or Syrian or Iraqi flag. Mourn for Paris to be sure,  but also for all victims.

October 28, 1915: Sir Charles Monro Relaces Ian Hamilton at Gallipoli

Though this post is technically a day late, or a day early perhaps (see below), it is an attempt to bring our centennial series on the Middle East in the Great War up to speed by returning to the Gallipoli Front where, from mid-October to mid-November, as decisions would be made which would lead to the decision to wind down and evacuate the Dardanelles force.

Gen, Sir Ian Hamilton

On October 16, months after the Gallipoli operation stalled following the Suvla landings in August, General Sir Ian Hamilton, the overall commander, was recalled by Lord Kitchener. Hamilton, despite being one of the more disastrous British generals in a war when Britain produced more than is share of disastrous generals, retired to write books of military memoirs and became head of the veteran's organization, the British Legion, for Scotland. He remained a pillar of the British establishment though, as a leader of the Anglo-German Association, he was an early admirer of Adolf Hitler. Having already been knighted in 1910, he was made a Knight Grand Cross of St. Michael and Saint George (GCMG) in 1919. To be fair, they say he wasn't bad in the Boer War. He lived until 1947 and died at 94.

Gen. Sir Charles Monro

Replacing Hamilton as the Commander-in Chief of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force was General Sir Charles Monro, a veteran of the Boer War and the Western Front. He was also an advocate of the Western Front first approach, though he would end up commanding in the Salonika Front, Mesopotamia, and India before the war was over. As we'll see in the coming weeks, he would also be the advocate of withdrawal from Gallipoli. He arrived at Imbros, the staging area, on October 28, and at Gallipoli October 30, so posting today splits the difference.

He would find support from another direction: the growing demands of the Balkan Front. As I noted in discussing the Mesopotamian Campaign, Bulgaria had finally entered the war on the Central powers side, and promptly attacked Serbia, which was already partly occupied by Austria-Hungary, thus giving the Ottomans the prospect of a direct rail link with Vienna and Germany. Though a bit peripheral to the Middle East proper, the British and French sought to shore up a collapsing Serbia by landing a military force at Salonika (Greek Thessaloniki) in Greece. They did this despite opposition from a divided Greek government. In the end it was too late to save Serbia, so the rationale became defending Greece (whether it liked it or not) against the Ottomans and Bulgarians.

The French would send mostly colonial troops and the Russians and other allies would send token forces, and remnants of the Serbian Army who escaped through Montenegro and were evacuated by Italy would join them, but the obvious source of British Empire troops were the ANZAC, British, and Irish troops stuck at Gallipoli. Already on September 30 the 10th (Irish) Division left Gallipoli, landing at Salonika October 5. The troops on Gallipoli were clearly not going to take Constantinople, so Salonika, despite the crushing of Serbia, and were thus a potential source of troops.

The Khedive throws a Party: As Egypt Prepares for Grand Opening of Enlarged Suez Canal, Let's Remember 1869

As I've noted in a couple of recent posts this is the week Egypt is celebrating the dedication of the "New Suez Canal,"consisting of a newly dredged channel and a widening and deepening of the existing Canal, to permit increased traffic and two-way traffic in sections. It looks to be a much-hyped celebration, but it will be hard pressed to match the extravagant party staged by Khedive Isma‘il on the opening of the original Canal in 1869.

Cairo Opera in 1869

In the 1860s, Isma‘il had embarked on a spending spree, partly funded by European loans. As the French were working (with local laborers of course) to build the Canal, Isma‘il embarked on an ambitious plan to rebuild Cairo, or more precisely to build a European-style city in the reclaimed floodplains to the West of the traditional city. He also was granted the right by the Ottoman Sultan to use the title of Khedive rather than Wali. The new Isma‘iliyya quarter, what we think of today as downtown Cairo, consisted of grand, Parisian-style avenues and boulevards scattered with parks and squares, European hotels, an Opera House, several palaces, and more. The architecture was mostly French or Italianate. The Opera House was opened on November 1, 1869, just before the Canal dedication. (Most people think the first performance was the debut of Verdi's Aida, which was indeed commissioned for the occasion, but was not yet ready, so Rigoletto was performed instead. Aida had its debut in 1871.) This original Cairo Opera on what was called Opera Square next to the Ezbekiyya Gardens burned in 1971, The present Opera House on Gezira was built in 1988.

In addition to a European city and a European Opera, Isma‘il invited the Crowned heads of Europe. The French under De Lesseps were building the Canal, so France had pride of place. Napoleon III was busy (the Franco-Prussian War would break out the following year), so he sent his Empress, Eugénie, to preside. These distinguished guests would need places to stay. (The Khedive did not invite Muslim sovereigns such as the Shah of Persia or the Sultan of Morocco, however.) Other guests included painters, scholars, musician, and novelists.

Gezireh Palace after becoming a Hotel

The New Hotel (later the Continental Savoy) opposite Ezbekiyya was taken over for many of the guests, but it would not do for Royalty, so the Khedive had built a palace especially for them, just across the Nile in the Zamalek area of Gezira. This, the Gezira Palace, was where Eugénie and others were quartered. It later became a grand hotel, first called the Gezira Palace and Later the Omar Khayyam. Today the original palace forms the central core of the much-expanded Cairo Marriott Hotel and Omar Khayyam Casino. The video shows the interior in its later incarnation as a grand hotel.

Pavilion at Ismailia (Illustrated London News)

But the celebrations would not be confined to Cairo. The guests of honor were given a boat tour up the Nile and then transported to the city of Ismailia for the Canal opening. On November 17,  after a Muslim cleric and a French priest blessed the Canal at Port Said, a parade of ships sailed and steamed through the Canal to formally open it. The Empress declared it open and the guests banqueted in the desert.

The Empress on Camelback

The ceremonies brought Egypt much world attention, but there was a downside. The Khedive had borrowed heavily from Europe, and the debts were to accumulate. Ironically, though the French built the Canal, the first toll-paying ship through it was British, and the Canal would become a lifeline to British India. By 1875, with Egypt indebted and France weakened in the Franco-Prussian War, Britain acquired the shares of the Suez Canal Company. In 1879 Isma‘il was deposed in favor of his son, and in 1882 the British occupied Egypt. Isma‘il's big party was over.

Video of Beirut in the 1920s

Via the blog Hummus for Thought, here's a video (silent, with French title cards), showing Beirut in the 1920, during the French Mandate:

A Two-Month Late Remembrance of Eric Rouleau (1926-2015)

Nasser and Rouleau, 1963

First, apologies for being late to this: I should follow the French press more closely. I've belatedly learned that the great journalist and diplomat Eric Rouleau died on February 25. He was unquestionably the greatest French journalist on the Middle East of his generation as the Middle East correspondent for Le Monde for several decades, and later served as France's Ambassador first to Tunisia and then to Turkey.

I previously wrote about him in 2012, when the Cairo Review of International Affairs published an excerpt in English from his memoirs. AUC has since published the translation of his French memoirs as Cairo: a Memoir. I believe the French version covers his whole career: Dans les coulisses du Proche-Orient: Mémoires d’un journaliste diplomate.

His background explains a lot. He was born in the Cairo suburb of Heliopolis in 1926 as Elie Raffoul, to a family of Egypt's once-flourishing Jewish community. Like many Egyptian Jews of the era he also had Communist affiliations and was expelled in 1951. He made a journalistic career in France under the name Eric Rouleau. Though Jewish he was a sympathizer of the Palestinian cause and in 1963 was granted an interview with Nasser.

I only met him once at a reception somewhere (in DC I think) and heard him speak a few times, but I read him often. One of the truly great journalists who also had an afterlife as a diplomat, I regret that I am so late learning of his passing.

Paris Court Rules "King of Raï" Cheb Khaled's First Big Hit was Plagiarized

Blogging has been light due to deadlines, but there's big trouble in the Arabic music world, especially for fans of the Algerian folk form known as raï. A court in Paris has ruled that Algerian-born singer Cheb Khaled, known as the "King of Raï," is guilty of plagiarizing his 1993 hit "Didi," the hit that made him an international star.

See also this report and, in French, this one and this one. The court ruled the song was plagiarized from another another singer, who sings as Cheb Rabah, and that the song's success deprived Cheb  Rabah of the opportunity for a more lucrative career. The court imposed €100,000 in compensation and another €100,000 in punitive damages. Cheb Khaled (born Khaled Hadj Ibrahim: raï  singers are called "Cheb" or "young man" though Khaled is now 55) reportedly will appeal.

I'll link to this YouTube video though they may well take it down now:

Israel's Yediot/Ynet Publishes New Revelations in the 1965 Ben Barka Assassination Case; Lengthy Story Then Disappears Down Memory Hole

Mehdi Ben Barka

Update: The story has reappeared under a new title, and I haven't compared the two.

Early Sunday morning Israel time the Ynet website, the English online site for Yediot Acharanot, published a lengthy article on the Israeli role in the 1965 disappearance and death of Moroccan dissident Mehdi Ben Barka, called "Secret History: How the Mossad became entangled in a political assassination."

You may note that I didn't link to the article. That is because within 24 hours, perhaps less, it disappeared from the website. 

The article, by investigative journalists Ronen Bergman and Shlomo Nakdimon, remained availble through Google cache last night, but now the cached version also brings up a page not found message.

Fortunately Le Monde had already interviewed one of the authors, (link is in French) and some Algerian  and Palestinian papers ran summaries, but the main story seems to have disappeared down a memory hole.

This is curious. The Israeli press is subject to military censorship, but articles must be cleared before publication. Did censorship clear it in error? Did somebody else spike the story?

If so, they must not understand the Internet. Even when someone manages to delete it from Google Cache, you can't be sure readers haven't already saved copies to the hard drives.

Readers like me.

Screencap of the story

I won't violate their copyright by quoting the story in full, but since it seems to have vanished I'll summarize it.

I previously wrote about the Ben Barka affair back in 2012. The disappearance of Ben Barka from the streets of Paris was a scandal mat the time. French investigations led to the jailing of a few French agents, and the involvement of Moroccan intelligence has long been established. Mossad's role has long been rumored, but with few details known.

Ahmad Dlimi

Bergman and Nakdimon begin by discussing Mossad's good relations with French intelligence dating from the days of the Algerian war, as well as their growing covert relations with Moroccan intelligence. They report that Morocco  provided Israel with full details of the 1965 Arab Summit in Casablanca, and in return asked for Israeli help in locating the exiled dissident, Mehdi Ben Barka.

They directly quote from interviews they had with the Mossad chief at the time, Meir Amit, prior to his death in 2009. According to Amit (as quoted in the article), Israel was willing to cooperate but did not want to get directly involved in a killing.

They helped the Moroccans locate Ben Barka, who traveled frequently, discovering he picked up mil from a kiosk in Geneva. This was conveyed to Moroccan Deputy Interior Minister Ahmed Dlimi. (The article spells it Dalimi, but Dlimi is standard in both English nd French.) But then:

But for the Moroccans, Israel's debt had not yet been paid. On October 1, 1965, they requested Mossad agents in Paris to rent them a hiding place and provide them with camouflage, makeup and fake passports. In addition, they wanted Israel to follow their target for them and advise them on how best to send Ben Barka to meet his maker.

According to the protocol of the meetings between Amit and [Prime Minister Levi] Eshkol, only on October 4 did Amit report to the prime minister about the Mossad's involvement. To sweeten the pill of what he was about to tell Eshkol, Amit began with good news, describing the valuable intelligence gathered by the Mossad at the summit in Casablanca. "I want to show you the information about the debates," Amit told Eshkol, and said that intelligence indicated that at that time, the armies of the Arab countries were not ready for war against Israel.

Then came the less good tidings: "What do they want?" Eshkol asked. Amit continued: "A very simple thing: Deliver Mehdi Ben Barka. We found him in Paris and King Hassan gave an order to kill him. They came to us and said: 'We do not want you to do it, but help us.'

Meir Amit

Israel agreed to provide five foreign passports, but they quote Amit as sayi[ng that Eshkol said to him in Yiddish, "It does not smell right to me."

Four days went by. On October 8, Amit told Eshkol: "So far, all is well. We are able to hold on. We are 'ducking' the issue."

But the Moroccans had no intention of "ducking" the issue. On October 12, Dalimi asked Israel for fake car license plates and a poisonous solution. Israel rejected the request for the license plates and suggested the use of rented cars, for which it would provide fake documentation. Dalmi also informed Israel that Oufkir had decided to postpone the operation until the end of October, but did not specify an exact date.

On October 13, 1965, Dalimi left France to return to Morocco, and Amit took this as a sign that the entire operation had been scrapped. "Thank God, they gave up on it," he told Eshkol on the same day.

Besides Amit, the report also cites the work of Dr. Shlomo Ben-Nun, an expert on Israeli-Moroccan relations.


Dlimi and his agents, with the help of French police acting on their own, kidnapped Ben Barka as he arrivved for a meeting at the famed Brasserie Lipp, They took him to an apartment on the outskirts ofn Paris and t]ortured him. The authors cite conflicting reports over whether the Mor0ccans asked Mossad for poison, but say the sources agree that Ben Barka died under torture. Mossad then assisted in disposing of the body in a forest outside Paris.

Muhammad Oufkir

Charkes de Gaulle was furious .at a kidnapping on the streets of Paris in broad daylight,  and reportedly demanded that King Hasan II hand over Dlimi and his superior, Interior Minister Muhammad Oufkir. On November 5, Amit reportedly told Eshkol, "The Moroccans killed Ben Barka. Israel had no physical connection to the act itself."

Much of this has been reported or rumored in the past. But the authors also discuss an internal Israeli blowback from the operation. According to them, Mossad's legendary "founding father," Isser Harel, retired but an adviser to Eshkol, entered the tale. They quote Harel (who died in 2003) as telling them before his death

When Harel heard of the Mossad involvement in the affair, he turned to prime minister Eshkol. Before his death, Harel described the conversation to us: "I told him (Eshkol): 'God sent me to protect you and you became terribly entangled. Amit lied to you all along. You told him not to get involved, and he was involved. Your situation is very grave. You had a consultant on this issue and you didn’t consult him. And it heightens your own responsibility, and now you have to resign.'

"Eshkol really begged for his life," Harel recounted. "I told him, in my opinion, you should appoint an inquiry commission and see who is responsible for this failure, and the findings of the investigation will decide whether you continue as prime minister. And as for Amit, you should know that he did not tell you the truth. You had an advisor and did not use him. Eshkol almost started crying ..."

Isser Harel

Eshkol refused to resign and refused to fire Amit, but continued to pursue the issue, leading to secret investigations and much infighting. Amit blamed Harel's jealousy of his successor. De Gaulle through Mossad's European headquarters out of Paris.

I can't testify to any of this and would normally have just referred you to the link. The whole story is much longer and more detailed than my summary.

As for Muhammad Oufkir, he was implicated in a plot to shoot down the King's plane in 1972, after which he committed suicide, or many believe "committed suicide." Ahmad Dlimi went on to become the hero of the war against POLISARIO in Western Sahara, becoming the most powerful figure since Oufkir and perhaps considered a threat by the King. In 1983, after a meeting with the King, he was killed in an auto accident, the "accidental" nature of which has been widely questioned.

March 18, 1915: The British and French Navies Fail at the Dardanelles

A century ago today, the Gallipoli campaign, at least arguably, was doomed to failure more than a month before the first troops went ashore. This post repeats text and photos that appeared in a post last year, a sort of rerun for the actual centennial today. You should also read my March 10 post about the Turkish minelayer Nusret.

Winston Churchill, at the time First Lord of the Admiralty, had a thing about the Mediterranean that would persist into the next World War as well. He conceived a daring plan to break the stalemate on the Western Front, knock one of the Central Powers out of the war, and provide a warm-water supply line to Russia by forcing the Turkish straits, and taking Constantinople/Istanbul. The Royal Navy still controlled the seas, and a British and French flotilla was duly sent to try to force the Dardanelles.

The plan seems crazy in retrospect, especially in view of the ten months of carnage in which British commanders kept throwing Australian and New Zealand troops against entrenched Turkish positions, the latter commanded in part (and eventually entirely) by Mustafa Kemal. If it ever had any hope of success, that surely lay in a quick naval victory, not in infantry landings. And that, originally, was the plan. The flotilla arrived off the Dardanelles in February and began shelling the Turkish forts on both sides of the strait, and using minesweepers to clear the minefields that filled the passage. The plan was, after softening up the forts and clearing the mines, the Royal Navy and its French allies would force the straits and sail right up to the Topkapi.

As daring as it seems, the Ottomans took it seriously. The US Ambassador to the Porte, Henry Morgenthau, recorded that archives and critical documents were being crated up to be moved deeper into Anatolia. (Note that just a few years later, the capital was moved to Ankara.) The Ottoman forts were nearly out of ammunition, the minefields were largely cleared, and there seemed to be little standing between the Allied flotilla and the Golden Horn.

The Allied Flotilla in the Dardanelles, 1915

Then, on March 8, the minelayer Nusret managed to lay a line of 26 mines which the Allies failed to detect.


Ten days later, the Allied naval assault began. On March 18, the attempt to run the straits began.

Line No 11 is Nusret's Minefield

Now, the Royal Navy had a low opinion of the Turkish fleet and the Admiralty insisted on keeping all the most modern, Dreadnought-class battleships in home waters in case the German High Seas Fleet came out. The flotilla in the east were older, pre-Dreadnought vessels, slower and less thickly armored. As if that wasn't enough, the commander, Admiral Carden, took ill the day before and his deputy, Rear Admiral John de Robeck, who had serious doubts about the venture anyway, took command.

Bouvet Afire

As the flotilla moved into the Çannakale Strait, the narrowest part of the Dardanelles, the French battleship Bouvet suddenly exploded. Within minutes she capsized and sank with the loss of her captain and all hands.

It soon got even worse. The battle cruiser HMS Inflexible and the battleship HMS Irresistible struck mines; the first was beached, the second evacuated and left adrift; both apparently sank. Several other ships were damaged. For a total Turkish loss of 118 men, Nusret's mines and the shore guns had sunk three Allied capital ships and crippled another.

Bouvet Capsizing and Sinking

Though the Turks were still bracing for a renewed attack, de Robeck was shocked by the losses, and at this point London made what was arguably the decisive mistake that transformed Gallipoli from a daring naval raid that failed into a symbol of the meat-grinder tactics of the Great War: they decided to suspend the naval operations until ground troops could be landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

HMS Irresistible Proves it was Misnamed

That would not take place until the date we  today know as Anzac Day: April 25. The naval battle was March 18. In the intervening weeks, Turkey would rush ammunition, artillery shells, mines. and troops (and Mustafa Kemal) to turn the Galipoli Peninsula into a hardened fortification. A campaign aimed at bypassing the carnage of the trench warfare on the Western Front would recreate that carnage on a barren peninsula in the Aegean.

The element of surprise had been lost. The Turks were ready.

You can find a much more detailed account of the action in the British Official .of Naval Operations.

Belated Centenary: March 8, 1915: Nusret Lays Her Mines

Nusret (all photos Wikipedia)

I'm two days late in marking another World War I centennial event over the weekend: on March 8, 1915, the little Turkish minelayer Nusret  surreptitiously laid the minefield that would deter the Allied fleet from running the Dardanelles 10 days later, forcing the decision to land troops at Gallipoli, with ultimately disastrous results. I posted about the feat last year and quote from that post:

As daring as it seems, the Ottomans took it seriously. The US Ambassador to the Porte, Henry Morgenthau, recorded that archives and critical documents were being crated up to be moved deeper into Anatolia. (Note that just a few years later, the capital was moved to Ankara.) The Ottoman forts were nearly out of ammunition, the minefields were largely cleared, and there seemed to be little standing between the Allied flotilla and the Golden Horn.

The Allied Flotilla in the Dardanelles, 1915

Except for the little minelayer that could. Nusret would become a legend in Turkish naval history. Only 40.2 meters (131 feet) from stem to stern,she was no match for the battleships in the Allied flotilla.

And it's said that the 26 mines she carried were the last mines available to the Turkish Navy.

Line No 11 is Nusret's Minefield

On March 8 (a month and a half before ANZAC Day), Nusret slipped down the Dardanelles by night into areas controlled by the Allied fleet, and laid those 26 mines close inshore in Eren Köy Bay on the Asian side where she hoped the Allied minesweepers wouldn't find them. It's said that at the end of her mission her captain died of a heart attack from the stress.

Nusret's mines remained undetected. On March 18, the mines and shore batteries sank one British and one French battleship and a British battle cruiser and crippled others. The attempt to force the straits with ships alone was abandoned. By the time the landing force arrived in late April, the Turkish defenses were much strengthened.

As I concluded in that previous post:

As for little Nusret, whose 26 mines sank three men of war and arguably saved the Ottoman Empire for another three years, not to mention derailed Winston Churchill's political rise for some time, she stayed in service for years, spent some time at the bottom of the sea but was later raised; as she was much remodeled through the years. a better sense of what she looked like in 1915 is provided by this modern reconstruction at a museum in Çannakale:

Vanished States: The Rifian Republic, 1921-1926

In 2012 I began a (very) occasional series of posts labeled "Vanished States,"  about nascent states that had only brief lives. History is full  of such states, so I limited my scope to the 20th century. I did posts on the Republic of Hatay (1938-39), the Syrian Arab Kingdom under Faisal (four months in 1920), and the Hashemite Kingdom of the Hejaz (1916-1925). Then I for some reason didn't return to the theme, though there were many other candidates. Today, one that would provide a model for many anti-colonial guerrillas, but also a model for modern technological means of colonial powers' suppressing suppressing "native" resistance: the five year life of the Rifian Republic and the brutal Rif War, in which Spain, and eventually France as well, would dismantle it. It was arguably the only Tamazight-speaking "state" to enjoy brief independence in the past century.

Morocco had been the last of the North African states to come under European colonial rule, with Spain, which had long held an enclave at Ceuta, declaring a protectorate along the northern coast, while France, often opposed by Germany, sought to create a protectorate in the rest of Morocco proper. (Spain also expanded into the future Western Sahara.) By 1912 France and Spain held their own protectorate zones in Morocco, and in 1923 Tangier became an international city.

While the Sultan of Morocco had little choice but to acquiesce, his nominal subjects were not so willing. As they had already done in Algeria, the French spent much time in warfare with rebellious tribes: think of just about every Foreign Legion movie ever made.(except for The Last Remake of Beau Geste) (1977). Often the fiercest resistance came from Amazigh ("Berber") tribes, from the desert Touareg to the mountain tribes of the Atlas in French Morocco and the Rif Mountains in Spanish Morocco. (Although al-Rif in standard Arabic means "the countryside" and, because the l of the article elides as ar-Rif, one may assume this is the origin of the name, but it seems to be an indigenous Tamazight name, Arif, which just happens to sound the same (and in Arabic is spelled al-Rif). It takes Berber derivatives (the language is Tarifit) and some have suggested it relates to the Canarian name Tenerife. In Morocco it refers not to any countryside but specifically to the mountain range along the country's northern coast, which is not geologically part of the Atlas, but linked with the Spanish chain across the Strait of Gibraltar, including Gibraltar itself.

Flag of the Rifian Republic

It's the Rif we're interested in here, for here, where for five years, the Tagduda n Arif  as it was known in the Tarifit form of Tamazight, or the Confederal Republic of the Tribes of the Rif, had its life.

This was no evanescent fantasy. For five years the Rifian Republic held the Spanish Army at bay, only succumbing after a brutal war in which France joined with Spain and which saw mustard gas dropped from aircraft despite the post World War I Geneva Protocol against the use of poison gas. The Rifian Republic had its own flag, its own currency, and a national anthem you can hear later in this post. It had a charismatic leader who had both political and military talents. His name would eventually be ranked among the greatest anticolonial resistance leaders: ‘Abdel Krim.

‘Abdel Krim

Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi, to give him his formal Arabic name, or Muḥend n Ɛabd Krim Lxeṭṭabi in one transliteration of his Tarifit name, was born in Ajdir, the future capital of his Rifian Republic, in 1882 or 1883. He and his brother were given traditional Islamic educations in Ajdir, Tetouan, and Fez, and also Spanish educations, becoming translators. He became Chief Qadi in Melilla (the Spanish enclave, not part of the Protectorate) and published a newspaper in Spanish.

Alarmed at Spanish efforts to occupy unoccupied areas of the Rif, ostensibly to combat the warlord/brigand Ahmad al-Raisuni (he of Teddy Roosevelt's "Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead" [Raisuni is the proper spelling] ultimatum; another post for another day), ‘Abdel Krim returned to Ajdir and raised his revolt.

Spanish Morocco; Rifian Republic's Claimed Borders in Red

Colonial powers often began these sorts of wars with a fundamental assumption of their own superiority. When the Spanish general moving into the claimed territory received an ultimatum from ‘Abdel Krim, he reportedly laughed it off. In July of 1921, after a fierce battle at Annual, some 8000 Spanish troops had died out of a force of 20,000. Annual remains a major resistance victory against a colonial army, a sort of proto-Dien Bien Phu.. The Spanish Army soon discovered that it was a poor match for highly motivated mountaineers defending their own territory. At its worst point, it found itself holding little more than Melilla and the area around Tangier.

Rifian One Riffan Note

On September 18, 1921, the Rifian Republic's independence was formally declared. It adopted its own currency, the Riffan, The images I've found are in Arabic and English, not Spanish or French. (There was no accepted version of writing Tarifit at the time.)

The Rifian Republic, though unrecognized internationally, would become a model for many later anticolonial struggles. ‘Abdel Krim's guerrilla tactics (he never had more than a few thousand truly professional fighters, the rest being tribal militia's defending their home turf) would become a model for later guerrilla fighters such as Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh, and the FLN in Algeria, though the latter also had the model of the great resistance fighter ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri.

In keeping with acquiring all the trappings of sovereignty, the Rifian Republic also had a rather martial National Anthem:

 Chastened by their losses, the Spanish began relying on their own version of the French Foreign Legion to wage the Moroccan fight. The second in command was a colonel named Francisco Franco. You may have heard of him.

Through 1921 and 1922 the war was fierce, and the Spanish performance uneven despite numerical and technological superiority. The performance of the Spanish Army in the Rif helped propel events in Spain as well, and the 1923 coup by General Miguel Primo de Rivera was in part a reaction. That would set the stage for the whole Spanish tragedy of the 1930s, the Revolution, Civil War, and proxy rehearsal for the Second World War.

By 1924, the Spanish were resorting to dropping mustard gas from aircraft, violating the new Geneva prohibitions but also learning aerial bombing tactics. Britain and France were also learning bombing strategies from fighting colonial resistance, that would see fruition in 1939-45. Germany had no colonies after 1918, so it practiced in Spain.

Back in the Rif, France had moved forces into areas disputed with the Rifian Republic and Rifian forces attacked them. The French had already had discussions with Spain about intervention, and the French were far more experienced with North African warfare than the Spanish. (Not to mention the well-established reputation of the French Foreign Legion, technically known in military terms as "pretty badass.")

French intervention and a massive Spanish landing of troops, combined with aerial bombardment and the use of mustard gas, eventually turned the tide. But the Rif War was as fierce as it got at the time. Wikipedia isn't always a great source, but their casualty figures are:  Spain: 23,000 casualties of whom 18,000 dead; France: 10,000 dead and 8,500 wounded; Rifians, 30,000 casualties including 10,000 dead.

For contemporary Americans, Time magazine is a fading shadow of its former self, but when it was founded in 1923 it was radically new: a weekly summary of the news of America and the worlf. From the beginning each issue had a portrait on the cover. Down into at least the 1970s, being on the cover of Time was a sign you had made it. As near as I can make out, the first Middle Easterner to appear on Time's cover was Atatürk on March 24, 1923; then Fuad I of Egypt on April 28 of the same year; in 1924 nobody unless you include Greece (Venizelos).

Then, in 1925, only the third Middle Eastern figure to appear on a Time cover, is, on August 17, 1925, was none other than ‘Abdel Krim. Sure, he's sinister looking, but it reminds us the world took him seriously.

On May 26,1926, at Targuist, ‘Abdel Krim surrendered. Given his experience with Spain, it is probably no surprise that he surrendered to the French.

Like other French captive nationalist leaders, he was sent to Réunion in the Indian Ocean (just as the British favored the Seychelles or Mauritius), where he lived in comfortable exile from 1926-1947. In the latter year he was allowed to move to France, but managed to gain asylum in Egypt.

After Moroccan independence, King Muhammad V reportedly invited him to return to Morocco, and he is said to have said he would not return until all French forces were out of North Africa. He lived to witness the independence of Morocco and Tunisia and the expulsion of the French base at Bizerte, and finally, he lived to witness the end of French rule in Algeria in July of 1962.

‘Abdel Krim going into exile

Almost exactly seven months after the last colonial forces left the Maghreb, ‘Abdel Krim died in Cairo on February 6, 1963.

Aux Armes, Citoyens! Edith Piaf, One-Quarter Amazigh, Sings La Marseillaise

A week ago I posted a post in support of France which included the version of La Marseillaise most familiar to Americans: the scene from Casablanca. It has occurred to me that there may be a more appropriate version, especially since two of the attackers in France were of North African origin. Edith Piaf was, without question, the most popular French singer of the first half of the 20th century.

What many of her French fans may not know, is her maternal grandmother was a Moroccan Berber, so her version of the anthem may be particularly appropriate.

"Nous sommes tous Français": La Marseillaise from Casablanca

Immediately after September 11, 2001, Le Monde, one of the world's great newspapers but rarely one with a pro-American tilt, ran the front page sidebar "Nous sommes tous Américains."  I know the fashion now is to write Je suis Charlie, and of course the attack on Charlie-Hebdo was barbarous and appalling, but rather than endorse their often openly racist humor it seems to me the better response is to echo Le Monde and say, "Nous sommes tous Français." And of course, as an editor, I defend complete freedom of the press, no matter how offensive.

Or as an earlier generation of Americans once put it, "Lafayette, we are here."

Or as Casablanca put it back in 1942:

Juan Cole on France and "Sharpening Contradictions"

Of all the vast corpus of commentary generated in response to yesterday's jihadist killings in Paris, I think one of the more enlightening perspectives has been Juan Cole's "Sharpening Contradictions: Why al-Qaeda attacked Satirists in Paris," which I think captures an element frequently overlooked in assessing jihadist groups' tactics and motivations. Citing the Marxist approach of provocations aimed at "sharpening the contradictions" between labor and capital in order to radicalize uncommitted workers, he argues that:

The operatives who carried out this attack exhibit signs of professional training. They spoke unaccented French, and so certainly know that they are playing into the hands of Marine LePen and the Islamophobic French Right wing. They may have been French, but they appear to have been battle hardened. This horrific murder was not a pious protest against the defamation of a religious icon. It was an attempt to provoke European society into pogroms against French Muslims, at which point al-Qaeda recruitment would suddenly exhibit some successes instead of faltering in the face of lively Beur youth culture (French Arabs playfully call themselves by this anagram term deriving from wordplay involving scrambling of letters). Ironically, there are reports that one of the two policemen they killed was a Muslim.

 He also notes how the former Al-Qa‘ida in Iraq, predecessor of ISIS, purposefully provoked Shi‘ite retaliation against Sunnis there, in order to solidify and radicalize tthe Sunni community.

While it is still unclear if the perpetrators' main allegiance is to Al-Qa‘ida (one is said to have trained in Yemen) or the Islamic State, the tactics are similar in either case: to provoke a polarization in French society by creating a backlash  against the Muslim community generally, "sharpening contradictions" in a large Muslim community whose youth are overwhelmingly secular at the moment.

I think this insight is valuable. This is not about cartoons, but about creating a polarization in French society that may work to radicalize the Arab community in France.

Diglossia Watch: Marzouki Lashes Out at Reporter for Saying "Plutôt"

We often discuss diglossia here, usually in terms of the interplay of colloquial Arabic and Modern Standard Arabic. Bit in the Maghreb (and in Lebanon), the use of French, either in its own right or by peppering one's Arabic conversation with French words, is criticized by some linguistic purists, Lameen Souag at Jabal al-Lughat, the Algerian linguist who knows the territory well, has a post called "Good prescriptivism?" stemming from this interchange between Tunisia's current President, Moncef Marzouki (who ran second in the Presidential elections and is in this month's runoff) lambasting a reporter in October (I think) for dropping  "plutôt" in an Arabic sentence:

"Respect the Arabic language! Plutôt, what does plutôt mean? You say plutôt, what's that? My sister in Douz won't understand plutôt. [...] [Interviewer: It's a chance for her to learn...] No, she needn't learn - you learn the language of Tunisians!"

For those who know Arabic (and this mixes Standard and Tunisian colloquial) here's the exchange:

November 5, 1914; War Comes to the Middle East

One hundred years ago today, Britain and France declared war on the Ottoman Empire. Russia had done so three days earlier, and its troops crossed the border in what became known as the Bergmann Offensive in the Caucasus, which I'll discuss soon.. As I noted yesterday, on November 3 Britain jumped the gun and anticipated its declaration of war by two days by shelling the forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles. On November 6, it would land forces in Mesopotamia.

Authors writing from a western European perspective often would characterize the great War in the Middle East as a "sideshow" of the horrors of the Western Front, and outside the region itself few people know much about it. Everybody knows Lawrence of Arabia (or at least Lawrence of Arabia, the David Lean film), and thus something about the Arab Revolt. Australians and New Zealanders know Gallipoli, and the exploits of the Light Horse in Palestine, but only Turks remember the hard, slogging, snowy war in the Caucasus. Even British memory has tended to forget the mass surrender at Kut.

Yet every student of the Modern Middle East knows that this is the era that gives us the creation myth of most modern nation-states in "our" region. The postwar settlement, usually and incorrectly attributed to "Sykes-Picot" (whose map would be largely unrecognizable today) created the Middle East we know today. To quote David Fromkin's wonderful title of his book on the subject, "the war to end all war" ended with "A Peace to End All Peace." (The original joke was made in 1066 and All That, referring to Versailles, but Fromkin gets credit for applying it to the Middle East.)

In the coming days, weeks, and months (and given the opportunity, till 2018), I plan to take the "historical and cultural context" mission of this blog literally and (being a historian by training), retell or, when possible, tell mostly forgotten aspects of the war that forged the Middle East we know today. Since, except for the Caucasus and Mesopotamia, which we'll be discussing soon, the actual battle fronts took some time to develop, I'll also be looking at the strategic calculations and war plans of the various belligerents. Stay tuned.

1914: Gearing Up for War: First Moves Before the Declaration

As I have noted previously, since August 1914 and certainly since the closing of the Dardanelles in September, it had been obvious that, a century ago, the Western powers and the Ottoman Empire were likely to go to war. After the Turco-German shelling of Russian seaports on October 29, it became a certainty. Russia declared war on November 2, and Serbia the same day; Montenegro followed on the third.

Britain and France, not enjoying the autocratic power of the Tsar of All the Russias, had to wait for the workings of their democratic processes, and would declare war on November 5. But in the intervening days, fully aware of what was imminent, they were not inactive. France's main preoccupation was keeping communications open to Algeria (considered part of France proper) and to Morocco and Tunisia. Britain's interests were much closer to the Ottoman borders.

We've already discussed Britain's critical concerns in the region: the Turkish Straits; Egypt, with the Suez Canal its essential link with India; and the oil refinery at Abadan in the Gulf. Before the declaration of war, it took action in all three, and in one case initiated hostilities.

The Dardanelles

Rear Admiral Carden

Keep in mind that the British had kept a naval force just outside the Dardanelles since the flight of Goeben and Breslau in August; this force was now commanded by Rear Admiral Sir Sackville Carden, and included French vessels as well. It was still there.

On October 30, after the British Ambassador had delivered an ultimatum to the Ottoman Government, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill proposed a "demonstration" against the forts at the entrance to the Dardanelles. This Carden was ordered to do late on November 1, on the earliest suitable date. On November 2 he conducted some coastal operations and at dawn on November 3 two British battle cruisers bombarded the forts on the European side of the Strait, while two older French battleships bombarded the Asian side. The results were satisfactory and a magazine exploded at the fort of Sedd El-Bahr on the European side. Britain had opened hostilities against Turkey, two days before the formal declaration of war. Churchill's fascination with the Dardanelles, which would lead to the Gallipoli campaign, was already in evidence.

Egypt

We have already discussed the anomalous position of Egypt.

De facto a virtual protectorate (often referred to as a "veiled protectorate") of Britain,it was de jure still an Ottoman province, yet under its on hereditary ruling family. In the Imperial era, Britain was not going to let legal details endanger the Suez Canal, and began a series of moves which, within weeks, would change both Egypt's status and its ruler. On November 2, again before any declaration of war, it declared martial law in Egypt.

The Gulf

I've also gone into considerable detail previously about Britain's concern about the Iranian oilfields and Abadan refinery, its links with the semi-independent Sheikh of Muhammara, and the pre-positioning of an Indian Army Brigade (Force D) at Bahrain in anticipation of war. Now, with war inevitable, that force, meant to protect Abadan and soon to be ordered to take Basra, moved northward to the bar at the mouth of the Shatt al-‘Arab, and arrived there on November 3. There they paused, awaiting the formal declaration of war, a nicety ignored by Churchill and Carden at the Dardanelles. On November 6, the land war would begin.

Tunisia's Evacuation Day: The Last French Leave Bizerte, 1963

Today is Evacuation Day in Tunisia, marking the 51st anniversary of the withdrawal of the last French troops from Bizerte. With the Parliamentary elections coming late this month, it may be worth noting a somewhat forgotten crisis in Tunisian history (not forgotten by Tunisians, of course).

Bizerte in 1961 (Wikipedia)

When Tunisia became independent in 1956, France retained the rights to its naval base at the northern port city of Bizerte, controlling the city as well as the base. President Habib Bourguiba saw it as a remnant of colonial rule, one which France also used in fighting against the Algerian struggle for independence. In July of 1961, Tunisia declared a blockade of the city and ordered the French not to violate Tunisian air space. When a French helicopter did so, it was fired upon. French paratroops were sent in, and fighting erupted. By the time a ceasefire was declared, 630 Tunisians and 24 French were dead, and many wounded.

The result of the three days of fighting were negotiations that led to the final withdrawal of French troops on October 15, 1963. The videos below show the aftermath of the 1961 fighting.

October 10, 732 (Maybe): The Battle of Tours

On this date (or close to it; see below) in AD 732, Charles Martel, Mayor of the Palace in the Merovingian Frankish Kingdom, and Odo, Prince of Aquitaine, won a battle with a Muslim force from Umayyad Spain (al-Andalus) between the towns of Tours and Poitiers in Gaul, after several days of maneuvering. Usually called the Battle of Tours (though sometimes Poitiers), the battle came to be regarded by Europeans as one of the most decisive in history. It has long featured in "Great Battles" type books, from Edward Creasy's 1851 Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World onwards, and a century earlier, in his Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Edward Gibbon had penned his memorable vision of a Muslim conquest of Europe:

A victorious line of march had been prolonged above a thousand miles from the rock of Gibraltar to the banks of the Loire; the repetition of an equal space would have carried the Saracens to the confines of Poland and the Highlands of Scotland; the Rhine is not more impassable than the Nile or Euphrates, and the Arabian fleet might have sailed without a naval combat into the mouth of the Thames. Perhaps the interpretation of the Koran would now be taught in the schools of Oxford, and her pulpits might demonstrate to a circumcised people the sanctity and truth of the revelation of Mahomet.

Charles Martel became a hero not just to France but to all of Christian Europe, portrayed as having been the only thing standing between Europe and an Islamic conquest. For nearly 1300 years Tours has been a powerful symbol, and European nativists and Islamophobes have even adopted it as a symbol for their own hostility to Muslim immigrants.

But was Tours really that decisive? Though mentioned by most of the (relatively few) chroniclers of the era, both Christian Franks and Muslims (and one Mozarabic Christian chronicler living in Muslim Spain, author of the so-called Chronicle of 754, formerly attributed to  an apparently nonexistent Isidore of Beja), and by later chroniclers on both sides, the actual descriptions of the battle are fairly sparse. For a battle for which so much importance is claimed, we know little for certain, including the exact date and place, the numbers involved or the long-term intentions of the Muslim operation (raid?)(invasion?)(attempted conquest?).

The Date:
I am posting this on October 10 because this is the traditional date found in standard modern  European accounts; the contemporary and other early sources generally only specify that it occurred in October of 732. Two rather later Latin chronicles say It took place on a Saturday. On the other hand, the Arab chronicler Ibn ‘Idhari in his Bayan al-Mughrib fi Akhbar Muluk al-Andalus wa'l Magrhib dates the battle to Ramadan AH114. If we accept these two statements, which are not contemporary to the battle, it cannot have been on October 10, since October 10 was a Friday in 732 (a leap year in the Julian calendar), and it coincided (give or take a day or two for differences in sighting the moon in differing countries) with 26 Sha‘ban, AH 114. So not only was October 10 not a Saturday but it also was not in Ramadan. If we insist on meeting both conditions, the only date in October 732 that was both a Saturday and in Ramadan would be October 25, which was a Saturday and the first of Ramadan AH114. On the other hand the monkish annals mentioning Saturday date from the century after the battle and Ibn ‘Idhari from about 1312,  so assuming both are accurate is a leap of faith, but is still the best guess.

Where was the Battle? And Why was it Fought?
We can be a bit more confident here. The commander of the raid, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Ghafiqi, had been named the governor of al-Andalus by the Caliph Hisham two years before. The Berber governor of Catalonia (today Catalunya) allied with Odo (or Eudo) of Aquitaine to rebel against ‘Abd al-Rahman. After putting down the rebellion, ‘Abd al-Rahman crossed the Pyrenees, where Muslim rule in Narbonne and Septimania had been established since 719-720. The earlier invasion of Gaul had been stopped at Toulouse and remained limited to the area around Narbonne. This time, determined to punish Odo, ‘Abd al-Rahman raided farther north, taking and sacking Bordeaux and defeating Odo on the Garonne. Odo fled and sought help from Charles Martel, though they were old enemies.

The Muslim Army, probably mostly cavalry and of both Arab and Berber ethnicity, continued northward in the direction of Tours; the Christian chroniclers generally agree that the immediate goal was to take and sack the Shrine of Saint Martin at Tours. Martel reportedly took indirect routes to intercept ‘Abd al-Rahman.

They met somewhere between Tours and Poitiers, but then as now the two towns are about 100 kilometers apart. The battle almost certainly took place along the old Roman road between the two; the traditional Arabic name for the battle, balat al-shuhada'  (road or literally "pavement" of the martyrs) implies a paved road.  The exact location is uncertain, though the village of Moussais-la-Bataille claims the honor; it is a strategic position where the road crosses the Clain and Vienne Rivers near their juncture, though there are arguments against it (would Martel have fought with his back to a river with a single bridge for retreat?). You can find a rather detailed argument about the site here; another detailed account here; and you can reflect on what meticulously detailed maps people have drawn of a battle whose location is uncertain and so are the strengths of the Armies. Which brings us to:.

Numbers:.
The Christian sources agree that the Franks were badly outnumbered by the Muslims, and the victory was a miracle that saved Christianity. The Muslim sources agree that they were vastly outnumbered by the Franks, and the results were inevitable. Numbers range from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands (the enemy always being bigger) and are totally unreliable. Casualties were high, and ‘Abd al-Rahman himself was among the dead.

What Was ‘Abd al-Rahman's Goal?
There is no real reason to doubt the assumption that ‘Abd al-Rahman.'s immediate goal was Tours and the rich pilgrim's shrine at Tours. Martel's victory certainly saved Tours. But did it also, as the conventional European narrative had it, save Paris, save France (which didn't exist yet), save Europe, and save Christianity? Was Charles Martel, the "hammer," all that stood between ‘Abd al-Rahman. and Gibbon's vision that:

the Arabian fleet might have sailed without a naval combat into the mouth of the Thames. Perhaps the interpretation of the Koran would now be taught in the schools of Oxford, and her pulpits might demonstrate to a circumcised people the sanctity and truth of the revelation of Mahomet.

Leaving aside the fact that the interpretation of the Qur'an is taught at Oxford and has been for at least the last couple of centuries, was the Battle of Tours all that prevented a Muslim conquest of all of Europe?

There is plenty of reason to question that. Most of the Arabic accounts spend less time on the battle itself but on the death of ‘Abd al-Rahman, who after all was governor of al-Andalus.The Arab historians clearly saw this as a raid on enemy territory (several note that ‘Abd al-Rahman died as a ghazi, the term used for the border raiders along the Byzantine frontier). In fact most of the Arab historians seem to portray this as a ghazwa or border raid, for plunder and retaliation against Odo of Aquitaine, remembered mainly for the "martyrdom" of ‘Abd al-Rahman and the other casualties; hence, balat al-shuhada'.

There is an old saying, "Amateurs talk about strategy; professionals talk about logistics." Tours is a very long way from the center of the Umayyad Caliphate, in Damascus. The width of Africa, the Strait of Gibraltar, all of Iberia, and the Pyrenees lay between. And distant Gaul was hardly the main priority of the Caliphs. In 717-718 the Second Arab Expedition against Constantinople had been beaten back; taking Constantinople was a far higher priority for the Caliphs.

Tours in the Arab chroniclers is a sidelight of the history of al-Andalus, mainly remembered for the death of ‘Abd al-Rahman. By contrast Martel's victory, and the much later victories at Vienna in 1529 and 1683, became enormous symbols of the defense of Europe.

And it probably didn't look much like this French Romantic painting from the Palace of Versailles, either (and no, I don't know what the partially unclad woman is doing right in the middle of the two armies, unless she represents France being rescued by Martel from a fate worse than death — a sort of proto-Marianne — nor do I know why the cross looks Celtic):

Charles de Steuben, La Battaille de Poitiers