Shura Council Convenes to Do Whatever it is it Does

 Earlier this year I noted some of the mysteries surrounding Egypt's Upper House of Parliament, the Shura Council; the biggest one being "What's it supposed to do?" Other than providing a lot of appointive positions (a third of its members are appointed, two-thirds elected), it's official duties are mostly to ratify constitutional amendments, treaties, etc. The newly-elected Shura Council met for the first time today, electing Ahmad Fahmy of the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party as its Speaker. The FJP won a solid majority of 105 of the 180 elected seats in the Shura Council elections, with extraordinarily low turnout in the elections (the runoff of round two got only a 7.2% turnout).

The elections cost a lot of money, and many people were openly wondering why Egypt even needed an upper house. Many liberals (and others) think the Council should be abolished. This would seem to be logical, but the current government (and thus presumably the SCAF) and the Muslim Brotherhood — in other words, the two bodies whose opinions can be implemented — disagree.

The government wants to strengthen it, not abolish it:

The Minister of Parliamentary Affairs, counselor Mohammed Attiya, said the meeting will be held under the chairmanship of the Speaker of the People’s Assembly Saad el-Katatni.
He told reporters that the Shura Council has become “worthy of obtaining a stronger parliamentary role by increasing its legislative and oversight competencies in parallel with the People’s Assembly to strengthen democratic life.”

He added that the role of the Upper House, or Shura Council, would “achieve balance in the performance of the parliamentary institution, especially since it includes the competencies needed by the country at the present stage of the Shura Council,” and rejected the abolition of the Upper House under calls to reduce state expenditures.

Nor is the government alone. Since the FJP dominates the lower house and controls the upper house outright, guess which party (surprise, surprise!) also wants to strengthen the role of the Shura Council?

One new role the Council is already slated to play is joining with the People's Assembly in choosing the body to write the new Constitution. The two chambers will assemble Saturday to choose that Constitutional Assembly to write the new charter.

Precisely what the Shura Council will do after that remains to be seen.

Egypt's Election Day (Well, the First Day of the First Round of the First Phase): Some Things to Keep in Mind

Despite the ongoing tensions, Egypt votes today. More power to them.


Above, a Google banner tribute for the Egyptian vote, at Google Egypt. (Link may change after today.)

Well, that's imprecise. Not all Egyptians vote today, nor will anything be settled today. Today is actually the first of two days of voting for the first round of the first phase of voting for the lower house; the first phase is only for nine of Egypt's 27 Governorates (Muhafazat, provinces). (At the time of the fall of Mubarak there were 29; two new ones created under Mubarak, 6 October and Helwan, have since been abolished and re-absorbed into Giza and Cairo respectively, from which they had been carved out.)  In fact, Egyptians are going to be voting for somebody somewhere pretty much continually from here to next March, so don't plan to stay up tonight waiting for the results. Apparently the authorities figured if Egyptians want real elections, let's stretch it out as long as possible.

Here's the short form which I'm taking from this Arabic site by the Higher Elections Commission:

28-29 November: First round of first phase for People's Assembly (Lower House): Governorates of  Cairo, Fayyum, Luxor, Port Said, Damietta, Alexandria, Kafr al-Sheikh, Asyut, and Red Sea.
5-6 December: Second Round: runoffs for First Phase governorates where a runoff is required.
14-15 December: First round of People's Assembly vote for the second group of Governorates: Giza, Bani Suef, Menufiyya, Sharqiyya, Ismailiyya, Suez, Buhaira, Sohag, and Aswan.
21-22 December: Second round runoffs for the Phase two Governorates.
3-4 January 2012:  First round of People's Assembly voting for the third phase group of Governorates: Minya, Qalyubiyya, Gharbiyya, Daqahliyya, North Sinai, South Sinai, Wadi al-Jadid, Matruh, Qena.
10-11 January: Second Round runoff for the above.
13 January: Final date to announce results for the People's Assembly.
Last half of January: First session of the People's Assembly
29-30 January: First round for first phase Governorates (same grouping as for lower house) for the Shura Council (Upper House).
5-6 February: Runoffs for the above.
14-15 February: First round, second phase Governorates Shura Council
21-22 February: Runoff round, second phase Governorates.
4-5 March: First round, third phase Governorates, Shura Council.
11-12 March: Runoffs for the above.
14 March: Last day to announce Shura Council results.
24 March: First session of Shura Council.

So what we learn today and tomorrow will give us some clues, but it won't give us all the answers. The divisions are not even geographical: Upper Egypt, the Delta, and the outlier Governorates are divided among the three phases.


Non-Egypt-hands may look at the phase one Governorates and say, but, both Cairo and Alexandria are voting today and tomorrow? Don't they encompass the bulk of the population? But what is voting today is Cairo Governorate. What we think of today as Greater Cairo spans three Governorates: Cairo, Giza, and, increasingly as Cairo's industrial suburbs and worker's housing creeps northward into the Delta, Qalyubiyya. Cairo votes today and tomorrow; Giza in round two; Qalyubiyya in round three. (Until 6 October and Helwan were merged back into Giza and Cairo earlier this year, Greater Cairo comprised five Governorates. I hope that, unlike my own voting precinct in Northern Virginia, the polling places aren't in local school cafeterias. If they are, the kids are going to need to bring lunch a lot of days this winter.

Seriously though, may all go well, and may violence not disrupt this timeline.                                                          

Round Three of Lower House Elections; Upper House Elections Streamlined to Move Up Results

Tomorrow the elections for the third round of the People's Assembly in Egypt begin. Meanwhile,
the ruling Military Council, in Field Marshal Tantawi's name for once, has moved up the convening of both houses of a new Parliament by holding the Upper House elections  in two stages rather than the previously announced three. The original schedule was posted here; here; the new one is described here.

This will mean that the Upper House, the Shura Council, will finish the electoral cycle and convene in February, rather than March. While still a little vague, SCAF has promised a Presidential election by July and is talking about a campaign beginning in in April. Unless they change the order of things this seems to envision drafting the new constitution and putting it to a referendum between late February and April, unless the Presidential campaign starts before the President's powers are defined.

This will please the Islamists, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, who want a working Parliament as quickly as possible, but there are still a lot of questions.

One of these which that I have harbored for some 30 years now is what the Shura Council is actually for. Back in the pre-1952 coup years the Egyptian Parliament was bicameral, with the Upper House called the Senate. When Nasser reintroduced Parliamentary life after 1952 he created a unicameral Parliament called the People's Assembly. In 1980 Anwar Sadat amended the constitution to create the Shura Council (Maglis al-Shura) as the Upper House of a bicameral legislature. I'm not sure most Egyptians know what it's for. I know I don't. It doesn't do much; it has to ratify constitutional amendments and treaties, and otherwise mostly "advises" and "proposes." The British House of Lords in its modern form isn't very powerful either, but it's a historical vestige, not a modern creation.

The key may be the fact that a third of its members are appointed by the President; the other two-third are elected. It gives the President a lot more sinecures to offer cronies, or potentially in a truly changed Egypt, elder statesmen and wise folks, positions of influence, which if I understand it correctly is sort of what the Canadian Senate is for.

Anyway, once round three of the People's Assembly elections are over, it's on to the Shura Council, but now in two phases rather than three.

No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Saudi Hardliners Angry About Women on Shura Council

You probably have heard how King ‘Abdullah of Saudi Arabia recently named 30 women to the Shura Council, the country's appointed advisory council, named by the King to advise the King.It cannot legislate and is unelected. There are still now women in the Cabinet, and the 30 women in the 150-seat Council will be seated separately and enter by a separate door. And they still can't drive to the meetings. In other words, while an encouraging sign of change in the Kingdom, the move did not exactly turn the country into an egalitarian utopia.

But of course, even the smallest bit of progress has its critics. Hardline clerics are protesting. Here's why:

In an unauthorized but un-policed protest at the royal palace, a video of which is now circulating on YouTube, religious groups condemned ''the dangerous changes taking place in the country''. They demanded a meeting with palace officials to ''make them change their minds'', saying the female nominations ''are not representative of society'' and calling for similar parliamentary quotas for religious figures.

Eek! Girls in the clubhouse! I must say,though, that I do agree with one aspect of the complaint: that it's "not representative of society." Demographically, the Council would have to be half female to be representative of society. (Yet somehow, I don't think that's what he meant. And while the speaker wasn't identified in the story, I don't think I'm being too daring in referring to the speaker as "he.")

And of course, the Iranian PressTV was glad to report the protests. In terms of women in public life Iran actually seems enlightened by comparison if you don't look much farther in your comparison. But PressTV does have a clip of the demonstration along with an English commentary (though I don't endorse the commentary: I would not take PressTV's unsupported word that the sun comes up in the East):

Egypt: Election Dates Set; Electoral Laws Changed

Today Egypt's Supeme Council of the Armed Forces announced the dates for the Egyptian Parliamentary elections, beginning November 28, oner week late than previous leaks had suggested. There will be three rounds of elections for the People's Asssembly (Lower House), concluding on January 3, followed by three rounds for the Shura Council (Upper House), starting January 29. The People's Assembly will convene March 16, the Shura Council March 24. Thixs stretched-out calendar means that Parliament cannot begin the project of amending the Constitution before spring, meaning Presidential elections will be pushed into late 2012 if not later.

The SCAF decree also confirmed the Cabinet amendments to the electoral law which were pushed through on Sunday and which have provoked strong criticism from most political parties. These provide that two-thirds of the People's Assembly will be elected on a party list basis, and one third by individual constituencies, as opposed to half and half as previously envisioned. This is being criticized as strengthening the established parties and perhaps keeping the previous establishment in power,  while other critics are arguing that it will create a weak and divided Parliament, thus strengthening the power of the Military Council.,which some suspect of wanting to remain in power. (See this earlier post.)


Although after the fall of Mubarak, there were many calls to write a new constitution first (the route Tunisia has chosen), others urged quick elections. In the end we have neither: the electoral calendar is long and the Presidential elections are shifting well into 2012 (and some are hinting 2013). More time, some worry, for the Military Council to get used to being in power.

Only Lower House Dissolved? A Chance to Find Out What Shura Council is For

A thought in a somewhat lighter vein: Despite earlier reports that both houses of Parliament will be dissolved under the Egyptian court ruling, many reports now say only the lower house, the People's Assembly, will be dissolved. [UPDATE: Still much confusion, but the Court seems to be saying both houses.] That would leave the Upper House, the Shura Council, intact.

There could possibly be one upside in this disaster, Someone might finally be able to figure out what the hell it is the Shura Council is actually for. No one has ever succeeded in finding a practical use for it up till now.

Saudi Women and the Vote: A Small Acknowledgment of Arab Spring?

Based on King ‘Abdullah's announcement over the weekend, it now appears that Saudi women will be given the right to vote and run in municipal elections and to be appointed to the Shura Council, even though, as Zeinobia has acerbically pointed out, they still can't drive to the polling place.

Juan Cole's analysis situates the move within the broader movements for women's rights and political reform in the Kingdom, and poses the question of whether it goes far enough. As with any of the reforms offered by established regimes in the face of the ferment of the Arab Street in what is still called "Arab Spring" as the leaves begin to fall, only the course of events can answer that. With the (extremely important) exception of Bahrain, the GCC states have generally avoided the violence of other Arab protests, mostly by increasing social and economic benefits in lieu of political rights.

Municipal councils are only partly elected (and partly appointed); they are the only vote Saudis can exercise. The Shura Council is fully appointed, though reformers have pressured for electing at least some of its members.

It is hard for me to picture a revolutionary movement succeeding in Saudi Arabia, but last December it was hard for me to picture the toppling of leaders in Tunis, Cairo and Tripoli and the ongoing conflicts in Yemen and Syria. King ‘Abdullah is often portrayed as a reformer (within the parameters of the Saudi Royal Family), and some had suggested that — as a Saudi professor says in the interview below — he would move on the driving rights issue soon. Instead, he has chosen to move on the issue of voting and service on the Shura Council.

It is certainly a victory for Saudi women, if a small one with a long way to go. Here's an Al Jazeera discussion in English, which Juan Cole also reproduced:

Egypt's Shura Council Elections

While most Middle East media and bloggers were focused on the Gaza flotilla and yours truly was flat on his back or in surgery, there was little coverage of Egypt's Shura Council elections. A predictable exception was Issandr El Amrani (The Arabist), who wrote a good one for Middle East International, which he reproduces at his website, along with some good links.

The Shura Council, Egypt's Upper House, generally is considered less relevant than the People's Assembly (the Lower House), but as The Arabist notes, there are points worth making.

Since he does a good job of it, I'm typing in bed with the laptop at an awkward and, as my orthopedic surgeon reminded me today, I'm typing on drugs (which, before the obvious comments appear, I have not done before). So I'll let you read his post, and maybe try again when the dosage is decreased.

The Khairat al-Shater Factor

Khairat al-Shater

After a week or so of waffling over whether it would actually name a candidate for President, and then saying it would meet Monday (today) the Muslim Brotherhood suddenly announced on Saturday that it would indeed run Brotherhood Deputy Leader Khairat al-Shater.  Sunday having now passed without the Brotherhood calling another press conference to say "April Fool!," it appears they really mean it this time. The announcement was initially made by the Brotherhood itself, not by its political front, the Freedom and Justice Party, which however (surprise!) promptly announced Shater as their nominee, though it had not previously been clear that he was even a member of the party.

So what does this mean to the Presidential elections?  Well, based on the Egyptian media, you can take your choice:

1. The Brotherhood is directly challenging SCAF, which strongly opposed a Brotherhood candidate. (Evidence: the recent public rancor between SCAF and the Brotherhood.)
2. SCAF and the Brotherhood are working hand in glove to elect a Brotherhood candidate, which SCAF has wanted all along. (Evidence: Shater had to be pardoned in order to run as he served prison time.)
3. SCAF wanted a Brotherhood candidate but not because it wanted him to win, but to split the Islamist vote among three candidates and elect a pro-SCAF figure. (Evidence: there are now three Islamist candidates — Shater, former Brotherhood figure ‘Abdel Moneim Abu'l-Futuh, and poster boy Hazem Salah Abu Isma‘il — all with strong support bases.)

Other than the obvious fact that these three explanations are mutually exclusive, they all make a certain amount of sense, depending on one's biases and willingness to adhere to conspiracy theories.


While some may suspect that the Brotherhood intended all along to spring a candidate on voters at the last minute, there seemed to be genuine divisions about whether to do so. The Brotherhood and the FJP Party reportedly were in some disagreement, and the Brotherhood's Shura Council reportedly voted to support Shater by 58 out of 108, hardly unanimity. The pretense that the FJP is an independent party, which never was very convincing, has evaporated now that the Party has rubber-stamped the candidacy of a man chosen not by the party but by the Brotherhood's secretive Shura Council.

If the Brotherhood leadership really was determined not to name a candidate, why did they change their mind. They are seeking to convince the world it was because they feared otherwise a secularist backed by the Army, an Amr Moussa or an ‘Omar Suleiman, would win. A better explanation may be that they were concerned about the surging popularity of Abu'l-Futuh. A former senior figure in the Brotherhood, his decision to run last year led to him being read out of the organization and to the Brotherhood warning its members that it would expel anyone supporting Abu'l-Futuh. Still, many younger Brotherhood members were openly objecting to that decree, and planned to support Abu'l-Futuh. If an Islamist opposed by the Brotherhood leadership had won, despite the Brotherhood's opposition, it would be a major blow to their claims to be the preeminent Islamist movement. A victory by the Salafi Abu Isma‘il would be arguably even worse. So the Brotherhood decided to field a candidate.

Shater is a businessman, the mastermind of the Brotherhood's finances and, some argue, far more its real leader than General Guide Badie. Profiles of him here and here; his webpage here (Arabic); his curriculum vitae here (Arabic). And Marc Lynch's take here.   [UPDATE: The Arabist's Issandr El Amrani offers his views here.]

The sudden recent shift in the Brotherhood's approach to running a candidate has caught a lot of the other candidates off guard, however much they may be playing it down. Apparently, even some of Shater's ten children were shocked.

Does Shater become the front-runner,or does the presence of three Islamists split the vote? I'm going to say it's too early to know and suggest we wait and see.

Judiciary, MB in Egypt Approaching Showdown?

Last Friday, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt held demonstrations calling for a "purge" of the judiciary, as the continuing series of confrontations between the courts and the Presidency deepen. Having already dissolved the Lower House of Parliament last year, the courts are considering the constitutionality of the Shura Council, the Upper House now serving as the sole legislature, while other court rulings have put off the Parliamentary elections, originally due this month, until fall at the earliest. The Shura Council is meanwhile debating a new Judiciary Law that would force the retirement of as many as 3,000 judges.

Meanwhile, the government has essentially ignored court rulings against its appointment of the Prosecutor General and another ruling that sought to remove the Prime Minister. Justice Minister Ahmad Mekki has submitted his resignation, though it is unclear if it will be accepted; a Cabinet reshuffle is expected in the next few days. [Update: Mekki reportedly will not resign and Morsi has reportedly suspended the Judicial Authority Law after talks with the judges.]

Along with the Cabinet reshuffle, the government is expected to name new governors for the Governorates; if it seeks to name primarily Brotherhood members, it is likely to deepen the confrontations; it could however signal a willingness to work with the opposition. President Morsi's international travels have yet to provide the sort of deus ex machina solutions to the country's economic problems he seems to have hoped for, and the failure to address the economic crisis further deepens the political stalemate.

The Muslim Brotherhood's Real Problem: Its Secrecy

I already linked earlier today to Nathan Brown's piece at The National Interest on the Khairat al-Shater nomination. In passing, he remarks:

The problem for Egypt is not al-Shater personally. Since the Brotherhood is still a fairly closed organization with a strong sense of discipline, it is difficult to state with precision very much about individual leaders.

This touches on a factor that I feel hasn't been talked about very much. The sudden emergence (eruption?) of the Brotherhood from the shadows of a nominally banned organization (but a tolerated one much of the time) into a commanding role in Parliament, in the constituent assembly, and now perhaps int he Presidential race has drawn a lot of attention, and a great many pundits who may still not be all that enthusiastic about the Brotherhood's agenda feel compelled to write think pieces about how the US is going to have to learn with Islamists (true enough: they're out there) and how the Brotherhood is really moderate (so far, so good). But what still bothers some of us, and many Egyptians as well as far as I can tell, is the total lack of transparency about how the organization works.  It was founded as a secretive, underground, cell-based revolutionary organization. Now, it says, it is ready to play a democratic role in an open system in which it does not seek dominance but wants to be a player in a genuinely democratic system. Though it wants to do so as a secretive, semi-above-ground, cell-based organization.

I wouldn't personally have voted for the MB — not just because I'm not Muslim, but because on a wide range of issues from women's rights to minority rights to personal freedoms I think they're either wrong or I'm suspicious of their suddenly shifted stance. I think they should be allowed to play a political role because they clearly represent a powerful constituency, but I also think it's worth some caution (and constitutional checks and balances) to assure they're really what they claim now to be.

But, of course, I'm not an Egyptian, and no one is going to ask me. Nor should they.

But I do think one reason so many Egyptians seem upset by the Shater nomination is that it has suddenly, and at a critical moment of confrontation over the constituent assembly, reminded everyone of how the MB makes decisions. Or rather, reminded everyone of how none of us really has much of an idea of how the MB makes decisions.

Consider:

• The Brotherhood had not only sworn time after time that it would not run a candidate but even read Abdel-Moneim Abu'l-Futuh out of its ranks for daring to run; yet it suddenly, for reasons everyone is still speculating about, reversed itself. Some say it lied. Did it intend to do this all along? Did it change its mind precipitately? Will anyone ever know for sure?
• Many reports have claimed that the MB's Shura Council only narrowly endorsed Shater. Several figures have quit the Brotherhood in protest already, but no one is sure what the exact vote was or how narrow the margin because details are based on leaks. Anyone watching the current primary season in the US must think occasionally, "There must be a better way to choose a candidate," but I'm pretty sure the behind-closed-door secrecy of the MB isn't it.
• Before the announcement, there were reports (true or false? we'll never know) of major disagreements between the MB leadership and the Brotherhood's political vehicle, the Freedom and Justice Party. But once the Brotherhood spoke, the FJP announced (discovered?) that Shater was its nominee. So the way to win the "FJP primary" is to be anointed by the Brotherhood, but how exactly do you do that?
• Shater strikes many as the brains behind the Brotherhood's current leadership. Whose idea was his candidacy? General Guide Badia's? Shater's own? Who knows for sure?
• If this is how they choose their candidate, how will they govern?

MB Founder Hasan al-Banna

Of course when Hasan al-Banna created the Brotherhood in the late 1920s and crafted its organization through the 1930s, cell-based underground movements were all the rage, both on the far left and the far right, especially in Europe. In Egypt and other Arab countries Communists and various shades of fascist movements were adopting such organization, and the Brothers did the same. They found themselves in a covert war with the Palace and the British and their secret wing operated as a vehicle for revolutionary violence. All that has supposedly receded into history, but the secrecy still prevails. Yes, they were harassed and persecuted under Mubarak,  but never suppressed completely as had been done under Nasser.

The Brotherhood is hardly the first revolutionary movement to find it hard to make the transition to a role in a democracy: a long list from Fatah to Sinn Fein have faced the issue, and success has not always resulted. But I do think that one of the reasons the whole Khairat al-Shater nomination has bothered many people is the fact that it has forcibly reminded Egyptians and others about how little we understand about how the Brothers arrive at decisions, and how the organization really functions. If the Freedom and Justice Party needs to make a decision once in power, will it heed the ballot box or the Shura Council?

That concern may handicap Shater's candidacy before he is fully out of the starting gate, even among many Islamists.

Egypt Gets a "Constitutional Declaration"

If I'm blogging a lot about Egypt, it's because much is happening there; it's being overshadowed in the media by Libya and Syria, but it's worthy of note.

Today the Armed Forces Council announced that Presidential elections will be held by November, a couple of months after the Parliamentary elections due in September. It also issued its anticipated butr delayed Constitutional Declaration. This turned out to be not just an embodiment of the recently passed referendum, but rather a 62-article interim constitution, to see the country through elections, after which a new permanent constitution will be drafted. The Arabic text can be found here; as usual the Armed Forces Council posted it to their Facebook page. If I find an English text I'll link to it.

It reduces the power of the appointed upper house, the Shura Council, and makes the various changes approved in the referendum, but it keeps masny aspects of the 1971 constitution, including the provision that half of he lower house consist of workers and farmers, a relic of the socialist ideology of the Nasser era.

The Saudi Reshuffle

It seems as if the major development in the region over what was a three-day weekend in the US was the Saudi reshuffle. In the US media most of the attention has been given to the fact that the King (in his capacity as Prime Minister) named the Kingdom's first woman deputy minister, as Deputy Minister of Education for Womeh's Education. But I think this BBC account I linked to gets the emphasis right: the replacement of both the head of the Supreme Judicial Council and the head of the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice: these are key positions, critical to the country's justice system. The latter post is in charge of the mutawa'in, the religious police, and the former has been blocking the King's efforts at judicial reform.

Saudi rehuffles are rare. Usually ministers are replaced one at a time, when death or clearcut misconduct makes it necessary; a tenure lasting decades is not unusual. Clearly King 'Abdullah is sending some messages in this reshuffle.

Lately the Kingdom has been embarrassed internationally by a number of judicial decisions, and the educational system has long been criticized for the content of textbooks: by going after the education and justice systems the King seems to be addressing both issues, while also naming new figures to the Shura Council and the Council of 'Ulama.

This is no great revolution -- the Kingdom is not revolutionary -- but it is a major reform, and it suggests 'Abdullah is tired of foot-dragging in key areas, particularly the judiciary. It is also a direct attack on the most conservative parts of the religious establishment: the judciary, the schools, and the mutawa'in.

Again, the real thing to emphasize here is the rarity of significant shake-ups in the Saudi Cabinet and other administrative apparatus. This one affected several major power centers at once, and that is almost unheard of. While the appointment of a woman at sub-ministerial level is unprecedented, it may in the long run be less important than the shake-up in the courts and the religious police.

. . . And All the King's Men

Although the interrogation of the Mubarak family has gotten all the attention outside Egypt, the net is gradually widening as more and more senior officials of the former Cabinet and former Ruling Party are being investigated for corruption and other related charges such as misappropriation of public funds. Most are held at Tora (Tura) prison, notorious for holding political prisoners under the old regime. Jokes are spreading about whole cabinet meetings of ex-officials now being possible at Tora.

Latest is word that the former Minister of Petroleum, Samih Fahmi, is being investigated.

Besides Mubarak, his wife (who has been questioned but not detained) and two sons (both of whom are detained), the roundup so far includes:

The former Interior Minister, Habib al-‘Adly, was one of the first to be arrested back in February. Industrialist Ahmad ‘Ezz, a key figure in the ruling party and ally of Gamal Mubarak's. Safwat Sharif, head of the Shura Council (Upper House) and key figure in the ruling party for decades, is also jailed; so is the former Presidential Chief of Staff, Zakaria ‘Azmi. The former Prime Minister, Ahmad Nazif, was detained just before the Mubaraks.

The former Ministers of Tourism,  Housing, and Industry and Trade are also either jailed or outside the country, and the former Finance Minister under investigation.

At this point it is hard to know how the fall of the old elite will finally conclude. The decision to go after the Mubaraks has cheered many of the young revolutionaries but worries others who might have preferred a Reconciliation model (a la South Africa) instead of vengeance against a man about to turn 83.

There is an unspoken limitation to the investigations so far. They have penetrated into the senior Cabinet, the Mubarak family itself, and even the powerful internal security establishment. But, despite the nominal independence of the Prosecutor General's office, they have not touched the Armed Forces, which, however, has extensive economic investments and influence as well.  As long as the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has anything to say about it, the Armed Forces remain off limits.

Egypt's Electoral Calendar: Too Long?

Egypt's Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has been meeting with political parties, explaining their proposed schedule for Parliamentary elections. Not everyone is happy. Elections, originally promised for September (that is, now) and delayed until November, would indeed begin on November 21 with the first of three rounds for the lower house (the People's Assembly), with those rounds concluding in January and followed by three rounds for the Upper House (the Shura Council), extending into April. Once a new Parliament is elected, it would in turn create a new constitution. Only once the new Constitution is in place would Presidential elections be held, sometime late next summer. Some details here.

The recent extension of the Emergency Law into next summer at the least, has led to suspicions that the military may not be as eager to transfer power as they claim. On the other hand, many of the newer parties originally wanted to delay elections until next year to allow longer time for party organizations to build infrastructure, fearing that early elections would favor the Muslim Brotherhood. The problem is that there is a growing sense that the revolution has lost its momentum, that the old guard is retrenching.

There are certainly political figures and parties urging a faster electoral calendar. One of the problems is a growing distrust of SCAF, which remains remarkably opaque in its decision-making.  Who is really making the decisions is anything but clear.

Egypt's Constituent Assembly: Islamists' Predominance Stirs Protests; Growing Quarrels Between MB and SCAF

Egypt has now announced the 100 members of the Constituent Assembly which will draw up the new Constitution. A mix of members of the People's Assembly, the Shura Council, and non-Parliamentarians of prominence, they will write the new Constitution.

Provoking comment and alarm is the fact that, depending on how you define an Islamist and how you count, somewhere between half and by one estimate up to 65 of the 100 may be defined as Islamists, with he Muslim Brotherhood predominating. That suggests that the Brotherhood and its allies, and the more extreme Salafi al-Nour Party, will be able to shape the new constitution on their own image.

Will they draft a constitution that entrenches their power and makes it difficult to ever reduce their strength? The Brotherhood has talked a good line so far, but secularists are alarmed. Many might be willing to let them govern for a term so long as, if they fail, it is possible to vote them out of office. But Egyptians are too familiar with constitutions deliberately written to maintain a ruling party in power forever, as they've had one for the past half century.

Not surprisingly, there are already protest movements urging a "Constitution for All Egypt." The Brotherthood has repeatedly said that it wants that too, but now that it dominates the constituent assembly, its opponents are not confident it means it.

The Brotherhood is also testing its strength in other ways. Though it backed off an initial effort to force the replacement of the existing Cabinet, it is increasingly critical of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). It recently questioned the fairness of the upcoming Presidential elections, leading Field Marshal Tantawi to strike back by criticizing the Brotherhood. This growing SCAF/Brotherhood feud has long been predicted; the initial "honeymoon" between the Army and the Islamists was always likely to break down when the Islamists found the Army was not prepared to hand over power completely to them.

Adding to this is growing talk that the Brotherhood, which has insisted since the early days of the revolution that it will not run a candidate in the Presidential election, is talking about choosing one, raising questions about other assurances it has made.

The credibility of the new Constitution may be riding on how non-Islamists perceive it: if it emerges as an obvious attempt to entrench Islamist power, tensions may rise rapidly.

Details of Egyptian Elections Emerging

Egypt's Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has begun to spell out the details of the upcoming elections. Statements yesterday by the Higher Committee for Elections Chairman and today by an Armed Forces Spokesman have made a few things clearer:

• Egyptians will vote using their national ID cards, so no registration process is required, eliminating an element that worked toward rigging elections in the past. No decision has been reached on letting Egyptians abroad vote.
• The elections will be held in three stages, but both the lower and upper houses will be elected at the same time.
• The rule that half of candidates for the People's Assembly (lower house) must come from the workers and farmers is retained.
• Half the seats in the People's Assembly will be elected by party list and half by member-based constituencies.
• Only two-thirds of the seats in the Shura Council (upper house) will be elected; the other third will remain vacant until after a Presidential election, after which the President will appoint them.
• Twitter posts are reporting the Army spokesman ruled out international monitoring of the elections as it violates Egypt's sovereignty.

Most of the points strike me as positive or at least neutral, but given the track record of Egyptian elections, the last one is disturbing. Western countries allow international monitoring without feeling their sovereignty has been infringed.

As Parliament Gets Down to Business, the Brotherhood Still Feeling its Way

Egypt's new Parliament has chosen its committees, with the Muslim Brotherhood heading nine of the 19 committees, fewer than its electoral strength might have allowed. Clearly the Brotherhood is still feeling its way, fully cognizant that its relatively good relations with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which is likely to seek to limit Parliament's power. (SCAF unilaterally amended the Presidential election rules before Parliament assembled, though it announced it only after; it seems to want to keep calling the shots.) The Brotherhood, some feel, is gearing up for a challenge to SCAF, and in any event Parliament as a whole, as the only elected body at the moment, is likely to try to turn its legitimacy into real authority. (For nitpickers out there, by "Parliament" I mean the People's Assembly, since the Shura Council elections are still under way. But as I've noted before, even a lot of Egyptians aren't clear why Egypt even has an Upper House. The People's Assembly is what matters.)

One theme that is turning up lately, most recently in this piece by Khalil Anani at Foreign Policy, "Old Habits Die Hard!" After 80 years in the shadows, much of that time officially illegal, the Muslim Brotherhood and, by extension, its new creation the Freedom and Justice Party, are still functioning with the mentality of an opposition underground movement, meeting in secrecy, espousing gradualism rather than revolutionary change. Even the election of the FJP's Secretary-General, Sa‘ad al-Katatni was done with no one outside the party even aware of the process (the Katatni is now the Assembly Speaker).

It's hardly the first time a longtime revolutionary movement is suddenly confronted with the challenge of governance, of course, and the results range from the highly successful to the questionable. The Brotherhood has been around a long time, with a highly organized structure and infrastructure and an Egypt-wide influence despite years underground; getting used to power, especially shared power, may take some adjustment.  Some similar themes occupy Nathan Brown in his latest paper from Carnegie, "When Victory Becomes an Option: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood Confronts Success." (PDF) (Also, here's the first part of a response to Nathan Brown on the Freedom and Justice Party website.)

Unlike their Salafi rivals in Al-Nour, the Muslim Brotherhood does not limit itself to focusing on the hijab or banning beer and bikinis; because it has long drawn its membership from the professional and entrepreneurial classes it takes Egypt's economy seriously, though doing something about it may be a challenge to defy almost any single party. Any political party, Islamist or secular, coming after three decades of corruption and drift, is going to face a formidable task, and the past year's disruptions have crippled an already damaged economy severely. The ultimate test of any party in power is whether it can meet payrolls, collect the garbage, deliver the mail and keep the trains running (if not on time, at least running).

I know there are many who think the ascendancy of the Brotherhood means Egypt is going to be another Iran, or at least break with the US and Israel, destroy its own tourism sector and impose a theocracy. That could still happen, but that sounds more like Al-Nour's platform than the Brotherhood's. They've learned to be cautious — most of the leadership have lots of jail time on their resumes — and are still behaving so. Let's see what happens.

Egypt's Parliament Meets for 12 Minutes, Refers Fate to Courts. Wait—What Just Happened?

The showdown at the Cairo Corral seemed imminent, the Earps and Clantons facing each other down, and then — everybody went home. Egypt's dissolved Parliament, recalled by President Morsi in what seemed a challenge to both the military and the Supreme Constitutional Court, assembled, voted to refer its fate to the Appeals Court (technically seeking advice on how to implemnet the SCC dissoluton), and dissolved 12 minutes later pending the appeal. Two days of sound and fury, of sturm und drang, ended with — what, exactly?

A prolcedural point made, to be sure: Parliament chose to appeal its own fate, but did noy seek to legislate. Some suspect a more abstruse point may be in play: SCAF having handed over executive power to Morsi in the interim, Morsi may argue that constitutionally the legislative authority now devolves to him, not to SCAF. But that bsttle is one for the courts, not the streets. That seems implicit here:

Speaker Saad al-Katatny chaired a general meeting that discussed means of enforcing the verdict. He said the decision by President Mohamed Morsy to reinstate the assembly did not defy the court's ruling, but rather reversed the consequent decision by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to disband the assembly.

"In all of its activities, the state is bound by laws. The People's Assembly is fully cognizant of its competences, and respects the judiciary," Katatny stressed.

He added that he had consulted the legislative committee to enforce the verdict and its relevant measures, but noted that Article 40 of the Constitutional Declaration, which has governed the country since March 2011, stipulates that the Court of Cassation has jurisdiction over the validity of parliament memberships.

 So who blinked, and who won? I think that Morsi and the Parliament may have made a procedural point for the legal maneuvering ahead, but hardly the daring reclamation of Presidential authority this was being portrayed as over the past couple of days.

Was this the intended scenario all along, or an 11th hour dialing back of the crisis? Morsi's move alarmed many liberals and others who feared the Muslim Brotherhood was making a ploy to get back the Parliament it dominates and thus control the political arena as a whole; the fact that the MB's Shura Council held a meeting shortly before Morsi's move added to fears that, despite his "resignation" from the movement, it is not Morsi but the MB leadership calling the shots. The Brotherhood has frequently overplayed its hand in the past year and a half, and may have done so again.

But that will be hard to judge until it's clear what Morsi intended from the beginning. Was the plan all along to go to the brink and then back off, as seems to have happened? Was the plan all along to make a recondite constitutional point, and then let the courts figure it out? (Meanwhile, pending cases relating to Parliament were postponed to July 17.)

An initial impression is that the MB hurt itself here: it seemed to be flouting the rule of law (even if the SCC is a Mubarak-packed body) and alienating some of its own allies. In the end, it may have backed away from a confrontation it was going to lose. Or perhaps this compromise (if that's what it is) was its goal all along.

Egyptian Supreme Court Dissolves Parliament but Keeps Shafiq in Race: Double Blow to MB on Eve of Elections

 On a day when Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court handed down two decisions which each could have thrown the country into chaos, it chose to deliver one shocking blow to the transitional process but to avoid the second: it effectively dissolved Parliament, but it left Ahmad Shafiq in the Presidential race,so that the runoff election will take place this weekend. Had it alsl disqualified Shafiq, the whole transition would likely have collapsed. As it is, the decision not only dissolves :Parliament but also presumably the just-named Constituent Assembly named by Parliament,

Though the Court ruling only invalidated the Parliamentary election law for the 1/3 of the seats elected on an individual basis, a Court official said that it requires the dissolution of both houses of Parliament, the People's Assembly and the Shura Council.

For a backgrounder on the two cases decided today, see here. Also for background see Mara Revkin on "Egypt's Injudicious Judges."

There is no question who the big loser is. By dissolving the Islamist-dominated Parliament but leaving old regime secularist Shafiq in the race for President, the decisions will likely be taken by the Muslim Brotherhood as a double blow. Had Shafiq been disqualified Brotherhood candidate Muhammad Morsi would either have won by default or new elections would be required; and by losing :Parliament the Brotherhood risks losing most of what it has gained, One Brotherhood spokesman has already called the decision a "military coup," and Morsi is to speak soon, Former Presidential candidate Abdel Moneim Abu'l-Futuh has echoed the "military coup" judgment and linked these two decisions to yesterday's announcement that military police could arrest civilians in support of that interpretation.

And if, as some are saying, SCAF now assumes both the powers of Parliament and of the Constituent Assembly, the "military coup" judgment doesn't seem far fetched.

It's too soon to judge just how things will play out but my initial reaction is that just as this was already the worst possible choice of two candidates, this is the worst possible set of decisions: by dissolving Parliament and keeping Shafiq in the race it gives the impression of rolling back the revolution and disenfranchising the Brotherhood, through a court decision not the ballot box, while yesterday's arrest announcement seems to restore the State of Emergency.

The dangers of a renewed revolution, but this time with the Brotherhood fully supportive from the start, or a bloody, repressive crackdown seem more real than at any time since the fall of Mubarak. I think there is real danger here.

There will surely be much more to say here.