Surprise: New Egyptian Parliament Dominated by Pro-Sisi Forces

I haven't written much about the final results of Egypt's Parliamentary elections because, frankly, Egyptians didn't pay much attention either, as evidenced by the low turnout, which even the official media noted.

While there are still a few challenged results and the President will appoint additional members, Egypt's new unicameral House of Representatives (replacing the bicameral People's Assembly and Shura Council), on the one hand, is not a monolithic body dominated by a single party as in past eras, but rather a mix of many parties and independents representing a range across he ideological spectrum. The catch is the vast majority support President al-Sisi's policies, and the other catch is that the body may have less power than the dissolved Islamist Parliament elected in 2011.

The seats allocated to Party Lists 120, were all taken by the "For the love of Egypt" coalition, a lierl.secularist coalition of a number of parties. The remaining seats, allocated by individual constituency competition, also saw the members of the coalition do well, with the Free Egyptians Party, founded by Naguib Sawiris, the venerable liberal Wafd, and the new and little-known Future of the Homeland Party leading the secular parties. The only Islamist Party running, al-Nour, alsoately well but nothing like 2011 when it was the largest bloc in Parliament.


Now most of the liberal secular parties are negotiating to form a pro-Sisi bloc. There are some differences. The most pro-Sisi elements want, as Sisi himself has suggested, to amend the 2014 Constitution to restore some of the reductions made to Presidential power from the Sadat-Mubarak era.

"When You See the Black Banners Advancing from Khurasan": Apocalyptic Imagery (Unscheduled) Part III

When I first heard that the US was bombing an al-Qa‘ida subgroup called "Khorasan," I wondered if here was some mistake, since Khorasan historically extends from northeastern Iran up into Central Asia, a long way from northwestern Syria. But as you might expect, this resonates with our recent posts on apocalyptic end times imagery in ISIS and similar movements. I had planned only Part I on Dabiq and Part II on Sufyani, etc. But here's another of them, as I gradually remembered where my onetime focus on early ‘Abbasid history overlaps with modern jihadi imagery: the black banners advancing from Khurasan (the Arabic spelling; Khorasan in Persian).

Most immediately, the name Khorasan or Khurasan seems to come from the fact that several of the leaders of the group in Syria were chosen by al-Qa‘ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri from leaders of the movement who had been inside Iran (only sometimes tolerated by the Shi‘ite regime) or in Afghanistan and the Pakistani borderlands. They had links to al-Qa‘ida's council for affairs in the Afghan region, the Shura of al-Qa‘ida in the land of Khurasan or the Khurasan Shura. But the choice of "Khurasan" has a deeper resonance.

There is a hadith or tradition of the Prophet Muhammad which most hadith commentators consider weak and probably fabricated,that with some variations usually is cited as something like this:

If you see the black banners coming from the direction of Khurasan, then go to them, even if you have to crawl, because among them will be Allah’s Caliph the Mahdi.

Indeed, as I said, most commentators do not accept this as a real tradition of the Prophet, and many commentators and historians assume it was created to garner support for the ‘Abbasid Revolution which overthrew the Umayyad dynasty in AH 132/AD 750, and which started in Khurasan with a revolt led by a somewhat mysterious figure named Abu Muslim, and whose emblem was indeed a black banner. Some versions of the hadith even include phrases like "they are the sons of al-‘Abbas."  The third ‘Abbasid Caliph (and the father of Harun al-Rashid) took the name al-Mahdi.

Jabhat al-Nusra Flsg

Even if the hadith was a fabrication of the ‘Abbasid propaganda machine, it is ostensibly a prophecy of the end times, and has become popular in jihadist circles. For al-Qa‘ida, jihad begins in the east, Afghanistan and Pakistan, historically part of a sort of Greater Khurasan with a bit of geographical stretching. And jihadism is now seeking to establish itself in the core Arab lands of Iraq and Syria, advancing westward, and, of course, carrying black flags.

ISIS flag

So for al-Qa‘ida Central, moving leaders from the Shura Khurasan to Syria powerfully evokes the image of the black banners advancing from Khurasan to conquer the heartland from the periphery.

And as an aside, some versions of the hadith suggest that the individual fighters in the armies advancing under those black banners will be known not by their given names but by a kunya (the "Father of" name) followed by the nisba name formed from their home town or country. Hence the standard form of the jihadi nom de guerre: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi, Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri, Abu Anas al-Libi, and so on.

Egypt's New Prime Minister is Very Old Establishment Indeed

Ibrahim Mehleb has been named as Egypt's new Prime Minister.

Egypt's new Prime Minister-Designate is not a new face. He was Housing Minister in the outgoing Cabinet, but he has been a senior figure in the Mubarak-era establishment. In the eyes of many of the young revolutionaries he will probably been seen as a classic member of the fallul, the "remnants," of the old regime. An engineer by training, he was a member of the Policies Committee of the now-disbanded (except for all the still-influential members) National Democratic Party; he served on the Shura Council (the Upper House) under Mubarak. But perhaps more important, he spent 11 years as Chairman of the Board of The Arab Contractors (Osman Ahmed Osman & Co.).

If that means little to you, I'm guessing you've never set foot in Egypt. The Arab Contractors is not just the biggest construction company in Egypt, but one of the largest in the Arab World. It has had a hand in almost every construction project in Egypt from the Aswan High Dam under Nasser to the new version of the Library of Alexandria. It was founded by Osman Ahmed Osman. Though the Osman family lost control of the company to the government in 2001, Osman, who died in 1999, had built it up through one of the classic examples of what has been called crony capitalism, benefiting from friends in high places. Already influential under Nasser, he was a personal friend of Anwar Sadat and welcomed Sadat's infitah or economic opening; the alliance was further cemented when Osman's son married Sadat's daughter. Throughout the Mubarak era, the company enjoyed a role in almost every major construction project. The company owns a soccer team, The Arab Contractors (their home is Osman Ahmed Osman Stadium).

It was this company that Mehleb served as its Chairman of the Board for 11 years. Definitely not a new face.

A Week After the Army Moved, the Army Speaks Softly, But Uses its Big Stick

This morning's Washington Post headlines emphasized the appointment of a Prime Minister and a Vice President in Egypt; other headlines around the world are emphasizing how the Public Prosecutor is going after senior Brotherhood figures, including the Supreme Guide. The emphasis seems to be on the civilian sector: President names a Prime Minister, Public Prosecutor (not the Army) charges the Supreme Guide. While General Sisi has not been completely invisible, but he's not exactly been at center stage, either.

Pay some attention to the uniformed men behind the curtain. The Egyptian Armed Forces may not have fought a war in nearly 40 years (except for a division-sized contribution to Desert Storm), but it is large and wields enormous influence in Egyptian society. Laura Dean at The New Republic scoffs at the idea of civil war, given the strength of the Army.

I agree that a full-scale civil war would be dampened down quickly by the Army and the equally potent Interior Ministry forces. But the profound polarization so many are noting, with the secularists acting as if the Brotherhood will now simply go away, is likely to mean that the Army will have to play a major role.

The irony is that the same secular liberals who were denouncing the battles at Mohammed Mahmoud Street and Maspero in 2011-2012, demanding the fall of SCAF, are again proclaiming that "the Army and the people are one hand." Maybe, but occasionally that hand turns into a fist, The fact that the transitional government is seeking to amend the 2012 constitution rather than replace it is  testimony to the fact that the Army (and the judiciary) plan to hold on to the perks they were given by the Brotherhood in that Constitution.  The Army is going to protect its own interests, first of all.

The efforts to dismantle the Brotherhood, despite initial rhetoric about working with all elements, suggest the Army may play rough at times. Besides closing the Brotherhood's TV stations and seeking to arrest its leaders (and Morsi's "preventive detention" by the Republican Guard, whose mission was to protect the President), raise some concerns, though again the Brotherhood's call for an uprising provides plenty of excuse. The Shura Council-appointed editors of Al-Ahram have now been replaced.

The Brotherhood proved arrogant and authoritarian. They have been replaced by the Army, which is sometimes arrogant and by nature authoritarian. The Army may, indeed, entrust power to a civilian government and oversee early elections. I hope so. But as Omar Robert Hamilton notes in the suitably titled "Selective Memories," many liberals seem to have already forgotten the events of less than two years ago.

Abdel Fattah Sisi is no Gamal Abdel Nasser, though he seems slightly more comfortable with public speaking than Field Marshal Tantawi did.

I hope that the insistence that this was a revolution, not a coup is borne out over time. But the next President should remember what the Caesars learned the hard way in Rome: if you rely on the Praetorian Guard to gain power, remember that they may tire of you in time.

The Paradoxes and Contradictions of June 30

 On Sunday, June 30, opponents of Egyptian President Muhammad Morsi will take to the streets on the anniversary of his presidency to demand new Presidential elections and a reboot of the democratization efforts that began with the January 25 revolution. They want to remove the President, dissolve the Shura Council (Islamist dominated and acting as the sole legislative body), and rewrite the new constitution. The Tamarrud (rebellion, insurrection) movement, the main organizers of the protests, are mostly secularist revolutionaries of 2011 disillusioned and feeling their accomplishments were sidetracked, perhaps derailed, when the Muslim Brotherhood got control of the locomotive. As Zeinobia notes, they're now trying to institutionalize a front organization.

The Brotherhood and its Freedom and Justice Party intend to defend the regime, seeing it as legitimate, democratically elected. and, as Morsi said in his speech this week, needing more time. They wouldn't object too strongly if the independent press (and maybe a couple of state-owned papers as well) and the judiciary got hammered a bit in the process.

US Ambassador Anne Patterson came under fire this week for suggesting that protests against the elected government would be a bad idea (an oversimplification of what she said, but one feeding the conspiracy theory among some Egyptian conspiracy theorists among liberal secularists that the US is backing the Muslim Brotherhood).

There's rather open yearning among some secularists for a military coup, to reset the clock and restart the democratization process. Really? Wasn't that what the 1952 coup promised? Didn't you finally shuffle your last general off the stage in 2011. 59 years later? Yeah, that'll work. It worked so well the last time. What are you thinking?

The prospect of the demonstrations has also fueled insecurity. There's a gasoline shortage and runs on other necessities. Insecurity is just what Egypt needs.

So am I opposed to June 30 (conspiracy theorists could say I'm in league with Ambassador Patterson)? No, the right to demonstrate should be sacrosanct. But there are problems with the demands being made. They would roll everything back, in effect, to February 11, 2011. That is not going to happen,because it ignores the Parliamentary and Presidential election results. Morsi won an election (by 51%) and the Freedom and Justice Party won a plurality in the Parliament (since dissolved) while Islamists held a majority overall. That can't be ignored. The Brotherhood and its allies have proven their support base.

The other side of the coin is they've proven other things as well: 

1. A remarkable incompetence and inability to address serious issues like the economy, and a tendency to rally against outside enemies (Ethiopia on Nile waters, the usual suspects of Israel, "outside influences" meaning the West, Syria) while ignoring horrors at home (the recent killings of Shi‘ites, continued looking the other way on Coptic-Muslim clashes, public harassment, abuse, and even rape of women, torture in the prison Morsi himself once spent time in, etc.)
2. Despite the FJP having won only a plurality in Parliament and Morsi's narrow squeaker win for the Presidency, an unwillingness to compromise, a sense of "legitimacy is ours and you're the enemy," and an attitude to NGOs and the press that is indistinguishable from Mubarak's except for the identity of some of the targets.
3. An overall performance that, in a Parliamentary system, might already have led to the fall of the government, and that might justify a constitutional impeachment if there were in fact a Parliament in place.

But the opposition doesn't want a constitutional removal; they want a new revolution. Or so they say.

Now as an American, I have standing to criticize emerging democracies because of our sterling record of our two major parties working together. OK, how about the House, Senate, and President fully understand the need for compromise and always work together. Oh, all right. At least all sides universally accept judicial decisions. 

OK I see your point, maybe I don't have standing to criticize. But hey, Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, and John C. Calhoun got on real well in the 1840s. Too bad about that little Civil War unpleasantness that followed.

It is in fact the refusal of either side in Egypt to recognize the legitimacy of the other or consider power sharing that is most disturbing. One of the best expressions of the conflicting issues and ambiguities of this quarrel I have seen is in this post by Egyptian journalist Sarah Carr (who has an English father and Egyptian mother and is always a good read). Excerpts (but read it all)(language warning for one phrase):

Ideologically, I am extremely torn about the protests’ demands. I would like nothing better than for Morsy and his arrogant, obstinate Brothers to be booted out of Egyptian political life (and I voted for Morsy in order to keep out Shafiq) but have three issues:

1. It would hit the Muslim Brotherhood harder if they were ejected from Egyptian public life via elections. They would not be able to cry foul, and this would hit at their precious legitimacy in a way that the protests don’t. I have long been of the opinion that the Muslim Brotherhood should be left to their own devices as long as the economy can stand it, so that they continue to fuck up, destroy their support base, and we can be rid of them forever. This is a problematic and unpopular position, I know and it assumes firstly, they hold elections and secondly, they don’t forge results.

2. I keep imagining that it was ElBaradei or Hamdeen [Sabahi] or someone non-MB and palatable to those taking to the streets on Sunday was elected. I imagine, what if Mr Palatable did something to garner the ire of his (Islamist) opposition on a par with Morsy’s constitutional amendment, something along the lines of removing all reference to Sharia in the constitution (PEDANTS: I AM JUST IMAGINING FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS EXERCISE AND AM NOT SUGGESTING THEY WOULD).

Say that this inspired mass protests similar to those at the presidential palace in December 2012 and that Mr Palatable’s supporters used violence against the raging Islamist mobs. Now imagine that the political impasse dragged on and on until the exasperated Islamist opposition, together with ordinary Egyptians fed up at the economic situation and turmoil (I am assuming that no president could have fixed much in a year) took to the streets demanding Palatable go.

What would my position be? I would most likely stand against the Islamist mob and one of the arguments I would invoke is that Palatable was democratically elected and you, raving Islamist mob, represent nobody but yourselves.

3. If a miracle happened and Morsy did step down as a result of these protests it sets an awkward precedent. Particularly if the army is involved.

So I am in a quandary. I despise the Muslim Brotherhood and hate what they have done to the country. I like democracy, such as it is, and think that respecting clean election results is a useful and pretty essential rule in a functioning society, but then the Muslim Brotherhood themselves seem to have no respect for the rule of law. The reappearance of the Egyptian army in politics would be disastrous, and prompt a jingoistic army lovefest that my embattled nerves could not withstand. It would be ammunition for the Omar Suleiman “Egyptians are not ready for democracy” crowd, and that would be heartbreaking.

Indeed.
 

Egyptian Salafi: "Shi‘a Are More Dangerous Than Naked Women"

Add to the "[Stuff] Salafis Say" file this wondrous quote from a Salafi Nour Party MP in Egypt, according to Ahram Online: 

 "The Shi[‘]as are more dangerous than naked [women]," MP Tharwat Attallah of the Salafist Nour Party said during the meeting. "They are a danger to Egypt's national security; Egyptians could be deceived into [converting to] Shi[‘]ism, giving it a chance to spread in Egypt," he added.

 Oh, my. What to say? We've previously discussed the odd Salafi preoccupation with Shi‘ism in a country which has very few, and, well, I guess I probably don't have to cite chapter and verse on how Salafis feel about naked women.

I hope you don't mind the bracketed ‘ayns. I'm not always pedantic, but I refuse to omit consonants.

Now, there are no doubt some dangerous Shi‘a. I'm not, personally, a great lover of Hizbullah or the Iranian Revolution Guards Corps, but I've known plenty of Lebanese and Iraqi Shi‘a who were fine people. Similarly, I suppose naked women can be dangerous, since it was just last month that, during the so-called International Topless Jihad Day, the Ukrainian feminist group Femen proclaimed that their bare breasts (they actually said "tits" but I'm euphemizing)  "are deadlier than your stones," and "deadly" = "dangerous" seems fair. But I'm not sure these are really comparable threats. (Or, well, threats at all.)

But then, since this was a case of the Shura Council questioning the Tourism Ministry, by "naked women" the Salafi speaker may have meant "tourists in bikinis," a perennial threat to Salafism, since in Egypt, actual naked women are as thin on the ground as actual Shi‘a. Aliaa Elmahdy left the country some time back (and has most recently gotten naked in Sweden, but I don't think it's considered dangerous there), easing the terrible danger of anyone being naked in Egypt.

My own answer to the "Shi‘a" versus "naked women" debate is, "why can't we have both?"

Though I read Ahram Online daily I nearly missed this gem, so a hat tip to Khalil Al-anani for linking to it, though he has absolutely no responsibility whatsoever for my comments on said link.

Judiciary, MB in Egypt Approaching Showdown?

Last Friday, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt held demonstrations calling for a "purge" of the judiciary, as the continuing series of confrontations between the courts and the Presidency deepen. Having already dissolved the Lower House of Parliament last year, the courts are considering the constitutionality of the Shura Council, the Upper House now serving as the sole legislature, while other court rulings have put off the Parliamentary elections, originally due this month, until fall at the earliest. The Shura Council is meanwhile debating a new Judiciary Law that would force the retirement of as many as 3,000 judges.

Meanwhile, the government has essentially ignored court rulings against its appointment of the Prosecutor General and another ruling that sought to remove the Prime Minister. Justice Minister Ahmad Mekki has submitted his resignation, though it is unclear if it will be accepted; a Cabinet reshuffle is expected in the next few days. [Update: Mekki reportedly will not resign and Morsi has reportedly suspended the Judicial Authority Law after talks with the judges.]

Along with the Cabinet reshuffle, the government is expected to name new governors for the Governorates; if it seeks to name primarily Brotherhood members, it is likely to deepen the confrontations; it could however signal a willingness to work with the opposition. President Morsi's international travels have yet to provide the sort of deus ex machina solutions to the country's economic problems he seems to have hoped for, and the failure to address the economic crisis further deepens the political stalemate.

New Feuds: MB versus Al-Azhar and (Maybe) General Intelligence?

 The Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt was already embroiled in its latest round of sparring with the judiciary, and now it's being challenged by another key institution, Al-Azhar, and (depending on whose version you credit), maybe an even more formidable foe, the General Intelligence Service (Jihaz al-Mukhabarat al-‘Amma,  جهاز المخابرات العامة). Though both parties are denying talk of a feud between the Brotherhood and the Mukhabarat, anyone familiar with the history of either institution is unlikely to be surprised.

First, Al-Azhar. The new Constitution provides that Al-Azhar's Senior Scholars' Authority is the final authority on issues involving Islamic law. In the past week the Shura Council, the Upper House which is functioning as a Parliament in the absence of a Lower House, pushed through a law promoted by the Muslim Brotherhood authorizing the issuance of Islamic bonds (sukuk). Al-Azhar has now insisted that, consistent with the new Constitution, it must give prior approval to the Sukuk Law. The Salafi Nour Party is supporting Al-Azhar's claim, and also wants al-Azhar to approve any new IMF agreement, since it would involve payment of interest.

One would normally expect this kind of constitutional dispute to be resolved  by the courts, but the President and the judiciary are already at loggerheads over President Morsi's replacement of the Prosecutor General.

There has already been a lot of speculation (denied by the parties, but not silenced) that the Army is increasingly disillusioned by the Brotherhood-dominated Government. Now there's a debate about General Intelligence.

First, several people expressed concern about growing problems between the Brothrhood and the GIS:

Sources close to Morsi, meanwhile, say that the president "faces a coup attempt partially orchestrated and executed by the intelligence apparatus."

In a recent television interview, Morsi himself voiced concern about what he described as "certain loopholes within the intelligence apparatus."

Morsi's statement followed assertions by FJP leader Mohamed El-Beltagi that "an intelligence officer" had been "apprehended" distributing money and weapons to thugs hired to attack Morsi supporters.

This week, Abul-Ela Madi, leader of the moderate-Islamist Wasat Party (an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood) made similar statements, alleging the existence of a wide-ranging conspiracy against Morsi from within the ranks of Egyptian intelligence.

The Wasat Party's Madi's alleged claims were reported like this:

On Tuesday, Madi said at a Wasat Party meeting that Morsi had told him that, during the Mubarak era, Egypt's General Intelligence apparatus had established a secret group of 300,000 paid thugs. He went on to assert that these thugs had appeared during recent political violence.

"President Morsi told me that, several years ago, General Intelligence had formed a secret group of 300,000 thugs, including 80,000 in Cairo alone," Madi had said in statements that were captured on video and circulated online.

He added: "General Intelligence then handed responsibility for this group over to Egypt's General Security Directorate in the interior ministry, which, in turn, handed it over to the State Security apparatus."

The group, Madi went on, "resurfaced again during recent clashes at the presidential palace [between Morsi's supporters and opponents]; this is what President Morsi told me."

But the same link cited above  has the Wasat Party's backpedal:

"The statements were [intentionally] taken out of context in order to make it look as if [Madi] was accusing an apparatus known for its patriotism," the statement asserted.
The party statement clarified that Madi had meant that the ousted regime was still using state apparatuses against its opponents.

The party went on to stress its respect for the General Intelligence apparatus.
"The Wasat Party declares its respect for Egyptian state agencies, including General Intelligence, and reiterates its longstanding position that all sovereign apparatuses – including the military, police and intelligence – should stay out of political conflicts and alliances," the statement read.

Madi, the statement added, "had been speaking about what the former regime use to do, namely, exploit state apparatuses to form gangs of thugs. What we suffer from now is the result of that ugly past, to which we will not return."

Oh, they meant the bad old General Intelligence Service, not the new one! Past and former GIS officers have been noting that the agency is subordinate to the Presidency (link is in Arabic) and politicians are defending it, though one of its former senior officials, Hossam Khairallah, turns the argument around and sees a threat to GIS from the Presidency:

"Anger is boiling over amid such continuing irresponsible statements from the [Wasat] party or other groups close to it," Hossam Khairallah, strategic analyst and former first undersecretary of Egypt's General Intelligence apparatus, told Ahram Online.

Khairallah – who ran in last year’s presidential elections that were ultimately won by the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi – articulated the simmering discontent within the ranks of the intelligence apparatus over Madi’s statements, which many of its members reportedly perceived as an insult.

The former intelligence official also condemned Egypt’s presidency for not issuing a statement on the matter. He went on to predict that Egypt's current General Intelligence chief, Major-General Mohamed Raafat Shehata, would resign if the presidency failed to react “appropriately” to the matter and hold those behind the allegations responsible.

Khairallah, for his part, denied that anything of the kind had taken place during his 35-year tenure in the intelligence apparatus, stressing that Egyptian intelligence was devoted to information collection.

"Directing such considerable numbers needs thousands of leaders," he argued. "This is illogical. It has never happened under the rule of any of Egypt's presidents."

Khairallah was of the opinion that providing such information was not in the president's interests and could even jeopardize the state's national security.

"This gives Egypt's foes the opportunity to topple an apparatus that should act as a guiding light to the president," he asserted.

"It is the country's intelligence that should be the president's guide, not the [Brotherhood's] Guidance Bureau, which believes that [former General Intelligence chief] Omar Suleiman left a black box [of information] to the apparatus," he noted.

Khairallah also voiced doubt as to the future of cooperation between the presidency and Egyptian intelligence amid what he described as "attempts to target the intelligence apparatus."

Khairallah believes that any bid to 'Brotherhoodise' Egyptian intelligence would fail, since this would bring the presidency into conflict with the army.

He pointed out that, during Egypt's transitional phase of military rule, former military head Hussein Tantawi had issued a decree stipulating that the head of intelligence should be drawn from a military background. This, Khairallah believes, further rules out any possibility of the 'Brotherhoodization' of intelligence.

Recent weeks have seen scattered reports of the imminent appointment of Mohamed El-Beltagi, secretary-general of the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party, as interior minister or intelligence chief. Such speculation, however, was later quashed by El-Beltagi, who on Thursday described the reports as "false rumours and fabricated news."

Those rumors may be behind the whole flap, a pre-emptive mood on the part of the intelligence community to block such an appointment.

The late GIS Director Omar Suleiman was a devoted enemy of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Muslim Brotherhood remembers. Most of the GIS senior leadership rose under the aegis of Suleiman and doubtless have little love for their onetime adversaries either,

Some of the GIS' defenders note that it is responsible for foreign intelligence, not domestic. This is not believed by most Egyptians, though technically State Security Investigations, part of the Interior Ministry,has the lead there. Just as State Security has now been replaced by the entirely different (new stationery!) National Security, the GIS Madi says he meant to criticize is a totally different GIS. Or so we're told.

Omar Suleiman is dead. That much is true. (Hmm...)

Cold Cases and Deep States: Suad Husni Case Dismissed for "Insufficient Evidence"

Suad Husni about 1972

I think it may have been Yossarian in Catch-22 who first remarked that just because you're paranoid doesn't mean they're not out to get you. And just because Middle Easterners tend to see plots and conspiracies everywhere doesn't mean that some of them aren't real.

A couple of days ago, an Egyptian judge dismissed a case seeking to uncover the truth behind the 2001 death in London of Egyptian actress Suad Husni, who fell, or jumped, or was pushed, from the balcony of her London high-rise apartment. Longstanding rumors that she was involved with Egyptian intelligence have led to speculation of foul play.

Conspiracy theory? Maybe. But consider this; between 1973 and 2007 four prominent, well-known Egyptians in London, three with known intelligence links and Suad Husni with rumors of same, all died mysteriously. But: three of them died by falling from their apartment balconies (or jumping, or being pushed). Starting to seem to push the coincidence level a bit? Oh, did I mention that two of them, though nearly 30 years apart, fell from balconies in the same apartment tower? The Stuart Tower in Maida Vale. No cause for suspicion in any of this, right?

The official Egyptian explanation is that most or all committed suicide,  while the British authorities found cause for suspicion, but no proof.

The four were:

1) El-Leithy Nassif. Commander of the Republican Guard under Nasser and the early years of Sadat. Named Ambassador to Greece, he went to London for medical treatment. Found dead on the pavement under his apartment on August 15, 1973. His wife claimed he was pushed and blamed Anwar Sadat. He lived in and fell from the Stuart Tower.

2. Ali Shafiq. Major General Ali Shafiq's case is unusual in that he did not fall off his balcony. A former Office Director for Nasser's number two man, Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amr, who committed suicide (or in some accounts, "committed suicide") after the 1967 war, he was later linked with Saad al-Din al-Shazly, fired by Sadat during the 1973 war. On July 5, 1977, he was found dead in his home in Harley Street in London, having been dead for some days, but was reportedly found in a pool of blood.

3. Suad Husni. The subject of this post; details momentarily. Died 2001. Fell from the Stuart Tower.

4. Ashraf Marwan. We've written about the Marwan case several times. Marwan was Nasser's son in law. In the Sadat era he headed the Arab Organization for Industrialization, which ran a large segment of Egypt's military industries, and later became an international businessman and apparently a back-channel diplomat and intelligence agent.  In 2007, amid Israeli reports that he was the double agent who tipped off Israel the day before the 1973 war and other allegations, he was found beneath the balcony of his home in St. James Park. His wife (Nasser's daughter Mona) insists he was killed. Some blame Mubarak, others Mossad. depending on their preferred conspiracy theory. But if he was a Mossad asset, why would they kill him? It's said he was trying to market his memoirs when he fell/jumped/was pushed.

Stuart Tower: Watch Your Step

Coincidences? Or perhaps a singular lack of originality on the part of the hit squad's modus operandi over three decades?

Back to Suad Husni. In the 1960s and 1970s she was Egypt's superstar, beautiful, captivating, conveying both innocence and sexiness. She dominated Egyptian films for years. When I arrived in Egypt in 1972 her film Khali Balak min Zouzou (Watch out for Zouzou) had already been in theaters for much of a year, and in that pre-VCR/DVD era, was still playing when I left. It's the usual realistic plot: college student moonlights as a belly-dancer, falls in love with her professor, etc. etc.

She continued to make films through the 1980s and into the 90s, but she also became the Egyptian equivalent of a tabloid sensation with multiple marriages. rumors of a secret marriage to singing superstar Abdel Halim Hafiz. and so on. There would also be rumors that she had links to Egyptian intelligence and to senior political leaders. Born in the poor Cairo quarter of Bulaq, she was popularly called "Cinderella," having become a princess.

In the 1990s she moved to London. She suffered from a back injury and other health issues and gained weight. (There are some mysteries about the nature of her illnesses, which further fuel the conspiracy theories.)

On June 22, 2001, she fell from her balcony. The balcony was, of course, at the Stuart Tower in Maida Vale, the same building from which Nassif fell back in 1973.

She was given a huge burial in Egypt, but rumors began immediately. Suicide was blamed, but it was noted that one slipper was found in the bathroom and one on the balcony, suggesting she had been forcibly moved. More crucially, friends and family said she had contracted for her memoirs and had been making tape recordings of those memoirs.

Only those of you who've never seen a single spy thriller will need to be told that the tapes, which some claim to have seen, were not found in her apartment and have never been found since her death.

Opposition press reports and, eventually, her own younger sister told a different tale: she had been recruited by Egyptian intelligence and worked for it for many years. One of the key figures in this was Safwat Sharif, an intelligence man under Nasser, Information Minister for decades under Sadat and Mubarak, and finally head of the Shura Council until the fall of Mubarak. In short,. one of the most powerful men in Egypt. Other names mentioned include Zakaria Azmi, Husni Mubarak's Chief of Staff. It is also alleged that she was required to provide sexual favors both to intelligence targets and to senior regime figures. And I should note that her own younger sister supports this narrative, despite its scandalous aspects.

I have no knowledge of the facts beyond the press accounts, and while I'm usually skeptical of conspiracy theories, sometimes they're pretty obvious.

But the judge decided a couple of days ago that there's "insufficient evidence." He may well be right: the British courts couldn't find a smoking gun either, but seemed to still be a bit skeptical of the suicide theory. (And please, let's do more for safety measures on balconies of London flats.) Then again, "insufficient evidence" may mean "nothing to see here: move along now."

Am I suggesting that the Egyptian intelligence and security services are still protecting themselves despite a Revolution and the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood? That the spooky parts of the Egyptian establishment (the "Deep State") are unchanged? ("Deep State" is a term used of foreign countries like Turkey and Egypt, but how many Presidents of both parties did J. Edgar Hoover serve as FBI Director in the US?)

Oh, why would I even hint at such a thing? I know that the old, hated, evil and all-powerful State Security Apparatus (jihaz amn al-dawla) was abolished and replaced with the totally new and utterly different National Security Sector (qita‘ amn al-watani). (It works for the nation, not the "state," and it's just a "sector," not a sinister "appartus." Nothing in common but that word "security." Hey, they even fired a handful of people at the top and no doubt bought new stationery. No Deep State here.

And insufficient evidence about Cinderella's fall.

Here We Go Again: Court Suspends Egyptian Elections

Egypt's Administrative Court has suspended the Presidential decree setting the Parliamentary elections in several stages from late April through June.

This latest round in the sparring between the Morsi Government and the courts is not necessarily the end of the story; the Presidency has already indicated it will appeal. In February, the Supreme Constitutional Court had invalidated five provisions of the electoral law. The Shura Council, the Upper House now functioning as a legislative body, amended them, but then Morsi immediately called the elections without referring the amendments back to the Supreme Constitutional Court; the Administrative Court has ruled it should have referred them to the SCC again.

Egyptian Elections to Begin April 27-28, Run into June

Egypt will hold its Parliamentary elections beginning April 27-28 and they will be held in four stages. They had been expected sometime in April, though the four rounds will men the results will stretch into early June. The new Parliament will convene July 6.

The decree by President Morsi came after the Shura Council, the Upper House currently legislating in the absence of a lower House, agreed to amendments to the electoral law that had been demanded by the Supreme Constitutional Court.

April 28, the weekend of the first round,  will be Coptic Palm Sunday. (Eastern Easter this year is over a month later than Western Easter.)

No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Saudi Hardliners Angry About Women on Shura Council

You probably have heard how King ‘Abdullah of Saudi Arabia recently named 30 women to the Shura Council, the country's appointed advisory council, named by the King to advise the King.It cannot legislate and is unelected. There are still now women in the Cabinet, and the 30 women in the 150-seat Council will be seated separately and enter by a separate door. And they still can't drive to the meetings. In other words, while an encouraging sign of change in the Kingdom, the move did not exactly turn the country into an egalitarian utopia.

But of course, even the smallest bit of progress has its critics. Hardline clerics are protesting. Here's why:

In an unauthorized but un-policed protest at the royal palace, a video of which is now circulating on YouTube, religious groups condemned ''the dangerous changes taking place in the country''. They demanded a meeting with palace officials to ''make them change their minds'', saying the female nominations ''are not representative of society'' and calling for similar parliamentary quotas for religious figures.

Eek! Girls in the clubhouse! I must say,though, that I do agree with one aspect of the complaint: that it's "not representative of society." Demographically, the Council would have to be half female to be representative of society. (Yet somehow, I don't think that's what he meant. And while the speaker wasn't identified in the story, I don't think I'm being too daring in referring to the speaker as "he.")

And of course, the Iranian PressTV was glad to report the protests. In terms of women in public life Iran actually seems enlightened by comparison if you don't look much farther in your comparison. But PressTV does have a clip of the demonstration along with an English commentary (though I don't endorse the commentary: I would not take PressTV's unsupported word that the sun comes up in the East):

Polarization in Egypt and the Excluded Middle

The confrontations in Egypt are perhaps all the more dangerous because both sides claim — and I suspect believe sincerely —that they are on the side of democracy. President Morsi's supporters (the Muslim Brotherhood and others) see him as duly elected, and taking a stand against an entrenched bureaucracy and judiciary, much of which consists of Mubarak era "remnants." In fact, I suspect some of Morsi's moves are widely popular: firing the hated State Prosecutor,blocking the courts from dissolving elected institutions like the Shura Council, etc.

But his decree went beyond blocking the courts from interfering with elected institutions, giving himself powers with no oversight whatsoever. The overreach is the problem. And the Brotherhood, while correctly noting  Morsi won an election, overlooks the fact that he did so with 51% of the vote (and got less than 25% in the first round. Not a huge mandate.)

His opponents, however, must recognize that while he has overreached, he does have a legitimacy they were unable to achieve at the polls.

If one side is taking a straight majoritarian approach to democracy: we won, so we get to make the rules; then the other side is taking the approach of denying him any legitimacy despite his electoral victory.

The problem is that democracy requires, , if it is to function properly, both the rule of the majority and a protection of the rights of the minority. The polarization in Egypt (which reflects a polarization of society) excludes any room for negotiation and compromise (so far), with even "liberals" like Mohamed ElBaradei speaking of non-negotiable demands. It's the problem of the excluded middle: both sides see democracy as a zero-sum game. (The fact that many of these statements could also be applied to the "fiscal cliff" discussions in the US Congress at the moment is purely coincidental.)

It's time both sides stepped back a bit and remembered that if the polarized sides do not find a way to work within a democratic frame, someone else, perhaps someone in uniform, will perhaps feel obliged to act.

Egypt's Parliament Meets for 12 Minutes, Refers Fate to Courts. Wait—What Just Happened?

The showdown at the Cairo Corral seemed imminent, the Earps and Clantons facing each other down, and then — everybody went home. Egypt's dissolved Parliament, recalled by President Morsi in what seemed a challenge to both the military and the Supreme Constitutional Court, assembled, voted to refer its fate to the Appeals Court (technically seeking advice on how to implemnet the SCC dissoluton), and dissolved 12 minutes later pending the appeal. Two days of sound and fury, of sturm und drang, ended with — what, exactly?

A prolcedural point made, to be sure: Parliament chose to appeal its own fate, but did noy seek to legislate. Some suspect a more abstruse point may be in play: SCAF having handed over executive power to Morsi in the interim, Morsi may argue that constitutionally the legislative authority now devolves to him, not to SCAF. But that bsttle is one for the courts, not the streets. That seems implicit here:

Speaker Saad al-Katatny chaired a general meeting that discussed means of enforcing the verdict. He said the decision by President Mohamed Morsy to reinstate the assembly did not defy the court's ruling, but rather reversed the consequent decision by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to disband the assembly.

"In all of its activities, the state is bound by laws. The People's Assembly is fully cognizant of its competences, and respects the judiciary," Katatny stressed.

He added that he had consulted the legislative committee to enforce the verdict and its relevant measures, but noted that Article 40 of the Constitutional Declaration, which has governed the country since March 2011, stipulates that the Court of Cassation has jurisdiction over the validity of parliament memberships.

 So who blinked, and who won? I think that Morsi and the Parliament may have made a procedural point for the legal maneuvering ahead, but hardly the daring reclamation of Presidential authority this was being portrayed as over the past couple of days.

Was this the intended scenario all along, or an 11th hour dialing back of the crisis? Morsi's move alarmed many liberals and others who feared the Muslim Brotherhood was making a ploy to get back the Parliament it dominates and thus control the political arena as a whole; the fact that the MB's Shura Council held a meeting shortly before Morsi's move added to fears that, despite his "resignation" from the movement, it is not Morsi but the MB leadership calling the shots. The Brotherhood has frequently overplayed its hand in the past year and a half, and may have done so again.

But that will be hard to judge until it's clear what Morsi intended from the beginning. Was the plan all along to go to the brink and then back off, as seems to have happened? Was the plan all along to make a recondite constitutional point, and then let the courts figure it out? (Meanwhile, pending cases relating to Parliament were postponed to July 17.)

An initial impression is that the MB hurt itself here: it seemed to be flouting the rule of law (even if the SCC is a Mubarak-packed body) and alienating some of its own allies. In the end, it may have backed away from a confrontation it was going to lose. Or perhaps this compromise (if that's what it is) was its goal all along.

Only Lower House Dissolved? A Chance to Find Out What Shura Council is For

A thought in a somewhat lighter vein: Despite earlier reports that both houses of Parliament will be dissolved under the Egyptian court ruling, many reports now say only the lower house, the People's Assembly, will be dissolved. [UPDATE: Still much confusion, but the Court seems to be saying both houses.] That would leave the Upper House, the Shura Council, intact.

There could possibly be one upside in this disaster, Someone might finally be able to figure out what the hell it is the Shura Council is actually for. No one has ever succeeded in finding a practical use for it up till now.

Egyptian Supreme Court Dissolves Parliament but Keeps Shafiq in Race: Double Blow to MB on Eve of Elections

 On a day when Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court handed down two decisions which each could have thrown the country into chaos, it chose to deliver one shocking blow to the transitional process but to avoid the second: it effectively dissolved Parliament, but it left Ahmad Shafiq in the Presidential race,so that the runoff election will take place this weekend. Had it alsl disqualified Shafiq, the whole transition would likely have collapsed. As it is, the decision not only dissolves :Parliament but also presumably the just-named Constituent Assembly named by Parliament,

Though the Court ruling only invalidated the Parliamentary election law for the 1/3 of the seats elected on an individual basis, a Court official said that it requires the dissolution of both houses of Parliament, the People's Assembly and the Shura Council.

For a backgrounder on the two cases decided today, see here. Also for background see Mara Revkin on "Egypt's Injudicious Judges."

There is no question who the big loser is. By dissolving the Islamist-dominated Parliament but leaving old regime secularist Shafiq in the race for President, the decisions will likely be taken by the Muslim Brotherhood as a double blow. Had Shafiq been disqualified Brotherhood candidate Muhammad Morsi would either have won by default or new elections would be required; and by losing :Parliament the Brotherhood risks losing most of what it has gained, One Brotherhood spokesman has already called the decision a "military coup," and Morsi is to speak soon, Former Presidential candidate Abdel Moneim Abu'l-Futuh has echoed the "military coup" judgment and linked these two decisions to yesterday's announcement that military police could arrest civilians in support of that interpretation.

And if, as some are saying, SCAF now assumes both the powers of Parliament and of the Constituent Assembly, the "military coup" judgment doesn't seem far fetched.

It's too soon to judge just how things will play out but my initial reaction is that just as this was already the worst possible choice of two candidates, this is the worst possible set of decisions: by dissolving Parliament and keeping Shafiq in the race it gives the impression of rolling back the revolution and disenfranchising the Brotherhood, through a court decision not the ballot box, while yesterday's arrest announcement seems to restore the State of Emergency.

The dangers of a renewed revolution, but this time with the Brotherhood fully supportive from the start, or a bloody, repressive crackdown seem more real than at any time since the fall of Mubarak. I think there is real danger here.

There will surely be much more to say here.

The Muslim Brotherhood's Real Problem: Its Secrecy

I already linked earlier today to Nathan Brown's piece at The National Interest on the Khairat al-Shater nomination. In passing, he remarks:

The problem for Egypt is not al-Shater personally. Since the Brotherhood is still a fairly closed organization with a strong sense of discipline, it is difficult to state with precision very much about individual leaders.

This touches on a factor that I feel hasn't been talked about very much. The sudden emergence (eruption?) of the Brotherhood from the shadows of a nominally banned organization (but a tolerated one much of the time) into a commanding role in Parliament, in the constituent assembly, and now perhaps int he Presidential race has drawn a lot of attention, and a great many pundits who may still not be all that enthusiastic about the Brotherhood's agenda feel compelled to write think pieces about how the US is going to have to learn with Islamists (true enough: they're out there) and how the Brotherhood is really moderate (so far, so good). But what still bothers some of us, and many Egyptians as well as far as I can tell, is the total lack of transparency about how the organization works.  It was founded as a secretive, underground, cell-based revolutionary organization. Now, it says, it is ready to play a democratic role in an open system in which it does not seek dominance but wants to be a player in a genuinely democratic system. Though it wants to do so as a secretive, semi-above-ground, cell-based organization.

I wouldn't personally have voted for the MB — not just because I'm not Muslim, but because on a wide range of issues from women's rights to minority rights to personal freedoms I think they're either wrong or I'm suspicious of their suddenly shifted stance. I think they should be allowed to play a political role because they clearly represent a powerful constituency, but I also think it's worth some caution (and constitutional checks and balances) to assure they're really what they claim now to be.

But, of course, I'm not an Egyptian, and no one is going to ask me. Nor should they.

But I do think one reason so many Egyptians seem upset by the Shater nomination is that it has suddenly, and at a critical moment of confrontation over the constituent assembly, reminded everyone of how the MB makes decisions. Or rather, reminded everyone of how none of us really has much of an idea of how the MB makes decisions.

Consider:

• The Brotherhood had not only sworn time after time that it would not run a candidate but even read Abdel-Moneim Abu'l-Futuh out of its ranks for daring to run; yet it suddenly, for reasons everyone is still speculating about, reversed itself. Some say it lied. Did it intend to do this all along? Did it change its mind precipitately? Will anyone ever know for sure?
• Many reports have claimed that the MB's Shura Council only narrowly endorsed Shater. Several figures have quit the Brotherhood in protest already, but no one is sure what the exact vote was or how narrow the margin because details are based on leaks. Anyone watching the current primary season in the US must think occasionally, "There must be a better way to choose a candidate," but I'm pretty sure the behind-closed-door secrecy of the MB isn't it.
• Before the announcement, there were reports (true or false? we'll never know) of major disagreements between the MB leadership and the Brotherhood's political vehicle, the Freedom and Justice Party. But once the Brotherhood spoke, the FJP announced (discovered?) that Shater was its nominee. So the way to win the "FJP primary" is to be anointed by the Brotherhood, but how exactly do you do that?
• Shater strikes many as the brains behind the Brotherhood's current leadership. Whose idea was his candidacy? General Guide Badia's? Shater's own? Who knows for sure?
• If this is how they choose their candidate, how will they govern?

MB Founder Hasan al-Banna

Of course when Hasan al-Banna created the Brotherhood in the late 1920s and crafted its organization through the 1930s, cell-based underground movements were all the rage, both on the far left and the far right, especially in Europe. In Egypt and other Arab countries Communists and various shades of fascist movements were adopting such organization, and the Brothers did the same. They found themselves in a covert war with the Palace and the British and their secret wing operated as a vehicle for revolutionary violence. All that has supposedly receded into history, but the secrecy still prevails. Yes, they were harassed and persecuted under Mubarak,  but never suppressed completely as had been done under Nasser.

The Brotherhood is hardly the first revolutionary movement to find it hard to make the transition to a role in a democracy: a long list from Fatah to Sinn Fein have faced the issue, and success has not always resulted. But I do think that one of the reasons the whole Khairat al-Shater nomination has bothered many people is the fact that it has forcibly reminded Egyptians and others about how little we understand about how the Brothers arrive at decisions, and how the organization really functions. If the Freedom and Justice Party needs to make a decision once in power, will it heed the ballot box or the Shura Council?

That concern may handicap Shater's candidacy before he is fully out of the starting gate, even among many Islamists.

The Khairat al-Shater Factor

Khairat al-Shater

After a week or so of waffling over whether it would actually name a candidate for President, and then saying it would meet Monday (today) the Muslim Brotherhood suddenly announced on Saturday that it would indeed run Brotherhood Deputy Leader Khairat al-Shater.  Sunday having now passed without the Brotherhood calling another press conference to say "April Fool!," it appears they really mean it this time. The announcement was initially made by the Brotherhood itself, not by its political front, the Freedom and Justice Party, which however (surprise!) promptly announced Shater as their nominee, though it had not previously been clear that he was even a member of the party.

So what does this mean to the Presidential elections?  Well, based on the Egyptian media, you can take your choice:

1. The Brotherhood is directly challenging SCAF, which strongly opposed a Brotherhood candidate. (Evidence: the recent public rancor between SCAF and the Brotherhood.)
2. SCAF and the Brotherhood are working hand in glove to elect a Brotherhood candidate, which SCAF has wanted all along. (Evidence: Shater had to be pardoned in order to run as he served prison time.)
3. SCAF wanted a Brotherhood candidate but not because it wanted him to win, but to split the Islamist vote among three candidates and elect a pro-SCAF figure. (Evidence: there are now three Islamist candidates — Shater, former Brotherhood figure ‘Abdel Moneim Abu'l-Futuh, and poster boy Hazem Salah Abu Isma‘il — all with strong support bases.)

Other than the obvious fact that these three explanations are mutually exclusive, they all make a certain amount of sense, depending on one's biases and willingness to adhere to conspiracy theories.


While some may suspect that the Brotherhood intended all along to spring a candidate on voters at the last minute, there seemed to be genuine divisions about whether to do so. The Brotherhood and the FJP Party reportedly were in some disagreement, and the Brotherhood's Shura Council reportedly voted to support Shater by 58 out of 108, hardly unanimity. The pretense that the FJP is an independent party, which never was very convincing, has evaporated now that the Party has rubber-stamped the candidacy of a man chosen not by the party but by the Brotherhood's secretive Shura Council.

If the Brotherhood leadership really was determined not to name a candidate, why did they change their mind. They are seeking to convince the world it was because they feared otherwise a secularist backed by the Army, an Amr Moussa or an ‘Omar Suleiman, would win. A better explanation may be that they were concerned about the surging popularity of Abu'l-Futuh. A former senior figure in the Brotherhood, his decision to run last year led to him being read out of the organization and to the Brotherhood warning its members that it would expel anyone supporting Abu'l-Futuh. Still, many younger Brotherhood members were openly objecting to that decree, and planned to support Abu'l-Futuh. If an Islamist opposed by the Brotherhood leadership had won, despite the Brotherhood's opposition, it would be a major blow to their claims to be the preeminent Islamist movement. A victory by the Salafi Abu Isma‘il would be arguably even worse. So the Brotherhood decided to field a candidate.

Shater is a businessman, the mastermind of the Brotherhood's finances and, some argue, far more its real leader than General Guide Badie. Profiles of him here and here; his webpage here (Arabic); his curriculum vitae here (Arabic). And Marc Lynch's take here.   [UPDATE: The Arabist's Issandr El Amrani offers his views here.]

The sudden recent shift in the Brotherhood's approach to running a candidate has caught a lot of the other candidates off guard, however much they may be playing it down. Apparently, even some of Shater's ten children were shocked.

Does Shater become the front-runner,or does the presence of three Islamists split the vote? I'm going to say it's too early to know and suggest we wait and see.

Egypt's Constituent Assembly: Islamists' Predominance Stirs Protests; Growing Quarrels Between MB and SCAF

Egypt has now announced the 100 members of the Constituent Assembly which will draw up the new Constitution. A mix of members of the People's Assembly, the Shura Council, and non-Parliamentarians of prominence, they will write the new Constitution.

Provoking comment and alarm is the fact that, depending on how you define an Islamist and how you count, somewhere between half and by one estimate up to 65 of the 100 may be defined as Islamists, with he Muslim Brotherhood predominating. That suggests that the Brotherhood and its allies, and the more extreme Salafi al-Nour Party, will be able to shape the new constitution on their own image.

Will they draft a constitution that entrenches their power and makes it difficult to ever reduce their strength? The Brotherhood has talked a good line so far, but secularists are alarmed. Many might be willing to let them govern for a term so long as, if they fail, it is possible to vote them out of office. But Egyptians are too familiar with constitutions deliberately written to maintain a ruling party in power forever, as they've had one for the past half century.

Not surprisingly, there are already protest movements urging a "Constitution for All Egypt." The Brotherthood has repeatedly said that it wants that too, but now that it dominates the constituent assembly, its opponents are not confident it means it.

The Brotherhood is also testing its strength in other ways. Though it backed off an initial effort to force the replacement of the existing Cabinet, it is increasingly critical of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). It recently questioned the fairness of the upcoming Presidential elections, leading Field Marshal Tantawi to strike back by criticizing the Brotherhood. This growing SCAF/Brotherhood feud has long been predicted; the initial "honeymoon" between the Army and the Islamists was always likely to break down when the Islamists found the Army was not prepared to hand over power completely to them.

Adding to this is growing talk that the Brotherhood, which has insisted since the early days of the revolution that it will not run a candidate in the Presidential election, is talking about choosing one, raising questions about other assurances it has made.

The credibility of the new Constitution may be riding on how non-Islamists perceive it: if it emerges as an obvious attempt to entrench Islamist power, tensions may rise rapidly.

Shura Council Convenes to Do Whatever it is it Does

 Earlier this year I noted some of the mysteries surrounding Egypt's Upper House of Parliament, the Shura Council; the biggest one being "What's it supposed to do?" Other than providing a lot of appointive positions (a third of its members are appointed, two-thirds elected), it's official duties are mostly to ratify constitutional amendments, treaties, etc. The newly-elected Shura Council met for the first time today, electing Ahmad Fahmy of the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party as its Speaker. The FJP won a solid majority of 105 of the 180 elected seats in the Shura Council elections, with extraordinarily low turnout in the elections (the runoff of round two got only a 7.2% turnout).

The elections cost a lot of money, and many people were openly wondering why Egypt even needed an upper house. Many liberals (and others) think the Council should be abolished. This would seem to be logical, but the current government (and thus presumably the SCAF) and the Muslim Brotherhood — in other words, the two bodies whose opinions can be implemented — disagree.

The government wants to strengthen it, not abolish it:

The Minister of Parliamentary Affairs, counselor Mohammed Attiya, said the meeting will be held under the chairmanship of the Speaker of the People’s Assembly Saad el-Katatni.
He told reporters that the Shura Council has become “worthy of obtaining a stronger parliamentary role by increasing its legislative and oversight competencies in parallel with the People’s Assembly to strengthen democratic life.”

He added that the role of the Upper House, or Shura Council, would “achieve balance in the performance of the parliamentary institution, especially since it includes the competencies needed by the country at the present stage of the Shura Council,” and rejected the abolition of the Upper House under calls to reduce state expenditures.

Nor is the government alone. Since the FJP dominates the lower house and controls the upper house outright, guess which party (surprise, surprise!) also wants to strengthen the role of the Shura Council?

One new role the Council is already slated to play is joining with the People's Assembly in choosing the body to write the new Constitution. The two chambers will assemble Saturday to choose that Constitutional Assembly to write the new charter.

Precisely what the Shura Council will do after that remains to be seen.