If there was a turning point in the tense weeks preceding the
1967 Arab-Israeli War, it was surely the closing of the Strait of Tiran on May
22-23, 1967. In 1956-57, at the end of the Suez War, Israel refused to withdraw
its troops from Sinai unless Egypt guaranteed free passage of the Gulf of Aqaba (the only access to Israel’s port of Eilat) and that the border be guarded by
the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). After Nasser ordered UNEF out of
Sinai and Gaza, pressure increased to close the Strait.
Israel immediately made it clear that any closure of the
Strait would violate the right of innocent passage under international law and
would be considered an act of war. On May 23 much of the worlf realized that, intentionally
or not, Nasser had provided Israel with
the casus belli it needed to justify first strike.
Foreign Minister Abba Eban was on a series of peace missions
to the UN and Western Europe. Some historians have suggested that Eban, in his
effort to win support, may have underplayed Israel’s willingness to strike
first, leading others to underestimate the urgency of the crisis.
Rhe US under Lyndon Johnson came up with a bright (?) idea of forming an intentional flotilla codenamed Operation Flotilla. It would take a while to assemble. There would not be time.
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