Friction on Saudi-Yemeni Border

Before I go quiet for the weekend, this may be worth noting: Yemen's campaign against Zaydi rebels in the north and increasing Saudi jitters about recent terrorist acts in the border region may be combined in this story of Saudi troops allegedly opening fire on the border area a few days back or this one claiming that Saudi troops have clashed directly with the Houthi rebels that Yemen is fighting. And here's an Arabic article in the Saudi daily Al-Watan on mutinies within the Houthi ranks.

Given the fierceness of Yemen's campaign against the rebels, and the fact that while Saudi-Yemeni government tensions are decades old, the Houthis represent a greater threat in many Saudis' eyes than the government forces do, these reports could mean anything, from deepening tensions along the border itself, to Yemeni propaganda. But it merits watching, and the Houthi conflict has received little real attention outside the region.

Saudi Arabian Press on Kuwaiti Women and Passports

Here's an Arab News article from tomorrow entitled "Saudis Laud New Kuwaiti Law."

Yes, they're referring to the court ruling overturning the requirement that Kuwaiti women have the permissions of their husbands or sons before obtaining a passport. Of course, if you read the article with care, you'll note that while noting that Saudi women are free to travel, they sidestep the issue of a rather similar requirement in Saudi Arabia. For example:

“Kuwaiti women now have the full rights that they deserve and for which they have fought for a long time,” said Samia Al-Idrissi, a businesswoman based in the Eastern Province.

“Saudi women are eligible to travel, and entitled to be responsible for themselves and the decisions that they make,” she said, adding that Saudi women are not second-class citizens.

Al-Idrissi, a prominent businesswoman, believes that since women are held accountable and able to take big decisions like men, they can handle themselves when traveling.

Speaking about the irony of Saudi widows forced to get consent to travel from their sons, she said, “The Saudi mother knows her values — If her husband is dead, then her son gives her his consent to travel.”

Okay. Wait. Did I miss something?

Or is this subtle editorializing that this is a good thing, and let's do it here, but with a nod to the religious establishment and the mutawwa‘in at the end?

Lebanon: Can't Anybody Here Figure Out How to Govern?

Even the redoubtable Lebanese blogger Qifa Nabki is a bit bewildered by the twists and turns in Lebanon. If he can't make sense of it, please don't expect me to. In the first place, Michel ‘Aoun, the one member of the opposition bloc whose party lost the most in the elections (the West played it up as a Hizbullah loss, but they more than held their own), has stiffened his demands for joining a unity government. Walid Jumblatt says that "there seems to be both internal and external wills not wanting for the Syrian-Saudi summit to succeed," whatever that means. (Walid Bek can sometimes be as inscrutable as his late Marxist/mystic father.) But Walid Bek is not, this time, the most inscrutable. Here's Speaker Nabih Berri:

Friday's issue of Al-Afkar magazine will have Berri's explanation for the reasons that made him abstain from naming Hariri for the second designation.

Regarding re-designating Hariri, Berri said: "It is true that I work in politics, but my dignity comes first and I was the first to announce my intention to re-designate Hariri in case he apologized. Despite that, al-Mustaqbal bloc MPs started to attack me, and some of them reminded about electing me head of Parliament."

Berri revealed that he asserted a lot of efforts to thwart Hariri from apologizing during the first designation and that Hariri surprised everyone by apologizing.

Answering a question regarding the Progressive Socialist Party leader MP Walid Jumblat, Berri described Jumblat as the pacification and salvation partner.

Okay, to clarify matters, here's Suleiman Frangieh the younger:

Marada Movement Leader MP Suleiman Franjieh said that stepping down for our country's best interest is not a loss. "No party should consider this initiative as its own victory and leave the country with the concept of having winning and losing teams," he added.

After meeting with Palestinian Authority Representative in Lebanon Abbas Zaki Franjieh said that "if the situation remains as it is now then let them form a government without us". He then added that the government will see the light in a few days. [Emphasis mine.]

"There is no preference in the portfolio that will be assigned to us as we consider PM-designate Saad Hariri has the best intentions to reach a consensus," he concluded.

A really bad translation may account for some of this, but does anybody have a clue what they're talking about? Are they just spewing boilerplate? Please look at the sentences I've put in bold italics. Huh?

Well, ‘Aoun and Berri and Frangieh are all pro-Syrian, and Jumblatt is during months with an "r" in them, when he's not being the toast of the neocons in DC, and therefore Bashar al-Asad must be able to clear the whole thing up, right? Here's his take:

The Syrian President Bashar Assad said that the Syrian Arab Republic is with rushing the formation of a national unity government as it will bring Lebanon back to its normal status after years of division and conflicts.

After a meeting with the President of the Republic of Finland Tarja Halonen in the People's Palace in Damascus, Assad said that the importance of sticking to national legislative decisions is important to achieve peace in the Middle East.

Thanks for clearing that up. Maybe it makes more sense in Finnish. (It can't make less.) "National legislative decisions?" Meaning what? Acts of Parliament? Weren't there elections in June? Huh? There is either going to be a national unity government in Lebanon, or not, or something. Maybe. If Qifa Nabki can't figure out what's going on, I dare not try. From the leaders' quotes, I'm pretty sure they have no clue either.

Sorry to sound cynical again, as I have before, I know. Poor Lebanon. Such a beautiful country. Such an educated people. Such a botch they've made of it, with the help of their neighbors to be sure, but who asked them in? The Lebanese.

There are no innocents here, I fear. The US has played its role, mostly in the 1980s, and France keeps its hand in, and Israel and Syria and Saudi Arabia and Iran are, of course, all in the game. But everybody needs a Lebanese surrogate ally or it wouldn't have happened. Perhaps you can't put Humpty-Dumpty together again, but there were moments in the late 90s and early 'oos where it looked possible. Perhaps it is.

It would be nice to think so, anyway.

Cypriot Maronite Arabic and Other Cool Stuff

Tired of the same old posts about politics? Okay, this is for those of you who are interested in the arcane stuff. We've talked a few times about diglossia and Arabic dialects. The excellent linguistics blog Jabal al-Lughat, written by Lameen Souag, an Algerian studying African languages at SOAS, had a post recently (well, last month, I'm late to the party) with references to Cypriot Maronite Arabic, three words I'm not used to seeing together. I knew there was a fairly substantial Maronite Christian community in Cyprus, but did not know that elements of this community have retained a spoken Arabic dialect. What's more, he links to a YouTube video called "Sanna" (from lisanna, "our language"). The main narrative is in Greek, with English subtitles, so note his comments first on what to listen to:

go straight to 2:40, 5:00, 7:04 to hear the language itself. (Ignore the video's ill-informed claims that this is descended from Aramaic, by the way.) If you speak Greek, there are even lessons at Hki Fi Sanna. This is far more incomprehensible to me than any mainstream Arabic dialect I've ever heard, including the Levantine Arabic from which it presumably derives - a remarkable case study in how much isolation from related varieties speeds up language differentiation.

It doesn't sound anything like Levantine Arabic to me. I can recognize a few words, but it's like trying to understand French if you only speak Spanish. Or maybe even Dutch and English. The link he notes, actually spelled on the website Xki fi Sanna mostly requires Greek, but the transliteration used reminds me a bit of Maltese, itself an Arabic spoken dialect that got separated from the Islamic world and written Arabic and took on a life of its own. There's an Egyptian proverb, azan fi Malta, to give the call to prayer in Malta. An Egyptian teacher once told me it meant they wouldn't understand you, but that's not really it: they would understand the words, since Maltese is an Arabic dialect that has become a separate language, but they're Christians, not Muslims, so they wouldn't heed the call. (Why I know anything at all about Maltese is a long story, not for this post.) Maltese is said to have links to Siculo-Arabic, spoken in Sicily when it was under Arab rule (just as some aspects of Tunisian Arabic allegedly derive from Andalusian Arabic, since a large number of Muslims expelled from Spain ended up in Tunis). (Note added later: in fact the not uncommon Tunisian surname Mourou is actually said to be from Moro.)

Also, if the post isn't recondite enough for you so far: While browsing around at Jabal al-Lughat I found a very interesting post called "Why would 'qaswarah' be claimed to be Ethiopic?" which makes the above discussion seem mainstream. Still, linguists among you may find it intriguing, as I did, though in fact no one can really comment who doesn't know 1) Qur'anic Arabic, 2) the Qur'anic tafsir tradition, 3) Ge'ez (Old Ethiopic), and 4) the Old South Arabian writing system. I don't qualify (okay on one and limited on two, dead no on three and four). Among personal acquaintances my count comes up to precisely one, who's now retired, and perhaps one other (yes on Old South Arabian, not sure about Ge'ez, and also retired), though worldwide there are doubtless hundreds (well, maybe dozens) who fill the bill, including Lameen Souag. Even if you aren't qualified to critique the argument, it's an interesting read.

The Nozette Case

I guess I'll eventually have to mention the whole Nozette case. It seems to me, at first blush, that this is not a Pollard retread: Nozette was lured into offering to spy for Israel by a Federal agent, and there's no sign any Israeli agents were actually involved. And if he actually provided information to any foreign government, it may have been India.

There is, however, an element that hasn't gotten much attention so far as I've seen. The criminal complaint against Nozette includes the information that when he was approached he expressed surprise he hadn't heard from "Mossad" (actually the FBI) earlier, becuase "I thought I was working for you already. I mean, that's what I always thought. [The foreign company] was just a front."

The Foreign Company is, apparently, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), for which he has been working for some time. This does not seem to be much of a secret. While a government-owned defense industry, IAI is also a major defense corporation with many US connnections. In itself, it proves nothing about his handling of classified information.

But the indictment clearly says there is no evidence Israel actually tried to recruit him: and of course if he was working for IAI, legally, it would be hard to determine whether he ever passed on classified information. In fact, this whole sting may have come about because it was assumed he had been passing information to IAI.

At this point I don't think it rises to Pollard scales, not because Nozette is necessarily innocent, but because the degree to which Pollard compromised US and regional security has never been spelled out, but every US Administration since the Pollard case has refused any idea of clemency. Pollard, I think, profoundly undermined the security of a key US ally in the Middle East (I believe Egypt, but that's a guess), while Nozette seems to be a man playing James Bond in his spare time. But it's worth watching.

Hell Freezes Over! Israel and Iran Talking About Nukes?

I try not to post at midnight. After all, I'm a family guy. But sometimes it just demands it, since tomorrow morning's Mideast press appears about now.

How's this for a headline: Israeli and Iranian representatives hold first talks on nuke-free Mideast. Here's the gist:

A representative of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission and a senior Iranian official met last month to discuss the chances of declaring the Middle East a nuclear-free zone, Haaretz has learned. This is the first direct meeting between official representatives of the two states since the fall of the Shah in 1979.

Meirav Zafary-Odiz, director of policy and arms control for the Israel Atomic Energy Commission, and Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran's delegate to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), met several times over September 29 and 30 and, together with representatives of other countries, conversed, presented questions and gave replies.

The popping sound you're hearing are neocon and other heads exploding. Michael Ledeen must be in great pain. If this is true — and Yossi Melman is not a tabloid headline artist — it's very interesting in the context of all the IAEA Iranian nuclear deal reportage.

And how about this:

The Israel Atomic Energy Commission confirmed that such a meeting did take place but refused to comment.

The exchanges between the Iranian and Israeli representatives took place within three panel sessions, each dealing with one of the issues with which the ICNND is concerned - declaring the Middle East a nuclear-free zone, preventing nuclear proliferation in the region and matters of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The two did not meet or shake hands outside the sessions. In one of the discussions, Soltanieh directly asked Zafary-Odiz - and eyewitnesses say he spoke in an impassioned voice, "Do you or do you not have nuclear weapons?" Zafary-Odiz smiled, but did not respond.

During the meetings, Zafary-Odiz explained the Israeli policy of being willing, in principle, to discuss the Middle East as a nuclear-free zone. She also detailed Israel's unique strategic situation, saying regional security must be strengthened, security arrangements must be agreed upon and a peace agreement must be sealed before Israel would feel at liberty to discuss this topic.

Zafary-Odiz said Israel lived in a complex geopolitical reality, noting that in three decades, four countries in the region broke their commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty - Iraq, Iran, Libya and Syria. She said Israel takes a responsible approach to the nuclear issue as a whole, and that the far horizon of its vision did include the possibility of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East, even if the chances for this were slim.

Soltanieh defended his country's policy, and said Iran was not striving for nuclear armament and did not endanger Israel. He said Israel did not understand the mentality and ideology of the Tehran regime. He said the regime did not oppose or hate Jews, but was merely politically opposed to Zionism. He said Iran's growing arsenal of missiles was for defensive, not offensive, purposes.

Israel and Iran have refrained from all direct and indirect diplomatic contact since 1979.

If this is true, it's a game-changer, I think.

Exclusive to This Blog: More About Spy Gear in Lebanon

I noted earlier all the Sturm und Drang about "Spy Gear" left behind by Israel in Lebanon. I had a nagging feeling it rang a bell somewhere.

Now I remember why: exclusively, here's the website for "Spy Gear."

My nine year old got some of this stuff for Christmas. That's why it sounded familiar.

Personally, I suspect the Viper Blaster.

EgyptAir Hijacking Foiled

A drunken Sudanese passenger tried to hijack an EgyptAir flight from Istanbul to Cairo using a knife from an in-flight meal. He apparently demanded to go to Jersualem and said he intended to "liberate" Jerusalem.

That's going to take more than a knife from an in-flight meal, I suspect, and the air marshals seem to have made short work of the whole thing. The plane landed in Cairo and the man was taken into custody at the airport. (Wonder if they had to let any bloggers go to make room for him?)

Too much raki at the Istanbul airport?

Ayman Nour's Office Raided

Via The Arabist, reports that Ayman Nour's office was raided during an anti-Gamal-succession meeting, and Nour's laptop and other devices seized. The anti-succession movement had been getting a fairly high profile; perhaps it was inevitable that State Security would step in.

He also caught an Al-Masry al-Yaum article I missed, in which Coptic Pope Shenouda again endorses Gamal Mubarak and dismisses the Coptic candidate. The Arabist expresses dismay at the Pope's remarks, but as I noted in earlier posts on Shenouda, Shenouda tried opposition politics under Sadat and spent several years in exile in the desert after Sadat deposed him in 1981, until Mubarak brought him back. He's been a Mubarak loyalist ever since, to the dismay of many Copts abroad and some at home.

Speaking of The Arabist, he posted a good dissenting comment to my recent post on Tunisia; it's worthy of your attention since it was posted nearly a week after the original post and only those who get the RSS feed of new comments will probably have seen it.

Court Gives Kuwaiti Women Passport Rights

Kuwait's constitutional court has ruled that Kuwaiti women may obtain passports without first securinmg permission from their husband or guardian. The court said the practice of requiring women to obtain consent "undermines her free will and compromises her humanity."

Well said, and good news for Kuwaiti women.

Palestinian Elections by January 24?

It's hard to know where to begin here. Egypt has been pushing hard to bring to fruition the tentative agreement between Hamas and Fatah on a reconciliation agreement and new Palestinian elections in both the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinian Authority's dubious decision to ask to defer a UN vote on the Goldstone Report torpedoed the agreement, at least from Hamas' point of view, but Egypt has been arguing that it can't wait forever and that Hamas is dragging its feet. Now Mahmoud ‘Abbas says he'll call new elections, as constitutionally required, by January 24.

Is this good news or bad news? Hard to say, but if Hamas refuses, it's meaningless news. An election only in the West Bank achieves little. (Well, if Hamas won, I might amend that, but I wouldn't expect that result if the PA is running the show.) The Egyptian reconiciliation process seemed to be within sight of success until the whole Goldstone postponement thing came up, and I fear that US pressure had something to do with that.

Okay, Peace Process 101, my version:

1. You can't have a peace process without some sort of united Palestinian negotiating team.
2. You can't credibly negotiate borders with Israel if the West Bank and Gaza are two separate (but not truly independent) entities.
3. Fatah and Hamas either have to work together, or there is no way to achieve both 1) and 2).
4. Fatah and Hamas seemed to be coming close to an agreement: the Egyptians were laboring hard, and the Damascus Hamas leadership seemed more on board than the Gaza leadership, for a while, and then the whole Goldstone debacle blew it out of the water.
5. Egypt is clearly leaning on Hamas, but that can cut both ways.
6. Does any of this matter if Netanyahu doesn't have a massive road-to-Damascus conversion?

I'm still not sure if an arbitrary January 24 deadline is a good or bad augury.

Now, Hints from ‘Amr Moussa

Now Arab League Secretary General ‘Amr Moussa is not ruling himself out of the race for the Presidency in Egypt. (For those who read Arabic, here's the original interview in Al-Shuruq that Reuters is quoting.) Though at 73 he is not a young man, he does have an Arab world reputation and long served as Egypt's Foreign Minister.

What I think is worth noting is that there has been a sea change in the willingness of the Egyptian media (the independent press anyway) to discuss the succession question and report on the various anybody-but-Gamal efforts (though Moussa clearly indicates Gamal has a chance too — well, as clearly as a diplomat who has to speak for the whole Arab League is ever allowed to be, anyway).

In part I think the discussion of alternatives to Gamal — the Baradei, ‘Omar Suleiman, and now ‘Amr Moussa discussions — represent a real assumption that Husni Mubarak will step down, and perhaps also an assumption on many people's part that we may not have two more years before something happens. There have been rumors of an early Presidential election sometime in 2010 for some time now. The discussion — which would have been taboo a couple of years ago — shows that there really is a fin du règne sense out there.

Recent MEI Additions to the Web World

A couple of the Middle East Institute's own have increased their web presence lately, and I thought I'd call your attention to them:

• Prof. Mishkat Al-Moumin, an MEI Adjunct Scholar and professor of Environmental Science and Policy at George Mason, has launched a blog, True Stories About Security, telling stories about her memories of Iraq.

• Former MEI President, and former Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs and Ambassador to Israel, Egypt and the UAE Edward (Ned) Walker is now tweeting on Twitter @AmbassadorNed.
  

Kuwait: Consolidate to a Single Electoral Constituency?

This story could be, if it actually happens, extremely important. A committee of the Kuwaiti Parliament has approved a move towards creating a single electoral constituency. Currently there are five constituencies, and critics say the system is gerrymandered to support pro-government/tribal political blocs. As the article itself notes, earlier versions have had anywhere from 10 to 25 constituencies.

As far as I can think of off the top of my head, the only Middle Eastern electoral system that has a national-level constituency with no geographic districts is, well, Israel.

Worth watching, though of course little may actually come of it.

The "Spy Gear" Scandal (?)

I can't really top Abu Muqawama's post of yesterday on the "spy gear" controversy in South Lebanon, which I haven't posted about because I thought it was a sort of non-story, but it's taken on some legs so I guess I should comment, but not without first quoting his post from yesterday, which includes these immortal comments:

Building off of yesterday's post on Hizballah and Israel, I need to tell you that the UN in southern Lebanon is complaining the Israelis have placed "spy gear" in southern Lebanon that is now causing suspicious explosions. The only thing cooler than spy gear, I say, is exploding spy gear.

What, though, is "spy gear"? Can you imagine the UNIFIL investigation?

What did you find, Pierre?

Looks like a case of spy gear, Jim.

I understand his somewhat cynical approach here since so far this seems to be blown way out of proportion, given the fact that sensors and information gathering equipment are the tools of the trade in the security business these days. Hell, clear back in the 50s we tapped the East German phone system without realizing that the East Germans knew all about our secret tunnel and were taking advantage of that knowledge. It's COMINT, folks.

So let's start with the overstatements. Here's Hizbullah's Al-Manar site in English from yesterday:

Once again, the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon thwarts an Israeli plot against the country and its people and uncovers a non-traditional violation of the Lebanese sovereignty under the form of "espionage."

In a statement it released at pre-dawn, Hezbollah hailed the "major accomplishment" achieved by the Islamic Resistance when its members "uncovered and thwarted an Israeli enemy aggression," a reference to three Israeli spy devices that have been blown up in south Lebanon over the weekend.

Hezbollah pointed out that the Islamic Resistance members "managed to uncover a spy device planted by Israel between Houla and Mais el-Jabal in South Lebanon that had been installed following the July 2006 war." It said the device was booby-trapped. "The spying gear was planted on a telecommunication cable that was placed after the 2006 July war. Right after the device was discovered, the"Israeli enemy remotely destroyed the gear," the statement read.

Okay. I read that as they tapped one of your telecom lines, or something similar. The statement is, well, over the top, but hey, it's Hizbullah. As for the Israeli tap: Well, who wouldn't? Though since then Hizbullah has suggested this was planted after the 2006 war (so Israelis can infiltrate the south despite Hizbullah's security? I'm shocked, shocked.). And Israel, of course, is trying to turn the alleged revelations against Hizbullah.

I'm not sure this is news. It's classic shadow war stuff, but it distracts both sides from any substantive discussion of issues. Sure each side spies on the other. Israel has some technical capabilities that may have been in play here, but it's still not clear from the stories that this is anything more than a tapped communications line in which the tapping devices were wired for self-destruct, perhaps remotely. Israel had recently accused Hizbullah of being behind a munitions explosion in the area.

Hey, everybody, it's even easier to listen to your cell phone calls, you know? This story might last a few more days, but it doesn't strike me as very shocking.

Overnight: Another Saudi Terrorist Incident?

This from the early overnights: it's not entirely clear yet but this story in the Saudi paper al-Watan of the arrest of a a man who opened fire on the police, (sorry: Arabic only; I'll try to post an English version later), apparently from a car, opened fire on a police patrol in the ‘Asir region (again, in southwestern Saudi Arabia near the Yemen border, where so many recent incidents have occurred), looks like it might be yet another terror incident. More as the day progresses and the news arrives.

Impending IDF transfers and the Palestinian Authority

From The Jerusalem Post (of all places) an interesting detailed article (there are two pages to the article) on some impending transfers and promotions in the Israel Defense Forces that may have a major impact on some little-reported links between IDF officers in the West Bank and the Palestinian Authority. A useful read.

Muslim Brotherhood Guide "Has Not Resigned"

UPDATE: A bit more background here.

Perhaps this is another Streisand Effect post like the previous one, but the General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mehdi ‘Akef, has not resigned! (English version of the denial here.) Now, earlier postings have noted that ‘Akef reportedly plans to step down in the near term, but he hasn't resigned yet.

There have been some interesting developments lately in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and these rumors may stem from them: the Brotherhood will, apparently, have an option to appeal some decisions of military tribunals to civilian courts, and there is talk of the next General Guide being a younger figure from the group's reform movement. Right now I'm not sure what these rumors stem from or what they mean, but they're worth watching. Something is going on.

King Mohammed VI and the "Streisand Effect"

There's an Internet phenomenon that even has its own Wikipedia entry: "The Streisand Effect." The Wikipedia article explains it as:

The Streisand effect is an Internet phenomenon where an attempt to censor or remove a piece of information backfires, causing the information to be publicized widely and to a greater extent than would have occurred if no censorship had been attempted. Examples of such attempts include censoring a photograph, a number, a file, or a website (for example via a cease-and-desist letter). Instead of being suppressed, the information receives extensive publicity, often being widely mirrored across the Internet, or distributed on file-sharing networks.

We seem to have a classic case in Morocco. The government has shut down a weekly publication and jailed its editor for publishing an article about the King's health. I had never heard of the publication in question, or any recent rumors about the King's health, but now everybody from Reporters without Borders to the Committee to Protect Journalists to probably everybody else is criticizing the crackdown on the publication, and I find myself (as you doubtless will) wondering what's wrong with the King's health.

Yes, I get the whole concept of lèse majesté, that you just aren't supposed to talk about Kings (there was an earlier case where a paper was prosecuted for actually running a complimentary article that was considered to intrude on the King's privacy). But closing a publication and jailing the editor makes those of us outside the Kingdom more curious about the King's health. And since as far as a reasonable amount of Googling tells me, it's just that he's got a rotavirus, I don't get the big deal. I've had that. Is royal diarrhea the big offense, or is there something else going on here? See, you made me wonder. And I would never have heard this rumor if you hadn't cracked down on an editor.

Now, of course, those of you who follow this stuff may be aware that the King, back when he was Crown Prince, got some unfortunate European tabloid coverage that created some scandal, but I have no intention of resurrecting that. I'm just noting that if you don't want people speculating, stop shooting the messenger. More people are talking about his health right now than if the article had simply been ignored.

Stop Presses: Mubarak Graying?

Egyptian blogger Zenobia has the picture of the day: the first evidence that Husni Mubarak, a mere lad of 81, is starting to gray at the temples!

I think it's just a trick of the lighting, or else he left the shoe polish at home.

See here to compare Mubarak's hair coloring with Barack Obama's (maybe he figured a little gray in the temples would make him more like Obama?) or here with Bob Gates.

As I've suggested before, this may just be sour grapes on my part: I'm 20 years younger than he is, and completely white haired.

Only his hairdresser knows for sure.

Not Two Phrases I Want to Hear Together

I missed this story, which is now a week old, but I'm pretty sure that two phrases I do not like hearing together are "Al-Qa‘ida in the Islamic Maghreb" and "Large Hadron Collider."

Or this:

The suspect had been working on the LHC Beauty (LHCb) experiment, which is investigating the slight differences between matter and anti-matter by studying a type of particle called the "beauty quark".

Don't you just love it when they play with matter and anti-matter?

On that note, enjoy the weekend,

New MEI Viewpoints Publication on Saudi Arabia

MEI's continuing series of Viewpoints Publications centering on the 30th anniversary of key events of 1979 has produced the fifth of six scheduled publications this year: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 1979-2009: Evolution of a Pivotal State. The 21 essays by 22 contributors are issued to mark the 30th anniversary of the seizure of the Mosque in Mecca, but the essays are not limited to that event but deal with many aspects of Saudi society. The link above takes you to a summary; the full publication (.pdf) is here.

Lots of reading here, and the price is right (free), so enjoy.

Ah, the Radicalism of the Young: I Guess it's Not the Sixties Anymore

Okay, we old Boomers who remember the sixties are glad to see student agitators still exist, but something seems a tad different somehow. Cases in point: a) the other day, Kuwait University's student elections saw a solid victory for the Islamist movement, while the Al-Wasat al-Dimuqrati group ("The Democratic Center") ran well behind; b) while in Egypt, women and other protestors at Cairo University have staged a sit-in over the recent ban on the niqab or full face veil in classrooms. Oh, come on, at least call it a veil-in or something.

I feel old.

Egyptian Opposition Rallies Against Gamal Mubarak

The Egyptian opposition doesn't unite very often, but Wednesday evening a wide range of Egyptian opposition groups, from Ayman Nour to the Muslim Brotherhood to the Kifaya Movement, came together to protest the tawrith or inheritance of power by Gamal Mubarak.

The rally is getting publicity not only in Egypt but elsewhere, and of course there was the recent flutter of talk about Muhammad El Baradei (getting a bit of mileage from a Saudi paper here) the curious flurries earlier this year in favor of ‘Omar Suleiman, and even the country's first Coptic candidate.

It seems like an "Anybody but Gamal" ground swell, if you forget for a moment that in Egypt's variant of one-man-one-vote, Husni Mubarak is the man, and he's got the vote.

I really don't think the average Egyptian likes the idea of inheritance — tawrith is the word constantly used by the opposition, since it implies something handed down as in a will, the Presidency as a "bequest" — but I also fear the average Egyptian is inured to the fact that he or she doesn't really have a say in choosing the next Pharaoh President. The traditions of Pharaonic power have been adapted and adjusted through the millennia, but it's still a pretty Pharaonic presidency.

Because Egypt really does have a certain degree of freedom of expression not found in some other Arab autocracies, and a relatively independent press alongside the government one, the opposition can hold these sorts of rallies (up to a point), and make itself heard (in central Cairo), and find support from bloggers. That's the pressure valve that keeps the system from exploding.

It is, of course, just possible that if opposition to Gamal grows sufficiently, the Army could veto the succession, or Husni Mubarak might just decide he's good for another six years. Another term would carry him to 2017, when he'd still be a few months shy of 90. (Remember this story, though I still think it highly dubious, that claimed Mubarak said he'd hang on to power until his "last breath.")

But Gamal does have some real support from the nouveaux riches entrepreneurial class, and he has put his own brand on the National Democratic Party. Lately pro-Gamal Facebook groups are proliferating, I hear; I'll link to some when I have time to chase them down.

I haven't got any trace of monarchist tendencies (I'm a blend of Irish ancestors who hated British Kings and Scotch-Irish backwoodsmen who threw out the last one around these here parts), but I confess there have been moments I find Gamal a bit more impressive than Mubarak Senior. Not that that qualifies him for the Presidency. I think the big question mark for Gamal is the Army and the Security Services. He isn't one of them. And however much Sadat and Mubarak have co-opted the Army by granting it its own sector of the Egyptian economy, Gamal would still be the first President of Egypt not to come from the military. (And go back and look at the official portraits of Kings Fuad and Farouq: they're always shown wearing military uniforms.) If he does succeed, he's going to need either Field Marshal Tantawi or ‘Omar Suleiman (or preferably both) standing next to him when he's sworn in.

A few years ago there was talk that Gamal would launch his own party. (It was rumored to be called Mustaqbal: the Future. Of course Hariri in Lebanon appropriated that, but I've sometimes wondered if Ayman Nour named is party al-Ghad (tomorrow) in imitation, and that's why the Mubaraks have come down so hard on Nour.) Instead he took over the National Democratic Party. But he seems to be (if the opposition types are right in their criticisms) depending on a very small clique of close associates.

I still think the unpredictable element is Husni Mubarak's health. If he doesn't serve out his term, the succession process could be disrupted. He's actually been very slow and systematic: a lot of us thought Gamal would be General Secretary of the Party by now, but he's only head of its Political Committee (admittedly, that's just a more palatable translation of what a few decades back would have been translated "Politburo"). But as inexorable as the process seems, it isn't quite there yet, and if Husni left the scene suddenly, I'm not sure the process would proceed.

One additional side note: a theme you'll see in some of the linked articles is that a) succession is the kind of thing that happens in places like Syria, and b) Egypt is not Syria. The Asad succession has long been pointed to by Egyptians as a sign that Syria's not really serious about its republican credentials, and there are lingering resentments of the 1958-61 United Arab Republic, when Syria and Egypt learned to resent each other during three years as one country.

Until fairly recently, Egyptians denied that Gamal would ever succeed. Now, they seem to be more resigned to the possibility. But we're still about two years out from the elections, and much can happen between now and then.

Oren and J Street

A fairly lengthy piece in Haaretz on Israeli Ambassador Michael Oren's giving up his American citizenship and the Embassy's decision to snub J Street, the new dovish Israeli lobbying group seeking to offer a different approach than AIPAC. Some of us remember when Yitzhak Rabin (privately, though it promptly leaked) accused AIPAC of essentially representing Likud. Now that Likud is back in power, J Street is ignored by Israel's Embassy.

A reminder that 1) not all Israelis are a cheering section for the present government and 2) Haaretz can write things that the Washington Post would be lambasted for.

And They're Off: Tunisia's Presidential Campaign Begins: Some Personal Thoughts

Tunisia's Presidential campaign has begun for the October 25 elections. (Could we possibly arrange to have an election primarily fought in the same month as the vote? Nahhh...not if it's like this one, anyway.) For background and details on the election, I'd refer you to Hamadi Redissi's piece in the latest Arab Reform Bulletin from the Carnegie Endowment. This post is more of a personal reflection than an analysis. (For a more critical analysis, The Arabist had one recently, but since his server or IP or something has been hanging today, I can't give you a direct link. [Okay, it's back and it's here.])

I like Tunisia. It's a lovely country. I've visited many times, and my wife and I honeymooned in Sidi Bou Said in 1993. It's prosperous by Arab world (non-oil) standards, cosmopolitan, secular, Mediterranean. North African cuisine is great: I like couscous, I like the fiery red harissa, I even like the merguez sausages cooked at the little stand-up snack bars, since they give the Lipitor something of a challenge. It's the Maghreb country I know best (I emphasize Maghreb, not "North African," since that would include Egypt).

I don't usually name-drop much here, but to set the stage let me note that I've even met President Zine El ‘Abidine Ben ‘Ali a few times and once had a one-on-one (no one else in the room) hour long off the record interview with him. The former Foreign Minister and longtime Ambassador to the US, Habib Benyahia, was an old friend, as is the current head of the Tunisian External Communications Agency, Oussama Romdhani, another Georgetown product like myself.

I do not, however, mistake the political system for a democracy. Redissi's article notes the limitations on pluralism. I would note a few others.

Some US and French journalists visit Tunisia and are awed by the Western (mainly French) feel of the cities, the secularism and prominence of women, the downright pride in the country's Jewish heritage and the ancient Ghriba synagogue on Djerba Island, the fierce anti-terrorist sentiments, and (though not always mentioned in their reports), the beach resorts full of German and Italian tourists in rather scanty bathing suits for an Arab country, the ready availability of alcohol (we are talking about journalists), and they feel they have found a real Western island in the Arab world. That they have, but not in a political sense.

Tunisia has never had a particularly strong military, and the military has never played a role in politics: that is one legacy of the founder of the state, Habib Bourguiba. But Ben ‘Ali, who deposed Bourguiba in 1987 when the old man was officially 84 (some say older: he lived to be 97, but perhaps more than 100), came from the internal security apparatus, so while he is only peripherally a military man he is primarily an internal security type.

Bourguiba was, unquestionably, increasingly a loose cannon. By the time he entered his 80s he had first cultivated his son as his successor (long before the Asads, Saddams, Mubaraks and Qadhafis) but then split with said son; more and more he seemed to be senile (yes, I know it's not a medical diagnosis), and finally his Prime Minister (Ben ‘Ali) deposed him.

Bourguiba had been President for Life. Ben ‘Ali promptly announced that there would be no future Presidents for life, and amended the constitution to limit the President's terms, and the maximum age the President might run for office. (As Ben ‘Ali aged and served more terms, these limitations were lifted.) Ben ‘Ali keeps extending his eligibility, but he is not President for life. Since 1999 he has run against competing candidates.

In 1999 he squeaked through with 99.66% of the vote; in 2004 he was clearly less popular, only winning 94.48% of the vote.

I'm going to go way out on a limb here and guess he's going to be reelected this year. Without a runoff.

Why do we hear less about Tunisian lack of democracy than about other countries? Partly because the Tunisian press and opposition parties are rather tame. The press tends to be pro-government or government run, and the opposition party papers are dependent on the government for printing plants, paper and ink. There is nothing comparable to the sometimes wild tabloid media that exists in Egypt, which is otherwise not particularly more liberal in electoral politics. And Tunisia knows how to cultivate and flatter Western journalists (yes, including me) for good press. And it's no Iraq under Saddam, of course, though it's also not terribly hospitable to strong oppositional politics or political Islam.

Tunisia is in some ways something like a North African Singapore: economic prosperity and high employment compensate for an absence of political freedoms. (And increasingly, China is a sort of Singapore writ large.) Most of Ben ‘Ali's initial efforts after he displaced Bourguiba have been countermanded: the term limits, the age limit. But the economy has been liberalized from the rigid statism of Bourguiba's day. And the opposition parties, at least the approved ones (no Islamist parties need apply) are guaranteed seats in Parliament, though the ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally (the modern incarnation of Bourguiba's Neo-Destour) is guaranteed a constitutionally-amending lock on the majority. Despite some opening up, Ben ‘Ali has also gone from the somewhat austere reformer to a President in the usual Arab tradition: his (second, acquired after becoming President) wife and her family have enormous business and financial power, and her jet-setting to the fashion spots of Europe has drawn European tabloid attention (who often refer to her as a "former hairdresser"). Of course, I never descend to such tabloid gossip here.

So the campaign is on. There are four candidates. Usually one or two of them will endorse Ben ‘Ali somewhere in the campaign and announce their campaign is only symbolic out of their love of democracy (?).

There was more suspense in the Algerian election, if you don't mind my saying so. Bouteflika only got 90%.

Yet, I still like Tunisia.

Al-Riyadh on Lebanon Returning to Syria?

Oh, my. This could set off some real paranoia in some Lebanese circles, coming as it does after the ‘Abdullah-Asad summit: Al-Riyadh, the Saudi newspaper, is asking "Why Doesn't Lebanon Return to Syria?"

It's in Arabic so some of you can't read it, but it will get attention, I suspect, in the Lebanese press. Yes, the opening lines are, "I realize it's not an easy manner, and the difficulties are not exclusively Lebanese ..." You got that right.

Sorry I'm not so attuned to Al-Riyadh as to be able to pick up on any nuances here. But the Lebanese are going to be reading this one carefully.

UPDATE: See the links in the first comment below.

Exum on the Afghanistan Decision Delay

Abu Muqawama has a useful thought this afternoon on using the extended debate over Afghanistan to put pressure on Karzai. That's an oversimplification, so read the whole thing.

Soccer Diplomacy

Turkey and Armenia held their soccer game today, and despite some concerns about Azeri flags and other such issues, it seems to have gone off all right, but there are protests in Yerevan over concessions to the Turks (and as I noted earlier, Armenian American groups aren't happy either).

The Turkey-Israel-Syria Triangle

The three-day Columbus Day holiday, during which I was actually in the West Virginia mountains for a quick three-day weekend, meant I didn't comment (yet) on the recent, rather rapid devlopments in the complex relationship Turkey has with both Israel and Syria. Since I presume most of my readers do not rely on me for all of their Middle East analysis, this probably won't be news to very many people, but it's worth recappinjg:

First, reportedly as a protest against the war in Gaza early this year, Turkey objected to Israeli participation in a joint NATO air exercise, which in turn led to the US and Italy pulling out of the exercise, and the US "gently" criticizing Turkey for the decision. Israel sought to play the issue down, with Haaretz reporting that "diplomats" at Israel's mission in Ankara were emphasizing that "Israel has no interest in settling disagreements through newspaper headlines."

But the newspaper headlines were quick to note that even while feuding with Israel, Turkey was cementing its relations with Syria, which were hostile not so long ago, with some of the most solid indications of cooperation yet. The Turkish Foreign Minister took a good part of the Turkish Cabinet to Aleppo to forge a new cooperation council with Syria. They announced the lifting of visa requirements between the two nations, a move previously announced but now apparently formalized. But it wasn't just the Foreign Ministers: along for the trip were the Turkish Defense, Interior, Economy, Oil, Electricity, Agriculture, and Health Ministers.

And here they are celebrating the Aleppo meeting. Apparently sunglasses were de rigeur, though I think the white-haired chap in the middle is Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Mu‘allem, and he's not wearing them.

And, as if to rub salt into the Israeli wounds, Turkey and Syria announced that they will hold a larger joint military exercise than the first, limited land exercise they held last spring. This announcement, on the heels of the cancellation of Israel's participation in the NATO exercise, was hardly coincidental.

Anyway, it is obvious from the press coverage, at least outside of Israel, that the Syrian rapprochement and the Israeli estrangement are being reported in tandem, as if reciprocal in some way. That could be unfortunate because, while better relations between Ankara and Damascus have been a priority for the Erdogan government for some time, that improving climate has also made Turkey a useful intermediary between Syria and Israel, and an interlocutor in the efforts to resume negotiations on the Syrian track.

But, of course, the Netanyahu government insists it's not going to negotiate over the Golan (or at least isn't going to agree to resume negotiations where they left off back in the 1990s), and that makes progress pretty difficult.

Turkey may be sending a number of messages here. Certainly it has sent one clearly to Israel. The message to Syria also seems to be that the old disputes over the PKK and water rights are forgotten or at least set aside for the time being.

I may have added little new here, but if you haven't been following this the links above should bring you up to date.