The US Department of State has an in-house reputation of always being behind the curve on technology. So it doesn't surprise me that at a town hall meeting with Secretary Clinton, the State Department employees are asking to use Firefox. Oddly enough, I got the link from the leftist Egyptian blogger Hossam al-Hamalawy.
So does this mean they're using Internet Explorer? Or some early version of Netscape? Mosaic?
Monday, July 13, 2009
The Persians are Coming, the Persians are Coming!
A somewhat wry story in the Washington Post notes that Washington has been warning for months about the fact that Iran is building a huge new embassy in Managua, Nicaragua, except that it isn't. A Congressman compared it to Russian funding of Cuba, but Cuba was getting a million dollars a day in mid-2oth century dollars, and Iran's not that flush. Abu Muqawama comments on the story as well.
IDF Senior Officer Maneuverings
There was a little drama in the upper ranks of the Israel Defense Forces over the weekend. According to the press, IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi wanted to appoint Gadi Eizenkot, the General Officer Commanding Northern Command, as the new Deputy Chief of Staff, while Defense Minister Ehud Barak supported the Southern Commander, Maj. Gen. Yoav Gallant. Instead, they compromised and named Maj. Gen. Benny Gantz, the attaché in Washington, as the new Deputy Chief of Staff. But Gallant had said he would resign if passed over, and Barak wanted to keep him around. In the end, Gallant was persuaded to stay on, so the three men are now considered prime candidates to succeed Ashkenazi as Chief of Staff when his tour ends in 18 months. Background and details from Haaretz are here and here, and an analysis here.
Old Films of Egypt
And now for something completely different.
Thanks to a link at Egyptian Chronicles, a video documentary with a lot of footage of Egyptian newsreels and film from the earliest days of cinema onward. It's in 13 parts at YouTube and I haven't viewed some of the later ones myself, but you'll see links to the later parts across the bottom of the screen. In Arabic.
Thanks to a link at Egyptian Chronicles, a video documentary with a lot of footage of Egyptian newsreels and film from the earliest days of cinema onward. It's in 13 parts at YouTube and I haven't viewed some of the later ones myself, but you'll see links to the later parts across the bottom of the screen. In Arabic.
Saturday, July 11, 2009
The Handshake: Differing Sartorial Styles
Not as obviously awkward as the Rabin-Arafat handshake, but not exactly old buddies either. I doubt if either is asking the other for fashion advice. And I'm sure some Republicans are going to have exploding heads over this photo.Where does he get his clothes? (I don't mean Obama.) Head shops selling wall-hangings for 60s hippies, painted during bad acid trips? Draperies in houses of ill repute? Surely those patterns aren't traditionally Libyan. Does he design them himself, and if so, what mind-altering substance is he on? There may be some sub-Saharan African cultures that could pull off this style (sort of Paisley/Leopard/19th century wallpaper blend), but in North Africa, well, no, not really. But compared to the dark blue suit and light blue tie, which are somewhat understated, it is somewhat, well ... overstated. Or perhaps, screaming at the passing traffic about your alien abduction.
Some things just can't be ignored, even on weekends. I now return to the weekend.
Friday, July 10, 2009
Weekend Reading
If the new readers are still around, perhaps I should explain that since I don't blog on weekends, I've taken to putting together a sort of catchall "weekend reading" list of reports, studies, or postings of interest in the field. It's pretty much whatever I'm aware of and isn't meant to be comprehensive.
And, a I noted in the previous post, according to my counter this will be the 400th post since starting in January. A full hundred of those appeared in June, thanks to the Lebanese and Iranian electons, the Obama speech in Cairo and the Iranian uprising.
And, a I noted in the previous post, according to my counter this will be the 400th post since starting in January. A full hundred of those appeared in June, thanks to the Lebanese and Iranian electons, the Obama speech in Cairo and the Iranian uprising.
- The Carnegie Endowment's Arab Reform Bulletin has a special issue on the world economic crisis and its impact, offering a somewhat different emphasis than its usual concentration on democratization issues.
- David Pollock at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy has sometimes criticized methods of polling in the Arab world, but today he's noting some new polls that show the US doing better in the "Arab street." [Oops. For several hours I had it spelled "Pollack." Sorry, Dave. Must have been thinking of Ken. Fixed now.]
- Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Qatar-based, Egyptian-born television preacher often criticized in the West but much watched in the Middle East, has a new book out; Marc Lynch considers it quite important; Arabic Media Shack is more cautious; Al-Masry al-Youm serialized parts of it for those who read Arabic.
- The latest podcast is up at MEI: A View of the Current Situation in the Swat Valley and Waziristan by Pakistani Minister for Parliamentary Affairs Dr Babar Awan. (Podcast plays when you click the link, so use earphones if you're in a busy office.) Original details of the July 6 event are here.
Greetings to New Readers
This is proving to be a very busy week for the blog, mostly apparently due to my post on Marwa al-Sherbini the other day. On Wednesday I had a total of 334 page views, 310 of them to that specific story, which as of last night had had a total of 880 page views. Small potatoes for the big guys, I'm sure, but gratifying to a still relatively new blogger. And I thank both The Arabist and Marc Lynch for links that are bringing people here. Also my RSS subscriptions are increasing.
So I thought I should welcome any new visitors by suggesting you look around the archive a bit; the blog started in January, and I explained who I am back then; we've covered a wide range of topics and I'd urge you to browse around and come back often. In fact, I see that my post count shows 399 right now, so my traditional Friday afternoon "weekend reading" post will also be my 400th.
So I thought I should welcome any new visitors by suggesting you look around the archive a bit; the blog started in January, and I explained who I am back then; we've covered a wide range of topics and I'd urge you to browse around and come back often. In fact, I see that my post count shows 399 right now, so my traditional Friday afternoon "weekend reading" post will also be my 400th.
The Parking Lot Wars
Jerusalem has been going through a particularly Israeli sort of poltical crisis for several weeks now, one that has received little attention outside Israel because it is one of those things that is particularly Israeli in nature. American supporters of Israel tend to sentimentalize and idealize the state and therefore do not like to focus on its internal divisions; too many Arab states simply demonize everything about Israel and therefore do not seek to report or analyze the internal stresses of Israeli society.
I'm calling this one the parking lot wars. Tourism is a major industry in Jerusalem — I hardly need to explain why, I think — and as anyone who knows the city knows, parking is an issue. Actually, several distinct issues. Back in the mid-1990s was the only time I ever rented a car in Israel (I'm not normally masochistic) and since it was rented in West Jerusalem I soon learned I couldn't park it in East Jerusalem lest someone set fire to it (this was between the Intifadas but it still wasn't good to have Israeli plates on the Arab side of town). I ended up parking at Mamilla park, well west of the old city. To make things easier on tourists, the Jerusalem government sought to open a parking garage just outside the walls of the old city on the Sabbath. There would be no charge; a non-Jew would run it; it would therefore not seem to violate the Sabbath. The haredi or "Ultra-Orthodox" protested. The Mayor shifted to a different approach: same deal, but a privately operated parking lot opposite the Jaffa Gate.
A radical haredi group known as Eda Haredit, or the Haredi Community, which is anti-Zionist and extreme in its opinions, has been forcefully protesting even the compromise approach. They've been protesting, mostly peacefully, and at other times rather more violently.
One of the fundamental ironies of Israeli society is the extreme dichotomies between the haredim and the generally secular society that is the majority, at least outside Jerusalem. I remember once being driven by a cab driver to East Jerusalem (the Arab section) on a Friday evening at dusk: he expressed alarm that he might have to go past Mea Shearim, the haredi quarter, where his car might be stoned for driving on the Sabbath, so I gave him directions for getting there through all-Arab neighborhoods. Admittedly that was just before the first Intifada, but the irony was clearly present: driving through an Arab neighborhood didn't scare him nearly as much as going past Mea Shearim on the Sabbath.
Most Western supporters of Israel are fairly unaware of the secular/religious divide and the contradictions it produces. In Jerusalem, and certainly in particular neighborhoods, there have been attacks on billboards and, in the past, even the burning of bus shelters which had ads showing women in bathing suits. Yet Israel also has plenty of topless beaches. Until you understand that dichotomy, you probably won't really understand Israel.
The parking lot wars are nother example.
I'm calling this one the parking lot wars. Tourism is a major industry in Jerusalem — I hardly need to explain why, I think — and as anyone who knows the city knows, parking is an issue. Actually, several distinct issues. Back in the mid-1990s was the only time I ever rented a car in Israel (I'm not normally masochistic) and since it was rented in West Jerusalem I soon learned I couldn't park it in East Jerusalem lest someone set fire to it (this was between the Intifadas but it still wasn't good to have Israeli plates on the Arab side of town). I ended up parking at Mamilla park, well west of the old city. To make things easier on tourists, the Jerusalem government sought to open a parking garage just outside the walls of the old city on the Sabbath. There would be no charge; a non-Jew would run it; it would therefore not seem to violate the Sabbath. The haredi or "Ultra-Orthodox" protested. The Mayor shifted to a different approach: same deal, but a privately operated parking lot opposite the Jaffa Gate.
A radical haredi group known as Eda Haredit, or the Haredi Community, which is anti-Zionist and extreme in its opinions, has been forcefully protesting even the compromise approach. They've been protesting, mostly peacefully, and at other times rather more violently.
One of the fundamental ironies of Israeli society is the extreme dichotomies between the haredim and the generally secular society that is the majority, at least outside Jerusalem. I remember once being driven by a cab driver to East Jerusalem (the Arab section) on a Friday evening at dusk: he expressed alarm that he might have to go past Mea Shearim, the haredi quarter, where his car might be stoned for driving on the Sabbath, so I gave him directions for getting there through all-Arab neighborhoods. Admittedly that was just before the first Intifada, but the irony was clearly present: driving through an Arab neighborhood didn't scare him nearly as much as going past Mea Shearim on the Sabbath.
Most Western supporters of Israel are fairly unaware of the secular/religious divide and the contradictions it produces. In Jerusalem, and certainly in particular neighborhoods, there have been attacks on billboards and, in the past, even the burning of bus shelters which had ads showing women in bathing suits. Yet Israel also has plenty of topless beaches. Until you understand that dichotomy, you probably won't really understand Israel.
The parking lot wars are nother example.
Israel Requests the Joint Strike Fighter
Israel is seeking the next-generation Lockheed-Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. It will be very interesting if this becomes a point of leverage on such issues as settlements and territorial compromise over the next year or two. Previous administrations wouldn't have thought of linking US demands about the settlements to arms sales, but perhaps this one will. Worth watching.
Suez Governor: Prosecute Bird Flu Victims?
This seems to belong to the "You Can't Make This Stuff Up" category, except that it's in no way funny: the Governor of Suez in Egypt wants people who come down with bird flu prosecuted for illegally raising birds. Leftish blogger Hossam al-Hamalawy points to the story in Al-Masry al-Youm with the comment, "This is not from The Onion." No, The Onion is actually funny.
I commented during the Swine Flu furor that bird flu was a bigger problem but no one was proposing killing all the birds. It never even occurred to me someone might think of prosecuting people for getting bird flu.
Egyptian governors, in case you were wondering, are appointed, not elected. I don't know the background of this particular governor, but traditionally those in border governorates or strategically important ones like Suez tend to be military men.
I commented during the Swine Flu furor that bird flu was a bigger problem but no one was proposing killing all the birds. It never even occurred to me someone might think of prosecuting people for getting bird flu.
Egyptian governors, in case you were wondering, are appointed, not elected. I don't know the background of this particular governor, but traditionally those in border governorates or strategically important ones like Suez tend to be military men.
Al-Qa‘ida in Egypt Plot?
Today's news starts a little Egypt-heavy but the Egyptian government is claiming it has busted an Al-Qa‘ida plot to attack foreign ships in the Suez Canal. Another account here. The Egyptian accounts tangentially suggest Palestinian involvement; the Israeli press headlines it, though 24 of the 26 arrested are said to be Egyptians.
This one deserves a certain amount of skeptical caution, I think, until the evidence is made public, but it's not intrinsically improbable. The Canal is easily accessible since it runs past three major Egyptian cities. Ships of all nations (including Israeli warships) transit the Canal constantly.
This one deserves a certain amount of skeptical caution, I think, until the evidence is made public, but it's not intrinsically improbable. The Canal is easily accessible since it runs past three major Egyptian cities. Ships of all nations (including Israeli warships) transit the Canal constantly.
Thursday, July 9, 2009
Today's Iran Protests
I haven't got anything to add on today's Iran protests that isn't already well covered by the usual Iran-watching sites. The National Iranian American Council (Trita Parsi's group) has been providing good coverage. As was the case with the earlier protests, mainstream bloggers Andrew Sullivan at The Atlantic and Nico Pitney at Huffington Post are prolific, and of course there's Twitter. When I have some particular insight of my own, I'll add it, but for the day's events these sites are good aggregators.
Rumors of an Early Mubarak Retirement?
Okay, let's start with this post at Israel Policy Forum, neither a sensational nor an ideological site generally (beyond the obvious alignment that their name indicates): "Early Retirement for Egyptian President Mubarak?" They're citing, mostly, Israeli sources.
Yesterday I noted rumors of a possible dissolution of Parliament. Is something going on here?
Maybe. It's not outrageously impossible, and I think the Israeli reports that Mubarak was deeply moved by the death of his young grandson may well be true. But are we really on the verge of a transition?
Mubarak is 81 and presumably has his moments of being fully aware of his age and mortality. I'm 20 year younger and have the same.
Unless we are all being led down a real path of disinformation, he wants Gamal to succeed him. But my own guess — emphasize the word guess since I have no direct knowledge or evidence — is that he doesn't want it to be as obviously dynastic as the Hafiz al-Asad/Bashar al-Asad succession, but wants it to at least look constitutional.
But he's been moving very slowly: instead of making Gamal the head of the National Democratic Party he simply made his Political Bureau post more powerful and eligible for succession.
There does seem to be opposition to Gamal, including the odd and perhaps false-flag flutter of support for Omar Suleiman; but most of all Mubarak the elder has held off settling the issue until he is himself weakening. If he dies before his term is out, or quits early, Gamal may not yet have the broad-based support he would need.
Don't ask me to predict; watch it and predict for yourself.
Yesterday I noted rumors of a possible dissolution of Parliament. Is something going on here?
Maybe. It's not outrageously impossible, and I think the Israeli reports that Mubarak was deeply moved by the death of his young grandson may well be true. But are we really on the verge of a transition?
Mubarak is 81 and presumably has his moments of being fully aware of his age and mortality. I'm 20 year younger and have the same.
Unless we are all being led down a real path of disinformation, he wants Gamal to succeed him. But my own guess — emphasize the word guess since I have no direct knowledge or evidence — is that he doesn't want it to be as obviously dynastic as the Hafiz al-Asad/Bashar al-Asad succession, but wants it to at least look constitutional.
But he's been moving very slowly: instead of making Gamal the head of the National Democratic Party he simply made his Political Bureau post more powerful and eligible for succession.
There does seem to be opposition to Gamal, including the odd and perhaps false-flag flutter of support for Omar Suleiman; but most of all Mubarak the elder has held off settling the issue until he is himself weakening. If he dies before his term is out, or quits early, Gamal may not yet have the broad-based support he would need.
Don't ask me to predict; watch it and predict for yourself.
Michael Young on Sami Gemayel; Qifa Nabki on the Christian Vote
Speaking of Lebanon ... (weren't we?) ...
As noted previously, the Gemayels did well in the Lebanese elections, sons of both Bashir and Amin being elected. Michael Young, the excellent columnist for Beirut's Daily Star, gives us a less than enthusiastic assessment of Sami Gemayel, son of former President Amin Gemayel, who won in the elections.
And while we're on Lebanon, a useful note from the always readable Qifa Nabki on "The Christian Vote" in the last elections.
As noted previously, the Gemayels did well in the Lebanese elections, sons of both Bashir and Amin being elected. Michael Young, the excellent columnist for Beirut's Daily Star, gives us a less than enthusiastic assessment of Sami Gemayel, son of former President Amin Gemayel, who won in the elections.
And while we're on Lebanon, a useful note from the always readable Qifa Nabki on "The Christian Vote" in the last elections.
Lebanese Spy Flees to Israel: How Does This Work?
We've mentioned the continuing reports of a Lebanese unraveling of an alleged Israeli spy ring in the south. Unless, like Claude Rains in Casablanca, you are "shocked, shocked!" to learn that spying is going on, this is fairly standard stuff, but on a couple of occasions there have been reports of some of the suspected spies making their way into Israel. Most recently, it's said to be a Lebanese Lieutenant Colonel who slipped into Israel. Here's Haaretz' more cautious ("is believed to have fled to Israel") account, from the other side of the fence.
I do have a few questions. Back in the old days of the "Good Fence" when southern Lebanon was occupied by Israel's client "South Lebanon Army" and you could drive to the Israeli border town of Maalula and see SLA officers and ordinary Lebanese buying snacks at the border post, none of this would have been surprising. But Israel withdrew, the SLA vanished, and South Lebanon is supposedly Hizbullahland these days. Admittedly the defector was a Lebanese Army officer and his uniform would probably allow considerable access, but just how easy is it to cross into Israel from Lebanon?
Bear in mind, I'm just asking. I haven't been on that border since the mid-1990s, and back then it would have been easy, but my sense is it's changed a lot. Am I wrong?
I do have a few questions. Back in the old days of the "Good Fence" when southern Lebanon was occupied by Israel's client "South Lebanon Army" and you could drive to the Israeli border town of Maalula and see SLA officers and ordinary Lebanese buying snacks at the border post, none of this would have been surprising. But Israel withdrew, the SLA vanished, and South Lebanon is supposedly Hizbullahland these days. Admittedly the defector was a Lebanese Army officer and his uniform would probably allow considerable access, but just how easy is it to cross into Israel from Lebanon?
Bear in mind, I'm just asking. I haven't been on that border since the mid-1990s, and back then it would have been easy, but my sense is it's changed a lot. Am I wrong?
Wednesday, July 8, 2009
Abu Aardvark Joining Abu Muqawama at CNAS
Marc Lynch announced today that he is going to be a non-resident senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security in addition to his roles at George Washington University and Foreign Policy. CNAS, already characterized by some as the house think-tank of the Obama Administration, (also see here) is becoming Middle East blogger central as well; Lynch (who started his blogging career as "Abu Aardvark" before moving to Foreign Policy's blogsite) now joins Abu Muqawama among the bloggers at CNAS. As he puts it at the post already linked:
I feel that we have finally achieved a harmonic convergence with a genuine Axis of Abus: putting Abu Aardvark and Abu Muqawama in the same place at the same time... it ain't nothin' but a blogger party.Congratulations from one of the newer bloggers in the field (though, alas, not one of the younger ones) to one of the pioneers.
More Muslim Than the Sheikh al-Azhar?
... would seem to be the Egyptian equivalent of "More Catholic than the Pope," but it would appear that some Egyptian critics are attacking Sheikh Tantawi for not walking out of an interfaith forum in Kazakhstan when Shimon Peres showed up. The Haaretz article really understates the story by headlining "Egypt Academic Under Fire." The Sheikh al-Azhar is rather more than an "Egypt academic" by any standard.
This is another reminder that normalization is between states, not necessarily between populations, and that Israeli normalization is still unpopular in many areas of Egyptian political life and society, except when the government insists. The Sheikh al-Azhar has an unusual role in Egypt and it is not surprising that some of his own colleagues, and the Muslim Brotherhood and others do not like him appearing with an Israeli, even in an international interfaith meeting.
This is another reminder that normalization is between states, not necessarily between populations, and that Israeli normalization is still unpopular in many areas of Egyptian political life and society, except when the government insists. The Sheikh al-Azhar has an unusual role in Egypt and it is not surprising that some of his own colleagues, and the Muslim Brotherhood and others do not like him appearing with an Israeli, even in an international interfaith meeting.
Some Odds and Ends Worth Reading
I'm not saving the roundups till Friday this week since there's a fair amount of interesting linkage to link to:
- I've already noted that The Moor Next Door is doing good coverage of the Mauritanian elections on July 18, about the only go-to site I know in English (there's more in French, of course). Here's his latest on candidate Messoud Boulkheir, the candidate of Haratine origin (literally "freedmen": descendants of slaves, but Arabic speaking, not sub-Saharan). Besides the obligatory comparison to Barack Obama, there's the curious introduction that might in an American context seem a little patronizing, but probably is fine in Mauritanian context:
If the campaign for the 18 July elections in Mauritania were an American movie, Messoud Boulkheir would be portrayed by Morgan Freeman. But the movie would be somewhat of a departure for Freeman: its ending would evoke cynicism more than hope.
- Marc Lynch's post yesterday on Palestinian elections is a good summary: it looks like Abu Mazen is joining his PM Salam Fayyad in calling for holding them on time and saying he'll step down if Hamas wins: he's calling their bluff, I think, but it's an interesting development.
- If you missed it, I already noted the awkwardness VP Biden created in his seeming "green light" to Israel to attack Iran, which is almost certainly not what he meant. President Obama has again clarified his Vice President's remarks to explain what he really meant. I think Biden is actually a very shrewd foreign policy expert; it's his tendency to speak off the cuff that causes his problems. Perhaps he needs to spend more time in an undisclosed location, like other recent VPs?
- Thanks to The Arabist yet again for citing my Marwa al-Sherbini post; I do basically agree with him that the whole comparison of this to Neda Agha Soltan or any other news item is pointless, but I thought it worth noting the growing controversy in Egypt. And I don't think the issue is that it isn't topping Michael Jackson in the Western media*, but rather that even the German media was pretty silent. As some have noted, this is changing: BBC, Al-Jazeera English, and others are getting the word out. And meanwhile, the Egyptian media seems to have pretty universally adopted the phrase shahidat al-hijab, "martyr of the hijab" (head veil).
- A curious rumor in Egypt of a possible early dissolution of Parliament. I'm dubious: I don't immediately see what benefit the regime could hope to gain from new elections, but perhaps I'm missing something.
Expanding the Blogroll
Recently both Arabic Media Shack and The Arabist have noted a relatively new blog from Cairo, The Boursa Exchange. It seems a rather eclectic blog with interest in Arabic language issues, politics, music and other things. I've added it to the Blogroll, along with Menassat and some other sites I've linked to recently, notably Bikya Masr and Iskandarani Misri. I'll continue to expand the blogroll as I can.
Tuesday, July 7, 2009
The Increasing Irrelevance of Ayman Nour
Not to get into American politics too deeply, since I'll offend half my readers and that's not the subject of this blog, but the recent controversies over former Republican Vice Presidential candidate Sarah Palin's decision to resign as Governor of Alaska (not just to quit at the end of her term but to resign this month) has puzzled and confused the pundits and many of her devout supporters, leading to a lot of debate as to whether she's played a brilliant political hand, or proven herself a quitter, or is trying to avoid a scandal, or what. Unless she knows something we don't, she seems to have made herself less, not more, likely to win higher office. Sometimes political figures make puzzling, even seemingly self-defeating, decisions.
That can happen with political candidates in the Middle East, too. Case in point: Ayman Nour.
You'll remember Ayman Nour, who's been active enough to have his own topic in the "Categories" file of this blog, with seven posts just since January up to this one; I refer you to that list rather than link individually, but the story so far: former Wafd Party figure, split with the Wafd Party (actually kicked out), started the Al-Ghad (Tomorrow) Party, ran against Mubarak for President in 2005, lost and was sent to prison on (rather dubious) charges; released in order to placate the US' new Administration; tried to make himself relevant to the April 6 demonstrations this year, but was sandbagged by his wife announcing she was divorcing him on the same day; claimed he'd been attacked by a person on a motorbike who lit a spray aerosol can and set fire to his hair, giving him first degree burns; strongly denied press reports that he'd told the doctors that he'd burned himself with a hairdryer.
That's my attempt at a fair summary of his career since getting out of prison. And I like Ayman Nour.
Now, to add to his stellar performance since his release, Ayman Nour has recently:
He might do better to fight his conviction in court, try to achieve vindication, and then seek to run as President.
One reason that we are likely to see the real competition for succession to Husni Mubarak as between Gamal Mubarak and some military figure such as Omar Suleiman is simply that there doesn't seem to be a liberal democratic alternative or, for that matter, a civilian alternative within the ruling party leadership. Gamal today controls most of the National Democratic Party levers, except for a few ancient figures retained from earlier eras, but too old to contend for power. The Wafd has been, to all intents and purposes, destroyed, and was once the only opposition party with a real national base, other than the ruling National Democratic Party and the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Ghad has always been Nour's personal party, though perhaps with appeal to the old (but increasingly geriatric) Wafd base, but he is increasingly being made to look ridiculous. Of course the regime is partly responsible for that, but Nour himself is increasingly complicit. Most of the other parties, excepting always the Muslim Brotherhood, are either intellectual debating clubs, personal hobbyhorses of their leader, or remnants of pre-Revolutionary movements that never had the support that the Wafd enjoyed. The ruling party has fragmented the opposition. Nour had a moment in the sun when he could have created a real alternative, but he has become increasingly irrelevant. It's Gamal or the Army or the Brotherhood, as far as I can see, and I expect the Brotherhood will let the other two fight it out and stand in the wings as the alternative.
That can happen with political candidates in the Middle East, too. Case in point: Ayman Nour.
You'll remember Ayman Nour, who's been active enough to have his own topic in the "Categories" file of this blog, with seven posts just since January up to this one; I refer you to that list rather than link individually, but the story so far: former Wafd Party figure, split with the Wafd Party (actually kicked out), started the Al-Ghad (Tomorrow) Party, ran against Mubarak for President in 2005, lost and was sent to prison on (rather dubious) charges; released in order to placate the US' new Administration; tried to make himself relevant to the April 6 demonstrations this year, but was sandbagged by his wife announcing she was divorcing him on the same day; claimed he'd been attacked by a person on a motorbike who lit a spray aerosol can and set fire to his hair, giving him first degree burns; strongly denied press reports that he'd told the doctors that he'd burned himself with a hairdryer.
That's my attempt at a fair summary of his career since getting out of prison. And I like Ayman Nour.
Now, to add to his stellar performance since his release, Ayman Nour has recently:
- Announced that he is running for President in 2011, even though he is barred from doing so by current electoral laws and his conviction; and (since that could at least be seen as a challenge to the status quo), has also
- Picked a fight with the Coptic Church. This one makes me wonder about the man's stability. Insofar as his Al-Ghad Party has any political base, it is as a modern offshoot of the historic Wafd, and the historic Wafd, the liberal party of the monarchical period, was often strongly supported by the Coptic elites, such as Makram ‘Ebeid. So Nour has sought to visit a church (Mari Girgis) in Alexandria. The reason is not entirely clear, but is presumably political, but he has been told by the Coptic Pope, Shenouda III, not to do so, and is fighting back (see the link). Now there are many divisions in the Coptic Church today (a subject for a future post), and Shenouda, once back in the Sadat era a critic of the regime, has become a strong supporter of Mubarak and endorsed him in 2005, and there are Coptic elite figures (and some bishops) who are quietly opposing him. Nour may win some Coptic support by attacking the Pope, but he will lose even more. This one doesn't make any sense, not for a Muslim running in a Muslim country. Don't try to play internal minority politics if you aren't part of the minority: you won't get it right, and it will almost certainly backfire.
He might do better to fight his conviction in court, try to achieve vindication, and then seek to run as President.
One reason that we are likely to see the real competition for succession to Husni Mubarak as between Gamal Mubarak and some military figure such as Omar Suleiman is simply that there doesn't seem to be a liberal democratic alternative or, for that matter, a civilian alternative within the ruling party leadership. Gamal today controls most of the National Democratic Party levers, except for a few ancient figures retained from earlier eras, but too old to contend for power. The Wafd has been, to all intents and purposes, destroyed, and was once the only opposition party with a real national base, other than the ruling National Democratic Party and the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Ghad has always been Nour's personal party, though perhaps with appeal to the old (but increasingly geriatric) Wafd base, but he is increasingly being made to look ridiculous. Of course the regime is partly responsible for that, but Nour himself is increasingly complicit. Most of the other parties, excepting always the Muslim Brotherhood, are either intellectual debating clubs, personal hobbyhorses of their leader, or remnants of pre-Revolutionary movements that never had the support that the Wafd enjoyed. The ruling party has fragmented the opposition. Nour had a moment in the sun when he could have created a real alternative, but he has become increasingly irrelevant. It's Gamal or the Army or the Brotherhood, as far as I can see, and I expect the Brotherhood will let the other two fight it out and stand in the wings as the alternative.
Monday, July 6, 2009
The Marwa al-Sherbini Case and the Outrage of the Egyptian Street
Have you heard of the Marwa al-Sherbini case? If not, it may be worth asking why not, since that's what Egyptians are asking.
Some of my readers, most of whom are presumably involved professionally or academically in Middle East affairs, may have heard of Marwa al-Sherbini, but the case has been little noted in the Western media. Sherbini was a young (32 years old) mother killed in a German court — yes, in an open courtroom during a judicial sesssion — in Dresden July 1 in front of her three-year old son. She was stabbed (18 times) in the courtroom by a xenophobic German who had previously attacked her as a "terrorist" for wearing hijab, leading her to lodge a complaint against him. He was appealing a fine when he stabbed her. Adding insult to injury, when her husband sought to protect her from her attacker, the security in the courtroom shot the husband, not the attacker. (As one person notes in one of the links, "he wasn't blond so he must be the attacker.") And to add more insult to that one, the prosecutor initially charged the attacker with manslaughter (for stabbing someone 18 times in an open courtroom?). (Now there are reports the charge will be changed to murder.)
Oh, sorry, now it appears she was also pregnant with her second child. And why, exactly, are people outraged? Oh, right. All these reasons.
It's received very little coverage in Europe or the US, and that fact as well as the crime itself has outraged the Egyptian street to a remarkable degree. Her body was met at Cairo airport; thousands reportedly turned out for her funeral in Alexandria. Everyone from the Sheikh al-Azhar on down to the most secularist bloggers are expressing concern. The Egyptian blogosphere has been awash with postings, many noting that the killing of Neda Soltan in Iran (by the government, admittedly) led to Western outrage, while the killing of a Muslim mother in a European courtroom by a man clearly motivated by hatred of Islam and Muslims, is ignored. The Egyptian reaction is pretty intense so far, and interestingly, some of the opposition forces seem particularly incensed. Though the official media is incensed as well, these kinds of popular outcries can backfire on unpopular regimes.
Here's an overall account of the case. And here are some of the blogposts so far, starting with English:
Zenobia at Egyptian Chronicles;
Hicham Maged's Blog;
Here, Bikya Misr argues that the Western media is showing its bias by ignoring the case; many have compared the coverage of Neda Soltan, the Iranian women killed by the Basij, with this case, though obviously this was not a killing by an arm of the state;
And newspaper accounts. In English:
at Al-Misri al-Yaum.
at Daily News Egypt
Blogs in Arabic:
The funeral in Alexandria at Iskanderani Misri.
Newspapers in Arabic:
The main government daily Al-Ahram;
Reactions at the website Al-Misriyun;
The opposition Al-Dustur calling her shahidat al-hijab (martyr of the hijab);
. . . and so on. This feels, at a distance, like real outrage, from bloggers conservative and leftist, and in the street. This case is going to get a great deal of attention in Egypt and probably throughout the Muslim world.
Some of my readers, most of whom are presumably involved professionally or academically in Middle East affairs, may have heard of Marwa al-Sherbini, but the case has been little noted in the Western media. Sherbini was a young (32 years old) mother killed in a German court — yes, in an open courtroom during a judicial sesssion — in Dresden July 1 in front of her three-year old son. She was stabbed (18 times) in the courtroom by a xenophobic German who had previously attacked her as a "terrorist" for wearing hijab, leading her to lodge a complaint against him. He was appealing a fine when he stabbed her. Adding insult to injury, when her husband sought to protect her from her attacker, the security in the courtroom shot the husband, not the attacker. (As one person notes in one of the links, "he wasn't blond so he must be the attacker.") And to add more insult to that one, the prosecutor initially charged the attacker with manslaughter (for stabbing someone 18 times in an open courtroom?). (Now there are reports the charge will be changed to murder.)
Oh, sorry, now it appears she was also pregnant with her second child. And why, exactly, are people outraged? Oh, right. All these reasons.
It's received very little coverage in Europe or the US, and that fact as well as the crime itself has outraged the Egyptian street to a remarkable degree. Her body was met at Cairo airport; thousands reportedly turned out for her funeral in Alexandria. Everyone from the Sheikh al-Azhar on down to the most secularist bloggers are expressing concern. The Egyptian blogosphere has been awash with postings, many noting that the killing of Neda Soltan in Iran (by the government, admittedly) led to Western outrage, while the killing of a Muslim mother in a European courtroom by a man clearly motivated by hatred of Islam and Muslims, is ignored. The Egyptian reaction is pretty intense so far, and interestingly, some of the opposition forces seem particularly incensed. Though the official media is incensed as well, these kinds of popular outcries can backfire on unpopular regimes.
Here's an overall account of the case. And here are some of the blogposts so far, starting with English:
Zenobia at Egyptian Chronicles;
Hicham Maged's Blog;
Here, Bikya Misr argues that the Western media is showing its bias by ignoring the case; many have compared the coverage of Neda Soltan, the Iranian women killed by the Basij, with this case, though obviously this was not a killing by an arm of the state;
And newspaper accounts. In English:
at Al-Misri al-Yaum.
at Daily News Egypt
Blogs in Arabic:
The funeral in Alexandria at Iskanderani Misri.
Newspapers in Arabic:
The main government daily Al-Ahram;
Reactions at the website Al-Misriyun;
The opposition Al-Dustur calling her shahidat al-hijab (martyr of the hijab);
. . . and so on. This feels, at a distance, like real outrage, from bloggers conservative and leftist, and in the street. This case is going to get a great deal of attention in Egypt and probably throughout the Muslim world.
Mauritania's Election
I won't even pretend to expertise on Mauritania. But with its rescheduled elections approaching, I will refer you to this update from Kal at The Moor Next Door, who appears to actually understand what's going on. I commend it to you.
Robert S. McNamara and the Middle East
The death of Robert S. McNamara at the age of 93 has naturally brought on the expected reflections on his role in Vietnam — the role which haunted him throughout his career — and in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Those were the critical moments for which he will be remembered, for good or ill, from his long period as Secretary of Defense under John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson.
The historian in me feels compelled to add a few footnotes, however: though it never became his central focus as first Cuba and then Vietnam did, the Middle East did intrude on McNamara's attention from time to time. It is easy to forget, because in the world we are familiar with US military support for Israel seems to have always been a feature of the landscape, but it was the Kennedy-Johnson years that marked the real beginning of the US supplying military equipment to Israel.
In the early years of the state, Israel depended heavily on French armaments, in a relationship largely built up by the then-young Shimon Peres. It was only in the Kennedy Administration that the US moved to sell Hawk surface-to-air missiles to Israel. That was the turning point, along with Charles de Gaulle's disillusionment with Israel and the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, that evolved into the close US-Israeli defense supply relationship we know today. It does not seem to have been primarly McNamara's doing — Deputy Secretary William Bundy is sometimes given credit — but the change in the defense relationship did begin under McNamara's watch at the Pentagon.
That, and the 1967 war, were the main defense concerns involving the Middle East, and they were still largely framed in Cold War terms. (The Kennedy Administration also interested itself in the Yemen Civil War for a while, but not to the extent of providing military aid.)
The historian in me feels compelled to add a few footnotes, however: though it never became his central focus as first Cuba and then Vietnam did, the Middle East did intrude on McNamara's attention from time to time. It is easy to forget, because in the world we are familiar with US military support for Israel seems to have always been a feature of the landscape, but it was the Kennedy-Johnson years that marked the real beginning of the US supplying military equipment to Israel.
In the early years of the state, Israel depended heavily on French armaments, in a relationship largely built up by the then-young Shimon Peres. It was only in the Kennedy Administration that the US moved to sell Hawk surface-to-air missiles to Israel. That was the turning point, along with Charles de Gaulle's disillusionment with Israel and the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, that evolved into the close US-Israeli defense supply relationship we know today. It does not seem to have been primarly McNamara's doing — Deputy Secretary William Bundy is sometimes given credit — but the change in the defense relationship did begin under McNamara's watch at the Pentagon.
That, and the 1967 war, were the main defense concerns involving the Middle East, and they were still largely framed in Cold War terms. (The Kennedy Administration also interested itself in the Yemen Civil War for a while, but not to the extent of providing military aid.)
Israeli Submarine Passed Through Canal
Speaking of Israel and Iran, the way this Haaretz story (Jerusalem Post version here) was reported in the Israeli press is a bit misleading. Another version here. They all tend to emphasize that though an Israeli Dolphin-class submarine joined exercises in the Gulf of Aqaba off Eilat, it will not be stationed permanently in Eilat and has returned through the Suez Canal to its Mediterranean base. The AFP report does a better job of getting at the real story: This is the first time one of the Dolphins has passed through the Suez Canal, which means it had to do so on the surface. There have been rumors that the subs have operated in Red Sea waters before, but if they did they apparently went around Africa to do so. (And there are questions about whether Israel could tend them on such a long voyage: they aren't nuclear powered, after all. Though I'll belatedly add — because someone may comment anyway — that there are (unconfirmed) rumors of Israeli military support bases in the Red Sea region.) The reason they were never sent through the canal before this, at least according to the conventional wisdom in defense circles, was that Israel did not want Egyptian or other observers getting a good look at the exterior of one of their most modern subs, the German-built Dolphins. There are rumors they carry Harpoon and perhaps Israeli ship-to-shore missiles that could carry nuclear warheads. And the Suez Canal is narrow and shallow, with three major cities along it full of people of all natonalities, so a sub passing through it is visible to the world.
So, up to now, Israel never sent its Dolphins through the Suez Canal. This time it did, presumably as a signal to Iran. That's the real story here, not the fact that the sub won't be based in Eilat: the Gulf of Aqaba is a narrow, easily closed waterway, and not where you'd want to bottle up one of your few state of the art subs, which may be your second-strike capability.
So, up to now, Israel never sent its Dolphins through the Suez Canal. This time it did, presumably as a signal to Iran. That's the real story here, not the fact that the sub won't be based in Eilat: the Gulf of Aqaba is a narrow, easily closed waterway, and not where you'd want to bottle up one of your few state of the art subs, which may be your second-strike capability.
The Biden Flap
One of the main stories over the three-day holiday weekend was the interview with Vice President Biden which has been interpreted by some in the region as a potential green light to Israel for an attack on Iran. I suspect that's not really what he was trying to say, but it would be very helpful to get this clarified. Marc Lynch posted on it yesterday, and I think he covers most of the key ground.
Biden's occasional infelicities of language are fairly well known in this country but not necessarily appreciated yet abroad. It would be good to clear this up.
Biden's occasional infelicities of language are fairly well known in this country but not necessarily appreciated yet abroad. It would be good to clear this up.
Thursday, July 2, 2009
The Wa’el ‘Abbas Detention
One last pre-fourth note. I hadn't said anything yesterday about the much-reported detention at Cairo airport of blogger/dissident Wa’el ‘Abbas; he was returning from a conference in Europe when security took his passport, held him at the airport for several hours, and in the end seized his laptop. Needless to say, he twittered his detention. Background here and here and the actual tweets here. But more importantly, his website now has a huge collection of links on global coverage of his detention. Most of the links are in English and Arabic, and it's another reminder of how computer-savvy, social-networked dissidents can draw attention to government pressures against them. Of course when a regime really wants to crack down, it can do what Iran has done and sit very hard on all communication, but as I said the other day, that also entails a certain amount of negative attention and cuts you off from a global information network, and in this case whoever decided to do this — whether it was actually State Security or whether it was overzealous airport security officials — not only did it receive a lot of bad publicity, but now you can find links to all of it at his blog, which is primarily in Arabic but includes lots of videos, photos and other material and which I've had in my blogroll since its early days. [UPDATED: In one of those snakes-swallowing-its-own-tail things, his collection of links now links back to this blog, which refers you to his collection of links.]
Reading for a Long Weekend
Since the Fourth of July falls on Saturday this year, the Federal Government is taking Friday as the holiday, and MEI, like most Washington institutions, observes Federal holidays. (Actually today, July 2, marks the date the Continental Congress actually cast the vote for independence, anyway.) Barring the outbreak of war (or peace) I'll be taking family time, so I'm providing my usual end-of-week wrapup a day early.
- Recently from MEI: a podcast of the event "A View from the Front Lines: the Condition of Pakistan's Internally Displaced," with Dr. Nasim Ashraf, head of MEI's new Center for Pakistan Studies. (Clicking on the first link will start the podcast.)
- Another MEI podcast: "After the Fire: The United States and Iraq," with John A. Nagl of the Center for a New American Security. Again, clicking the link will start the podcast. (I include this each time since if you're in an office you may not want your speakers to start blaring.)
- The sense that things are returning to normal in Tehran, that the revolutionary moment has passed, seems widespread. Juan Cole had an interesting commentary from an anonymous friend in Tehran yesterday that deserves your time.
- From the Institute for the Study of War, a new report, "Balancing Maliki: Shifting Coalitions in Iraqi Politics and the Rise of the Iraqi Parliament." Executive Summary is here; the full text of the report is here (PDF).
- Operation Khanjar, the big Marine Corps push in the Helmand Valley, is being called the biggest Marine combat operation since Vietnam (though others say the biggest since Falluja; I'm quoting the Marines here; it's also the first major operation since counterinsurgency expert Gen. Stanley McChrystal took command. Counterinsurgency blogger Abu Muqawama (Andrew Exum) has some early thoughts; also, as an Editor I have a comment for the press release writers at CENTCOM: you guys named the operation; so try not to misspell it in your own press releases.
- Laura Rozen at Foreign Policy offers some gossip on possible appointments at State once Jeffrey Feltman is confirmed.
More on Syrian-Saudi Rapprochement
A good piece in the Daily Star on the much-speculated-upon Syrian-Saudi rapprochement and forthcoming summit. I've noted previously that the growing friendliness between the US, Syria, and Saudi Arabia has made things easier for Sa‘d Hariri in Lebanon; a Syrian-Saudi cooperation could have positive repercussions in a lot of inter-Arab rivalries, if it can be pulled off.
Ahmadinejad Cancels Libya Trip
An awkward situation has been defused since Mahmud Ahmadinejad has cancelled his planned trip to the African Union summit in Libya. Qadhafi had apparently invited the Iranian leader without consulting the other African leaders, which made for considerable awkwardness and threatened to wreck the conference. Ahmadinejad has apparently cancelled the trip; he's looking for endorsements, not tension.
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