Algerian Revolution Day: 55 Years On

I let this one get by me. Yesterday, November 1, was Algerian Revolution Day, and this year marked 55 years since the outbreak on the Toussaint rouge (bloody All Saints' Day) on November 1, 1954.

The Algerian war of 1954 to 1962 was one of the most dramatic episodes of the entire decolonization struggle in the colonial world. France considered Algeria as an integral part of France, though Algeria's Muslims were never really integrated into the colonial society.

Not only did the war mark the birth throes of the Algerian state, but it also transformed France, bringing down the Fourth Republic and bringing in Charles de Gaulle and the Fifth Republic. Seen by many of the pieds noirs as their champion in the beginning, they soon learned that de Gaulle had a bigger vision, and the Secret Army Organization (OAS) soon was targeting de Gaulle, who, however, ultimately guided the process towards the establishment of an independent Algeria.

The newly independent Morocco and Tunisia, as well as Nasser's Egypt, were all involved in providing external support of the revolutionary movement. Algeria's revolution was bloody and tore French society almost as deeply as Algerian; when it comes to "revolutions" in the Middle East, it is a real one, not just a military coup masquerading as a revolution. Fifty-five years on, Algerian independence seems an inevitability of history, but many French and pieds noirs settlers fought hard to prevent it.

Karzai: Elected. Now What?

After Dr. ‘Abdullah pulled out of the second round in Afghanistan, the election has been canceled and Karzai declared elected. The second round was supposed to increase perceptions of legitimacy. Now what?

Certainly the timing is awkward. The US Administration has been saying it will make a decision on the McChrystal request after the second round. Now, we have Karzai without the second round. Perhaps there's some sort of coalition deal in the wings, or Karzai will somehow reach out to ‘Abdullah, but this will not strengthen the hand of those who want to give McChrystal what he wants.

I, for one, would not like to be in the President's shoes. Afghanistan is playing out badly, and few of the options are attractive.

Saudi Arms Cache

Saudi Arabia has announced discovery of an arms cache following interrogation of 44 alleged Al-Qa‘ida cell members arrested previously: 281 Kalashnikovs, 250 magazines and 55 boxes of ammunition. All found in a rest house on the outskirts of Riyadh.

Shameless Book Plug

A new Handbook on US-Middle East Relations from Routledge, edited by Robert Looney. If you check the link you'll note that chapter 22, on Egypt-US relations, is by, well, me. So this is just a shameless self-plug.

I had no idea the cover price would be so high. (Wasn't reflected in the honorarium. I guess they figure they make up for it by giving me a copy of the book.) (But then I shouldn't talk. The Middle East Journal doesn't pay for articles at all.) So this is mostly for libraries I suppose, rather than the average blog reader (whoever you are). And they're shrewd enough to put a link on their website for recommending it to your library. But it does seem pretty comprehensive (36 rather substantive chapters) and a lot of good people are represented. I haven't had time to read the other chapters, but was impressed by the table of contents when I first saw it earlier in the project. Bob Looney put together a pretty good team, I think. (No personal bias involved, of course.)

So excuse the self-promotion. Heck, I've been so busy with editing and blogging and family, I haven't published much of my own in the last few years, so I figured I'd note it when I did.

Amin Huwaydi, 1921-2009

Having established a certain track record in noting the passing of security men and spooks such as Nabawi Isma‘il and Meir Amit, I guess I really should note the passing (on halloween) of former Egyptian Mukhabarat chief and Defense Minister Amin Huwaydi. Here's the BBC Arabic report. Here's his bio in Arabic Wikipedia. Not much has shown up in the English media, at least so far.

That's probably because his role on the Egyptian stage (or at least center stage) was a brief one. Though an early supporter of Nasser's Revoluti0n, it was really only after the 1967 War that he had his moment of fame, and that ended when he split with Anwar Sadat in 1971.

As the obits note (I'll link to an English one if I can find one, but haven't yet), he was the only man to serve simultaneously as head of General Intelligence and Minister of War (as the Defense Ministry was then called). He had been deputy director of the Mukhabarat and took it over after the war. Later, after Vice President ‘Abd al-Hakim ‘Amr's suicide in the wake of the war (or "suicide" if you're a skeptic) and the firing of War Minister Shams Badran, there was considerable reshuffling of the high command, and he took over the War Ministry as well, at least for a short time. (His War Ministry doesn't even seem to be listed on the present Ministry of Defense Website.)

He ran the Mukhabarat during the War of Attrition in 1967-70. That period seems remote now, and Huwaydi was among those linked to the ‘Ali Sabri group, who clashed with Anwar Sadat and were generally ousted/resigned in the May 15, 1971 events that Sadat liked to call the "Corrective Revolution" and others see as Sadat's purging of the old Nasserists. By that time he was Minister of State.

Why To Hate Mondays

Most of us aren't great fans of Mondays, back to work after a weekend and all that, but this one seems to be full of grim news:

• The Lebanese Cabinet seems unachievable again, only days after a flurry of optimism
  

• Secretary of State Clinton's Middle East tour has ended with the Palestinians accusing the US of caving on Israeli settlements, which is not exactly a step forward.

Not the best way to start the week.

Don't Miss This

Don't miss Qifa Nabki's halloween posting.

I knew Walid Jumblatt reminded me of someone.

Web Addresses in Non-Latin Scripts

ICANN, the international body overseeing Internet web domains, has approved web addresses in non-Latin alphabets for the first time. An Arab News editorial here; Haaretz on the subject here.

Good. Most of the world writes in non-Latin scripts; it shows that the Internet Revolution really is spreading to everyone.

Happy Halloween.

Not Quite Yet: Lebanon Avoids Threat of Having A Government Yet Again

Okay, the last couple of days' scare that a government might break out in Lebanon seems to have been at least temporarily alleviated. Pretty much all commentators from all sectarian and ethnic backgrounds now seem to agree that the outside powers are all OK on a new government, but it looks like the Christian communities are still bickering. And Sa‘d Hariri isn't ready to say when the government will happen.

So, to steal Qifa Nabki's great headline, the impending anticlimax is still looming, but appears likely to loom a while longer.

On that note, enjoy the weekend.

"Arabinglizia"

For those who read (at least a little) Arabic, this is a bit of a diversion. About how the CNN Arabivc logo manages to combine the two alphabets (the dots under the CNN fill out the "Arabiyya" that starts on the right, for those who don't read Arabic...) And some other discussion. Another little linguistic aside, since I may be scarce this afternoon: have to chaperon a fourth grade halloween party.

Prayer is Better than Sleep

An interesting piece in The Jerusalem Post on Jewish complaints in parts of Jerusalem about the morning call to prayer from mosque speakers nearby. The complainers are from Pisgat Ze'ev and "other Jerusalem residents from Mount Scopus to Gilo."

Okay. Well, anyone who has ever lived near a mosque, stayed in a hotel near a mosque, etc., expects to hear the Fajr call to prayer before dawn. It's the one call to prayer that adds the additional line Al-Salat khayr min al-nawm, "Prayer is better than sleep." It's supposed to wake you up.

Now about the complaints, or I guess kvetching would be an appropriate Yiddish term. Pisgat Ze'ev is east of the Green Line, next to the suburb of Shu‘afat, and the big Shu‘afat refugee camp, not to mention the Separation Barrier. Mount Scopus, though it was technically part of Israel from 1948 to 1967, is surrounded by Arab suburbs. And Gilo is south of the Green Line, just above the West Bank towns of Bayt Jala and Bethlehem. In other words, most of these neighborhoods are in territory considered, by most of the world, "settlements" beyond the Green Line, or (in the case of Mount Scopus), surrounded by West Bank territory in the eyes of the world.

Well, you know, if you choose to live beyond the Green Line for ideological or even financial reasons you might just have Arab neighbors, and their mosques must might have loudspeakers. And they were there first.

The azan doesn't last that long. Go back to sleep when it's over. I was particularly struck by this quote:

"It's like we're living under their rule," Raz said, adding that the Shuafat refugee camp affected her the most. "It's the area that's closest to my home," she said. "And they just don't care."

Why should they? They're in a refugee camp. What a revealing comment. You chose to live beyond the Green Line. Live with it.

Lebanon: Something May Actually Happen Soon

There is an impending sense of government possibly breaking out soon in Lebanon. It's by no means certain. Even Hizbullah is optimistic! Though their reports that General ‘Aoun (who, having lost the most in the elections, is demanding the most non-negotiable terms) has agreed to concessions would seem to be a bit premature.

King ‘Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and Bashar al-Asad of Syria having met now, Lebanon can actually hope to form a government soon.

The Lebanese/Harvard blogger Qifa Nabki has, as he often does, come up with a nicely snarky inroduction to his post on the subject:

Like farm animals before an earthquake, the Lebanese daily newspapers are beginning to shift anxiously ahead of what they now believe to be, yes… I think we can confirm… yes, uh huh, there’s absolutely no question this time… it’s gonna… it’s, it’s… oh my God… it’s happening!

THE GOVERNMENT IS COMING, THE GOVERNMENT IS COMING!

Or so they say.

Al-Akhbar predictably claims that America’s evil Vice-Regent (Jeffrey Feltman) has given the green light, while Naharnet predictably claims that Syria’s evil Vice-Regent (Bashar al-Assad) has given the green light. Michel Aoun, in the meantime, is insisting that the light remains decidedly orange.

I also like his title: "Impending Anticlimax Looming?"

Wish I'd said that.

Saudi Crown Prince to Return to Kingdom

Saudi Crown Prince and Defense Minister Prince Sultan, who has been staying in his palace in Agadir, Morocco recovering from surgery in the US, will return to the Kingdom within the next two months, according to his son and Deputy Defense Minister for Military Affairs Prince Khalid bin Sultan, as reported in tomorrow morning's Saudi press. (That link is actually to a Kuwaiti paper quoting the Saudi media.) (Here's a Saudi link.)

He's been out of the Kingdom for much of the year, first for the surgery and then for his long recovery in Agadir, and there have been a number of rumors suggesting his condition was grave at one point, but in recent months the Saudis have been publicizing his receiving visitors. (The Saudis are discreet about his ailment but most rumors have been either stomach or intestinal cancer.) Now, according to Prince Khalid (who was the Saudi general commanding Arab forces in Desert Storm, among many other things), he will be returning "in the coming weeks." Khalid is his eldest son. (The other well-known son is Prince Bandar, who long served as Ambassador to the US.)

Court Rules Kuwaiti Female MPs Not Required to Wear Hijab

Kuwait's constitutional court has dismissed a complaint aimed at forcing female Parliamentarians to wear the headscarf (hijab). The complaint, brought by a "voter," argued that two of the four female MPs do not wear the hijab and therefore were not qualified to sit in Parliament.

The same court last week ruled that Kuwaiti women do not need permission of a male husband or guardian to obtain a passport. It would appear that the Kuwaiti constitutional court is a friend to women's rights.

Has Yemen Really Captured an Iranian Ship Taking Arms to the Houthis?

For some time now, the Yemeni government has been charging that Iran is supporting the Houthi rebels in northern Yemen; Saudi Arabia and Yemen, normally at daggers drawn over many issues, have seemed to have found some common ground in their concern about foreign support for the Houthis, amid reports of Houthi clashes directly with Saudi troops in the border area.

Over the past couple of days, Yemen has announced the seizure of an Iranian ship in Yemeni waters, reputedly carrying arms to the Houthis. Another account here.

I have no idea if this is substantiated — Iran is denying it — but if the Yemenis have actual evidence this could have some interesting repercussions. I've already noted the tendency of some in the Sunni Arab world to portray the Yemeni conflict as a Sunni-Shi‘i one, even though Zaydis have little in common with Iran's "twelver" Shi‘ites other than both being nominally Shi‘ite, and the fact that Yemeni President Salih, who's leading the fight against the Houthis, is himself a Zaydi. But if Iran really is supporting the Houthis — up to now I've been skeptical of those charges — this could actually push the Saudis and the Yemeni government into some kind of cooperation. The purported border clashes suggest that the hammer of the Yemeni government offensive is pushing the Houthis up against the anvil of the Saudi border. Proof of Iranian involvement could drive the two traditionally rival governments much closer together. This really bears watching.

Some Recent MEI Podcasts

A few of the latest podcasts at the MEI website, as always with the note that the podcast starts when you click on the link, so earphones out if you're in a group office:

• Asher Kaufman of Notre Dame, speaking October 27 on the Ghajar issue on the Israel/Syria/Lebanon border; his presentation derives from an article in the most recent issue of MEJ, which can be purchased (or read by subscribers) here;

• Bruce K. Rutherford, "Egypt After Mubarak: Challenges and Opportunities in Egyptian Politics," Presentation given October 22;

• Saudi Sociologist Mona AlMunajjed, "Saudi Women Today," presentation on October 20.
  

Heikal on the Presidency of Egypt

Someday I'm going to do a big, cathartic post on Mohammed Hassanein Heikal. I've never met the man (though, oddly enough, I've met his brother), and he is always described as a confidant of Nasser, which he was or, in my personal theory, was led to believe he was. (Though he was presumably the ghost writer of The Philosophy of the Revolution, I think Nasser gave him only the information — or disinformation — he wanted him to see, and sometimes made stuff up.) I've known many people who were in meetings with Nasser, Sadat, etc., personally, who profoundly dispute Heikal's version of events, which are usually second hand. My anecdotes go back to John Badeau, Ambassador to Egypt under JFK, and come down to relatively recent times. But that's a diatribe for another day.

The point is, Heikal has become a darling of Gulf media, and has been revealing online over the past few years many documents that Egypt thinks the state, and not Heikal, ought to own. At 86 years old, Heikal is not necessarily at the peak of his powers. But his 15 minutes of fame is approaching half a century.

Anyway, until I have time to write more on Heikal, I must at least note his recent outpourings on the Egyptian Presidency. In an interview with Al-Masry al-Youm, he rejected Gamal Mubarak as a candidate for the Presidency and instead suggested creation of a council of state to write a new constiution. It would include key Egyptians such as ‘Amr Moussa, &Omar Suleiman, and Muhammad ElBaradei, because they would not themselves be seeking office. (In other words, he just wrote off the alternative candidates as well.) It's prompted a fair amount of debate and commetary.

The interview was in two parts, for those who read Arabic. Here's Part One and here's Part Two. And the Al-Masry al-Youm website has lots of commentary on the subject: see these search results. For those who don't read Arabic, this account in Haaretz summarizes the story. Al-Masry al-Youm's English language website does not seem to have posted anything.

Clearly Heikal is, on the one hand, making a proposal that has little chance of actually occurring, but on the other, rejecting Gamal and seeking to co-opt the other potential candidates by kicking them upstairs to a council of state. Even at 86, he still fancies himself a player in Egyptian politifcs: not as a candidate of course, but as a Kingmaker.

Since Heikal still enjoys a high reputation in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world (despite my reservations noted above), I thought I should at least take note of this story.

Egyptian Transportation Minister Resigns Due to Train Wreck

Ministerial responsibility is a concept accepted in theory in most of the Middle East, but only rarely experienced in practice. We have one of the exceptions: the Egyptian Minister of Transportation has resigned over a train wreck that (officially, so far) killed 18 and injured 36. Another account here. (But the Egyptian rumor mill puts the death toll as high as 150! Though the coffeehouse gossip is not necessarily any more reliable — or necessarily any less — than the official account, something somewhere in between may prove to be true.) Apparently (the reports are a bit vague) the resignation has been accepted.

It was one of those Egyptian train wrecks that happen more often than they should: train one stops due to a water buffalo (gamusa) on the tracks; train two hits it from behind.

The Minister says he's responsible but won't resign. When Gamal Mubarak does a public discussion online, he says nothing about it, and he gets criticized for it. (He's not figured out how to campaign like a real politician, but then he doesn't have to.) Something then pushes the Minister to resign.

Apparently Minister Mansur is indeed out, but there's a bit of chaos at the Ministry since Ministers don't usually resign precipitously in Egypt.

Apparently there's an online joke rolling around Egyptian websites that this is the first time a gamusa (water buffalo) brought down a wazir (Minister). I'll try to find a link.

As the Al-Masry al-Youm link I linked to above notes, Mansur was, before becoming a Minister, head of the Mansour Group, a company with a billion-dollar turnover and, surprise, surprise, Mansur has close links with another youngish Egyptian entrepreneur, one Gamal Mubarak. I'm sure he's one of those who know him well enough to call him "Jimmy," as his friends do, and I suspect, that the fact that the National Democratic Party , the ruling party, starts its Annual Conference at the end of the week means it's not a good time to have a tragedy, especially one that generates criticism of Gamal for his silence, or his closeness to the Minister. Maybe that's why he first said he wouldn't resign, then did.

Usually ministers in Egypt who need to be scapegoated are fired; this one resigned. Could the closeness to Gamal have something to do with it? And the criticism of Gamal for having an online/televised dialogue (which I didn't blog about) a few days ago and not even mentioning the train wreck have influenced the outcome?

Or did the Gamal train just hit a gamusa on the tracks? This is interesting.

‘Abbas Threatens Not to Run if No Settlement Freeze?

This is one of those "Huh?" developments: Fatah has said it plans to hold elections in January whether Hamas agrees or not, and now here's a report that Mahmoud ‘Abbas told President Obama that he will not run for President if Israel doesn't agree to a settlement freeze. I have no idea if this article has any basis in fact: it's hard to see why Fatah would 1) insist on elections and then 2) change horses in the middle of the stream. Who would they run instead? Marwan Barghouti is the only name that comes to mind and he's still in an Israeli jail, unless one thinks Muhammad Dahlan or someone similar has a good claim to leadershp. If ‘Abbas actually said this to Obama I think it was a bluff; if he means it, it makes little tactical sense at all.

But when this story started to take on life yesterday, Marc Lynch posted his own views on the matter, (which has multiple links to other versions) and what he says deserves consideration: if it does happen it could lead to a renewal of Fatah and a revitalization of Palestinian leadership, perhaps even an end to the West Bank/Gaza division.

Okay, that's the best-case scenario. Worst-case scenario? Fatah shoots itself down in flames; Hamas gains in the West Bank; Fatah falls into internecine rivalries.

I'm not great admirer of Mahmoud ‘Abbas, but I don't have a say in choosing the Palestinian leadership. But a major meltdown combined with elections would make a bad situation worse. Maybe in the long run we would see improved leadership, and maybe (given the present Israeli position) the long run is all we have to hope for, but imperfect as he is, it's not a good time to step aside, in my instinctive reaction.

The Syrian Embassy vs. National Geographic

Over at Josh Landis' Syria Comment, the go-to blog for all things Syrian, there's a rather interesting response by Syrian Ambassador to the US ‘Imad Moustapha to an article on Syria in the November issue of National Geographic. Generally I don't find National Geographic all that tendentious in their reporting, but not usually guilty of hatchet jobs.

After reading both the article and the Ambassador's response (the two links aboce), I have mixed emotions. I havcn't been in Syria in so long that I'm in no position to discuss the Syria of Bashar al-Asad, but it strikes me that some aspects of the article (especially the title, "Shadowland") may be overly loaded, and that the article shifts about halfway through from moderately positive to generally negative. On the other hand, while I take many of the Ambassador's points, some seem a little overdrawn, such as his defense of the proper behavior in Syrian police stations. (Not that Syria is much different then other Middle Eastern countries on that score. I would not want to be taken in to a police station anywhere: the Arab world, Israel, Turkey or Iran all included.)

Mostly, though, I thought it was an interesting exchange; the Ambassador's coming to his country's defense is predictable, but a fight between an Embassy and National Geographic is more unusual. Those who know Syria should read both and judge for themselves.

Aluf Benn on the Questions over Gaza

Amid all the arguments on the Goldstone Report, the furor many Israelis have towards the whole idea of questioning the Gaza campaign, etc., it's always nice to be reminded that not all Israelis are totally on board: Haaretz' Aluf Benn today asks some key questions about the war in Gaza, and why it occurred.

Video of the World Record Hummus

I don't plan to draw out the hummus discussion from yesterday ad nauseam, but it would seem appropriate to show the video (YouTube clip from Lebanon's OTV, in Arabic but the big bowl of hummus needs no translation):

MEI 63rd Annual Conference Update

The 63rd Middle East Institute Annual Conference is scheduled for November 9 (Banquet) and 10 (Conference). I urge everybody around DC to consider it. The registration page is here, and "the program is here. There are always last-minute changes when you're dealing with VIP presenters, so keep checking those sites. We flipped Banquet Speakers in the last few days. Why do some key Middle East policy people sometimes find they have to cancel banquet speeches to, oh, I don't know, prevent war (or wage it) or something?

If you're near DC you really ought to be there. Hey, though the money doesn't immediately go to this blog (well, not only not immediately, but ever), helping MEI keeps this blog and all our other stuff going. But hey, it's always a good show.

Gary Sick: "How I Got Dragged Into an Iranian Show Trial"

Gary Sick, Professor at Columbia, an old friend, and a member of the Board of Advisory Editors of The Middle East Journal, was a pioneer of online Middle East discussion with his Gulf 2000 mailing list (which he's asked me not to mention too much as he doesn't want a lot of requests for membership; it's by invitation so please respect that: I mention it here because it's central to the subject matter), and he blogs intermittently. Here's his post on how he got dragged into an Iranian show trial. He's being accused of having worked for the CIA and knowing the defendant. As he notes, he's met several times with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, but so far the President hasn't been charged. Here are the key excerpts, but read it all at the link:

Last week, an Iranian-American colleague of mine, Kian Tajbaksh, was sentenced in Tehran to 15 years in prison. The indictment included the charges that (1) he was in contact with me; (2) that he was part of the Gulf/2000 network that I manage; and (3) that I am an agent of the CIA.

Normally, I simply ignore silly accusations such as this. They are nothing new. On one hand, it has been intimated that I must be under the influence of Iranian intelligence (by prominent neoconservatives who believe that my views on Iran’s political development and especially its nuclear program are not sufficiently alarmist). I have also been accused (by such worthies as Hossein Shariatmadari, the ultra-radical editor of Iran’s Kayhan newspaper, who is also a representative of the supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei) of being a CIA agent. I regard these insinuations as badges of honor, since they merely confirm that I do not subscribe to the ideological extremes of either of these groups. I have always felt that my reputation could speak for itself and required no public defense.

However, this time the accusations are really not about me but about a friend and colleague. Moreover, they are not just newspaper hyperbole by people who have an ax to grind and whose desire to make a political point exceeds their respect for the truth. These assertions are a matter of law—an official indictment by the judicial authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

It is often said that it is impossible to prove a negative. How do I prove that I am NOT an agent of the CIA? How do I prove that the Gulf/2000 Internet project is NOT engaged in overthrowing governments? How do I prove that Kian—a friend and a colleague—was NOT trying to lead a “velvet revolution” against the Islamic Republic of Iran?

Let me simply reverse the questions. I spent 24 years in the U.S. Navy—my only connection with the U.S. government. The Navy sponsored my education at the University of Kansas. It took me to the Persian Gulf for my first exposure to the region that has become my professional specialization. It sponsored my graduate work for a Ph.D. degree at Columbia University. And it paid my salary while I was on the National Security Council staff at the time of the Iranian revolution and the hostage crisis. I never received a paycheck from any other agency of the U.S. government. Do the prosecutors in Iran have evidence to the contrary? If so, please let me know.

There are a number of commentators on Iran, such as Reuel Gerecht, Graham Fuller, and Bruce Riedel, who indeed worked for the CIA. Although their political views disagree sharply, they always identify themselves as former CIA employees. I do not identify myself that way for the very simple reason that I never worked for the CIA.

The prosecutors charge that Kian was in touch with me. Right. We were both academics in New York, and we saw each other from time to time. However, I have gone back over the past 20 years with that in mind, and I am struck by something quite different. Over that period of time, I have known every Iranian ambassador to the United Nations and many members of the staff of the Iranian U.N. mission. I have spent much more time with them than with Kian.

More important, I have been in meetings with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on four different occasions over the past three years. I have spent at least nine hours with him, much more than I ever spent with Kian. In my last meeting with Mr. Ahmadinejad, I told him that if he were simply a lowly academic, instead of the president of Iran, he would be subject to arrest upon his return to Iran for meeting with the roomful of U.S. academics and think tank representatives that he had assembled at his hotel. He scoffed at the idea. Now one of my colleagues, a lowly Iranian-American professor who was about to take up a position at my university, is being condemned to 15 years in prison because, among other things, he had contact with me.

Iranian security officials are notably lacking in any sense of irony or humor. But I do wonder whether President Ahmadinejad is being considered for indictment because of his extensive contacts with me over the past four years.

This compels me to tell a story. (Doesn't everything? I'm Irish.) Back in 2007 we held a joint conference with the Library of Congress on the 60th Anniversary of The Middle East Journal.

One of the first questions asked was introduced by a statement that many people think we're funded by the CIA. We aren't. I made my usual comment that I wasn't paid nearly enough to be working for the CIA. But then we handed out the latest issue of the Journal, our 60th Anniversary issue (Winter 2007), in which the lead article was by Tom Lippman on a 1947 CIA National Estimate on Palestine. Then veteran MEJ Editor Richard Parker (1980-86, one issue in 1995), handed out a xerox of an early article in the Journal by Kermit Roosevelt (who was, of course, with the Agency). So much for denial. The fact is if you work in DC you cross paths with lots of people. I know at least as many Arab diplomats as I do folks in the intelligence agencies, but no one accuses me of being an Arab ... oh, wait, yes sometimes they do. Having worked as both an academic and a journalist, I would have a bit of a problem with a security clearance. Have I ever associated with anyone on the terrorism list? Well, if interviews count, yeah.

Obviously we all know this guilt-by-association stuff. Gary was career Navy and worked for the National Security Council but he's never been CIA. (How do I know? Well, I guess I don't. How do I know you're not an agent?) (Actually, I hope some of you are. They should be reading me.)

Enough side comments. Gary's concerns are real. An Iranian-American scholar is facing 15 years in prison for — well, something to do with the election protests and knowing Gary Sick, it sounds like. Middle Eastern scholars should be free to meet and talk with Western scholars, even those who've worked for the government.

Do read Gary's post.

Food Fight: Guinness Hummus, Tabbouleh Records Broken

I haven't gotten into the food fight over who owns hummus yet, with Lebanon incensed that it is sometimes portrayed as an Israeli dish, but I'm glad to see that one side effect of the debate is that the Guinness record for hummus and tabbouleh has been broken in Beirut. Of course, Hizbullah is being all triumphalist about it, but maybe with a trace of previously undiscovered humor.
Oh let's just settle this: who makes the best hummus? I do.

Now, if you want a real debate, where did baklava come from? That fight not only brings in the Arabs and Israelis, but Greeks, Turks and Armenians too. You can't get much more intense than that.

UPDATE: Okay, I can be funny, but Qifa Nabki wins the round: Israel Unveils Plan for Massive Hummus-Themed Resort. I know when I'm in the presence of a pro. Try this:

Mr. Cohen said that there were also plans to incorporate other “ancient Israeli dishes like zaatar, couscous, shawarma, and falafel” into the park’s attractions. One ride that is currently under development, Falafel Mountain, would send thrill-seekers on an eight-minute roller-coaster ride, tunneling inside a giant falafel the size of a football stadium.

“All the materials would be organic and edible, which are obviously not suitable for building,” admits Mr. Cohen. “But we are confident that a new breakthrough technology developed by an Israeli company will enable us to turn the falafel mix into a kind of durable cement,” he said, adding quickly, “It would still be edible, though.”

The project is sure to inflame Lebanese-Israeli tensions, not least because of the location of the site chosen for Hummus Land: the Shebaa Farms, a disputed twelve-mile strip on the border of the two countries.

“Israel is a crowded country,” said Mr. Cohen. “There is no room for a project on this scale. So why not make use of Shebaa? It’s not like we’re ever going to give it back to the Lebanese, the poor bastards.”

If only we could turn the entire Middle East conflict into a food fight . . .

Website for J Street Conference

The much-publicized first Conference of the dovish Jewish lobby J Street (which drew even more attenion when Israeli Ambassador Michael Oren declined to attend) is receiving live multimedia coverage at this website. It continues through tomorrow.

Ayman Nour "Attacked" in Hurghada

Egyptian opposition figure Ayman Nour's troubles with the authorities continue. Over the weekend he was allegedly attacked by security forces and National Democratic Party operatives in the Red Sea resort town of Hurghada. The linked report says he was at a restaurant with an American filmmaker, and the US may have intervened to free him.

Now that he's made himself the spokesman of the Stop Gamal movement, he'll be even more of as lightning rod drawing attention from the authorities.

Ben ‘Ali Squeaks Through

Sorry I didn't stay up late blogging the returns from the Tunisian Presidential election, but the suspense (?) is over, and Ben ‘Ali has won another term with a mere 89.62% of the vote.

Perhaps they realized that 97% to 99% is just a bit hard to believe.

Bourguiba simply had himself made President for Life, saving the expense and trouble of actually running.

A Dangerous Weekend

Well, it was a deadly weekend. Sunday saw the worst bombings in Baghdad this year, destroying key ministries and leaving at least 160 dead and over 500 wounded. As elections approach, renewed violence may be predictable, but unwelcome. The tendency to declare Iraq pacified and stable may have been a bit premature.

Meanwhile, weekend clashes on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem, while less bloody, are a worrisome escalation of tensions in the Holy City. Rumors seem to have sparked Muslim protests, but the growing tensions are real; the most intransigent elements on both sides — the settler movement and hard-core Islamists — are spoiling for a showdown. Not good.

Another MEI Video: Turkish Foreign Policy

Video is now up on YouTube of an MEI Turkish Studies Center Event on "Turkish Foreign Policy Between Ideology and Realpolitik," with Dr. Ibrahim Kalin, Advisor to PM Erdogan, held on October 9:



Clip is the first of eight parts. The others can be reached through it.