Al Arabiya: Preacher Says Angel Gabriel at Morsi Rally

I shouldn't even cite this, having recently called out Al Jazeera for bias, since its rival Al Arabiya tends to be as biased, but with an anti-Brotherhood tilt. But I can't resist. Al Arabiya has a headline: "Divine intervention? Angel Gabriel ‘spotted’ at pro-Mursi protest." The story doesn't fully live up to the headline as it involves someone having a vision:

Protesters in Cairo’s Rabia al-Adawiya Square believe they have seen the light.
In a show of support for Egypt’s ousted president Mohammed Mursi, a preacher giving a sermon at the Square this week told the crowds of a miracle.

In the speech, broadcast on Egyptian satellite channels, the preacher said the Angel Gabriel had been spotted among the crowds at the pro-Mursi Square.

Sheikh Ahmad Abdel Hadi, a Muslim Brotherhood preacher, addressed protestors saying: “Some good men in Madina Al-Munawara (in Saudi Arabia) told me of a vision in which Gabriel entered Rabia al-Adawiya’s mosque to keep people praying stationed in their positions.”

He added that there was another vision in which there was a gathering attended by Prophet Mohammed, Mursi and others. In the vision, when it was time for prayers, the people asked the prophet to head the prayers, but the propher asked Mursi to lead instead.

Nabil Fahmy Accepts the Egyptian Foreign Ministry

Nabil Fahmy (AUC)

After a week of rumors that he was a likely candidate, Nabil Fahmy has reportedly accepted the post of Foreign Minister in Egypt's interim Cabinet, as Prime Minister Hazem al-Beblawi continues to assemble his government.

Fahmy is a familiar face here in Washington, where he served as Egypt's Ambassador from 1999 to 2008; he has also served in Tokyo and at the United Nations, and since retiring has been the Founding Dean of the School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at AUC.

Fahmy's appointment suggests the interim government is determined to shore up relations with the United States, which he knows well, but also that it is seeking prominent and respected figures who will emphasize the civilian character of the transitional government.

As a historical note, Fahmy becomes a second-generation Foreign Minister; his father, Ismail Fahmy, served as Anwar Sadat's Foreign Minister between the 1973 war and the 1977 visit to Jerusalem.

Ismail Fahny (left) with Nixon and Kissinger

Al Jazeera's Nonstory on US Aid for Morsi Opponents

Al Jazeera, long known for its straightforward reporting, has come under increasing fire for its undisguised support for Muhammad Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, reflecting the views of its Qatari owners. For the most part the tendency has been most pronounced in Al Jazeera Arabic and their Misr Live channel from Egypt, and less so in Al Jazeera English. But this strange "exclusive" story is bizarre, "Exclusive: US bankrolled anti-Morsi activists: Documents reveal US money trail to Egyptian groups that pressed for president's removal."

It's already well-established that Egyptian secularists and liberals believe the US backed Morsi and helped support the Brotherhood; now we're being blamed for his overthrow as well?

Indeed, the US supports a number of organizations that promote democratization:Washington's democracy assistance programme for the Middle East is filtered through a pyramid of agencies within the State Department. Hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars is channeled through the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL), The Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), USAID, as well as the Washington-based, quasi-governmental organisation the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).

In turn, those groups re-route money to other organisations such as the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and Freedom House, among others. Federal documents show these groups have sent funds to certain organisations in Egypt, mostly run by senior members of anti-Morsi political parties who double as NGO activists.

In fact, as anyone familiar with these organizations should know (and could determine with a few calls), they generally maintain links with a broad range of political parties. Secularists have attacked some of them for their links to the Brotherhood, buy they, like the Embassy, maintain relationships with parties across the spectrum.  This is just as great an oversimplification as the charge that the US Embassy supported and propped up the Brotherhood, or that Ambassador Patterson was personally some sort of enabler of Morsi.

The lesson may be that if you try to keep lines open to all sides, all sides will end up blaming you. But Al Jazeera used to be above such blatantly slanted reporting, and they deserve to be called out on this.

The Egyptian Army in Politics, I: The ‘Urabi Revolt of 1881-1882

‘Urabi and the Army

Whether you choose to call what happened in Egypt a coup, a revolution, or something else, it hardly represents a unique case. Even if we leave out the nearly six centuries, first under the Mamluk Sultans and later under the Ottomans, when the Mamluk military establishent effectively dominated Egypt, the Egyptian Army has played a direct  political role in 1881, 1952, 2011 and this year. While it can be argued that the military really ruled from 1952 to the handover to Muhammad Morsi last summer, it occasionally stepped in more directly, as in the food riots of 1977, the police conscript uprising of 1986, or the Luxor tourist attack of 1997. Though the Army's prominent role primarily dates from 1952, a review of the history of th Army in politics really must begin with the ‘Urabi Revolt of 1881-1882.

Colonel Ahmad ‘Urabi Pasha

I recently wrote about Suleiman Pasha and the Midan and street named for him, now both known as Talaat Harb. The northern terminus of the street is a circle known originally as Midan Tawfiqiyya, after the Khedive Tawfiq. After the 1952 revolution, when royal names were replaced by nationalist ones, it became Midan ‘Urabi, after Tawfiq's nationalist challenger and adversary. (The neighborhood is still usually known as Tawfiqiyya, but you can't win 'em all.)

The Khedive Isma‘il, Viceroy of Egypt (and effectively sovereign under a loose Ottoman suzerainty) had profited greatly during the American Civil War when the Union blockade barred Southern US cotton from European markets and Egyptian cotton filled the gap. Isma‘il took the profits and spent profligately, rebuilding Cairo, launching wars in Sudan and Ethiopia, and most famously, building the Suez Canal. Meanwhile, the American war and blockade ended and the bottom fell out of the cotton market. Isma‘il found himself deeply in debt. Britain and France stepped in, effectively taking over the Egyptian economy under a system known as the "Dual Control." Major Evelyn Baring (later the first Lord Cromer) as Controller-General; Britain acquired ownership of the shares of the Suez Canal company, and more and more Europeans took senior posts in the Egyptian government. (This is a gross oversimplification; the classic account is still David S. Landes' Bankers and Pashas.) In 1878 Isma‘il gave up much if his power. The following year, at the instigation of the British and French, the Ottoman Sultan deposed Isma‘il. Under the Ottoman system, the title should have gone to Isma‘il's uncle, ‘Abd al-Halim Pasha, but Isma‘il had changed the succession to favor his son, Tawfiq, and the European controllers supported this. Tawfiq was a weak and unwilling ruler, and more or less putty in the hands of Baring and the other Europeans.

Khedive Tawfiq

But the growing control of the economy by foreigners had already eroded the popularity of Isma‘il, and Tawfiq had few admirers.As Egypt became more subservient, nationalism took root among intellectuals, the indigenous elites, religious classes, and the Army. Isma‘il's predecessor, Sa‘id Pasha, had broadened access by ethnic Egyptians into the officer corps, traditionally dominated by the Turkish and Circassian elites. These Egyptian officers, many of whom came from the fellahin rural peasantry, were sometimes referred to by shorthand as the fellah officers. Ahmad ‘Urabi was a fellah in this sense, an ethnic Egyptian from the rural hinterland, from a village in Sharqiyya near the city of Zagazig, which claims him today as its own. Born in 1841 as the son of a village leader, he was from a prosperous but rural background. Educated at Al-Azhar and the Military Academy, he rose through the ranks to the rank of colonel.

After Tawfiq's accession in 1879. he faced challenges from a National Party demanding a Parliamentary system, from nationalist such as Sheikh Muhammad ‘Abduh and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, and from the indigenous Egyptian officer corps.All opposed European control and demanded more national independence, though they otherwise had differing agendas.

In the end, to shorten the tale, it was the Army that mattered. The Egyptian officers, the most senior of whom were colonels like ‘Urabi, first sought to neutralize the Turco-Circassian senior officers; they won some concessions from Tawfiq. The British advisers grew alarmed, fearing a nationalist army might repudiate Egypt's debt. Tawfiq sought to play the nationalists, the British, and the Sultan in Constantinople against each other, but lacked the skills. In 1881, with ‘Urabi and the colonels increasing their power, Tawfiq sought to transfer him out of Cairo. He refused, declared himself Prime Minister, and called for a Parliament.

Yet he does not seem to have been all that radical. One slogan, "Egypt for the Egyptians," may have targeted not only the outside British and French but the internal Turco-Circassian elite, but the demand was essentially for a constitutional monarchy. But the British authorities not only managed to portray ‘Urabi as a radical threat, but also to hint to the Ottoman Sultan that ‘Urabi might raise the Arab provinces of the Empire in revolt, or even proclaim a rival caliphate, though ‘Urabi's ambitions do not seem to have run in those directions: he was an Egyptian nationalist.

Britain's View: "The Would-Be Dictator of Egypt," 1882

Although Tawfiq acceded to many of these demands he was also hoping for British, French, or Ottoman intervention. The Army, under ‘Urabi, was now effectively in control. ‘Urabi was probably the most popular man in Egypt, as well, seen (like Nasser 75 years later) as willing to defy Britain and France, and as an Egyptian fellah rather than a Turco-Circassian alien aristocrat. (The story goes that when the British finally persuaded Tawfiq to declare the colonel a rebel, the Khedive issued the order he did so only in Turkish, until his British handlers insisted he issue an Arabic version Egyptians might understand).

‘Urabi had befriended at least one Englishman who was not an imperialist. Wilfred Scawen Blunt was an aristocrat, but also a poet; his wife Lady Anne Blunt was Lord Byron's granddaughter. They had moved to Egypt to raise Arabian horses. While Blunt was something of a dilettante romantic Orientalist, he also came to be a fierce opponent of imperialism and colonialism, in Egypt and later in Ireland. He would also be a fierce critic of Denshawai in 1906 and after. He knew ‘Urabi, Sheikh Muhammad ‘Abduh, and other prominent nationalists, and while Cromer and others thought him a utopian dreamer, his 1907 The Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt remains the major English-language sympathetic source for the ‘Urabi revolt. Though he probably exaggerated his own role a bit, it's still an invaluable work. You can find the text free, online, in multiple formats, here.

The rest was predictable. Tawfiq had been unable to resist the colonels on his own, so his foreign patrons took charge. In 1882, unable to persuade the Ottomans to do it for them, the British intervened. In a brief war decided at the Battle of Tel el-Kebir, they defeated the Egyptian Army. Cromer, officially only a Consul General, ruled Egypt with the power of a Viceroy. (Though Britain dominated Egypt from 1882 to 1852, it was only officially a "Protectorate" from 1914 to 1922.)

‘Urabi Pasha in Exile in Ceylon

‘Urabi was packed off to exile in Ceylon (Sri Lanka), where he helped found a Muslim school and where his home in exile is now a museum and cultural center, now owned by the Egyptian Embassy in Sri Lanka. He lived in Ceylon from 1883 until 1901, when Tawfiq's son and successor, ‘Abbas Hilmi, allowed him to return to Egypt.

And that was Egypt's first colonels' coup.But Midan Tawfiqiyya in Cairo has been called Midan ‘Urabi for over 60 years now.

For the Record: Princess Fawzia's Funeral

As I noted earlier, in the midst of Egypt's current firestorm, the oldest surviving member of the former Royal Family, Princess Fawzia (last surviving sister of King Farouq and first wife of the late Shah of Iran), died at the age of 91, on July 2, the day before the not-a-coup.

Zeinobia has a post on her subject, complete with a slideshow and this clip of her rather unassuming funeral:

Two More Takes on Egypt: Nawal Saadawi and Hussein Ibish

I'm being selective among so much punditry, but two that struck me as worth reading:

• Via Juan Cole, Nawal Al-Saadawi on Egypt: A People’s Revolution, Not a Crisis or Coup.  The well-known feminist and activist on why the not-a-coup is justified.

• Hussein Ibish on "How NOT to Write about Egypt: Washington punditry manages to be even more frightening than Egyptian realities."

There are other views of course and I'm trying to acknowledge them all, but these are worth reading.

Stansfield for RUSI on Syria and the Region

Gareth Stansfield has a new briefing paper out at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) on "The Remaking of Syria, Iraq and the Wider Middle East." (Summary page at the link; full PDF of the report is here). From the summary:

Important as events in Cairo are, they distract Western attention from the much bigger game being played out in Syria which significantly risks changing the Levant after a century of relative territorial stability, according to a new paper from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).

The Remaking of Syria, Iraq and the Wider Middle East written by RUSI's senior associate fellow Professor Gareth Stansfield analyses the impact the Syrian civil war could have on the future of the Middle East state system across the Levant. The report warns that ongoing conflict may prompt the fragmentation of the region's twentieth-century defined states. Stansfield outlines how Lebanon, Jordan - and the interests of Israel and Turkey - could all be profoundly affected; but the most important casualty of the war is potentially Iraq, with inter-communal conflicts driven by deeply held and murderous sectarian hatreds that continue to stalk its political landscape today.

'Is Syria on the verge of collapse? And could Iraq, in particular - as well as Lebanon, Jordan and Israel - survive this eventuality? The answer is a tentative Yes to the first question and a probable No to the second,' writes Stansfield.

'There seems to be growing regional and international acceptance of the possibility of erasing the once-rarefied, externally imposed boundaries that have divided peoples as much as they have united them, with greater emphasis on the need for state structures to be tied more authentically to the peoples they encompass.'

'Therefore, if it is now no longer possible to simultaneously maintain the integrity of the extant state system while advocating democratisation - which may result, among other things, in the removal of existing dictatorships - then a different, and even more worrying, set of questions need to be posed. The problem now is how to ensure that the ongoing, escalating instability in Syria and Iraq does not deteriorate further into a region-wide war.'

Algerian and Egyptian Arabic Dialects, Revisited, and a Berber Comparison as Well

Almost two weeks ago now, I posted about an Economist column about Arabic dialects. Among the comparisons discussed there were the mutual intelligibility or lack thereof of various dialects. Algerian language blogger Lameen Souag also responded to the Economist piece with a detailed discussion of the Algerian case at his Jabal al-Lughat blog: "So How Different are Egyptian and Algerian Arabic, Really?"  (Unsurprisingly given the influence of Egyptian TV and movies, Algerians can understand Egyptian, though it may not work so well the other way.) I planned to link to his post right away, but then something happened in Egypt or somewhere, and I'm just now getting around to it. If you're interested in the whole diglossia issue and/or know either dialect, do read it.

And now, Lameen has added a post on a subject most of us know a lot less about: "So How Different are Algerian and Egyptian Berber?" He compares the Kabyle Berber (Tamazight) of Algeria with the Siwi of Egypt's Siwa Oasis.

A Week After the Army Moved, the Army Speaks Softly, But Uses its Big Stick

This morning's Washington Post headlines emphasized the appointment of a Prime Minister and a Vice President in Egypt; other headlines around the world are emphasizing how the Public Prosecutor is going after senior Brotherhood figures, including the Supreme Guide. The emphasis seems to be on the civilian sector: President names a Prime Minister, Public Prosecutor (not the Army) charges the Supreme Guide. While General Sisi has not been completely invisible, but he's not exactly been at center stage, either.

Pay some attention to the uniformed men behind the curtain. The Egyptian Armed Forces may not have fought a war in nearly 40 years (except for a division-sized contribution to Desert Storm), but it is large and wields enormous influence in Egyptian society. Laura Dean at The New Republic scoffs at the idea of civil war, given the strength of the Army.

I agree that a full-scale civil war would be dampened down quickly by the Army and the equally potent Interior Ministry forces. But the profound polarization so many are noting, with the secularists acting as if the Brotherhood will now simply go away, is likely to mean that the Army will have to play a major role.

The irony is that the same secular liberals who were denouncing the battles at Mohammed Mahmoud Street and Maspero in 2011-2012, demanding the fall of SCAF, are again proclaiming that "the Army and the people are one hand." Maybe, but occasionally that hand turns into a fist, The fact that the transitional government is seeking to amend the 2012 constitution rather than replace it is  testimony to the fact that the Army (and the judiciary) plan to hold on to the perks they were given by the Brotherhood in that Constitution.  The Army is going to protect its own interests, first of all.

The efforts to dismantle the Brotherhood, despite initial rhetoric about working with all elements, suggest the Army may play rough at times. Besides closing the Brotherhood's TV stations and seeking to arrest its leaders (and Morsi's "preventive detention" by the Republican Guard, whose mission was to protect the President), raise some concerns, though again the Brotherhood's call for an uprising provides plenty of excuse. The Shura Council-appointed editors of Al-Ahram have now been replaced.

The Brotherhood proved arrogant and authoritarian. They have been replaced by the Army, which is sometimes arrogant and by nature authoritarian. The Army may, indeed, entrust power to a civilian government and oversee early elections. I hope so. But as Omar Robert Hamilton notes in the suitably titled "Selective Memories," many liberals seem to have already forgotten the events of less than two years ago.

Abdel Fattah Sisi is no Gamal Abdel Nasser, though he seems slightly more comfortable with public speaking than Field Marshal Tantawi did.

I hope that the insistence that this was a revolution, not a coup is borne out over time. But the next President should remember what the Caesars learned the hard way in Rome: if you rely on the Praetorian Guard to gain power, remember that they may tire of you in time.

Two Pieces on Egypt's Constitutional Declaration

Here are two useful assessments of Egypt's latest "Constitutional declaration:

Nathan Brown (of course) weighs in at The New Republic with "Egypt Officially Declares What Is and Isn't Important: Three things that the interim president's constitutional declaration makes clear."

And at Foreign Policy,  Zaid Al-Ali on "Another Egyptian Constitutional Declaration."

Egypt's Transition Begins to Take Shape

Nearly a week after the military intervention and after several names were floated for Prime Minister, Hazem al-Beblawi, who was Finance Minister in 2011, has been given the job. The fact that earlier suggestions were apparently vetoed by the Nour Party or others suggests the problems Beblawi will face in putting together a Cabinet. The "Constitutional Declaration" issued yesterday (full Arabic text here; summary in English here), spelling out a timetable for writing and ratifying an amended constitution, leading to Parliamentary and Presidential elections by early next year, may also be somewhat utopian; the Muslim Brotherhood has already rejected it..

Note, by the way, that the plan is to amend the much-criticized 2012 Constitution, rather than to replace it? Why, you may ask, if it is so hated? I'm just guessing here, but I think the fact that the Brotherhood-brokered 2012 Constitution gave the Armed Forces more autonomous power than they ever held (at least formally on paper) in the Sadat and Mubarak eras, just might have something to do with it.

And while we're on the subject of Egypt, amid a lot of debate about what the US should do, see Laura Rozen's report in the advice of former US Ambassadors Frank Wisner and Dan Kurtzer: which is essentially to do nothing.

I agree. US policy has been thoroughly misunderstood among Egyptian liberals and secularists, and to do something precipitate right now could not only reinforce that misunderstanding but radicalize the Army. Now is a time for caution.

Ramadan Karim

Ramadan begins at sundown. Ramadan Mubarak to all my Muslim readers, and may it be a month of mercy and reconciliation in so many deeply divided countries in our region.

Sarah Carr on the Egyptian Divide

Sarah Carr is always a sharp observer of Egypt, and she has an excellent and balanced piece that addresses the deepening splits we have seen so visibly in today's bloodletting... The piece, "On Sheep and Infidels," can be found at Jadaliyya; it's also co-published with the relatively new and valuable Mada Masr site. It may alienate some readers on both sides if the divide, As she says in her opening:

I voted for Mohamed Morsi in the second round of the presidential elections (to keep out Ahmed Shafiq).

I am one of the administrators of a blog called “MB in English” that features English translations of awful statements of a sectarian, conspiratorial, or bonkers nature that the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) intends for domestic consumption only.

I am against army intervention in politics.

I state all this because Egyptian politics and society in general are split along identity lines in a way that they have never been in the last three years. This problem is so chronic that the merits or flaws of an argument are almost entirely determined by who is making the argument in a haze of fury and suspicion.

Read the whole thing,

The Ominous Nature of Today's Clashes

The deaths of at least 51 people in clashes between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian Army outside the Republican Guard Headquarters in Nasr City, combined with Brotherhood calls for an uprising, raise ominous prospects. The Salafi Nour Party,which had supported the military intervention, has withdrawn its cooperation, while the Sheikh al-Azhar has announced he is going into seclusion. Many liberal political figures are denouncing the violence.

The competing narratives are reminiscent of other clashes in other places. Each side says the other attacked; there are competing videos on YouTube. The delicate balance of the past five days, when the Brotherhood urged nonviolent protest, may be transformed by the call for an uprising. An Algerian-style civil war is still not necessarily likely, but the possibilities were increased by today's bloodshed.

It's time for the new interim government to be finally agreed upon and to start talks with as many elements as possible on a way forward. Further delays and shifting signals will leave the field to the Army and the Brotherhood, and perhaps many repeats of today's battle.

When is a Coup Not a Coup? Egypt on the Eve of Ramadan

The July 3 toppling of Muhammad Morsi in Egypt has predictably led to rolling clashes between supports of the deposed President and those who celebrate his departure. We've just had a four-day weekend in the US due to the Fourth of July falling on Thursday; I decided not to try to post through most of the holiday in order to allow my own thoughts to form more clearly.

What's clear is how much remains unclear. The confusion over the weekend over whether Mohamed ElBaradei was to become Prime Minister,or Vice President, or either is still murky; there have been many rumors about who is getting which jobs, with many distinguished names in play, but little certainty.

The US is seemingly unsure what to do. American law requires a cutoff of aid if there has been a military coup against a freely elected government. But US officials are carefully avoiding using the c-word, which would limit their freedom of action; the US has major strategic interests in Egypt, and with most of that aid going to the military, a cutoff of aid could lead to a radicalization of the Army which is holding most of the cards right now.

And I should mention that after this four-day weekend I found my email inbox full of over hundred (I stopped counting) messages from (ostensible) Egyptians all informing me, many in identical words and all in only three or four variant texts, that this was a revolution, not a coup. None of these were from anyone I knew, although a few purported to come from "the Egyptian people." If these folks think the US Administration will heed my advice, I'm flattered, but if they think spam-bombing Washington is the way lobbying works, they've got a lot to learn. Anyway, I got the message after the first dozen or so, I suspect that other Mideast hands got similar mail.

Was it a coup? Well, let me ask another question: was February 2011 a coup? We didn't generally call it that though it was the Army that sent Mubarak packing. But no one considered Mubarak freely elected (except perhaps Mubarak).

The tendency to see this as a simple case of polarization between the secular and the Islamists is complicated by the fact that the Nour Party, which is Salafi, has backed the coup (but may have blocked ElBaradei). But the arrests of Muslim Brotherhood leaders, and media closings, suggests an intention on the part of the new leadership to suppress the organization, which may not sit well with Nour.

And Ramadan starts at sundown. That may exacerbate tensions, especially among Islamists.

More thoughts are coming.

Just Over a Year Ago ... I Posted This

Don't say I didn't see it coming. My headline and post on July 2, 2012:

 And here's a closeup of that picture:

Photo via Zeinobia

Now we know the answer.

On July 4, May Egypt's New Government Remember What Morsi Forgot

On this holiday, may Egypt's new rulers keep firmly in mind what I fear President Morsi forgot: and may we remember here in the US that Jefferson did not intend his words just to apply to Americans; and especially the last part of this passage:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.

Long Holiday Weekend

Today is the Fourth of July and I'm off through the weekend, but I'll drop in to comment from time to time as events require.

The Army Has Moved. Now What Happens?

I'm hearing and seeing a lot of Egyptians saying that the Army intervention is not a coup because the people had demanded it; that may not be entirely untrue given that there was no constitutional mechanism in place to remove Morsi from office, and that arguably the rammed-through constitution and Morsi's other actions can hardly be called democratic. And, to be sure, the Armed Forecs were clever in having the Sheikh al-Azhar present to give religious sanction to the move, the Coptic Pope to reassure minorities, and opposition politicians young and old, including Mohamed ElBaradei, on stage to confer — to use Morsi's own favorite word last night — legitimacy.

That's the good news. The Army's "road map" could be a reasonable way to move quickly to new elections, but the first couple of hours since the announcement have not been promising, though you wouldn't know it from the celebrations in Tahrir Square. First, Morsi and the Brotherhood have rejected the road map and called on Egyptians to reject it, though they have urged against using violence. Though many have argued that concerns about a reaction like that in Algeria in 1992 do not apply here, I'm not entirely sure about that.

And, though General Sisi pledged to respect freedom of press and expression, there are reports that the Brotherhood's television station has already been closed down. The Brotherhood have shown their own contempt towards opposition media, but closing down stations is not an optimistic sign.

Egypt was in a mess, a deepening economic disaster and a political deadlock. The Army's road map may be one way out of it, but I fear that the Army's instincts may not be as liberal as some of those who called on them to intervene.

Although we are on the brink of a four-day weekend in celebration of the Fourth of July, I'm pretty sure I'll be saying a lot more about this.

Egyptian Humor Always Comes Through

I'm not sure who said this first as I'm seeing a lot of Egyptians and others repeating it:

I'll have fuller comments shortly.

An Editorial Comment

"Coup" is French for "blow." If it takes three days you're doing it wrong.

More after the formal announcement clears things up, assuming it does ...

Ambassador Roscoe S. "Rocky" Suddarth, 1935-2013, MEI President, Mentor, Friend

Fifteen years ago this very month I got a call from Ambassador Roscoe S. Suddarth, President of the Middle East Institute, informing me that Mary-Jane Deeb was stepping down as as Editor of The Middle East Journal and inviting me to be a candidate for the job. In October of that year I became Editor. Ambassador Suddarth, always "Rocky" to those who knew him, passed away on June 29. I owe Rocky a lot more than just my job. He was a strong supporter of the Journal, and of me. And one of the nicest and smartest people I have known.

Rocky was a career diplomat, and served as US Ambassador to Jordan from 1987 to 1990. He took over as President of MEI after his retirement, serving from 1995 to 2001. He was the first of three MEI Presidents I have served as MEJ Editor.

Rocky hailed from Nashville and had the easygoing manner of a Tennessean, but with overlays of Yale and Oxford. Under his Presidency MEI created its Public Policy Center, and Rocky and his wife Michele landscaped the Islamic garden in the MEI courtyard as a donation to the Institute.

After retiring from MEI, Rocky, an enthusiast for modern jazz, went back to graduate school to acquire another Master's degree, this one in music, at age 72.

MEI has lost a leader and benefactor, and I have lost a friend.

Crunch Day in Egypt Tomorrow: Al-Ahram is with the Army

Tomorrow's (state-owned) Al-Ahram: (via Zeinobia): Big headline in red: "Today ... Dismissal or Resignation." Black headline below masthead: "Formation of a Presidential Council and Suspension of the Constitution."

The state media now appears to be with the Army and not with Morsi. Game over? That remains to be seen.

Morsi's Speech and Tomorrow's Deadline

Egyptian President Morsi is not a charismatic speaker. But anyone who expected tonight's speech, in the middle of the night in Egypt, to provide any concessions were disabused quickly by his defiant defense of his legitimacy. In fact, he may have set some kind of record for the number of times he said "legitimacy" (شرعية) in a single speech.  That emphasizes his strongest argument: he was elected in a free election and removing him extra-constitutionally is undemocratic.

But, except for a claim that he had accepted an opposition initiative to resolve the standoff but that the demonstrators had rejected it, he made no gestures towards the opposition, instead insisting he would defend his position as the legitimately elected president. He claimed he is prepared to lose his life in the defense of that legitimacy. The statement that he had accepted an opposition initiative just might provide a slender opening for a compromise in which Morsi remains as President but there is a national unity government and plans for new elections, but it was far too vague to reassure. That, and the fact that the opposition is simply running out the clock on the Army ultimatum rather than seeking a real compromise, means that scenarios for tomorrow include some rather violent ones. Let's hope the Army really does have a plan that won't bring the Brotherhood militias out in an Algerian-style war.

In the Midst of Egypt's Turbulent Present, a Echo of the Distant Past: Princess Fawzia Dies at 91

Princess Fawzia

Princess Fawzia Fuad of Egypt, last surviving sister of King Farouq and onetime Queen of Iran, died today in Alexandria at the age of 91.

Born in 1921 to then-Sultan (later King) Fuad I of Egypt and Queen Nazli, she was married in 1939 to the Crown Prince of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who became Shah in 1941. She was Queen of Iran (only the Shah's third wife held the title of Empress) until she and the Shah divorced (she obtained an Egyptian divorce in 1945 but this was not recognized by Iran until 1948). Her proper form of address back in Egypt until the 1952 Revolution was "Her Imperial and Royal Highness," acknowledging both her Egyptian and Iranian titles.

Farouq, Fawzia, and the Future Shah

Princess Fawzia remarried in Egypt, and lived quietly in Alexandria as the oldest surviving member of the Royal Family.

Deepening Clashes as the Sides Run Out the Clock

There are reports of clashes in various parts of Egypt between pro-Morsi and anti-Morsi elements, with the Brotherhood so far seemingly defiant and ready to go down fighting, while the opposition seem content to run out the clock, assuming the military will rescue the situation.

As we have seen in earlier outbreaks in Egypt and else here, social media provide a vehicle for the spreading of rumors; reports of shootings,  Army mobilizations, and the like. I think I'll reserve my own assessment until a little later, when the day is over (if, of course. anyone bothers to sleep on a night with so much at stake).

Egypt's Strange Slow-Motion Creeping Coup

After the Egyptian Army's earlier ultimatum warning of intervention if political forces do not find a solution within 48 hours, the Army has issued another statement insisting that it is not threatening a coup, but merely pressuring political leaders, comparing it to the role played by the military in 1977, 1986, and 2011. (Link is in Arabic.) The food riots of 1977 and the police conscription riots of 1986 were cases of brief military operations domestically because internal security forces were outnumbered, but in 2011 SCAF took over and ran the country for more than a year, which to many would seem like a coup. But not to worry: we're told that a military coup would be against Egyptian Army doctrine.

Also today, it looked more and more as if the Army was openly siding with the demonstrators. After the initial announcement of the ultimatum, Army helicopters flew over Tahrir Square with giant flags. Internal Security Forces clashed with the personal bodyguard of Muslim Brotherhood Deputy Guide Khairat al-Shater, and the state media suddenly showed a tilt towards the protesters. In the provinces, the Army took over the governorate headquarters in Fayyoum, ousting the Morsi-appointed Governor.

In an even stranger development, the Egyptian Presidency announced that Morsi and Prime Minister Qandil had met with Defense Minister General Sisi, and posted this photo to the Presidency's Facebook page:

I was wondering what Sisi had in that briefcase, but then came reports citing a military spokesman as denying that Sisi met with Morsi at all today.

Morsi, meanwhile, has bumped a scheduled statement until tomorrow. The tone of the pro-Morsi rally has been defiant, but there is also speculation that he might agree to a referendum on new elections. We'll see.

Meanwhile, the countdown continues towards a possible military Definitely-Not-a-Coup-Just-an-Intervention.

Mark Your Calendars

On Twitter:

The pro-Morsi rally is now sounding increasingly defiant. The Army ultimatum may have increased the polarization and decreased any chance of compromise.

The Earthquake in Egypt: The Army's Statement

June 30 could have turned out in many ways. It could have been a fizzle — it was a Sunday rather than the usual Friday and many didn't have the day off — or a horribly violent explosion. There were too many deaths as it was, and the ransacking of Muslim Brotherhood headquarters was regrettable, but the demonstrators clearly made their point. The turnout, at least based on the photos, seems to have been far greater than at any point during the 2011 revolution. And that seems to have stunned a great many people, myself included.

Though many of the demonstrators were openly hoping for military intervention, today's statement by the Armed Forces and the resignation of a number of ministers suggests that the Morsi regime is crumbling before our eyes. What bothers me is the Army statement. It amounts to an ultimatum, a demand that within 48 hours the political leadership has to find a solution or the Army will. Though the Army again paid lip-service to the idea that it doesn't seek power, it's threat to create a "new road-map" for moving forward (implying perhaps a national unity government of some sort) would at any rate would mean a "Game Over: Restart" on the past two years, with the Army in some sort of tutelary role.

There are some problems with this. Many of those millions who turned out yesterday were, a bit over a year ago, shouting for SCAF, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, to go back to the barracks. For people who claim to be liberal democrats to yearn for military rule gives credence to those like Husni Mubarak and Omar Suleiman who long claimed Egypt was not ready for self-government.

Make no mistake. The Muslim Brotherhood has been singularly incompetent and we may be seeing a dimming of its reputation. Many of its Salafi allies declined to stand with it yesterday. (And in a perhaps related event, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi has returned to Egypt from Qatar amid gossip that the new Amir, Sheikh Tamim, asked him to leave.) There are now suggestions Morsi may agree to a referendum on new elections. (Link is in Arabic.) He may have realized (or been told by someone in uniform) that he has lost a sort of no-confidence vote even in the absence of a parliament.

But there is a danger here. The Brotherhood, despite Morsi's squeaker victory, feels that it did win the elections. If the military takes that away from it, Egypt's Islamists of all stripes could feel their victory has been stolen from them. Does anyone remember Algeria in 1992? And the civil war which folllwed? Tunisia's Rached Ghannouchi has taken a much more pluralistic approach than Morsi has, and has openly said it is because he fears an Algerian scenario.

It would be far better for Morsi to get the message and agree to new elections before the Army's 48-hour deadline has run out. The downside of the Army ultimatum is that it removes any incentive for the protesters to cut a compromise deal with Morsi: they can do nothing, and let the Army sort things out. And the Army can again claim to have saved Egypt. But I suspect most (not all, of course) of the demonstrators are not all that nostalgic for the return of SCAF.

I suspect we are going to see a very interesting, and perhaps rather dangerous, 48 hours ahead.

My Take on Egypt is Coming

I will be posting my own reflections on the still-developing events in Egypt this afternoon. Journal deadline commitments take precedence, and there's also a lot to say. (And much still happening, such as today's Army statement.) Stay tuned.