Scandal: Who Ate the President's Camel?

Al-Arabiya is reporting that a camel ceremonially presented to French President Hollande during his visit to Mali, as a gift expressing thanks for France's military intervention in Mali, has been eaten, apparently by the family who were supposed to be caring for it.

Six Questions on the Algerian Raid

Hugh Roberts at the London Review of Books LRB Blog asks  "Six Questions about Tigantourine," referring to the gas plant attack near In Amenas in Algeria. These do seem to raise pertinent questions about the official story so far and the gaps that have yet to be filled in.

Some Good Stuff on Mali and Timbuktu

The war in Mali has produced a great deal of opinion, most of it rather ill-informed.  Here are several very different readings (two from the modern policy world and two more historical) that may help clarify matters:

Laura Seay, Mali is Not a Stan, at Foreign Policy, argues that comparisons to Afghanistan (in addition to some fairly obvious topographical differences) misreads the situation; the French were invited in, know the country well, and are not plunging into a quagmire.

Marc Lynch, at Foreign Policy's Middle East Channel, asked his readers, Is Mali Part of the Middle East?  The conclusion is no, but certainly the events in Mali have resonances in the Maghreb, as the Algerian gas plant attack showed.  My on approach on this blog is to be as inclusive as possible; when Mali affects events in North Africa, we can look at it, though that doesn't make it part of the Middle East. But historically, it is part of the greater trading area for North Africa (as the Indian Ocean is for the Gulf), and will occasionally demand attention.

On more cultural issues, the African and Berber linguistics blogger Lameen Souag, at his Jabal al-Lughat blog, knows the territory well (one of his specialties is Songhay, the language group which includes the dominant language in Timbuktu). has two useful posts: "On Book-Burning in Timbuktu", and "Languages of Timbuktu," the latter of which seeks to clear up some confusion about the ethnicities and languages in the city.


http://lughat.blogspot.com/2013/01/languages-of-timbuktu.html

Good News from Timbuktu?

Via Jadaliyya, some good news on the question of the safety of the Timbuktu manuscripts. The South African partners in preserving the manuscripts are hearing they are indeed largely safe.

Were Most Timbuktu Manuscripts Hidden?

There are reports today suggesting that the vast majority of Timbuktu's ancient manuscripts may have survived (also here). These are much more encouraging reports than the initial fears of major losses; let's hope they're true.

Timbuktu's Lost Libraries

All wars lead to some destruction of parts of the world's cultural heritage, but the deliberate burning of books and the destruction of works of art seems a particularly barbarous event. It is especially outrageous when it is done in the name of the very religion that created the books and art. Yet the Jihadis who burned the Ahmed Baba Institute in Timbuktu (having already destroyed most of the Sufi shrines in the area) have almost certainly burned far more Qur'ans than Western Islamophobes have ever dreamt of doing. When the Taliban destroyed the Buddhas of Bamiyan it was equally appalling, but at least they could claim to be destroying idols; in Timbuktu, the modern Vandals destroyed some of the most precious treasures of Islamic culture.

European Image of Mansa Musa

The golden age of Timbuktu was golden indeed, and the wealth of the 14th Century Emperor Mansa Musa was so vast that even the European map at left considered him one of the main points of interest in all of Africa.

The news is not all bad; locals managed to preserve at least some of the thousands of ancient manuscripts, though just how bad the losses are may take some time to appreciate. But the losses are certain to be profound, however much mitigated.

Some Useful Takes on Algeria and Mali

Today's a US holiday (Martin Luther King Day combined with the Presidential inauguration) so posting may be light but with Israel's elections tomorrow and Jordan's on Wednesday, it's going to be a busy week.

First off today I wanted to point you to several interesting takes on the events in Algeria and Mali that provide useful perspectives that differ a bit from the Western media's received wisdom.

• Natalya Vince, "In Amenas – a history of silence, not a history of violence" argues that much  of the commentary on the Algerian response has focused on Algeria's supposed violent heritage, compressing modern Algerian history into the war of independence and the troubles of the 1990s and ignoring everything in between. A useful antidote to much superficial commentary.

• The Mauritanian blogger who blogs at Dekhnistan offers "A Disaster 50 Years in the Making," arguing that the roots of the situation in Mali lie not just in the Libyan civil war or the rise of Al-Qa‘ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), but in the years before French West Africa achieved independence, when nothing was done to alter colonial boundaries that combined Tuareg and Amazigh north with sub-Saharan south in such countries as Mauritania, Niger, Mali and Chad. While, farther east, we welcome the separation of Sudan and South Sudan, the specter of Al-Qa‘ida has become the primary focus in Mali.

• Related to the above, an article in Libération reminds us that not all of the northern rebels are Islamists, and that the Tuareg separatist group that started the whole affair the MNLA, are still in the mix: "Le Nord-Mali entre Touaregs et jihadistes" (in French). 


•  "How the French Air War in Mali Really Went Down" offers what appears to be considerable detail about the French (and other Western) operations over Mali in the current campaign.

The Raid in Algeria

I've been holding off on posting about the Algerian raid to free the hostages in the Sahara because reports have been so confusing and conflicted. It does seem that there are a large number of dead hostages, most apparently Algerian workers; it's also known that the hostages represented perhaps a dozen or so foreign nationalities.

Though the hostage-takers claimed to be retaliating for French intervention in Mali, kidnapping for ransom has a long history in Algeria, and while there's little question that this incident is a symptom of the worsening security situation in the Sahara generally. Algeria is reportedly saying the perpetrators entered the country from Libya. I'll say more if we learn more.

Two French-language sites are live-updating: Le Monde here, and Le Point here, and seem to be faster than the English-language sites, if you read French. More to come.

Heritage Destruction: Salafis Eradicating Timbuktu's Greatness

Somewhere, Ibn Battuta is weeping.

Although usually not within the purview of this blog, the takeover of the northern, Tuareg parts of Mali (the self-proclaimed "Azawad") first by the MNLA and more recently by radical Islamist groups this year, with links across the borders into Libya and Algeria, have forced attention to the ancient Islamic heritage of the reason. I've posted about Timbuktu's glorious past before, but now, following the fall first of Timbuktu and more recently of Gao to radical Salafist rebels of the Ansar Dine and MUJWA movements, that heritage is in danger. After destruction over the weekend of medieval Saint's tombs in Timbuktu, the Islamists have now destroyed an ancient door, kept closed for centuries, on one of Timbuktu's three great historic mosques, Sidi Yahya:

Among the tombs they destroyed is that of Sidi Mahmoudou, a saint who died in 955, according to the UNESCO website. In addition, on Monday they set upon one of the doors of the Sidi Yahya, a mosque built around 1400. Local legend held that the gate leading to the cemetery would only open on the final day at the end of time.

Local radio host Kader Kalil said that the members of Ansar Dine arrived at the mosque with shovels and pickaxes and yanked off the door, revealing a wall behind it. Kalil said that they explained they were doing so in order to disabuse people of the local legend and to teach them to put their whole faith in the Quran.

"Since my childhood, I have never seen the door on the western side of the mosque open. And I was born in 1947," said Kader, a longtime resident of the city. "When we were children, we were told that the door would only open at the end of time. These religious people want to go to the source, to show us that this is not true. .... Of course our population is not happy. The women, especially, are crying a lot."

Slideshow here. They have sworn to destroy every mausoleum in Timbuktu. UNESCO has put both Timbuktu and the Tomb of Askia in Gao on the Endangered List of heritage sites, which is unlikely to have much impact on the Ansar Dine. This French report shows video of some of the early destruction:


Destruction of tombs is often a Salafi demand: particularly in North Africa, where the Islamic cult of local saints is deeply ingrained, though Salafis have attacked Sufi tombs in Egypt and elsewhere, and when the Saudi Kingdom expanded into the Hijaz in the early 20th Century, many ancient tombs were destroyed by committed Wahhabis. While these monuments, and even the great mosques in Timbuktu, may not be as spectacular as the Buddhas of Bamiyan (destroyed by the Taliban), the destruction of Islamic monuments by those claiming to act in the name of Islam seems even more appalling somehow, though the destruction of heritage monuments is indefensible on any grounds.

As usual, one of the more perceptive commentators is kal at The Moor Next Door, whose latest post-fall-of-Gao analysis is here. MUJWA — the Movement of Unity and Jihad in West Africa — is something of a mystery; it seems to be a sort of offshoot from Al-Qa‘ida in the Islamic Maghreb, but with special emphases:

MUJWA’s propaganda during the Battle of Gao displays its intelligent exploitation of local grievances. A video released to regional media (and posted to the jihadist forums) shows the group’s effort to link its narrative to Songhai nationalist feelings; the video bears the name “Askia,” the name of a Songhai emperor with strong symbol power ... MUJWA has moved from former AQIM subcontractors, members and even drug runners to finding tactical support among members of the city other ethnic groups in the city, in the process projecting an image of ‘popular support’ which may or may not reflect sympathy with the Islamist groups per se as much as a perception of a common enemy.

It's a complicated story; two Twitter tweets (one from kal):

All this aside, this is a tragedy for Mali,for Africa, and for Islamic heritage in general.

The Moor on MUJWA

Kal at The Moor Next Door has a lengthy piece on the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), which has been playing a role in the events in northern Mali and whose exact relationship with Al-Qa‘ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is still a bit murky. An important piece I think for anyone interested in jihadist movements, the Maghreb, Sahara, or Sahel, etc.

And a reminder that his blog is a good resource for North Africa generally but especially for Algeria and Mauritania, as well as, increasingly, the whole Azawad separatist conflict.

The Moor on Mali

Now that Mali has intruded itself into our consciousness (the Algerians, Mauritanians etc. were already quite aware of it) and multiple and rival revolutionary groups have been appearing, it's hard to tell the players without a scorecard. To help interpret the mysteries of MUJWA and other groups, The Moor Next Door offers a primer of sorts.

"Azawad": Will Algeria be Drawn Into the Mali Conflict?

The proclamation of an independent "Azawad" by Tuaregs who, with their Islamist allies (or rivals?) have taken northern Mali in the wake of the coup in Bamako (where the coup-makers are now standing down) has raised concerns throughout the Maghreb, but most intensely in Algeria. Seven Algerian diplomats were reportedly kidnapped in Gao, but now have reportedly been released. The kidnappers were supposedly from the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA in its English acronym, MUJAO in its French), an offshoot that broke from Al-Qa‘ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Though the diplomats are now said to be free, Algeria is talking tough and saying it cannot accept the breakup of Mali, and there is growing concern that the northern extension of Mali could become a new rogue state aiming at destabilizing the region. Algeria has already had to face raids by AQIM from across its southern border. There were reports even before the kidnappings that Algerian special forces might intervene in Mali (report is in French).

But unsurprisingly, it's kal at The Moor Next Door who has a lot more about the Algerian buildup and the possibility of Algerian intervention. His article, quoting various Algerian reports, seems to suggest that Algeria might intervene in cooperation with the MNLA, the Tuareg force that initially won the north and then found its Islamist rivals pushing it out of the cities. But Algeria is also pledged to the unity of Mali, and cooperation with the MNLA might seem to contradict that goal. Kal's analysis was written before the diplomats' release, so the likelihood of an immediate Algerian intervention may now be much reduced.

There is still considerable confusion about the roles of the Tuareg MNLA, the Islamist Ansar Eddine, and MUJWA in the occupation of the north but they clearly have fallen out among themselves. Al-Jazeera English did score an unusual first with a report on the Ansar Eddine from Timbuktu (and where did they get the tanks?):

Fall of Timbuktu to Rebels a Reminder of the City's Onetime Greatness

The name "Timbuktu," to many Westerners,has long been synonymous with remoteness, isolation, a bit of mystery, Those attributes do not so much reflect the city's history as they do a particular Western concept of it, perhaps inspired by the fact that from the Mediterranean one had to cross the great Sahara to reach it, or even just by the somewhat magical sounds of the name itself. At an earlier time, in the Islamic world and the Mediterranean, the name of Timbuktu evoked fabulous wealth, a city rumored to abound in gold. That was never really the case either. But Timbuktu was once both a great entrepot where the Saharan caravan trade met the Niger River Valley, and a center of Islamic learning, the greatest university center south of the Mediterranean coastal cities.

On Sunday, Timbuktu became the latest front in Mali's war, when Tuareg rebels of the MNLA took the city in the wake of the recent coup in Mali. (See my earlier post here.) But soon after, the MNLA's erstwhile allies, the Islamist Ansar Eddine, reportedly pushed the MNLA out. Now there are reports that Al-Qa‘ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has joined Ansar Eddine in Timbuktu. The Moor Next Door tries to make sense of it, with many useful links.

I'm not going to try to sort out the tribal and religious factions in Mali, because despite being a blogger and being based in Washington, I still resist pontificating on things about which I know absolutely nothing at all. Which is the case here.

Djinguereber Mosque

Timbuktu, though, is another matter (though I've never been there). When I originally posted on the Mali coup I noted that, though Mali is not considered part of the Middle East these days, its Saharan regions had long been linked to the trans-Saharan trade, and the late Col. Qadhafi's meddling and Tuareg policies had spilled over into the Sahara and Sahel. But the links go even deeper, for long before Timbuktu became a symbol in European imagery for the remote and mysterious (and before the author of a children's book discovered that it rhymed with "Kalamazoo"), Timbuktu was known throughout the Arab world for its wealth, its gold, and its reputation as a major center of Islamic learning. It was echoes of that reputation which made Europeans want to find the city, and the difficulties of doing so gave birth to the image of one of the most remote places on earth.

But Timbuktu's original fame was not for its remoteness, but for its key location at the intersection of major trade routes across the Sahara. Located only a few miles from the upper Niger, it also provided access to the cultivable lands to the south.

European Image of Mansa Musa

In 1324 AD, the Emperor Mansa Musa of Mali made a famous pilgrimage to Mecca. Musa ("Mansa" is a Mandinka title meaning roughly, Emperor) was enormously rich in gold, and famously gave so much gold away that his hajj actually distorted prices throughout the Mediterranean basin. Musa added Timbuktu to the Mali Empire and proceeded to build its great mosques and its famous Islamic university; the reputation of his wealth soon combined with the reputation of Timbuktu's university and mosques to make its name familiar throughout the Arab world, though it was never Musa's capital. Ibn Battuta visited it and described it (but then, he went just about everywhere.)

By the time the Europeans got there finally, in the 1800s, the glory days had faded, but three of the medieval mosques still stand and the great University of Sankore still survives as the University of Timbuktu.

Azawad (Wikipedia)

The Tuareg rebels may, indeed, be tugging Timbuktu and other cities such as Gao back into a North African orbit rather than a sub-Saharan one, especially if they were to succeed in breaking the northern, desert region they call Azawad off from the rest of Mali.

Though Mauritania, Algeria, and Libya are certainly concerned about the events in Mali and worried about the possible role of AQIM among the Tuareg, so far the issue has been in the hands of the Economic Council of West African States (ECOWAS), which has been pressuring the new junta to restore the elected government. While the junta has delayed a promised return to the constitution, the rebels have taken Gao, Timbuktu and other cities of the north.

For more on Timbuktu's history, see the Timbuktu Foundation website,  and the Timbuktu Wikipedia article. To follow events in Mali see the links in The Moor Next Door's piece linked by me above.

Mali Coup: Qadhafi Still a Problem for Africa, Even Posthumously

Yesterday's military coup in Mali would not at first glance be of concern to this blog: Mali is not part of the Middle East by any usual definition, and not part of the region covered by the Middle East Institute or The Middle East Journal. But it does border Algeria and Mauritania, and its large northern region is part of the Sahara, unlike the more populous Niger River Valley to the south. And this coup seems to have direct resonances to the overthrow last year of Col. Mu‘ammar Qadhafi of Libya. Ironically Qadhafi, who fancied himself the leader of Africa and regularly meddled below the Sahara, is still meddling despite being quite dead for some months now.

This particular coup seems to have been provoked by a Tuareg revolt in the north,which the (now apparently ousted) President failed to respond to adequately. The Tuareg revolt periodically, but this one has occupied considerable territory and apparently the Army felt their honor besmirched.

MNLA Emblem (Wikipedia)

Beyond the fact that the Tuareg are a Berber (Amazigh)-speaking people, speaking a language known as Tamasheq, what merits a mention of Mali here is that many of the Tuareg supporting the revolt are said to be tribesmen who formerly fought to support the lat Mu‘ammar Qadhafi in Libya. Qadhafi recruited not only Libyan Tuareg but Tuareg from Mali and Niger as well; on his defeat, these crossed into northern Niger, reportedly well-armed and equipped; the Malians among them eventually made their way home. They seem to provide many of the arms for the MNLA, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, The group seeks independence for Azawad.

Azawad (Wikipedia)

their name for the large Saharan region of Mali and the neighboring Tuareg areas in Mauritania and Niger. (MNLA website in French, here. General background on the revolt here.)

It's too early to know the implications of the coup for the Tuareg revolt, In another Middle Eastern resonance, however, the Mali government has of course invoked al-Qa‘ida to characterize their enemy, claiming that the MNLA is allied with al-Qa‘ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a charge the MNLA strongly denies. The jury seems to be out on the relationship, but AQIM certainly has operated in northern Mali.

So Colonel Qadhafi, though dead these five months, is still making trouble in continent of which he once declared himself king; some, like this Economist article, go even farther and link the outflow o former Libyan arms to issues much farther afield, like the Boko Haram in Nigeria. link

Qadhafi: still dead, and still a troublemaker..