Hossam Bahgat on Why Parliament was Won by Pro-Sisi Forces

Hossam Bahgat, the Egyptian regime critic who was jailed for a time and recently reused permission to travel, has a rather daring article at Mada Masr documenting the direct role played by Egyptian General Intelligence in creating the pro-Sisi coalition that dominates the new Parliament. This article is unlikely to sit well with the government. I think this article is essential and will be widely cited.

January 1916:The Rise of the Arab Bureau

One of the most famous institutions in the Middle East in World War I, though its work was largely secret at the time, was the famous Arab Bureau. This small but growing section of the British Military Intelligence section  in Cairo would eventually count among its members T.E. Lawrence, Gertrude Bell, David Hogarth, Aubrey Herbert, Herbert Garland, George Lloyd (later Lord Lloyd), Stewart Newcombe, Leonard Woolley, and others.

You may want to review my posts of a little over a year ago on the British Intelligence Section in Cairo and the complicated chain of command, as well as the new men assigned there. Most of the intelligence section discussed there would either join or work closely with the Arab Bureau; some in Cairo, others with the Arab Revolt which the Arab Bureau would strongly support.

The Bureau's creation was the brainchild of Sir Mark Sykes (later of Sykes-Picot fame) who, after a tour of the Middle East from Egypt to India had ben impressed by the facts that Germany and the Ottomans were doing a better job than Britain in propaganda to the Muslim world outside of India.

In my earlier posts on the Cairo Intelligence Section, we discussed the rivalries between the Indian Government in Delhi and Simla and India Office in London on the one hand, and the Foreign Office and War Office on the other. India was resistant to putting the Arab Bureau in Cairo, since India wanted to maintain control of the Mesopotamia Campaign and its influence on the Arab tribes in the Gulf.

After bureaucratic maneuvering, a compromise was reached: Gilbert Clayton would have direct responsibility for the Bureau bu i would report not to the British military leadership (Archibald Murray) alone, but directly to the Foreign Office (via the High Commissioner for Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon), and he Governor General of the Sudan/Sirdar of he Egyptian Army, Reginald Wingate. The confusing chain of command masked the fact that Clayton's intelligence section had direct control. David Hogarth, the archaeologist, an occasional spy, became Director,  with Kinahan Cornwallis as Deputy Director

The Bureau and its secret intelligence publication The Arab Bulletin would be major players in the remaining years of the Great War.

First Vanunu, Now This: Revisiting the 1979 Vela "Double Flash"

Perhaps because of the Iranian nuclear agreement, there seems to be increased discussion of Israel's nuclear arsenal. Eyebrows were certainly raised when Mordechai Vanunu, long imprisoned and then forbidden to speak publicly for revealing details of Israel's deterrent, was interviewed on Israeli television on Septmber 4 and allowed to speak freely. That raised the question of whether the Israeli security establishment is prepared to be more open about its capabilities.

Now, Leonard Weiss revisits another old debate in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: "Flash from the past: Why an Apparent Israeli Nuclear Test in 1979 Matters Today."

For those who came in late, on September 22, 1979, a US intelligence satellite tasked to look for evidence of atmospheric nuclear testing, Vela 6911, detected a double flash where the Indian Ocean and Atlantic come together off South Africa. The double flash was characteristic of a nuclear explosion. It was speculated that it was either a South African test with Israeli assistance, or an Israeli test from a South African ship. (They were known to be cooperating at the time.) The US National Laboratories and the US Intelligence Community were convinced that it was indeed a nuclear test, but a scientific panel appointed by the government eventually declared the results inconclusive. Those familiar with the intelligence largely remained convinced it was real but the public perception was that it had been inconclusive.

Weiss's article revives the debate and reviews the evidence, allegations, and rumors. It's worth reading whether you're new to the debate or already familiar with it.

Israel's Yediot/Ynet Publishes New Revelations in the 1965 Ben Barka Assassination Case; Lengthy Story Then Disappears Down Memory Hole

Mehdi Ben Barka

Update: The story has reappeared under a new title, and I haven't compared the two.

Early Sunday morning Israel time the Ynet website, the English online site for Yediot Acharanot, published a lengthy article on the Israeli role in the 1965 disappearance and death of Moroccan dissident Mehdi Ben Barka, called "Secret History: How the Mossad became entangled in a political assassination."

You may note that I didn't link to the article. That is because within 24 hours, perhaps less, it disappeared from the website. 

The article, by investigative journalists Ronen Bergman and Shlomo Nakdimon, remained availble through Google cache last night, but now the cached version also brings up a page not found message.

Fortunately Le Monde had already interviewed one of the authors, (link is in French) and some Algerian  and Palestinian papers ran summaries, but the main story seems to have disappeared down a memory hole.

This is curious. The Israeli press is subject to military censorship, but articles must be cleared before publication. Did censorship clear it in error? Did somebody else spike the story?

If so, they must not understand the Internet. Even when someone manages to delete it from Google Cache, you can't be sure readers haven't already saved copies to the hard drives.

Readers like me.

Screencap of the story

I won't violate their copyright by quoting the story in full, but since it seems to have vanished I'll summarize it.

I previously wrote about the Ben Barka affair back in 2012. The disappearance of Ben Barka from the streets of Paris was a scandal mat the time. French investigations led to the jailing of a few French agents, and the involvement of Moroccan intelligence has long been established. Mossad's role has long been rumored, but with few details known.

Ahmad Dlimi

Bergman and Nakdimon begin by discussing Mossad's good relations with French intelligence dating from the days of the Algerian war, as well as their growing covert relations with Moroccan intelligence. They report that Morocco  provided Israel with full details of the 1965 Arab Summit in Casablanca, and in return asked for Israeli help in locating the exiled dissident, Mehdi Ben Barka.

They directly quote from interviews they had with the Mossad chief at the time, Meir Amit, prior to his death in 2009. According to Amit (as quoted in the article), Israel was willing to cooperate but did not want to get directly involved in a killing.

They helped the Moroccans locate Ben Barka, who traveled frequently, discovering he picked up mil from a kiosk in Geneva. This was conveyed to Moroccan Deputy Interior Minister Ahmed Dlimi. (The article spells it Dalimi, but Dlimi is standard in both English nd French.) But then:

But for the Moroccans, Israel's debt had not yet been paid. On October 1, 1965, they requested Mossad agents in Paris to rent them a hiding place and provide them with camouflage, makeup and fake passports. In addition, they wanted Israel to follow their target for them and advise them on how best to send Ben Barka to meet his maker.

According to the protocol of the meetings between Amit and [Prime Minister Levi] Eshkol, only on October 4 did Amit report to the prime minister about the Mossad's involvement. To sweeten the pill of what he was about to tell Eshkol, Amit began with good news, describing the valuable intelligence gathered by the Mossad at the summit in Casablanca. "I want to show you the information about the debates," Amit told Eshkol, and said that intelligence indicated that at that time, the armies of the Arab countries were not ready for war against Israel.

Then came the less good tidings: "What do they want?" Eshkol asked. Amit continued: "A very simple thing: Deliver Mehdi Ben Barka. We found him in Paris and King Hassan gave an order to kill him. They came to us and said: 'We do not want you to do it, but help us.'

Meir Amit

Israel agreed to provide five foreign passports, but they quote Amit as sayi[ng that Eshkol said to him in Yiddish, "It does not smell right to me."

Four days went by. On October 8, Amit told Eshkol: "So far, all is well. We are able to hold on. We are 'ducking' the issue."

But the Moroccans had no intention of "ducking" the issue. On October 12, Dalimi asked Israel for fake car license plates and a poisonous solution. Israel rejected the request for the license plates and suggested the use of rented cars, for which it would provide fake documentation. Dalmi also informed Israel that Oufkir had decided to postpone the operation until the end of October, but did not specify an exact date.

On October 13, 1965, Dalimi left France to return to Morocco, and Amit took this as a sign that the entire operation had been scrapped. "Thank God, they gave up on it," he told Eshkol on the same day.

Besides Amit, the report also cites the work of Dr. Shlomo Ben-Nun, an expert on Israeli-Moroccan relations.


Dlimi and his agents, with the help of French police acting on their own, kidnapped Ben Barka as he arrivved for a meeting at the famed Brasserie Lipp, They took him to an apartment on the outskirts ofn Paris and t]ortured him. The authors cite conflicting reports over whether the Mor0ccans asked Mossad for poison, but say the sources agree that Ben Barka died under torture. Mossad then assisted in disposing of the body in a forest outside Paris.

Muhammad Oufkir

Charkes de Gaulle was furious .at a kidnapping on the streets of Paris in broad daylight,  and reportedly demanded that King Hasan II hand over Dlimi and his superior, Interior Minister Muhammad Oufkir. On November 5, Amit reportedly told Eshkol, "The Moroccans killed Ben Barka. Israel had no physical connection to the act itself."

Much of this has been reported or rumored in the past. But the authors also discuss an internal Israeli blowback from the operation. According to them, Mossad's legendary "founding father," Isser Harel, retired but an adviser to Eshkol, entered the tale. They quote Harel (who died in 2003) as telling them before his death

When Harel heard of the Mossad involvement in the affair, he turned to prime minister Eshkol. Before his death, Harel described the conversation to us: "I told him (Eshkol): 'God sent me to protect you and you became terribly entangled. Amit lied to you all along. You told him not to get involved, and he was involved. Your situation is very grave. You had a consultant on this issue and you didn’t consult him. And it heightens your own responsibility, and now you have to resign.'

"Eshkol really begged for his life," Harel recounted. "I told him, in my opinion, you should appoint an inquiry commission and see who is responsible for this failure, and the findings of the investigation will decide whether you continue as prime minister. And as for Amit, you should know that he did not tell you the truth. You had an advisor and did not use him. Eshkol almost started crying ..."

Isser Harel

Eshkol refused to resign and refused to fire Amit, but continued to pursue the issue, leading to secret investigations and much infighting. Amit blamed Harel's jealousy of his successor. De Gaulle through Mossad's European headquarters out of Paris.

I can't testify to any of this and would normally have just referred you to the link. The whole story is much longer and more detailed than my summary.

As for Muhammad Oufkir, he was implicated in a plot to shoot down the King's plane in 1972, after which he committed suicide, or many believe "committed suicide." Ahmad Dlimi went on to become the hero of the war against POLISARIO in Western Sahara, becoming the most powerful figure since Oufkir and perhaps considered a threat by the King. In 1983, after a meeting with the King, he was killed in an auto accident, the "accidental" nature of which has been widely questioned.

"Such a Band of Wild Men": the British Military Intelligence Section in Cairo, December 1914, Part I

The British military General Headquarters in Cairo War Diary for December 22, 1914 (100 years ago last week) reportedly notes "Organisation Military Intelligence Department proceeding under Captain Newcombe R.E. [Royal Engineers] with five other officers sent from home. Badly needed."

Though the text seems to imply six, most sources indicate that five men constituted the officers of the new Military Intelligence unit in Cairo in mid-December, though that number would grow. Most arrived in Egypt between about December 11 and 22. The five were not exactly never to be heard from again: they included then-Captain Stewart F. Newcombe, 36, a military engineer and veteran of the Boer War who would go on to play a prominent role in the Arab Revolt, at Gallipoli, and elsewhere in the war; Leonard Woolley, 34, Oxford archaeologist and excavator of Carchemish (better known for his postwar excavations at Ur); Aubrey Herbert, 34, Member of Parliament and younger son of the Earl of Carnarvon (and half-brother of the next Lord Carnarvon, who would fund the discoverer of Tutankhamun's tomb);  Herbert, who would twice be offered the throne of Albania, is said to be the model for Sandy Arbuthnot in John Buchan's novel Greenmantle; George A. Lloyd, 35, another Member of Parliament and heir to business wealth who would eventually, as Lord Lloyd, be the High Commissioner in Egypt in the mid-1920s and write the two-volume history Egypt Since Cromer; and finally, the only one of the group under 30, a diminutive recently commissioned second lieutenant and budding 26-year-old archaeologist named Thomas Edward Lawrence. Usually better known these days as Lawrence of Arabia. In Seven Pillars of Wisdom, Lawrence would refer to the group as "such a band of wild men as we were."

Several of these men would later form part of the well-known Arab Bureau, along with others such as D.G. Hogarth, Herbert Garland, and Gertrude Bell. But the Arab Bureau would not be formed until December of 1915, when Sir Mark Sykes set it up to increase the role of Cairo at the expense of the India Office in the Middle East.

Of the five new arrivals, only Newcombe was a professional military man, though all had some experience in intelligence work; Woolley and Lawrence and Newcombe had worked together before the war. I'll have more on these men in Part III.

Gilbert Clayton

Before Turkey came into the war, British intelligence in Cairo had been rather limited, with one man, then-Lt. Col. Gilbert Clayton, heading both Military and civilian. intelligence branches. Beginning with the December arrivals, the military intelligence side would expand throughout 1915 and beyond, especially after the outbreak of the Arab Revolt in the Hejaz.

The old Savoy Hotel

When the war began, Army Headquarters was located in the Savoy Hotel, which at the time stood on Midan Qasr al-Nil, later Midan Suleiman Pasha, today's Midan Tal‘at Harb;  Lawrence and most of the others were billeted in another hotel, the Grand Continental, facing Opera Square and the Ezbekiyya Gardens, while reporting to work at the Savoy. Confusing matters is the fact that the old Savoy Hotel was torn down a few years after the war, in 1924, while the Grand Continental in that year became the Continental Savoy. (It continued in use as a hotel into the 1980s at least, but has since closed, and is now reportedly in danger of collapse.) The offices were at the Savoy; the staff stayed at the Grand Continental.

The Grand Continetal in better days

Initially, the old Savoy sufficed as Military HQ, though over time the British military would spread out to other parts of Cairo.

Ah, but some of you are saying, that doesn't look anything like British Military HQ in David Lean's 1962 epic film, Lawrence of Arabia. (The only clip I could find on YouTube is actually dubbed in Spanish, which may give you a clue):


That's not Cairo. It's the Plaza de España complex in Seville, Spain. Grandiiose, majestic, and not what it looked like.

In Part II, I'll discuss the chain of command of the Intelligence section.

Location of the old Savoy Hotel

Egypt: General Intelligence Chief Replaced

Muhammad Farid al-Tuhami

General Muhammad Farid al-Tuhami (often El-Tohamy), the powerful head of Egypt's General Intelligence Service was replaced over the weekend. Tuhami has generally been seen as a close ally of President al-Sisi, and he was Sisi's former superior in military intelligence. He was named to the GIS post immediately after Muhammad Morsi was deposed.He has been a major architect of the strong crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood.

The official reason being given is that he was replaced for health reasons, and it is reported he recently had a hip replacement.

He has been replaced by his Deputy, Khalid Fawzy, on an Acting basis.

What on Earth Does Jonathan Pollard Have to Do with the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process?

Back in the 1980s, when Jonathan Pollard was convicted of espionage, I happened to have a lot of contacts in the US intelligence community who dealt with the Middle East. While they never shared classified details, everyone from Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger on down was appalled by the magnitude of the security breach. Israelis and others claim that his life sentence is excessive for a US citizen. Perhaps, but the judge had access to classified data we don't, and the law permits stiff sentences if the betrayal led to loss of life (not known to be a factor in this case) or if "nuclear weaponry [...] war plans; communications intelligence or cryptographic information" were involved.  While I have no direct knowledge, several American and one or two Israeli sources have suggested to me through the years that all of those areas were compromised,and that several US allies in the Arab world had secure information passed along. Weinberger opposed any leniency towards Pollard as long as he lived, When Bill Clinton considered trading Pollard for peace concessions in the '90s, the CIA Director George Tenet threatened to resign. Some in the US intelligence community think Pollard's massive leaks were the biggest security breach between the nuclear secrets cases in the 40s and 50s, and Aldrich Ames, whose betrayal led to a number of executions in the Soviet union/Russia. Israel may be an ally, but you don't tell even your allies your deepest secrets.

At the time of his espionage, Pollard was a US citizen only, not a dual national. Only in the 1990s did Israel grant him citizenship and begin agitating for his release.

Pollard will be eligible for early release in a year or two, I believe, and that is an issue for the courts. But the current talk about releasing him in exchange for concessions in the Israel-Palestinian peace process strikes me as odd indeed. What has one thing got to do with the other? Spies are usually exchanged for spies, and if Israel is sincere about making progress with the Palestinians, what does Pollard have to do with it? It's mixing apples and oranges, demanding John Kerry make a concession on a bilateral US-Israeli issue in order to achieve progress between Israel end the PA. (And once you give up Pollard, how do you assure those concessions persevere? How do you know there won't be more demands?)

I believe, without having any direct knowledge, that some in the US intelligence community fear that Pollard still has sensitive information which could, even  quarter century later, be harmful to US interests  if divulged. Trade spies for spies, not for evanescent negotiating concessions. The man egregiously betrayed his oath, his trust, and his country, and was convicted in a court of law. He's not a hero.

Is Muhammad bin Nayef Replacing Bandar bin Sultan on the Saudi Syria Account?

Earlier today The Wall Street Journal reported that Saudi Intelligence Chief Prince Bandar bin Sultan, who for decades was Ambassador to the US, had been "replaced" as the Saudi responsible for Syria policy due to failures of Saudi policy in supporting the moderate Syrian rebels. Rumors about Bandar being either ill or on the way out due to the failures of his Syria policy and worsening relations with the US have been in the air for weeks, however. [Update: Let me clarify that the WSJ piece didn't explicitly say that he'd been replaced as head of intelligence; I simply read it that way at first and have changed my text to reflect the fact that the replacement only involves the Syria issue.]
This Washington Post piece by David Ignatius, known for his links in US intelligence circles, says that Western and Middle Eastern "spymasters" met to discuss Syria strategy and that Muhammad bin Nayef has taken over the Syria responsibility from Bandar, "who has been suffering from a back ailment and whose leadership of the program was seen as uneven."

One of the issues for the Saudis  is the growing power of Jihadi groups like the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Muhammad bin Nayef, when he was Deputy Interior Minister under his late father, was well-known as the main anti-terrorism chief against al-Qa‘ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), presumably even more so after an AQAP figure tried to kill him in 2009 by detonating a bomb inserted in his (the suicide bomber's) rectum. Muhammad received wounds but survived.

Bandar may well be on the way out at General Intelligence, but it would make little sense for Muhammad bin Nayef (who's on the fast track, clearly) to take a demotion. Giving him just the Syria dossier makes a lot more sense.

Thoughts on the Ignatius-Tohamy Interview

David Ignatius at The Washington Post had an interview many of you will have already seen with Egyptian General Intelligence Chief Gen. Muhammad Farid El-Tohamy. In it he explicitly says there has been "no change" in his relationship with the CIA: "'Cooperation between friendly services is in a completely different channel than the political channel',” Tohamy said. 'I’m in constant contact with [Director] John Brennan at the CIA and the local station chief, more than with any other service worldwide.'"

That's interesting given the current political climate, but the real news is the interview itself. I don't know of any Egyptian General Intelligence Chief who has given an on-the-record interview to the Western media. The late ‘Omar Suleiman may have done so after he became Mubarak's Vice President, but not while running the Mukhabarat. He did sometimes give briefings on visits to Washington, and I saw at least one of them, but they were strictly for non-attribution.

The Egyptian blogger Zeinobia offers an Egyptian take on the interview, and she also cogently notes that this comes not long after The New York Times article last month that emphasized Tohamy's being charged with corruption after the 2011 Revolution, and his rehabilitation under Sisi. Note that Tohamy's public interview was given not to the NYT but to its rival the WP. Not only might this be aimed at enhancing Tohamy's stature, but at reassuring the US policy community (the Intel community presumably being fully aware of the continued cooperation).

It's no doubt true that the GIS-CIA cooperation is greater than with "any other service worldwide," but under Suleiman the Israeli services were a close second. Neither Ignatius nor Tohamy mention Israel in their interview, but there is ample reason to believe that that relationship is also still quite healthy behind the scenes.

48 Years Ago Today, Mehdi Ben Barka Disappeared . . .

Mehdi Ben Barka

On October 29, 1965, the exiled Moroccan leftist opposition figure Mehdi Ben Barka headed to the famous Brasserie Lipp on Paris' Boulevard St. Germain for a supposed meeting he expected to be about making a film for an upcoming conference he was organizing in Havana on Third World liberation movements. Unidentified men grabbed him, shoved him into a car, and drove away. He has not been seen since.

In theory, the French consider the case still open (though no one expects a now 93-year-old Ben Barka to turn up suddenly); it's clear that Moroccan agents were involved, but there are a lingering questions about the role of French intelligence, since he was snatched in a very public place in Paris. (And, of course, some versions bring both the CIA and Mossad into the plot. Though the Middle East loves a good conspiracy theory, it's also true that the French, American and Israeli services all had close links with the Moroccan in those days.)

In 2012 I wrote a bit about the case, after a French judge tried to have the British arrest the head of the Moroccan Olympic committee at the London Olympics.

Plaque at Brasserie Lipp

Two French officers were jailed in 1967, but the French court blamed the plot on then-Moroccan Interior Minister Mohammed Oufkir, who was killed in 1972 during an attempt to overthrow the King; various alleged accounts of what happened agree Ben Barka was either killed or died under interrogation, but the accounts don't match (the body was dissolved in acid, or encased in concrete, depending on the version). Wikipedia offers a summary of various accounts and theories.

In two years, it will have been half a century. But this is not the sort of operation likely to be declassified even at this remove.

There is NOTHING Suspicious About This Fire, Nothing ...

Ahmad Qadhaf al-Dam is a cousin of the late Libyan leader Mu‘ammar al-Qadhafi and used to be one of his key liaisons to other countries and groups. He has been living in Egypt, where he apparently has both business interests and, some say, was well-connected with the former regime. Libya's revolutionary government wants him back, and has tried to extradite him. But he claims he was actually born at Mersa Matruh in Egypt and is claiming Egyptian citizenship; he's also asked for political asylum. An Egyptian court turned down the extradition request, but he was still facing charges in Egypt of resisting arrest, having a stockpile of unlicensed firearms, and other offenses. Now, however, a fire in the court building has reportedly destroyed the file relating to his case in the prosecution's office.

Now, Cairo watchers may recall that immediately after the revolution, there was a fire in the Evidence Bureau of the Interior Ministry, then one at the Central Auditing Bureau, and oh, yes, another fire at the Interior Ministry,  Conspiracy theorists thought someone must be systematically destroying evidence to prevent prosecution.

But I'm not a conspiracy theorist, so I'll just assume Mr. Qadhaf al-Dam, whatever exactly his links may be to Egyptian intelligence, has fortuitously benefited from this unfortunate fire. There is absolutely nothing to see here. Nothing.

Just to be safe though, he should probably avoid balconies in London.

New Feuds: MB versus Al-Azhar and (Maybe) General Intelligence?

 The Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt was already embroiled in its latest round of sparring with the judiciary, and now it's being challenged by another key institution, Al-Azhar, and (depending on whose version you credit), maybe an even more formidable foe, the General Intelligence Service (Jihaz al-Mukhabarat al-‘Amma,  جهاز المخابرات العامة). Though both parties are denying talk of a feud between the Brotherhood and the Mukhabarat, anyone familiar with the history of either institution is unlikely to be surprised.

First, Al-Azhar. The new Constitution provides that Al-Azhar's Senior Scholars' Authority is the final authority on issues involving Islamic law. In the past week the Shura Council, the Upper House which is functioning as a Parliament in the absence of a Lower House, pushed through a law promoted by the Muslim Brotherhood authorizing the issuance of Islamic bonds (sukuk). Al-Azhar has now insisted that, consistent with the new Constitution, it must give prior approval to the Sukuk Law. The Salafi Nour Party is supporting Al-Azhar's claim, and also wants al-Azhar to approve any new IMF agreement, since it would involve payment of interest.

One would normally expect this kind of constitutional dispute to be resolved  by the courts, but the President and the judiciary are already at loggerheads over President Morsi's replacement of the Prosecutor General.

There has already been a lot of speculation (denied by the parties, but not silenced) that the Army is increasingly disillusioned by the Brotherhood-dominated Government. Now there's a debate about General Intelligence.

First, several people expressed concern about growing problems between the Brothrhood and the GIS:

Sources close to Morsi, meanwhile, say that the president "faces a coup attempt partially orchestrated and executed by the intelligence apparatus."

In a recent television interview, Morsi himself voiced concern about what he described as "certain loopholes within the intelligence apparatus."

Morsi's statement followed assertions by FJP leader Mohamed El-Beltagi that "an intelligence officer" had been "apprehended" distributing money and weapons to thugs hired to attack Morsi supporters.

This week, Abul-Ela Madi, leader of the moderate-Islamist Wasat Party (an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood) made similar statements, alleging the existence of a wide-ranging conspiracy against Morsi from within the ranks of Egyptian intelligence.

The Wasat Party's Madi's alleged claims were reported like this:

On Tuesday, Madi said at a Wasat Party meeting that Morsi had told him that, during the Mubarak era, Egypt's General Intelligence apparatus had established a secret group of 300,000 paid thugs. He went on to assert that these thugs had appeared during recent political violence.

"President Morsi told me that, several years ago, General Intelligence had formed a secret group of 300,000 thugs, including 80,000 in Cairo alone," Madi had said in statements that were captured on video and circulated online.

He added: "General Intelligence then handed responsibility for this group over to Egypt's General Security Directorate in the interior ministry, which, in turn, handed it over to the State Security apparatus."

The group, Madi went on, "resurfaced again during recent clashes at the presidential palace [between Morsi's supporters and opponents]; this is what President Morsi told me."

But the same link cited above  has the Wasat Party's backpedal:

"The statements were [intentionally] taken out of context in order to make it look as if [Madi] was accusing an apparatus known for its patriotism," the statement asserted.
The party statement clarified that Madi had meant that the ousted regime was still using state apparatuses against its opponents.

The party went on to stress its respect for the General Intelligence apparatus.
"The Wasat Party declares its respect for Egyptian state agencies, including General Intelligence, and reiterates its longstanding position that all sovereign apparatuses – including the military, police and intelligence – should stay out of political conflicts and alliances," the statement read.

Madi, the statement added, "had been speaking about what the former regime use to do, namely, exploit state apparatuses to form gangs of thugs. What we suffer from now is the result of that ugly past, to which we will not return."

Oh, they meant the bad old General Intelligence Service, not the new one! Past and former GIS officers have been noting that the agency is subordinate to the Presidency (link is in Arabic) and politicians are defending it, though one of its former senior officials, Hossam Khairallah, turns the argument around and sees a threat to GIS from the Presidency:

"Anger is boiling over amid such continuing irresponsible statements from the [Wasat] party or other groups close to it," Hossam Khairallah, strategic analyst and former first undersecretary of Egypt's General Intelligence apparatus, told Ahram Online.

Khairallah – who ran in last year’s presidential elections that were ultimately won by the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi – articulated the simmering discontent within the ranks of the intelligence apparatus over Madi’s statements, which many of its members reportedly perceived as an insult.

The former intelligence official also condemned Egypt’s presidency for not issuing a statement on the matter. He went on to predict that Egypt's current General Intelligence chief, Major-General Mohamed Raafat Shehata, would resign if the presidency failed to react “appropriately” to the matter and hold those behind the allegations responsible.

Khairallah, for his part, denied that anything of the kind had taken place during his 35-year tenure in the intelligence apparatus, stressing that Egyptian intelligence was devoted to information collection.

"Directing such considerable numbers needs thousands of leaders," he argued. "This is illogical. It has never happened under the rule of any of Egypt's presidents."

Khairallah was of the opinion that providing such information was not in the president's interests and could even jeopardize the state's national security.

"This gives Egypt's foes the opportunity to topple an apparatus that should act as a guiding light to the president," he asserted.

"It is the country's intelligence that should be the president's guide, not the [Brotherhood's] Guidance Bureau, which believes that [former General Intelligence chief] Omar Suleiman left a black box [of information] to the apparatus," he noted.

Khairallah also voiced doubt as to the future of cooperation between the presidency and Egyptian intelligence amid what he described as "attempts to target the intelligence apparatus."

Khairallah believes that any bid to 'Brotherhoodise' Egyptian intelligence would fail, since this would bring the presidency into conflict with the army.

He pointed out that, during Egypt's transitional phase of military rule, former military head Hussein Tantawi had issued a decree stipulating that the head of intelligence should be drawn from a military background. This, Khairallah believes, further rules out any possibility of the 'Brotherhoodization' of intelligence.

Recent weeks have seen scattered reports of the imminent appointment of Mohamed El-Beltagi, secretary-general of the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party, as interior minister or intelligence chief. Such speculation, however, was later quashed by El-Beltagi, who on Thursday described the reports as "false rumours and fabricated news."

Those rumors may be behind the whole flap, a pre-emptive mood on the part of the intelligence community to block such an appointment.

The late GIS Director Omar Suleiman was a devoted enemy of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Muslim Brotherhood remembers. Most of the GIS senior leadership rose under the aegis of Suleiman and doubtless have little love for their onetime adversaries either,

Some of the GIS' defenders note that it is responsible for foreign intelligence, not domestic. This is not believed by most Egyptians, though technically State Security Investigations, part of the Interior Ministry,has the lead there. Just as State Security has now been replaced by the entirely different (new stationery!) National Security, the GIS Madi says he meant to criticize is a totally different GIS. Or so we're told.

Omar Suleiman is dead. That much is true. (Hmm...)

Cold Cases and Deep States: Suad Husni Case Dismissed for "Insufficient Evidence"

Suad Husni about 1972

I think it may have been Yossarian in Catch-22 who first remarked that just because you're paranoid doesn't mean they're not out to get you. And just because Middle Easterners tend to see plots and conspiracies everywhere doesn't mean that some of them aren't real.

A couple of days ago, an Egyptian judge dismissed a case seeking to uncover the truth behind the 2001 death in London of Egyptian actress Suad Husni, who fell, or jumped, or was pushed, from the balcony of her London high-rise apartment. Longstanding rumors that she was involved with Egyptian intelligence have led to speculation of foul play.

Conspiracy theory? Maybe. But consider this; between 1973 and 2007 four prominent, well-known Egyptians in London, three with known intelligence links and Suad Husni with rumors of same, all died mysteriously. But: three of them died by falling from their apartment balconies (or jumping, or being pushed). Starting to seem to push the coincidence level a bit? Oh, did I mention that two of them, though nearly 30 years apart, fell from balconies in the same apartment tower? The Stuart Tower in Maida Vale. No cause for suspicion in any of this, right?

The official Egyptian explanation is that most or all committed suicide,  while the British authorities found cause for suspicion, but no proof.

The four were:

1) El-Leithy Nassif. Commander of the Republican Guard under Nasser and the early years of Sadat. Named Ambassador to Greece, he went to London for medical treatment. Found dead on the pavement under his apartment on August 15, 1973. His wife claimed he was pushed and blamed Anwar Sadat. He lived in and fell from the Stuart Tower.

2. Ali Shafiq. Major General Ali Shafiq's case is unusual in that he did not fall off his balcony. A former Office Director for Nasser's number two man, Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amr, who committed suicide (or in some accounts, "committed suicide") after the 1967 war, he was later linked with Saad al-Din al-Shazly, fired by Sadat during the 1973 war. On July 5, 1977, he was found dead in his home in Harley Street in London, having been dead for some days, but was reportedly found in a pool of blood.

3. Suad Husni. The subject of this post; details momentarily. Died 2001. Fell from the Stuart Tower.

4. Ashraf Marwan. We've written about the Marwan case several times. Marwan was Nasser's son in law. In the Sadat era he headed the Arab Organization for Industrialization, which ran a large segment of Egypt's military industries, and later became an international businessman and apparently a back-channel diplomat and intelligence agent.  In 2007, amid Israeli reports that he was the double agent who tipped off Israel the day before the 1973 war and other allegations, he was found beneath the balcony of his home in St. James Park. His wife (Nasser's daughter Mona) insists he was killed. Some blame Mubarak, others Mossad. depending on their preferred conspiracy theory. But if he was a Mossad asset, why would they kill him? It's said he was trying to market his memoirs when he fell/jumped/was pushed.

Stuart Tower: Watch Your Step

Coincidences? Or perhaps a singular lack of originality on the part of the hit squad's modus operandi over three decades?

Back to Suad Husni. In the 1960s and 1970s she was Egypt's superstar, beautiful, captivating, conveying both innocence and sexiness. She dominated Egyptian films for years. When I arrived in Egypt in 1972 her film Khali Balak min Zouzou (Watch out for Zouzou) had already been in theaters for much of a year, and in that pre-VCR/DVD era, was still playing when I left. It's the usual realistic plot: college student moonlights as a belly-dancer, falls in love with her professor, etc. etc.

She continued to make films through the 1980s and into the 90s, but she also became the Egyptian equivalent of a tabloid sensation with multiple marriages. rumors of a secret marriage to singing superstar Abdel Halim Hafiz. and so on. There would also be rumors that she had links to Egyptian intelligence and to senior political leaders. Born in the poor Cairo quarter of Bulaq, she was popularly called "Cinderella," having become a princess.

In the 1990s she moved to London. She suffered from a back injury and other health issues and gained weight. (There are some mysteries about the nature of her illnesses, which further fuel the conspiracy theories.)

On June 22, 2001, she fell from her balcony. The balcony was, of course, at the Stuart Tower in Maida Vale, the same building from which Nassif fell back in 1973.

She was given a huge burial in Egypt, but rumors began immediately. Suicide was blamed, but it was noted that one slipper was found in the bathroom and one on the balcony, suggesting she had been forcibly moved. More crucially, friends and family said she had contracted for her memoirs and had been making tape recordings of those memoirs.

Only those of you who've never seen a single spy thriller will need to be told that the tapes, which some claim to have seen, were not found in her apartment and have never been found since her death.

Opposition press reports and, eventually, her own younger sister told a different tale: she had been recruited by Egyptian intelligence and worked for it for many years. One of the key figures in this was Safwat Sharif, an intelligence man under Nasser, Information Minister for decades under Sadat and Mubarak, and finally head of the Shura Council until the fall of Mubarak. In short,. one of the most powerful men in Egypt. Other names mentioned include Zakaria Azmi, Husni Mubarak's Chief of Staff. It is also alleged that she was required to provide sexual favors both to intelligence targets and to senior regime figures. And I should note that her own younger sister supports this narrative, despite its scandalous aspects.

I have no knowledge of the facts beyond the press accounts, and while I'm usually skeptical of conspiracy theories, sometimes they're pretty obvious.

But the judge decided a couple of days ago that there's "insufficient evidence." He may well be right: the British courts couldn't find a smoking gun either, but seemed to still be a bit skeptical of the suicide theory. (And please, let's do more for safety measures on balconies of London flats.) Then again, "insufficient evidence" may mean "nothing to see here: move along now."

Am I suggesting that the Egyptian intelligence and security services are still protecting themselves despite a Revolution and the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood? That the spooky parts of the Egyptian establishment (the "Deep State") are unchanged? ("Deep State" is a term used of foreign countries like Turkey and Egypt, but how many Presidents of both parties did J. Edgar Hoover serve as FBI Director in the US?)

Oh, why would I even hint at such a thing? I know that the old, hated, evil and all-powerful State Security Apparatus (jihaz amn al-dawla) was abolished and replaced with the totally new and utterly different National Security Sector (qita‘ amn al-watani). (It works for the nation, not the "state," and it's just a "sector," not a sinister "appartus." Nothing in common but that word "security." Hey, they even fired a handful of people at the top and no doubt bought new stationery. No Deep State here.

And insufficient evidence about Cinderella's fall.

A 70-Year-Old Cold Case: Assassination in Algiers

Today, Christmas Eve, marks the 70th anniversary of an assassination in Algiers in 1942 that still is veiled in mystery, speculation, and conspiracy theories: though there has never been any dispute about who pulled the trigger. And though set in an Arab country, these conspiracy theories are not the product of Arab coffeehouse gossip at all. All the players are European or American.

Christmas Eve, 1942:  only a few weeks after the Allied Operation Torch landings in French North Africa in November, the Allies have consolidated their hold on Morocco and Algeria, and are gearing up to battle the Germans for Tunisia. They had gained control of Vichy-controlled Morocco and Algeria in part by cutting deals with the local Vichy leadership and with Admiral Jean Louis Xavier François Darlan, former head of the French Navy and until the Torch landings Vice President of the Council in Vichy France, second only to Marshal Petain and Minister of Defense, Interior, and Foreign Affairs. By sheer chance Darlan had been visiting his ailing son in Algiers when the Allies landed, and he proceeded to maneuver to proclaim himself as High Commissioner of North Africa. In that capacity he won recognition from the Allied commander, General Eisenhower. Instead of becoming a prisoner of war, he found himself running the place with the Allies' blessing.  This infuriated the local French resistance, it infuriated Charles de Gaulle and the Free French, and it did not sit well at all with Winston Churchill and the British,who unlike the Americans had never recognized the Vichy regime.

Admiral Darlan

By Christmas the Germans had occupied the unoccupied, Vichy-run portions of France, but Darlan survived in North Africa thanks to his deal with the Americans. Actually, not quite until Christmas.

On the afternoon of Christmas Eve, a young 20-year-old French monarchist named Fernand Bonnier de la Chapelle waited in the corridor near Admiral Darlan's office until Darlan returned and shot him once in the face and once in the stomach.

That much everyone agrees upon. Bonnier de la Chapelle was arrested. The next day — Christmas Day — he was tried and convicted. The day after that, December 26, he was executed by a firing squad. He struck many people as confident he would be freed until close to his execution. Churchill's memoirs include the enigmatic comment, "He was surprised when they shot him."  Nothing at all suspicious about a 48-hour rush to execution, right?

Though no one doubts that Bonnier shot Darlan (there are no grassy knolls in this case), that's about all everyone agrees on. The clues and links can be read as pointing toward any of several countries/agencies behind the plot. That's not the only way in which it resembles a classic murder mystery: as in an Agatha Christie mystery, pretty much everybody had a convincing motive to remove Darlan. (Perhaps, like Murder on the Orient Express, everybody did it? But Hercule Poirot has yet to show up with the solution after seven decades.)

I have no solution to offer and there are book-length recitations of the evidence, so I'll just give a few examples of the confusing clues.

Let's start with his fellow French. As suspects go, the Gaullists seem to be the most likely to have been involved though perhaps with help from their allies. Several key Gaullist figures had links to Bonnier, and those who drove him to the scene of the shooting. And the Gaullists certainly saw Darlan as the devil incarnate.

On the other hand, General Henri Giraud, de Gaulle's rival and the favorite of the Americans, would succeed Darlan on his death as the French leader in North Africa. And Bonnier was a member of a movement called the Corps Franc d'Afrique, a Giraudist resistance movement in North Africa. And of course Vichy itself and their Nazi allies were none too happy with Darlan's cooperation with Eisenhower.

While Darlan's deal with the Americans, with Eisenhower and General Mark Clark, would seem to make the US the least likely culprit, the US was never comfortable with Darlan. The French and the British seem more likely, but there's the awkward fact that the gun used by Bonnier to shoot Darlan had belonged to a local OSS agent, the OSS being the World War II predecessor of the CIA. He had been Bonnier's superior during a training camp run jointly by the OSS and the British, and though he insisted his gun had been stolen, some claim he was near the palace when Darlan was shot. Just to show how bizarre this story is, the OSS agent in question was the famous physical anthropologist Carleton S. Coon. The OSS chief for North Africa, Col. Bill Eddy, moved Coon out of Algiers in disguise. Of course, another agency might have stolen the gun to point the finger at the Americans. Coon's anthropological views on race or out of fashion today, but he was a highly respected academic in his lifetime.

So far, the French look likely suspects, particularly the Gaullists, and the Americans less motivated but with some suspicious links. That brings us to the British. De Gaulle was the chosen Frenchman of the British, not the Americans, who were promoting Giraud. Churchill never liked the Darlan deal. If anybody was involved in this (likely along with the Free French), the British are a popular choice with many conspiracy theorists. In fact, there's a story (spread by the French) that after Darlan was shot, his last words were "The British have finally done for me."

Ah: but which British? At one point Bonnier, as part of the Corps Franc d'Afrique, had received some weapons training from Britain's Special Operations Executive (SOE), Churchill's own specially created special operations force. So the SOE had links with Bonnier, did Churchill's bidding, and were the likeliest agency for such an operation. (Not to make this too easy, though: as noted earlier the training camp was jointly run with the OSS.)

But the continuing puzzle of this story is that just when you think it's too confusing, another complication turns up. The SOE had a rivalry going with Britain's traditional overseas intelligence agency, the Secret Intelligence Service or MI6. The head of MI6 at the time was the legendary Sir Stewart Menzies, though he was not legendary at the time, when he was known only as "C." If this reminds you of something, it's probably because a young Royal Navy Commander named Ian Fleming, who worked under Menzies, later invented a spy called James Bond who worked for an MI6 chief known only as "M " and seemingly based on Menzies (whose real name, curiously, begins with "M"). Menzies remains a legendary spymaster. He is known to have been fiercely hostile to Darlan, as revealed in Alexander Cadogan's diaries..

Now, "C" rarely left England during the war, and usually not at holidays, and generally for operational reasons. Yet at Christmastime 1942 he made a secret visit (so secret his own Personal Assistant returned from the holidays without realizing his boss had been gone) to, of all, places, Algiers. (Ostensibly, to meet a French counterpart on Christmas Eve.) He was lunching in Algiers (with multiple witnesses, of course) when Darlan was killed. If MI6 was responsible, the fingerprints seeming to implicate OSS and SOE could be meant as a diversion. Or maybe all were involved.

Rivals the sort of conspiracy theories we often hear in the Middle East, doesn't it? Perhaps it really was all of the suspects, as in Murder on the Orient Express. Other than the drum-head conviction and immediate execution of Bonnier, basically nobody else was ever punished. And if any of the people mentioned in this account spent a moment  mourning Admiral Darlan, it doesn't seem to appear in the record.

Again, I'm not pointing the finger anywhere. After 70 years, if there is a paper trail somewhere, it is buried mighty deep. (And Menzies was known for not leaving paper trails.)

Half Century Old Ben Barka Case Rears its Head During Olympics

Mehdi Ben Barka

Almost 47 years ago, on October 29, 1965, the Moroccan leftist intellectual and opposition figure Mehdi Ben Barka headed to the Brasserie Lipp on Paris' Boulevard St. Germain to a meeting he expected to be about making a film for an upcoming conference he was organizing in Havana on Third World liberation movements. He was bundled into a car and whisked away. He has not been seen since.

The ghost of Ben Barka resurfaces periodically, however, and has just done so again in connection with the London Olympics. A French judge has asked British police to arrest the head of the Moroccan Olympic Committee. Judge Patrick Ramael wants to question Housni Benslimane about the disappearance of Ben Barka. Ramael has been trying to question ex-Moroccan military types for years, with little success.

L'affaire Ben Barka has long been one of the intriguing cases in the shadowy world of Middle Eastern espionage. It is generally agreed that he was kidnapped at the instigation of the Moroccan government and was either assassinated or died during interrogation. From the beginning there were allegations of French collusion; French agents may have carried out the kidnapping. At various times the CIA and Mossad have also been alleged to have played some role, and some have claimed Ben Barka was in the pay of Czech intelligence. Several people who claimed to know the truth have told their stories, but one says the body was encased in cement and another says it was dissolved in acid, so the case is hardly marked closed.

Former Moroccan Interior Minister Mohamed Oufkir is said to have been behind the kidnapping; Oufkir was killed in 1972 after he attempted to topple King Hassan II. Once Oufkir was dead the Moroccan government was content to lay the blame on him, and discourage further investigations. French involvement remains a subject of controversy in France. For background you can start with the Wikipedia article, (though the French Wikipedia article offers a bit more), though as in any good espionage thriller, the more details you learn, the less certain you are of the truth.

But the ghost of Mehdi Ben Barka keeps showing up in unexpected places, and now it has shown itself at the Olympics.

Simon Henderson on Bandar

Simon Henderson at The Washington Institute is someone I frequently find myself disagreeeing with, but he does know the Gulf monarchies very well,  and his new piece on the elevation of Prince Bandar to Chief of General Intelligence, "The Prince and the Revolution," is worthy of a read. He sees Bandar's appointment as an attempt to strengthen General Intelligence after the lackluster directorates of Princes Nawaf and Muqrin, in the era of Arab Spring and, particularly, the Syrian crisis.

Irony: Suleiman's Supporters Don't Seem to Know Their Man

 From Ahram Online's report on the arrival of the body of just-deceased former Egyptian spy chief ‘Omar Suleiman at Cairo airport before his military funeral Saturday:

Suleiman's body arrived at Cairo airport on Saturday morning amid tight security and emotional scenes as dozens of supporters of the ex-spy chief flocked to Egypt's main air transport hub. 

Wearing black t-shirts emblazoned with the Egyptian flag, they chanted prayers for Suleiman and slogans against Israel and the United States.

Suleiman may have held a lot of secrets, but his close working relationships with the intelligence and security services of both the US and Israel were not among them: they were well known. His supporters seem to be missing something here. Even the conspiracy theorists who think his death at the Cleveland Clinic means the US did him in might have trouble explaining why they're chanting against the two countries that will miss Suleiman the most.

Prince Bandar Takes Over Saudi Intelligence

Prince Bandar

Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the once high-profile Saudi Ambassador to the US, has been named head of Saudi Intelligence, replacing Prince Muqrin.

Bandar served as Ambassador to the US for an astounding 22 years, from 1983 to 2005. At the end of that tenure he was named head of the Saudi National Security Council, a post he will continue to hold along with that of Chief of General Intelligence.

Bandar, though head of the National Security Council, had dropped from sight for several years, leading to speculation about his health, physical or political. He returned to visibility in 2010.

Prince Muqrin

The appointment of the (once) high-profile Bandar suggests, as many are already saying, a recognition that the changes of Arab Spring and, particularly, the Syrian situation and the Iranian thrdeat represent a dynamically altered Middle East and necessitate a greater Saudi proactive policy.