New Feuds: MB versus Al-Azhar and (Maybe) General Intelligence?

 The Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt was already embroiled in its latest round of sparring with the judiciary, and now it's being challenged by another key institution, Al-Azhar, and (depending on whose version you credit), maybe an even more formidable foe, the General Intelligence Service (Jihaz al-Mukhabarat al-‘Amma,  جهاز المخابرات العامة). Though both parties are denying talk of a feud between the Brotherhood and the Mukhabarat, anyone familiar with the history of either institution is unlikely to be surprised.

First, Al-Azhar. The new Constitution provides that Al-Azhar's Senior Scholars' Authority is the final authority on issues involving Islamic law. In the past week the Shura Council, the Upper House which is functioning as a Parliament in the absence of a Lower House, pushed through a law promoted by the Muslim Brotherhood authorizing the issuance of Islamic bonds (sukuk). Al-Azhar has now insisted that, consistent with the new Constitution, it must give prior approval to the Sukuk Law. The Salafi Nour Party is supporting Al-Azhar's claim, and also wants al-Azhar to approve any new IMF agreement, since it would involve payment of interest.

One would normally expect this kind of constitutional dispute to be resolved  by the courts, but the President and the judiciary are already at loggerheads over President Morsi's replacement of the Prosecutor General.

There has already been a lot of speculation (denied by the parties, but not silenced) that the Army is increasingly disillusioned by the Brotherhood-dominated Government. Now there's a debate about General Intelligence.

First, several people expressed concern about growing problems between the Brothrhood and the GIS:

Sources close to Morsi, meanwhile, say that the president "faces a coup attempt partially orchestrated and executed by the intelligence apparatus."

In a recent television interview, Morsi himself voiced concern about what he described as "certain loopholes within the intelligence apparatus."

Morsi's statement followed assertions by FJP leader Mohamed El-Beltagi that "an intelligence officer" had been "apprehended" distributing money and weapons to thugs hired to attack Morsi supporters.

This week, Abul-Ela Madi, leader of the moderate-Islamist Wasat Party (an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood) made similar statements, alleging the existence of a wide-ranging conspiracy against Morsi from within the ranks of Egyptian intelligence.

The Wasat Party's Madi's alleged claims were reported like this:

On Tuesday, Madi said at a Wasat Party meeting that Morsi had told him that, during the Mubarak era, Egypt's General Intelligence apparatus had established a secret group of 300,000 paid thugs. He went on to assert that these thugs had appeared during recent political violence.

"President Morsi told me that, several years ago, General Intelligence had formed a secret group of 300,000 thugs, including 80,000 in Cairo alone," Madi had said in statements that were captured on video and circulated online.

He added: "General Intelligence then handed responsibility for this group over to Egypt's General Security Directorate in the interior ministry, which, in turn, handed it over to the State Security apparatus."

The group, Madi went on, "resurfaced again during recent clashes at the presidential palace [between Morsi's supporters and opponents]; this is what President Morsi told me."

But the same link cited above  has the Wasat Party's backpedal:

"The statements were [intentionally] taken out of context in order to make it look as if [Madi] was accusing an apparatus known for its patriotism," the statement asserted.
The party statement clarified that Madi had meant that the ousted regime was still using state apparatuses against its opponents.

The party went on to stress its respect for the General Intelligence apparatus.
"The Wasat Party declares its respect for Egyptian state agencies, including General Intelligence, and reiterates its longstanding position that all sovereign apparatuses – including the military, police and intelligence – should stay out of political conflicts and alliances," the statement read.

Madi, the statement added, "had been speaking about what the former regime use to do, namely, exploit state apparatuses to form gangs of thugs. What we suffer from now is the result of that ugly past, to which we will not return."

Oh, they meant the bad old General Intelligence Service, not the new one! Past and former GIS officers have been noting that the agency is subordinate to the Presidency (link is in Arabic) and politicians are defending it, though one of its former senior officials, Hossam Khairallah, turns the argument around and sees a threat to GIS from the Presidency:

"Anger is boiling over amid such continuing irresponsible statements from the [Wasat] party or other groups close to it," Hossam Khairallah, strategic analyst and former first undersecretary of Egypt's General Intelligence apparatus, told Ahram Online.

Khairallah – who ran in last year’s presidential elections that were ultimately won by the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi – articulated the simmering discontent within the ranks of the intelligence apparatus over Madi’s statements, which many of its members reportedly perceived as an insult.

The former intelligence official also condemned Egypt’s presidency for not issuing a statement on the matter. He went on to predict that Egypt's current General Intelligence chief, Major-General Mohamed Raafat Shehata, would resign if the presidency failed to react “appropriately” to the matter and hold those behind the allegations responsible.

Khairallah, for his part, denied that anything of the kind had taken place during his 35-year tenure in the intelligence apparatus, stressing that Egyptian intelligence was devoted to information collection.

"Directing such considerable numbers needs thousands of leaders," he argued. "This is illogical. It has never happened under the rule of any of Egypt's presidents."

Khairallah was of the opinion that providing such information was not in the president's interests and could even jeopardize the state's national security.

"This gives Egypt's foes the opportunity to topple an apparatus that should act as a guiding light to the president," he asserted.

"It is the country's intelligence that should be the president's guide, not the [Brotherhood's] Guidance Bureau, which believes that [former General Intelligence chief] Omar Suleiman left a black box [of information] to the apparatus," he noted.

Khairallah also voiced doubt as to the future of cooperation between the presidency and Egyptian intelligence amid what he described as "attempts to target the intelligence apparatus."

Khairallah believes that any bid to 'Brotherhoodise' Egyptian intelligence would fail, since this would bring the presidency into conflict with the army.

He pointed out that, during Egypt's transitional phase of military rule, former military head Hussein Tantawi had issued a decree stipulating that the head of intelligence should be drawn from a military background. This, Khairallah believes, further rules out any possibility of the 'Brotherhoodization' of intelligence.

Recent weeks have seen scattered reports of the imminent appointment of Mohamed El-Beltagi, secretary-general of the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party, as interior minister or intelligence chief. Such speculation, however, was later quashed by El-Beltagi, who on Thursday described the reports as "false rumours and fabricated news."

Those rumors may be behind the whole flap, a pre-emptive mood on the part of the intelligence community to block such an appointment.

The late GIS Director Omar Suleiman was a devoted enemy of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Muslim Brotherhood remembers. Most of the GIS senior leadership rose under the aegis of Suleiman and doubtless have little love for their onetime adversaries either,

Some of the GIS' defenders note that it is responsible for foreign intelligence, not domestic. This is not believed by most Egyptians, though technically State Security Investigations, part of the Interior Ministry,has the lead there. Just as State Security has now been replaced by the entirely different (new stationery!) National Security, the GIS Madi says he meant to criticize is a totally different GIS. Or so we're told.

Omar Suleiman is dead. That much is true. (Hmm...)

Irony: Suleiman's Supporters Don't Seem to Know Their Man

 From Ahram Online's report on the arrival of the body of just-deceased former Egyptian spy chief ‘Omar Suleiman at Cairo airport before his military funeral Saturday:

Suleiman's body arrived at Cairo airport on Saturday morning amid tight security and emotional scenes as dozens of supporters of the ex-spy chief flocked to Egypt's main air transport hub. 

Wearing black t-shirts emblazoned with the Egyptian flag, they chanted prayers for Suleiman and slogans against Israel and the United States.

Suleiman may have held a lot of secrets, but his close working relationships with the intelligence and security services of both the US and Israel were not among them: they were well known. His supporters seem to be missing something here. Even the conspiracy theorists who think his death at the Cleveland Clinic means the US did him in might have trouble explaining why they're chanting against the two countries that will miss Suleiman the most.

The Suleiman Funeral and the Problem of Who Will Attend

Today's death of ‘Omar Suleiman, the Egyptian intelligence chief and, briefly., Vice President, has created something of a protocol quandary. He was, after all, Vice President of the country, in fact the only Vice President it has had since Husni Mubarak ascended to the Presidency. He also heald the rank of Major General in the Armed Forces, so he is of course being accorded a military funeral (tomorrow) and, unsurprisingly, Field Marshal Tantawi will attend.

But what about President Morsi? ‘Omar Suleiman's record as an intelligence chief is mostly sealed, but of one thing he never made any secret: he was the inveterate foe of the Muslim Brotherhood, jailing them at home and working against their ally Hamas abroad. Will the Muslim Brothjerhood President attend the funeral of the man known for jailing Brotherhood members. (Morsi himself has spent short prisons in jail, though not the years of many of his colleagues.)

Early indications are, no: someone from the Presidential office will represent Morsi at the funeral. This could change, but it is the sort of awkward problem likely to crop up during Egypt's transition. When Mubarak dies, the fact that he was convicted of a crime and imprisoned might mean a low-key funeral. But Suleiman is an ex-Vice President, with no convictions, though there was speculation he might have left Egypt to live in the Gulfs when he left the country after Morsi's election.

And of course the conspiracy theorists are out in force, as is to be expected for a man with a spooky background like Suleiman's. Either the US did him in (after all, this week's conspiracy, as Hillary Clinton learned, is that the US is promoting the Muslim Brotherhood), or he actually died in the bombing in Damascus! 

‘Omar Suleiman, 1936-2012: A Spymaster Departs

At the End, He Made the Announcement

Everyone had their obituaries for Husni Mubarak written a month ago when he was reported to be clinically dead. He recovered, but the man who served him in so many ways and in the end became his Vice President and then, in a final service, announced Mubarak was stepping down, ‘Omar Suleiman has died in a US hospital.

Just this spring, he had sought to run for President, but was disqualified for insufficient petition signatures.  If had run and won, Egypt would have a different sort of constitutional crisis.

More recently, after Muhammad Morsi won the Presidency, he left the country. There were Egyptian reports that he had asked for asylum in the UAE; he denied these. We now learn he was in the US, apparently at the Cleveland Clinic, for medical tests, and died unexpectedly.

The obits will no doubt tell all the usual stories,  how Mubarak credited him with saving his life in Addis Ababa during an assassination attempt and trusted him thereafter as he trusted no one else; how he gradually emerged from the shadows (for years, his photo never appeared, and his name rarely, in the newspapers) to become Egypt's first Vice President in 30 years, and in that iconic scene shown above, announced — seemingly unwillingly and with "the man behind ‘Omar Suleiman" looking sternly from over his shoulder, that Mubarak had "decided" to step down.

They will mention that he was Egypt's liaison with Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and they will mention the allegations of his role in renditions. But they will not tell all the stories, because none of us know all the stories. Whatever else ‘Omar Suleiman was, he was a professional intelligence man, and like any such, many of his successes were never announced. Because he moved in that shadowy realm where Western intelligence agencies, Arab intelligence agencies, the Palestinian security services and Mossad all collaborate and deny they are doing so, we will probably never know the best stories.

I met him once, at a background briefing in DC. He said what you would expect him to say. He gave nothing away. I got little sense of the man himself. You weren't supposed to.

Though he held the rank of Major General and had served as head of Egypt's Military Intelligence before heading its General Intelligence Service (one of only a few men to head both the military and civilian intelligence bodies), he dressed in civilian clothes as head of General Intelligence.

His role as Vice President and the man who announced Mubarak's departure was his most visible role, but compared to running Egyptian intelligence for a decade and a half, that was a fleeting fame. His career was not aimed at fame, but was lived in the shadows. Perhaps both the best and worst assessments we can give are the same: he was first and last a man of the mukhabarat, and he appears to have been good at it.

Egypt's Election Mess Stays Messy: Now What?

Despite rumors and speculation that one or more of the candidates excluded from Egypt's election campaign over the weekend would be reinstated on appeal, the Elections Committee has reaffirmed the ban on all ten, including the "big three" of Khairat al-Shater Hazem Abu Isma‘il, and ‘Omar Suleiman.

The Arabist has responded with a "thank God" reaction which I understand (each of the three, he feels, is a destabilizing factor), but am not sure that knocking out the three front runners is going to convince anyone that democracy is taking hold. In fact, Hazem Abu Isma‘il's supporters have already been taking to the streets, and that's likely to continue. The Muslim Brotherhood had a backup candidate in place, Muhammad Morsi, who may not be as divisive within the Brotherhood ranks as Shater. Suleiman was a late starter, and there are allegations the security services were rallying support for him. So while the candidacies may be destabilizing, depriving these constituencies of their candidates will be equally so, I should think.

In a recent piece, Nathan Brown referred to the present increasingly murky mess as "Egypt's Transition Imbroglio." He noted:

There are, to be sure, some rules. In the seven weeks following former President Hosni Mubarak's forced departure last year, a series of policy statements by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), a set of constitutional amendments developed by an ad hoc committee appointed by the SCAF and approved in a referendum, and a "constitutional declaration" drafted secretly and proclaimed by the SCAF collectively laid out a set of procedures for rebuilding the Egyptian political order. Those procedures have largely been followed. But they have led Egypt into a state of complete confusion.

Indeed. "Imbroglio" is much too mild: the situation is currently [fouled] up beyond all recognition.Ten of the 20-odd candidates for President have been disqualified. Perhaps more critically, the Constitutional Assembly has been suspended by the courts, while SCAF and Field Marshal Tantawi are now saying that the constitution must be in place for SCAF to hand over power to the elected President on June 30, which is only a month and a half away and with no constitution-writing body in being. Is that an implied threat to stay in power on the part of the military? It sounds like one to me, raising the possibility that the return to the barracks will be postponed even further.

Brown adds, "But if the word 'process' has any meaning left, it cannot be applied to Egyptian politics today." His article carefully traces how the present mess evolved, for those who came in late.

While, like The Arabist, I wasn't eager to see either a Muslim Brotherhood candidate win or ‘Omar Suleiman return, and Hazem Abu Isma‘il would be arguably worse than either, the mass disqualifications here are reminiscent of the Mubarak era, where the rules were constantly manipulated to produce the desired results. Some have suspected all along that the Egyptian Establishment (though that itself seems fragmented these days) had decided on Amr Moussa as the next President: but he would not get there without clearing aside these other "front-runners" (if, in fact, that's what they were). Abdel-Mouneim Abu'l-Futuh, who has appeal to both liberals and Islamists, is probably the other major alternative to Moussa, assuming the disqualifications stand.

From the beginning, many objected to the idea of holding Presidential elections before writing the new Constitution. Or perhaps have a weak (but civilian) interim Presidency like Tunisia has, while the constitution is written. But it's too late for that now (or is it?). The next few weeks will be turbulent. Will they also be violent?

Links: Odds and Ends

Here's a  Monday grab bag of the interesting, the odd, the funny, and stuff I can't find anyplace else for:

• From The Arabist: "Of Course Omar Suleiman's Office is Entirely Black."  And judging from the picture he reprints, it really is.

• Hurriyet Daily News: "Turkey 'Acquitted' of 1915 Incidents in Malta."  (Hat tip to Abu Reyhan al-Biruni via Facebook.) I'm not making this up: Turkey's EU Minister says Ottoman officials were investigated by the British on Malta after World War I and werte "acquitted" of the Armenian Genocide (the latter two words in quotes of course in a Turkish paper), so that proves it didn't happen. Well, now that that's finally settled . . .

• Geocurrents: "Circassians in Israel." Focusing on two Circassian villages in northern Israel.

• The always useful CairObserver blog: "Cathedral of Abbasiyya: "a Masterpiece in the Center og Cairo." The Coptic Cathedral of Saint Mark, seat of the Coptic Pope.

• Ahram Online: "Is Sham El-Nesim Against Islam?" More on Salafi attempts to promote a boycott of today's spring holiday in Egypt. Apparently, though, it didn't work and turnouts were normal or better.

Your ‘Omar Suleiman Joke of the Day

From The Arabist, via Twitter, your ‘Omar Suleiman joke of the day.
Much as I hate to explain a good joke and perhaps ruin it, for those who came in late, the beating death of Khaled Said by police in Alexandria in 2010 became a major provocation for the protests that led to the revolution; then the Facebook  page "We are all Khaled Said" (originally started by Wael Ghonim) became a major rallying point. As a revolutionary slogan, "We are all Khaled Said" became famous.

‘Omar Suleiman: What Does His Run Mean?

This is one of the better Internet comments on ‘Omar Suleiman, in part because it doesn't require as much explanation to outsiders as most do. The caption reads "‘Omar Suleiman" but the "leiman" overlaps with the same Arabic letters in the phrase "Liman Turah" — Turah Prison, the notorious home for political prisoners outside of Cairo. It captures the darker side of Suleiman's reputation.

Come to think of it, if there's a brighter side to Suleiman's reputation, it must be classified. David Kenner at Foreign Policy sums up the man's career with links to some of the more well-known allegations against him. He was not a man who operated in the daylight, and he seems an odd choice for a political candidate. I heard him speak once, even met him briefly, but the speech was predictably off the record, so I can't comment on it here, though it was not about intelligence matters but about his role as mediator on Palestinian-Israeli issues.

Both Suleiman and Field Marshal Tantawi have denied that Suleiman is SCAF's candidate. While Suleiman held a general's rank and rose through the Army, the General Intelligence Director's job was a nominally civilian one. His power in the Mubarak regime came from his close personal relationship with Mubarak, not from the military. General Intelligence reports directly to the Presidency and thus was not under the influence of either the Ministry of Defense (the Armed Forces) or the Ministry of the Interior (which ran State Security and the multiple police agencies). While a key part of the security apparatus, he was not necessarily the only power center.

From a conventional political analysis Suleiman would not seem to be an ideal candidate. Until the last decade or so his photo was never published in newspapers. Even his name rarely appeared until he emerged as interlocutor with Israel and the Palestinians. If he's not the Army's candidate, why is he being treated as such a serious contender?

A common term in the past year has been fallul, the "remnants" of the old regime. But Suleiman is not a "remnant" of the old regime: he's more like the core of the old regime. A Wikileaks cable from a US diplomat famously called him "Mubarak's consigliere." He presumably appeals to those members of the Armed Forces, police, security services, and others who feel the need for a strong hand to restore order and maintain stability.

When the Soviet Union fell, Western observers were startled to see some demonstrators displaying photos of Joseph Stalin. But if the 20th century taught anything, it taught that there is, for some people at least, a temptation towards choosing a strongman when society is in flux. The man on the white horse, the enforcer who will make the trains run on time. Though the 20th century also taught that this approach doesn't work out well, it may be at work here.

And I have already noted in earlier postings that the man's well-known antipathy to the Muslim Brotherhood (if "antipathy" is defined as "throwing all of them in jail") makes him a Great Iron-Fisted Hope for some who fear the rise of the Brotherhood. But at what cost?

Some have said that his identity as one of the rare Upper Egyptians in a former regime dominated by men from he Delta is one of his strengths (Suleiman comes from Qena, near Luxor, and like most Upper Egyptians has strong "tribal" ties with many in the region). But the Upper Egyptian connection is not going to win any elections.

It is, of course, possible that everyone is reading too much into Suleiman's candidacy. Perhaps he will go nowhere. But if there is about to be a wave of disqualifications (Khairat al-Shater's pardon is too recent, Abu Isma‘il's mother is American, etc.), many will suspect that the fix is in. But the reaction to Suleiman's candidacy is also fierce, and the poster above is only a mild example. The hydra-head of the former regime seems to still have some life in it. The question at this point is how much.

I think it would be unwise for Americans and Israelis to look at Suleiman's record as a friend and collaborator of both countries as a plus. For most Egyptians, he was a "collaborator" in the negative sense of that word, and is seen as doing the will of the Americans and, worse, the Israelis. In the long run, that perception just fuels anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiments, which are already strong enough.

As this campaign develops, perhaps the mystery of why Suleiman is running will become clearer. But the sense that the old regime is still struggling, Rasputin-like, back to life will linger so long as figures like Suleiman remain players in the center of the public stage.

Suleiman Agrees (Under Pressure of "Popular Will")(?) to Run at Last Minute

Though Sunday is the deadline for submitting signatures to file as a Presidential candidate in Egypt, longtime General Intelligence Service Chief and short-time Vice President to Husni Mubarak, Gen. ‘Omar Suleiman, has "bowed to popular will" and agreed to run after saying as recently as yesterday that he would not.

Yes, there were demonstrations calling for him to run. And surely they were genuine: I mean, there's no way a guy who spent all those years running the intelligence service could bring people out into the street in his name, is there? No built-in constituency of old Mubarak spooks? Nah. I'm sure it's grass-roots.

And I'm equally sure no one has already been quietly collecting all those signatures he's going to need to have in place by Sunday.

UPDATE: From Ursula Lindsey at The Arabist's reaction to the Suleiman candidacy, I get the sense she's not enthusiastic:

But creepy Mubarak spy-master Omar Suleiman has also apparently just announced he will join the race! . . . Suleiman as Egypt's next president would really be ten times worse than a slap in the face to the revolution (it'd be more like a foot endlessly stomping on the face of the revolution...) That said, I'm surprised by news stories calling him a "front-runner." in a recent Al Ahram poll, he had 10% of the vote. While he can count on the police and intelligence communities, reactionaries and morons in search of "an iron fist," I think a majority of the country would never vote for him. They'd have to rig it to get him in. 

 Oh, go on, tell us what you really think.

UPDATE 2: Zeinobia via Twitter:

Late Entries in the Egypt Presidential Race Could Change Calculus

 Over 1,000 Egyptians have already put forward their names as potential Presidential candidates. The overwhelming majority will never put together the signatures needed to register them as formal candidates (30,000 voter signatures from at least 15 governors or the support of 30 members of Parliament), but perhaps hope springs eternal. The serious candidates had seemed to emerge some time ago: former Arab Leagues Secretary General Amr Moussa, former Muslim Brotherhood figure Abdel Moneim Abu'l-Futuh, Salafi figure Hazem Abu Ismail, young liberal Khalid Ali, former Air Force Commander and Prime Minister Ahmad Shafiq, Mansur Hassan, etc. etc. But in the past few days two new names have (so far unofficially) appeared in speculation, and they could dramatically transform the field.

One of these is former head of General Intelligence and (briefly) Mubarak's only Vice President, ‘Omar Suleiman. After dropping from sight after the revolution he has re-emerged and is making public appearances amid reports he will run. He may represent a coalition of the intelligence and security establishment; he may have little real support at all. But no one knows what broader constituency his renewed prominence may indicate.

Perhaps more important is the possibility of a Muslim Brotherhood candidate. The Brotherhood has a plurality in the People's Assembly and dominates the newly named constituent assembly, The Brotherhood had said it would not run a candidate, and when Abu'l-Futuh announced his candidacy, the Brotherhood expelled him and said it would expel members supporting him.

But now the Brotherhood is reconsidering, and there's much speculation it might put forward Deputy General Guide Khairat al-Shater. He runs the Brotherhood's business interests, spent years in prison under Mubarak, and some say he is the real power behind General Guide Muhammad Badie. (See a New York Times piece on Shater here, and Shater's webpage here (Arabic). Until the past week or so Shater was generally tipped to be the Brotherhood's candidate for Prime Minister in a coalition Cabinet. Now there's talk of his running for President instead. His entry would reshuffle the deck and reopen the betting.

The registration process closes April 8, so things should become clear this week and next.  Shater would transform the race; Suleiman would at least complicate the question of who the "establishment" candidate is.

UPDATE: The Brotherhood will reportedly consider Shater, Parliament Speaker Katatni, and Freedom and Justice Party leader Muhammad Mursi tomorrow, and announce a result by Thursday.

Rumor or Disinformaton? Iran says ‘Omar Suleiman to Assist Crown Prince Nayef?

This is one of the wilder stories out there, and one must consider the source: Iran's PressTV, quoting Iran's Fars news agency: "Nayef Hires Egypt's Ex-Spy Chief."  Iran of course loves to portray Saudi Arabis in a bad light, but they're claiming that when Egypt's former intelligence chief and (briefly) Vice President &slquo;Omar Suleiman arrived in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj, newly  elevated Crown Prince Nayef appointed him his security advisor,

And, of course, they manage to mention Suleiman's close ties with Israeli intelligence.

Bear in mind that Nayef has been denouncing Iran for the alleged plot against the Saudi Ambassador to the US. This belongs in the category of coffeehouse gossip at best, given the source. But it's also something I couldn't resist passing on.

Egypt's Role in the Shalit Deal: The Post-Suleiman GIS

Exactly which factors contributed most to the conclusion of the Shalit deal now rather than at any of the several times in recent years  when it seemed near may not be known for a while. One factor I think may have contributed is the fact that Egypt's relations with Hamas have improved since the fall of Husni Mubarak and the departure of ‘Omar Suleiman, the longtime head of Egypt's General Intelligence Service.

It was still the GIS which brokered the deal; it is the one Egyptian agency that still has solid ties to Israel, but with Suleiman gone from the scene (Murad Mawafi now heads the GIS), relations with Hamas apparently have improved. Suleiman had a deep and poorly concealed contempt for Hamas, which doubtless proved an impediment to Egypt's effort to be an honest broker.

The Most Talked About Man in Egypt

Who has his own Twitter hashtag, several Facebook pages dedicated to him, and is the subject of intense discussion in the social media today? Why, it's the guy behind ‘Omar Suleiman.

In several of Suleiman's last TV appearances, including the brief one announcing Mubarak's resignation, an unidentified man appears behind the Egyptian Vice President. He has the very serious look of a bodyguard or security man, but if so, why did he appear on camera? In the picture at left, it's hard to avoid wondering if he's holding a gun at Suleiman's back or otherwise making sure he says what he's supposed to, after Mubarak's Thursday night fakeout. For the past day or so there's been a lot of speculation and a lot of jokes in circulation ("State TV announces there was no one behind ‘Omar Suleiman").

All the jokes aside, it turns out he's Staff Lt. Col. Hussein Sharif, commander of something called Group 64 of the Egyptian Special Forces. What he was doing there is still unclear. Bodyguard or enforcer?

Tomorrow Could Be Critical

The clear mixture of disappointment and anger in Tahrir Square when Mubarak only transferred authority but did not resign suggest that tomorrow's demonstrations will be angrier than before. With what amounts to a general strike under way as well, tomorrow could in fact be particularly dangerous. Once again it appears as if Mubarak, and perhaps ‘Omar Suleiman as well, are not comprehending the situation and still assuming they can ride it out. A lot of people are comparing it to Ben Ali's third, "I have understood you," speech. (Ben Ali said he'd leave at the end of his term. He left the next day.)

Mubarak was also rather ambiguous about the delegation of powers. The Egyptian Ambassador to Washington has said that Suleiman has been given all Presidential authority, but that was not clear in the speech, at least not clear to the crowds in Tahrir. (Also, about three or four years ago a new round of constitutional amendments said the President cannot delegate the power to dissolve Parliament or amend the constitution to the Vice President.

The terms of the Military Council's "communique nunber one", and statements made to the demonstrators by senior military officials, certainly led the crowds to assume Mubarak would do more than they perceive him to have done. Now the crowds are furious. What is the Army thinking? Will there be a communique number two?

Tomorrow may hold some answers. People have had their hopes raised and then disappointed. They are angry. I'm reminded of the lines in Herman Melville's poem about the anger over the assassination of Lincoln:

There is sobbing of the strong,
And a pall upon the land;
But the People in their weeping
Bare the iron hand;
Beware the People weeping
When they bare the iron hand.

The Man Who Never Speaks, Speaks

Vice President ‘Omar Suleiman has gone on Egyptian TV to say that he has been entrusted to begin negotiations with the opposition in the next days. The man whose face never appeared in newspapers till a few years ago is now the apparent face of the government, as Mubarak remains wherever he may be. (Sharm al-Sheikh?, surrounded by those troops the Israelis approved deploying?)

Combined with the Army statement, I suspect the beginning of a transition, in which General Suleiman and perhaps the Army command discuss with the opposition's representatives what comes next.

I don't think Suleiman would be accepted by the opposition as a long-term leader, but as someone the Army would trust he could be used to usher in a transition.

If not the beginning of the end, at least, to steal from Churchill, also addressing an Egyptian subject (El Alamein), today's events may be the end of the beginning.

But tomorrow may be tense. Amid talk of a huge demonstration assembling from all over the country tomorrow, the government has halted train service throughout Egypt. After shutting down the Internet, the phones (now back), the banks (and the ATMs are out too, perhaps due to the Internet), Egypt has now committed itself to guaranteeing the trains won't run on time.

Rearranging Deck Chairs or Preparing a Transition?

I can think of two possible readings of the ‘Omar Suleiman appointment as Vice President of Egypt, the first Mubarak has named. The obvious one is that he sought to reassure about the succession (and deep six the Gamal Mubarak idea), but in the present context that seems like the proverbial rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.

The more optimistic reading is that Mubarak named Suleiman to give himself time to get out the door; to arrange a smooth transition to someone the Army knows and trusts, but who in turn could preside over the transition to some sort of coalition government to prepare for new elections.

I said it was an optimistic reading. So far, Mubarak doesn't seem to get what's happening. Someone tweeted yesterday, citing Ben Ali's "I have understood you" speech, that Mubarak's speech was more, "I'm sorry, I didn't understand you? Could you say it again?"

Tomorrow may see the naming of the new Cabinet, which could give us a clue as to whether Mubarak might move towards a transition, or whether he still doesn't get it.

Quick Takes

A couple of quick thoughts, with more to come later:

• ‘Omar Suleiman as Vice President (sorry, Gamal) and Ahmad Shafiq as Prime Minister would have been daring moves if made, say, on Monday. It finally offers a vision of potential successors who aren't named Mubarak.
  

• But Suleiman's role as head of General Intelligence may make him too suspect after all that has happened. (Though General Intelligence has never been as intrusive in the life of the average citizen as the dreaded State Security.)His age and his health are also issues as far as succession goes.

• Ahmad Shafiq is a respected former head of the Air Force (and more recently Civil Aviation Minister). But the Air Force is Mubarak's old service. Again, these moves made sooner might have forestalled the revolt. But made now, they may be too little, too late.

• Crowds tried to storm the Interior Ministry in the Lazoghly neighborhood. Home base of State Security, "Lazoghly," as it's sometimes known, is the Bastille of this revolt.

I'll have more comments later.

What's With the ‘Omar Suleiman Move?

I didn't fully appreciate, in my note yesterday about the ‘Omar Suleiman posters popping up around Cairo, that this happened when both the President and "Jimmy" (Gamal) were in Washington peaceifying. That is, indeed, a curious piece of timing, and there's a whiff of grapeshot coming from it all: is the intelligence community/Armed Forces sending a message here?

The internal machinations of the Egyptian elite (and, since the Sadat era, especially the military relations with the political sphere) are as opaque as the internal dynamics of the Saudi princes: those who think they know what's going on are almost certainly wrong. But reflecting on the timing — ElBaradei's star is fading; Gamal in in DC getting a taste of diplomacy; Saad Ibrahim gave Gamal a big PR boost, willingly or no — this is interesting timing.

A comment on my post of yesterday, and my response thereto, are worth repeating:

aron said...

"The fact that Suleiman still has his job suggests ... that he's not behind it"

Shouldn't he, well, say that? If it's really that clear where he stands on succession, one can't help but think a public statement would be in order. The absence of one is what's really perplexing.

Thursday, September 2, 2010 4:24:00 PM EDT

Michael Collins Dunn said...

aron:

Perplexing,yes, but typical. Suleiman almost never speaks for the record, never says much to the press, and then ONLY on Israeii-Palestinian issues, the one part of his portfolio that he's allowed (or perhaps chooses) to comment on publicly. His rare public appearances are off the record; I attended one some years ago, but have to respect the ground rules, though he said nothing of substance you don't already know. He's a classic spook. Say nothing much, and say even that on deep background.

I don't think he could make stump speeches: the aversion in professional spooks is pretty ingrained.

Friday, September 3, 2010 12:42:00 AM EDT

Now, the early commentary is interesting. Zeinobia is concerned, wondering why the supposed supporters of Suleiman say (I haven't found that quote) that security (presumably State Security, thus, the Interior Ministry) is supporting Gamal. She wonders if there is a rift between the Interior Ministry and the Military. It's a good question, but if this is some kind of ploy while Mubsrak is out of the country, it seems unlikely to be initiated by Suleiman. But then, if it's not, why doesn't he repudiate it?

Suleiman, at 74, is no youngster, has close links with the US and Israel (particularly with their intelligence bodies), and until a few years ago had no public profile whatsoever. Does that make him qualified to be President? (Well, I suppose if you compare him to Gamal . . .)

There's a new Facebook campaign, including as a starter a detailed hio of the man.

So who is this guy?

He was born in the Qena Governorate of Upper Egypt in 1936, and that makes him the rare Upper Egyptian in a regime whose elite are mostly from roots in the Delta, many from Menufiyya like Mubarak (and Sadat). He attended the Military Academy and served in the War in Yemen and the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, though his exact role is not stated. He served first in Military Intelligence, rose to command it in 1991, and in 1993 shifted to the General cntelligence Service (in US terms, shifting from DIA to CIA, but with both agencies far more powerful inside the regime).

In June 1995, he was in the car with Mubarak when it was attacked by assassins in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; Mubarak reportedly credits Suleiman with saving his life, and the two men have been personally close ever since. Traditionally the head of General Intelligence is never mentioned, but since about 2000 when he began to be involved directly as an Israeli-Palestinian mediator, he's regularly appeared in news photos.

Still, he's a man of the shadows, and there's little to suggest he wants the Presidency, though as the commenter above notes, it's time for him to say so if he doesn't. If he really is moving for the Presidenxcy and/or there's a split between the military and Interior Ministry over the succession, this could be important.

And Now, ‘Omar Suleiman Posters

Now posters are appearing in Cairo promoting ‘Omar Suleiman for President. You'll recall that as long ago as last summer, a website sprung up promoting the idea.

The "anonymous" group prmoting Suleiman remain a matter fof speculation: are they just anti-Gamal, or is there some genuine effort by the army or the security services to influence the succession? The fact that Suleiman still has his job suggests either that he's not behind it, or that the regime may not be as committed to the Gamal succession as most people think. I suspect the former.

The idea of Suleiman as a transitional figure probably appeals to some in the US government as well, but it's hard to see a career intelligence man as a democratizing figure. (Though to be fair, General Intelligence has a far better reputation than State Security, which is under Interior Minister Habib al-‘Adly and is the really feared agency.)

Happy 82nd Birthday to Husni Mubarak

Husni Mubarak turns 82 today. In honor of his special day I will refrain from my usual jokes about his complete lack of gray hair, despite the fact that mine's white and I'm 20 years his junior.

I will note, however, that there have been a fair number of rumors lately that he might actually name a Vice President. Also there've been reports that he may want ‘Omar Suleiman in that post, and even that he may want Suleiman to serve one five-year term and then yield to Gamal.

Needless to say, these reports are somewhere between just-made-up and, possibly, faint trial balloons. That's why I haven't mentioned them: we've heard so many rumors of this kind that I have no reason to credit these more than all the others. Only the President knows for sure what his plans are, but given his recent surgery, his seemingly lengthy convalescence (he's still at Sharm al-Sheikh, where he met with Netanyahu, and has ventured only as far as Ismailia), and the fact he's now 82, and elections are due by next year, something is going to have to happen fairly soon.

For one thing, protests have been building. There were major protests Sunday in favor of a rise in the minimum wage, which the government is apparently meeting in part. [And by "in part" I mean the protesters wanted a minimum wage of LE1200 (about US$216) a month, while the government has raised it from LE 214 ($38.50) to LE280 ($50)]. The cancellation of a march yesterday provoked more protest.

There's also the news that the Muslim Brotherhood will field 15 candidates in the upcoming Maglis al-Shura elections (Egypt's upper house). Having been blocked from running candidates before, it's running MB members who already hold seats in the lower house (the Maglis al-Sha‘b or People's Assembly). The Arabist offers his assessment of this story here.

Rumors or no, a fin du régime air is building, and some inkling of what is going to happen next is going to have to come at some point,

Happy birthday, Mr. President.