Beware the "Sunni-Shi‘ite Conflict" Narrative: the Houthis from a Local Rebellion to Geopoliticization

In January, I noted that although the Yemeni Houthis are certainly radical in their rhetoric, Zaydi Islam traditionally is not, and that while technically Shi‘ite in that their Imams must be descended from ‘Ali, they have never identified with the Twelver Shi‘ism of Iran, nor has it generally considered them genuinely Shi‘a. The same is true of the ‘Alawites of Syria, yet today both ‘Alawites and Houthis are loosely aligned with Iran's geopolitical goals (though the links between the Houthis and Iran have more often been asserted than demonstrated).

Iran has been partly responsible for this, but the readiness of the West to accept the narrative of an "ancient" enmity between Sunnis and Shi‘ites, some sort of inexorable clash, has also helped reinforce a regime narrative on the part of Sunni majorities who want to paint non-Sunni minorities as Iranian-backed fifth columns. This narrative has already led to a tendency to paint the conflicts in Iraq and Syria not as complex fractures along complicated lines but as a Sunni-Shi‘ite dichotomy. (The only reason this oversimplification has not been extended to the equally complex conflict in Libya is that there are no Shi‘ites to speak of in Libya.)

The danger is that the more the world accepts the dualistic view, which to some extent reinforces both the Iranian and Saudi regimes' dueling propaganda, the more the various regional conflicts with their complex historical, social, economic, ethnic (and yes, sometimes sectarian) roots, the more these local conflicts are merged into a regional general war, and the sectarian dualism becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.

On the Houthis, let me note that back in 2009 I was already blogging about border clashes between the Saudis and the Houthis, though accusations about Iranian support were just beginning.

I keep hearing the war in Yemen, which is complex (consider the role of ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih, old friend of the Saudis, new friend of the Houthis), described in simplistic ways which see broad geopolitical motives behind people fighting for quite different motivations (power, tribe, ideology). If one side misinterprets the motivation of their adversary, disastrous results are inevitable.

As the Houthis Rise in Yemen, it is Worth Remembering that Zaydi Islam Was Not Historically Radical

As the Houthi Movement in Yemen seems about ready to remove President al-Hadi, many Western commentators seem uncertain what to make of them. As I noted as far back as 2009, referring to these Zaydi Muslim revivalists as "Shi‘ite" without qualification is misleading, since their Shi‘ism is vastly different from that of Iran. Because Saudi Arabia suspects they have Iranian support, and they seem to, they are often seen as Iranian stooges, but in fact they are very much a home-grown movement springing from the Zaydi tribes of the North Yemen mountains.

On the other hand, the fact that sectarian conflict has been rare in Yemen and that since the fall of the monarchy in 1962 the distinction between Zaydis and Sunnis has been slight, and that Zaydism is historically very moderate, and that they fiercely oppose al-Qa‘ida, may mislead some into thinking they are natural allies of the West. Yet they routinely use the slogans "Death to America!" and "Death to Israel" and even "a curse on the Jews." (See the Arabic logo at left.) Not exactly our natural allies, then.

Starting as a Zaydi revivalist youth movement, the Houthis are fiercely anti-Western and have opposed the GCC-brokered transition plan under way in Yemen since 2011.

I'll leave it to the Yemen specialists to explain the radicalism of Houthi ideology; in the meantime I want to note that Zaydism as a religious school has been strikingly accommodating to Sunnis and other sects of Shi‘ism as well. With the Houthis, though, even Zaydism has acquired a radical face, though not all Zaydis back the Houthis, of course.

Zaydism is indeed a branch of Shi‘ism, the second-largest after the "Twelvers" of Iran, Iraq and Lebanon. But its history and beliefs are quite different from other varieties. While they are called "Fivers" because they accept the first four Imams recognized by Twelvers and Isma‘ilis ("Seveners") and recognize Zayd ibn ‘Ali as the rightful successor to his father ‘Ali Zayn al-‘Abidin while other groups recognize his brother Muhammad al-Baqir, they do not then insist that all rightful imams must descend from Zayd. In fact, the Zaydi doctrine of the Imamate differs enormously from other Shi‘a.

The Zaydis hold that ‘Ali, the first Imam, was the rightful successor to Muhammad, but they hold that since the Prophet did not make the succession clear and ‘Ali did not press his claim, they do not publicly curse Abu Bakr and ‘Umar. They hold that ‘Ali and his two sons, Hasan and Husayn, were rightful Imams, but that after them, the Imamate could be intrusted to any just, wise ruler descended from Hasan or Husayn, not limited to a single line. Though they recognize Zayd as their fifth Imam and his son Muhammad as their sixth, their list includes others from the Twelver line as well. There were various early sects of Zaydism that disagreed on some of these points, however.

The Zaydis do not believe in the infallibility of the Imams after the first three, and thus they also accept that geographically distant parts of the world could follow different lines of Imams. In the medieval period, there were Zaydi imamates in Tabaristan in northeast Iran and Gilan in northwest Iran as well as in Yemen. Zaydi states at one time also existed in the Arabian Peninsula outside Yemen, and in Morocco and Spain.

The Zaydi legal school is very similar to that of Abu Hanifa in Sunnism, and some have listed Zaydi law as a "fifth school" of Sunnism, except for the doctrine of the Imamate.

Zaydism was established in the highlands of Yemen in 893 AD and an imamate continued under various lines until the Revolution of 1962. In the 20th century the Imams also added the title of King and the title "Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen" for the country.

The last Imam, Muhammad al-Badr, continued to fight with Saudi backing in the eight year civil war, in which Nasser's Egypt backed the republicans. In 1970 he went into exile in Britain. He died in 1996. With the absence of any claimant to the Zaydi Imamate in Yemen, the distinctions between Zaydis and Sunnis became even fewer.

In former North Yemen, Zaydis were long a majority in the mountain interior, while the coastal plain was mostly Sunni of the Shaf‘i school. Unification with South Yemen in 1990 made Zaydism a minority (about 40%) in the country as a whole.

This tradition of there being little perceived difference between Zaydis and Sunnis seems to be another casualty of recent events in Yemen, given the radicalism of the Houthis.

The Huthis, Zaydis, and Trying to Get the Yemen Story Right

Though overshadowed by events elsewhere, major developments have taken place in Yemen. The Houthi or Huthi movement, after years of resistance to the Transitional Government in Sana‘a', has signed a peace agreement, and now seem to have fully occupied the Yemen capital.

For general background, see my MEI Colleague Charles Schmitz' "The Huthi Asccnt to Power," which covers the basics. But I also want to revisit a point I made over five years ago in a post about the Huthis and Zaydism in August 2009: If you insist on interpreting Yemen in dualist Sunni/Shi‘ite terms, you're going to mislead. For years media analysis interpreted the struggle between the Huthis and President ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih's regime in precisely those terms, though like the Huthis, Dalih was a Zaydi. He was a republican Zaydi but a Zaydi nonetheless.

And Zaydis are Shi‘ites in the sense that traditional Zaydis insist on rule by the Sada, the descendants of the Prophet (they are called "Fiver" Shi‘ites by some, but generslly do not restrict the Imamate to a single line), but they are not Twelver Shi‘ites like Iranians, Iraqis, and Lebanese and Bahrainis. I'm not a Yemen specialist and have never even set foot in the country, but the tendency to identify the Huthi struggle as a simple Sunni versus Shi‘ite dichotomy is just wrong. Saudi Arabia has long had a somewhat excessive focus on Yemen, and separately and for different reasons on Twelver Shi‘ism, and I suspect the Saudi perspective has influenced much of the media commentary.

Now that the Huthis seem to have taken over the capital, we'll see what comes next, but Yemen is a mix of Zaydi revivalists (the Huthis), Zaydi traditionalists, Sunni Salafis, Sunni secular republicans, and even jihadis like AQAP. It doesn't resolve itself into neat sectarian dichotomies.
 .

Al-Jazeera Program on Houthi Fighting

I'm busy with other things right now, so I'll give you something to watch. Some dramatic video and interesting commentary in an Al-Jazeera English report on the Houthi fighting:



Al-Jazeera is one news organization that posts to YouTube with embed codes, allowing bloggers to easily help spread their videos around. It's good advertising for them; too bad more news media (like the BBC) don't do it.

Saudi 10-Kilometer "Kill Zone" in Yemen?

Well, well. A week ago I noted that the artillery shown in a Saudi picture shelling Yemen had about an 11 or 12 kilometer range, and yesterday I remarked on the fact that Prince Khalid bin Sultan was talking about a 10-mile deep zone inside Yemen Saudi Arabia wanted clear of Houthis, though he never suggested Saudi troops might violate the border. Well, now a "Saudi government advisor" is telling Reuters that the Saudis are using air power and artillery "to enforce a 10-kilometer wide buffer zone inside Yemen." While the Saudis still deny having any ground forces across the border, I'd read that as acknowledging that they're bombing in the 10km strip south of the border.

Update on the Houthi War: Including Pics from the Houthi Side

Of the many things I've left unattended during the Annual Conference and Veteran's Day, there's that war on the Yemen border. I can't recap all the claims but I can give you a links dump and let you sort it out yourselves. The Saudis have continued to bomb and pressure the Houthi rebels in Yemen. They've said the Houthi infiltration was pre-planned. And an alleged ex-Houthi has claimed that the Houthis want to create a Shi‘ite state that not only includes northern parts of Yemen but adjacent parts of Saudi Arabia. While Yemen is also accusing various Saudi, Bahraini, and Kuwaiti "groups" or "quarters" — not those governments — of supporting the Houthis:

Bahrain: Yemen's ambassador to Kuwait Khalid Rajeh has reiterated charges that Kuwaiti religious groups were supporting the Al Houthi rebels in Yemen.

"The Kuwaiti groups have been supporting the rebels financially and through the media. However, the Kuwaiti political entity has nothing to do with this support," the ambassador was quoted as saying by Al Watan daily.

Al Rajeh said that groups and individuals in Iranian religious schools have also been extending support to the Houthis.

The Yemeni ambassador's statement came days after his foreign minister Abu Baker Al Kerbi said that the Zaydi rebels, also known as Houthis, were getting support from Kuwaiti, Saudi and Bahraini quarters, without naming them.

Okay, the word no one is quite saying, is "Shi‘ite." They're implicating Saudi, Kuwaiti, and Bahraini Shi‘ites — Iran has long since been demonized — and this may not augur well for those communities.

As far as I can tell, officially the Saudis are still insisting they are only pushing the Houthis who crossed the Saudi border back into Yemen, though the Houthis have claimed all along that the Saudis are fighting inside Yemen. Prince Khalid bin Sultan, effectively the head of the Saudi Armed Forces, was quoted as saying Saudi Arabia planned to push the Houthis tens of kilometers inside Yemen before ceasing their offensive, and it's hard to see how you do that unless Saudi forces go across the border.

From the Houthi Side

Up to now, this has been a war seen from Saudi and Yemeni government viewpoints. The Houthis are not, however, unheard from. For those with Arabic, this major website seems to be a go-to place for Houthi propaganda, pictures, videos etc. (I admit that when I noticed that a website whose Arabic name is Al-Minbar [the pulpit] has a Romanized address of Almenpar.net, one thing occurred to me: "Menpar" suggests some language with a "p" in it, which Arabic doesn't generally have (outside some Iraq dialects) but which would come naturally to a Persian speaker. If the Saudis and Yemenis aren't already citing this as suspicious evidence of Iranian involvement . . . but then, it doesn't necessarily prove anything.)

And there's a YouTube channel called sadahnow, which includes the video of the alleged Saudi POW of the Houthis:



Yet another YouTube channel called sadahonline1 has this video of alleged Saudi military equipment captured or destroyed:



or this at sadahonline:



And there's a lot more out there, including videos of downed Yemen Air Force aircraft, etc.

The world's media is a bit absent and YouTube videos can mean anything (Anyone can paint Saudi insignia on a vehicle), but it's interesting to see what's being claimed.

Saudi Campaign Intensifying (in Media at Least)

Tomorrow's headlines in Al-Watan are full of coverage of the campaign — now noticeably characterized as "by air and land" — against the Houthis. For English readers, here's an Arab News article. The Saudi media, at least, seems to be at war. Saudi Gazette ran the (file?) photo showing heavy field artillery I've reproduced here.

At this point I think I'm going to limit my comments to a few observations:

• I cannot recall any time since the invasion of Kuwait and subsequent Desert Storm in which the Saudi media has seemed so militant.
• Although the media continue to insist they have only conducted airstrikes inside Saudi territory, the talk about an "air and land" campaign to "secure the borders" could leave open a certain possibility of hot-pursuit; and if they're actually using those field pieces in the picture (105mm or above towed howitzers, I think) they can shell well inside Yemen (11 or more kilometers?) from the border.
  
• As a commenter noted on my earlier post, there have been many reports emphasizing the alleged Iranian involvement with the Houthis; the anti-Iranian drumbeat deserves attention.

On that note, unless something major demands my attention, I'm gone for the weekend.

The Kingdom Strikes Back: Going After the Houthis

I decided not to blog last night on the reports of Saudi air strikes inside Yemen; the Saudis aree now saying that they are only bombing inside Saudi territory. In any event, it seems clear that the Saudis are now serious about joining in the fight against the Houthis. The Saudi media, in fact, seems to be doing something akin to wartime propaganda, which is rather unusual for the Kingdom.

So the Houthis now find themselves between a Yemeni hammer and a Saudi anvil, and the Saudis are using their Air Force, which is much superior to Yemen's, at least on the Saudi side of the border. (The Houthis charge the Saudis have bombed inside Yemen.)

It's likely to get interesting. Unless you're a Houthi.

Houthis Cross Saudi Border

The Saudi media for tomorrow morning are up in arms about a raid across the Saudi-Yemeni border by Houthi rebels. The simmering tensions along the border may just have crossed a line (namely the border) and this could escalate. Here's Al-Jazeera in English on the story, and here's Arab News, but there's much more if you go to the Arabic press: Al-Watan in particular is full of stories so I'm linking to the front page rather than to individual stories. Their map is stolen (with full acknowledgment) on the upper right of this post. For those who don't read Arabic, the white parts to the right of the heavy line are Yemen and the colored parts (as well as the white parts with detail) are Saudi (the colored part is Jazan).
[Map from tomorrow's Al-Watan.]

This bears watching. The Saudi press is increasingly blaming Iran for the Houthis, as is the Yemeni government, and the two countries, usually at odds or at least awkward in their relations, are moving quickly towards some kind of common position here. More as this develops.

Has Yemen Really Captured an Iranian Ship Taking Arms to the Houthis?

For some time now, the Yemeni government has been charging that Iran is supporting the Houthi rebels in northern Yemen; Saudi Arabia and Yemen, normally at daggers drawn over many issues, have seemed to have found some common ground in their concern about foreign support for the Houthis, amid reports of Houthi clashes directly with Saudi troops in the border area.

Over the past couple of days, Yemen has announced the seizure of an Iranian ship in Yemeni waters, reputedly carrying arms to the Houthis. Another account here.

I have no idea if this is substantiated — Iran is denying it — but if the Yemenis have actual evidence this could have some interesting repercussions. I've already noted the tendency of some in the Sunni Arab world to portray the Yemeni conflict as a Sunni-Shi‘i one, even though Zaydis have little in common with Iran's "twelver" Shi‘ites other than both being nominally Shi‘ite, and the fact that Yemeni President Salih, who's leading the fight against the Houthis, is himself a Zaydi. But if Iran really is supporting the Houthis — up to now I've been skeptical of those charges — this could actually push the Saudis and the Yemeni government into some kind of cooperation. The purported border clashes suggest that the hammer of the Yemeni government offensive is pushing the Houthis up against the anvil of the Saudi border. Proof of Iranian involvement could drive the two traditionally rival governments much closer together. This really bears watching.

Friction on Saudi-Yemeni Border

Before I go quiet for the weekend, this may be worth noting: Yemen's campaign against Zaydi rebels in the north and increasing Saudi jitters about recent terrorist acts in the border region may be combined in this story of Saudi troops allegedly opening fire on the border area a few days back or this one claiming that Saudi troops have clashed directly with the Houthi rebels that Yemen is fighting. And here's an Arabic article in the Saudi daily Al-Watan on mutinies within the Houthi ranks.

Given the fierceness of Yemen's campaign against the rebels, and the fact that while Saudi-Yemeni government tensions are decades old, the Houthis represent a greater threat in many Saudis' eyes than the government forces do, these reports could mean anything, from deepening tensions along the border itself, to Yemeni propaganda. But it merits watching, and the Houthi conflict has received little real attention outside the region.

Yemeni Updates

First, a hat tip to Larry Marczak, the regular commenter who posts as LJ Marczak and who shared an apartment with me in Cairo in the CASA program back in 1972, when dinosaurs still roamed the earth and Nixon was President, and whom I hadn't seen until he retired to this area a year or so ago. He sends me links that I don't always find myself: he seems to pore over the Arabian peninsula stuff, having spent many of his intervening years in banking in the Gulf. I find most of this stuff myself, but tips from readers are always welcome.

Anyway, a report that Yemen had foiled an attack on the US Embassy in Sana‘a' by arresting some men with weapons and hand grenades has been called into question by this story saying they weren't intending to target the embassy but were just exercising their traditional right to bear arms.

Now, I'm well aware that the traditional jambiyya or khanjar type dagger has been replaced in practice with the fully automatic AK-47 as Yemen has entered the modern age, and men don't leave home without one, but I'm still a little vague on the utility of hand grenades walking through the middle of the national capital. Of course, the fact that these guys came from the Sa‘da region — heart of the Houthi rebellion — added a little zest to the original narrative, but perhaps once their tribal bona fides were checked out, it was decided they were just your average bunch of grenade-toting guys strolling near the embassy.

I can't argue too much since I live in Virginia, where the rest of the state keeps making sure we Northern Virginians understand the whole right to bear arms thing by making it illegal for local jurisdictions to do anything outrageous like ban open carry in restaurants or anything like that. I've been around here long enough to remember back in the late 60s or early 70s, I think it was, when the Virginia General Assembly finally decided to ban private ownership of anti-tank rockets. This infringement of the right to defend your home against hostile tank attacks was prompted by an incident in which a fellow gassing up at an Arlington gas station had either a WWII bazooka or an RPG (I forget the specifics) fall out of his pickup, launch a rocket, and blow the gas station to bits. So I'm sure there's some reasonable explanation for why Yemenis want to carry hand grenades in downtown San‘a'.

Also on Yemen: an update on the northern battles, and (in Arabic) a Saudi report quoting President Salih (who isn't normally that popular in the Saudi press) on Iranian support for the Houthis.

The Houthis and Iran: a Building Subtext

A couple of weeks back I noted that the fact that so much of the (Sunni) Arab media was presenting the Houthi revolt in northern Yemen as a Shi‘ite/Sunni conflict (even though the President of Yemen is himself a Zaydi like the Houthi rebels), and that this was really a distortion of the situation. Now some of the unspoken agenda behind the broad brush treatment of Zaydis as Shi‘ite (which they are, with lots of footnotes) is becoming clear as not only the Saudi media but other Arab media not following the Saudi line (such as Al-Jazeera) begin to beat the drum of Iranian involvement in the Houthi rebellion.

Now, I have no direct intelligence about possible Iranian support for the Houthis. I don't doubt there is some sympathy and perhaps some indirect or even direct cooperation, though exactly how the contacts are pursued isn't clear to me. But there's been a drumbeat, recently, of propaganda linking Iran with the Houthis. And, at the same time, the whole Muhammad bin Nayef assasination row has led to new Saudi criticism of the Yemeni regime. The result is that there seems to be an emerging narrative: the Yemeni Government is hand-in-glove with Al-Qa‘ida, or at least looks the other way, while their enemies the rebel Houthis are Iranian stalking horses. Or, if you want to combine the two, here (in Arabic) is a Saudi article in Al-Watan saying that the Houthis are actually supporting Al-Qa‘ida.

I suspect there's a trace element level of truth in each assertion, but not a real actionable fact. But when you look at this Al-Jazeera piece on the Houthis, you see that it's not just the Saudis who are pushing the Iranian connection. In fact, in the Arabian peninsula generally, plus Egypt, Jordan, and a few other places, Iran may be the new Israel: the enemy on whom we blame all our troubles. (Which doesn't mean, of course, that the accusations aren't true.)

But the narrative is building. True, false, or in between, the charge is growing that Iran is fueling things in Yemen.

Yemen's Scorched Earth Campaign: A Word About Zaydism

I haven't said anything yet about the renewed military campaign against the Houthi rebellion in the northern part of Yemen. The Houthi problem has been simmering for several years, and is an uprising in the Sa‘da region of northern Yemen centered on a religious revival movement of Zaydi Muslims who are followers of a religious figure, Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi (or Huthi), who was reportedly killed in 2004. It's a complex tribal issue in a country where the central government's writ traditionally doesn't run very far. Now, the Zaydis of Yemen are followers of a variety of Shi‘ite Islam that is quite different in most ways from the "twelver" Islam of Iran, a variety which ultimately allows any descendant of the Prophet to serve as Imam, and can accept multiple imamates in different parts of the Muslim world. The Imamate which ruled in Yemen until 1962 was a Zaydi Imamate. To refer to the Houthis as "Shi‘ite" is technically correct, but a bit misleading if it implies some identity with the Shi‘ites of Iraq or Iran.

But when I read an article such as this one from Al-Jazeera English, I realize just how confused even other Arabs are about the Zaydis of Yemen. Yes, the Houthis are Zaydis. Yes, a majority of the population of United Yemen is Sunni. But what the Al-Jazeera article doesn't seem to understand is that President ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih is himself a Zaydi, as is a considerable part of his power base. He comes from a small tribe in the larger Hashid tribal confederation. The Hashid and the other big Zaydi confederation, the Bakil, used to be referred to as the "wings of the Imamate" when Zaydi Imams still ruled in what was then North Yemen. The Houthis are indeed Zaydi, but so are quite a lot of the troops fighting them. Portraying the conflict as a Sunni-Zaydi clash is misleading. Most of the major Zaydi tribes have long since adapted to Yemeni republicanism, but the Houthis, by some accounts, want to restore the Imamate.

In a country where tribal rivalries run deep and vendettas can last a long time, the scorched earth campaign the government is waging in the north raises a lot of questions as to its wisdom. But when even an Arab-based news service portrays this as a Sunni-Zaydi conflict, it merely confuses the issue further. The fact that the Houthis are Zaydi fundamentalists (much as I hate that word) while the government is secular is probably more relevant than that the Houthis are Zaydi. So is Salih.

The BBC tends to muddle the issues too. I don't claim to be an expert on Yemen — I've never even been there — but I think portraying this as a Sunni-Shi‘a fight is misleading in the extreme.