The Strange Expulsion of Moulay Hicham from Tunisia

Moulay Hicham

Morocco's so-called "Red Prince," Moulay Hicham, first cousin of King Mohammed VI, was arrested by Tunisian authorities on September 8 at the Movenpick Hotel in Tunis and put on an Air France flight to Paris. Moulay Hicham was in Tunis for a conference on governance and security in Morocco, Egypt, and Yemen.

Though neither Tunis nor Moulay Hicham commented on the reason, the move was unusual given Tunisia's reputation as the one functioning democracy to emerge from the Arab Spring. French and Arab media have speculated that because Hicham had been scheduled to attend a conference in Doha, Qatar, and that Saudi Arabia and/or the UAE brought pressure on Tunisia to expel the prince, who is known as an advocate of democratic reforms.

Moulay Hicham has a Saudi connection and is related to Prince al-Walid bin Talal, whose mother is a sister of Hicham's wife, Lalla Lamia Solh. Both are daughters of the late Lebanese Prime Minister Riad al-Solh.

Various reports in English, French, and Arabic are linked here.

The Apotheosis of Muhammad bin Salman

When I wrote my post last week on "The Splintering Gulf," I promised another post that would include the dramatic changes in Saudi policy, but illness and deadlines intruded, and now the architect of those policies has been named Crown Prince.

Though some are calling it a surprise move, few should be really surprised. Since his father ascended the throne two years  ago, he has steadily consolidated power, and now he has replaced his uncle,Muhammad bin Nayef, as heir to the throne. In a country long ruled by a gerontocracy, the Crown Prince is 31, half a century younger than the 81 year old King.

For most of the 20th century, Middle East analysts could take one thing for granted: Saudi policy would be cautious, conservative, and risk-averse. But no more. In Yemen, the Kingdom has been pursuing an aggressive war against a perceived enemy. And while the new Crown Prince, known as "MbS" to his Western admirers. is openly supportive of the US, he is also marked on an open challenge to a key US Ally, Qatar. Risk-averse Saudi Arabia is now risk-taking, and much can go wrong.

April Longley Alley Revisits Yemen

April Longley Alley, the International Crisis Group's Senior Analyst for the Arabian Peninsula and a specialist on Yemen, has visited Sana‘a for the first time in two years. Her report is of interest to Americans who studiously ignore the war in Yemen: The Counter-productive Isolation of Proud and Hungry Sanaa

More Geographically Challenged US Political Leaders

In the wake of the "What is Aleppo?" controversy one would hope that US politicians would spend a little time with a map before speaking in public. In the midst of the Senate debate over an arms sale to Saudi Arabia, which was opposed by critics of the Saudi air campaign in Yemen, two Republican senators who really ought to know better seem to have confused the Strait of Bab al-Mandab with the Strait of Hormuz. Senator John McCain of Arizona, former Presidential candidate and a specialist in national security issues, and Senator Bob Corker of Tennessee, who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, defended the Saudi campaign by arguing that if the Houthis had been allowed to occupy all of Yemen, they could have posed a threat to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.

The Strait of Hormuz, of course, runs between Iran on one side and Oman and the UAE  on the other; no part of Yemen comes anywhere near it. (And don't get me started on the notion that the Houthis are Iranian stooges, because, um, the Saudis say they are. I'm no fan of the Houthi movement, but it's a home-grown Yemeni Zaydi movement.)

Hizbullah Joins Iranian Hajj Boycott

Hizbullah has announced that its members will be forbidden  to attend this year's hajj, which begins this weekend. Earlier this year Iran announced that it would boycott the hajj, following last year's carnage in a stampede and the deepening war of words between Riyadh and Tehran.

After a smaller disaster left hundreds dead in 1987's hajj, Iran boycotted the hajj for three years.

June 1916: Outbreak of the Great Arab Revolt

First let me say I'm recovering from my surgery, and let me thank the many kind wishes I received in the comments.

Sharif Hussein in 1916

Between my health and the Journal's deadlines, it's been a while since I dealt with the centennial of the First World War in the Middle East. But June marks a century since the outbreak of the Arab Revolt led by Sharif Hussein of Mecca, or the Great Arab Revolt as it is sometimes known.

We've talked about the Hussein-McMahon correspondence and the genesis of the idea on more than one occasion, Interpretations of the significance (or peripheral nature) of the Revolt have differed widely, with what might be called the British and Hashemite view of history playing up its importance. The role of T.E. Lawrence has enhanced the mythology surrounding the Revolt, and added to the emphasis on the tribal and guerrilla aspects of the Revolt, at the expense of the regular Sharifian Army. There will be plenty of time to debate the myths versus the realities; let's begin with the outbreak.

On May 28, 1916, Ronald Storrs, Oriental Secretary, left Cairo, accompanied by Lt. Cdr. D.G.Hogarth, archaeologist and intelligence agent, and Captain Kinahan Cornwallis, the latter two attached to the Arab Bureau. With them was £10,000 destined for Amir ‘Abdullah, son of Sharif Hussein and their main interlocutor with him at this time. They were also authorized to promise another £50,000 to the Sharif after the actual outbreak of the promised revolt.

Reaching Jidda on June 5 they did not find  ‘Abdullah as expected (who was in fact preparing for the revolt), but rather a message saying his youngest brother Zayd was coming instead. Zayd arrived with a message promising simultaneous attacks at Mecca, Medina, Ta'if, and Jidda. Indeed, on June 5, Hussein's sons ‘Ali and Faisal made an initial attack against Medina, and on June 6 Zayd met with Storrs and informed him of this. The main revolt had been moved up from June 16 to June 10.

But Medina was a very different target than Mecca would prove to be. A strong Ottoman garrison of 10,000 under Fakhri Pasha defended it, and it was the railhead of the Hejaz Railway, which allowed easy resupply from Damascus.

Ironically, the very same day as the attempt on Medina, far away in the North Sea north of Scotland, HMS Hampshire, en route to Russia, was torpedoed and sunk with all hands. One passenger was far more famous than the others: the Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener of Khartoum, former virtual ruler of Egypt and Storrs' former boss. A failed tribal raid on an Ottoman provincial capital would garner no headlines in London.

Kitchener was a national hero. Liberator of Khartoum, master of Egypt and, since the outbreak of war, the most famous recruiting poster. Though disliked by his subordinate officers and the rest of the Cabinet, he was idolized by the public and by Tommy Atkins in the trenches,and his death was a national shock. Egypt, where Kitchener was still known just as "the Lord" (al-Lurd) as Cromer had been before him, was also in shock.

Meanwhile, on June 10, Sharif Hussein proclaimed revolt in Mecca, declared the Young Turk regime had betrayed Islam, proclaimed an Arab Caliphate, and attacked the Turkish garrison in the Holy City. After a short siege, Mecca mostly was  under control by June 13, though resistance continued until July 9. 

HMS Fox

On June 10 also, ‘Abdullah attacked Ta'if. The town was soon taken but the garrison hunkered down in the fort.

The port of Jidda was critical as a means of supplying Mecca and the rebels. The Royal Navy moved an aging, obsolete warship, HMS Fox, and a seaplane tender, HMS Ben-My-Chree, a converted Manx packet steamer.

HMS Ben-My-Chree (note hangars)

The rebels attacked Jidda with support from Fox's guns and air cover from Ben-My-Chree's seaplanes, and the garrison surrendered on June 16.,

Once Jidda was taken, the British began creating a series of ports along the coast controlled by the Royal Navy, provided Hussein with artillery from the Egyptian Army, and began assembling a regular Sharifian Army from Arab officers and men of the Ottoman Army assembled from POWs and deserters.The Arab Revolt had begun.






 

Egyptian Court Annuls Tiran/Sanafir Agreement

An Egyptian Administrative Court has annulled the April agreement with Saudi Arabia transferring the islands of Tiran and Sanafir to Saudi sovereignty.

The agreement had provoked widespread demonstrations and charges that the government was selling Egyptian sovereign territory to Saudi Arabia. As I noted in April, the history of the islands is complex, and further complicated by the fact that they are part of Area C in the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty.

The government has already said it will appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court, which will have the final say. Although President al-Sisi has said that there are documents proving the islands are rightfully Saudi, no such documents were reportedly introduced at the trial.

Thoughts on the Latest Saudi Reshuffle

The latest Saudi Cabinet reshuffle over the weekend included  the replacement of powerful Petroleum Minister‘Ali al-Na‘imi, and the realignment of several other ministries, and serves as a reminder of just how much things have changed under the ascendancy of Deputy Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman. The 80-year-old Na‘imi had had disagreements with Muhammad in Salman (or MbS as he's sometimes referred to) and had held the position for 20 years. The oil experts can debate what the change means for energy policies, but the change underscores just how unusual a change in the Oil Ministry has been: in the 54 years from 1962 (a decade before the rise in oil prices) until last Saturday, Saudi Arabia had six Kings (Sa‘ud, Faisal, Khalid, Fahd, ‘Abdullah, Salman), but only three Oil Ministers (Shaikh Ahmad Zaki Yamani, 1962-1986, Hisham Nazer, 1986-1995, and ‘Ali Na‘imi, 1995-2016). The selection of Aramco President and CEO Khalid A. Al-Falih is no surprise, since that's the classic route to the Oil Minister's job, but it's indicative of how rare such changes are.

Khalid al-Falih

In fact, those of us who have followed the KSA for years have gotten used to the fact that barring death or serious illness, key posts in Saudi Arabia rarely change.  The late Foreign Minister Sa‘ud al-Faisal served from 1975 until 2015, a full 40 years, and when he stepped down for health reasons only a few weeks before his death, he was the world's longest-serving Foreign Minister. The late Prince Sultan, though admittedly a senior prince and full brother of King Fahd, held the Defense Ministry from 1963 until his death in 2011; Prince Nayef was Interior Minister from 1975-2012; the late King ‘Abdullah, before taking the throne, headed the National Guard from 1962 to 2010 and passed command to his son. Traditionally, "Cabinet reshuffle" in Saudi Arabia either meant changing the Deputy Minister of some obscure ministry or replacing somebody who died.

The rise of 30-year-old Muhammad bin Salman has turned much of the usual way of doing business in the KSA leadership on its head, and whether that's good or bad remains an open question.

Israel Gives Green Light to Saudi-Egyptian Islands Deal

Defense Minister Moshe Yaalon and other senior Israelis have said Israel was informed in advance and is not concerned about the transfer of Tiran and Sanafir islands from Egypt to Saudi Arabia, since the Saudis are committed to maintaining the guarantees of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Saudi Arabia has said that this does not mean normalization with Israel, but it appears to be another instance of the growing commonality of interest between Israel and the conservative Sunni Gulf states.

Within Egypt there is growing criticism for the deal, with many charging that President Sisi "sold" Egyptian territory to the Saudis in exchange for aid.


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Transferring Tiran and Sanafir: The Legal and Sovereignty Issues

Announcements during King Salman's visit to Egypt that the two countries are planning to build a bridge from Saudi Arabia to Sinai connecting their territories, and that Egypt was recognizing the islands of Tiran and Sanafir, in the Straits of Tiran, as Saudi territory, have raised some eyebrows, especially the latter.

The bridge,which would  bypass Jordanian and Israeli territory to connect KSA with Egypt directly, raises questions over a number of environmental issues, but the transfer of the islands is even more controversial, and has long claimed the islands, which are part of its Ras Muhammad National Park and which are often visited by tourists in Sharm al-Sheikh.

Besides being unpopular with the Egyptian public, the transfer of the islands (which still must be approved by Parliament), the islands are also part of Area C under the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, the area to be demilitarized.  Saudi Arabia is not a party to the treaty.

The islands have been in dispute since he British and Ottoman eras, and the Saudis had possession until 1950 when they allowed Egypt to occupy them to prevent possible Israeli occupation.Under Nasser, Egypt claimed them as its own territory. When Nasser closed the Strait in 1967, provoking the 1967 war, its blockade was made possible by Egypt's control of the islands. Israel occupied them along with Sinai. When it evacuated the last parts of Sinai in 1982, it returned them to Egypt, but Saudi Arabia reasserted its claims. At that time Israel indicated it would consider any transfer of the islands to be a violation of the Peace Treaty.

Is that still the case? Perhaps not, since the emerging tacit Israeli cooperation with the Gulf States over Iran may mean Israel was kept in the loop, but issues involving the treaty could resurface, though some reports say the status quo will remain undisturbed despite the transfer of sovereignty.

Egypt claims that the transfer is in keeping with a 1990 Mubarak-era decree on Egypt's territorial seas, but many Egyptians see the transfer as payment for continuing Saudi financial support for Egypt.

A Note for Climate Change Deniers

The road between Mecca and Medina last week:

Can the Escalating Crisis Be Contained?

Due to rain in the Middle East, many social media users posted New Year's photos of rainbows in Jordan, Gaza, and Lebanon. I thought it might be an excuse to make my first post of the new year an optimistic one. But January 1 was a holiday so I didn't post. And then the region went to hell in a handbasket over the weekend.

The  spiraling escalation of the Saudi-Iranian crisis, beginning with the Saudi execution of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, the subsequent attack on the Saudi Embassy in Tehran and the breaking of relations has happened so quickly that there is cause for concern that the situation could spin out of control. At a minimum, hope for some sort of peace deal in Syria is likely to be a casualty, and the GCC could escalate the proxy war in Yemen. The lack of a common land border makes direct ground clashes unlikely, but in addition to he proxy wars in Yemen and Syria, naval tensions between the two countries could threaten the security of tanker traffic in the Gulf.

Although predictably, much of the analysis focuses on the sectarian angle, seeing the Saudi-Iranian rivalry in Sunni-Shi‘ite terms. That isn't wrong, given Iran's revolutionary enthusiasm as a protector of Shi‘ites everywhere, and Saudi Arabia's claim to be a defender of Sunni orthodoxy, but it implies an inexorable rivalry that is not historically the case. A more productive analysis may be to see this as a function of the dramatic change in Saudi policy over the past year. What was once the most cautious of countries has become assertive in the extreme, some would say even reckless.

The year is not beginning well. Toby Craig Jones analyzes Saudi motives here.

Monday Morning Flashback: Salman and the Late Shah, 1970s

Remember the "twin pillars of stability?" Now King (then Prince) Salman of Saudi Arabia does a sword dance for the last Shah of Iran (1970s):

The Mina Disaster

Today's catastrophic stampede near the Jamarat pillars at Mina during one of the culminating rituals of the hajj has killed at least 717 pilgrims in one of the worst in a string of periodic mass stampedes accompanying the pilgrimage. There are already recriminations and accusations, with Iran (which had over 40 nationals killed) blaming, through its media, the Saudi government. Coming less than two weeks after the crane disaster at the Grand Mosque, it's a blow to Saudi Arabia in its role as protector of the hajj, and I'm sure the Iranian accusation will not be the last. (And some Saudi media have blamed "Africans," so the rush to judgment is not all one-sided.)

Let's mourn and bury the dead and hold off the blame wars until more is understood.

Egypt and Arabia, Last Night, from the ISS

Egypt and the Red Sea area from the International Space Station last night, posted by Astronaut Scott Kelly on Facebook.  No doubt that Egypt is still the Gift of the Nile as it has been since Herodotus, but look at how bright Mecca and Jidda are on the first full night if hajj.

And how dark Syria is, compared with Israel and Lebanon.

2.5 Million Syrian Refugees in Saudi Arabia? A Question

I'm very busy with our Fall issue but want to address one question I haven't seen discussed very much.

There has been a lot of discussion about the fact (or factoid) that the GCC states have not accepted Syrian refugees, unlike other Arab neighbors. Some of the criticism has been fair, and some unfair, such as posting photos of the Saudi tent city for Hajj pilgrims and saying these tents are standing empty. Since the Hajj is next week I'm sure they're filling up fast.

Several days ago (on September 11 to be exact), the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs insisted that not only was it hosting Syrian refugees, but that it was hosting no fewer than 2.5 million. The statement, posted by the Saudi Embassy in Washington, can be found here.

Part of it reads:

1. The Kingdom has received around 2.5 million Syrians since the beginning of the conflict. In order to ensure their dignity and safety, the Kingdom adopted the policy not to treat them as refugees or place them in refugee camps. They have been given the freedom to move about the country, and those who wish to remain in Saudi Arabia (some hundreds of thousands) have been given legal residency status like the remaining residents. Their residency comes with the rights to receive free medical care, to join the labor market and to attend schools and universities. This was contained in a royal decree in 2012 that instructed public schools to accept Syrian students. According to government statistics, the public school system has accepted more than 100,000 Syrian students.

Pro-Saudi apologists have touted this and critics of the Kingdom have expressed questions, but hardly anyone has raised an issue of who, exactly, these Syrians may be.

Northwestern Saudi Arabia is still a largely tribal area, with significant portions of the non-urban population either true nomads or transhumants who shift their livestock between summer and winter pasture.  These tribes are trans-national and sometimes have dual nationality if their winter and summer camps are on opposite sides of the boundary lines drawn with a straightedge ruler at the end of World War I. Unless there is a suspicion of a security threat, the nation-states rarely interfere with the semi-nomadic lifestyle that has persisted since ancient times.

One of the best known of these is the large tribal confederation of the Shammar, who may number as many as four million and are found in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, and Jordan. The Arabian branch of the Shammar, under the Rashid ruling family, were once the main rivals to the House of Saud.

Other big tribes that transcend borders are the ‘Anayza confederation, with multiple large subtribes including the important Ruwalla in Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia,

The true nomadic and seasonal transhumant elements among these tribes have routinely crossed map boundaries with near impunity. So my question is: what proportion of the Syrian refugees in Saudi Arabia are Bedouin who simply moved across the border to escape the war in Syria by joining their tribal kin in Saudi Arabia, or perhaps even migrating to their seasonal grazing pastures?

I'm not sure it matters, and bravo to the Saudis for accepting them, but most of the responses to the Saudi statement haven't noted this aspect.

Crane Collapse in Mecca 10 Days Before Hajj

The collapse of a construction crane a the Grand Mosque (Masjid al-Haram) in Mecca just 10 days before this year's hajj is likely to spur concerns about pilgrim safety, given the huge construction efforts underway in and around the Mosque. At least 87 dead are reporting and the number may grow.

The massive construction projects have been controversial both within and outside of the Kingdom, involving as they do massive expansion and modernization of the holy sites as well as ambitious projects such as the world's largest hotel, which will dominate he skyline of the Holy City.

Pilgrim safety has frequently been an issue in the past given the huge crowds assembled. It is unclear how much damage was done to the structure of the Mosque itself.

As the World Freaks Out About Russian Troops in Syria, Has Anybody Noticed Qatar and Morocco are Sending Ground Trrops to Yemen to Join the GCC Forces Already There?

The Russian buildup in Syria has produced a lot of media attention and expressions of concern, but Syria isn't the only war attracting foreign military intervention. Within days of the death in Yemen of 45 UAE troops  (along with 10 Saudi and five Bahraini troops), Qatar announced that it was deploying 1,000 ground troops to Yemen to join the Saudi-led coalition there, its first dispatch of ground troops there, and Bahrain's King Hamad announced that two of his sons would go to Yemen as part of their national service.

All of the GCC states except for Oman are now participating in the Yemen coalition, and with the Qatari deployment all will have ground troops in Yemen except Kuwait, which is contributing aircraft. Egypt, Jordan, and Sudan are also participating militarily in various ways, and now there are reports that Moroccan ground troops will also be joining the coalition. Reports suggest that up to 6,000 Sudanese troops may be coming as well.

At a time when it is still not clear whether the Russian buildup in Syria is intended to participate in combat or is merely there for force protection and regime protection, it is interesting that there is much less attention (at least in the US media) to the growing ground force commitment in Yemen.

Is Saudi Arabia's Hay'a Outlawing Rainbows?

Saudi Arabia's powerful Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, popularly known as the Hay'a ("Committee") or the Religious Police, is apparently determined to ban rainbows.
As Brian Whitaker notes at al-Bab:

Recent night-time pictures of the White House illuminated in rainbow colours, plus millions of rainbow-tinted profile photos on Facebook, have alerted Saudi Arabia's religious police to a previously unrecognised peril in their midst: the discovery that "emblems of homosexuality" are on public display in the birthplace of Islam.

But fear not. The haia (or the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, as it is officially known) is swinging into action to obliterate them.

The first casualty appears to be Talaee al-Noor International Schools in Riyadh, whose building proved a bit too gaily painted for the religious police:

It has now been repainted in the colour of a blue rainbow-free sky.

Strictly speaking, the offending colours were not quite those of the customary rainbow flag or, for that matter, an actual rainbow, but they seem to have been close enough to set alarm bells ringing. According to one of the haia's Twitter accounts, the school (which it hastens to point out is a "foreign" one) has been fined 100,000 riyals ($26,650) for "placing the emblem of the homosexuals" on display.

It adds that the person in the school who was responsible for the emblem has been taken to prison to await prosecution.

Whitaker illustrated his piece with a picture of a rainbow-colored Qur'an, which apparently is real and has proven popular in Southeast Asia.

Saud al-Faisal (1940-2015)

Saudi Prince Saud al-Faisal has died at the age of 75, just months after retiring from an extraordinary 40 years as the world's longest serving Foreign Minister.

The son of the late King Faisal took office as Foreign Minister in 1975, the year the Lebanese civil war began, and held the office for four turbulent decades. He retired due to worsening health in April.