The Clinton Protests and the New US-Egyptian Relationship

Morsi with Clinton; with Anti-US Sign

During Secretary of State Clinton's visit to Egypt over the weekend, there were some curious elements: demonstrations against her both outside the US Embassy and outside her hotel, protesting US interference in Egyptian domestic affairs and US manipulation of Egyptian politics. And, to add to the unusual responses, key Christian representatives, including representatives of the Coptic Church, the Maspero Youth movement, and the Evangelical Church, all declined invitations to meet with her. These protests are spurred by an impression that the United States has supported the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and Muhammad Morsi. Adding to the effect was the presence of Muslim Brotherhood members helping protect the US Embassy,while a photo circulated on the Internet showing Morsi with Clinton and an earlier photo showing Morsi and other Brotherhood leaders with a sign demanding the US and Israeli Ambassadors be kicked out. And then today there are reports that Field Marshal Tantawi assured Clinton that the military will not allow "one group," presumably meaning the Brotherhood, to take over Egypt, though many Egyptians seem to think that that has been the goal of US policy.

What is going on here? Well, there is a genuine feeling in Egypt that the US, with its huge aid package and its influence, is calling the shots behind the scenes. And clearly, the Muslim Btotherhood has been in ascendancy lately, with a plurality in the now disbanded Parliament and Morsi in the Presidential :Palace. Therefore, that must be what the US wanted.

Now, while I realize there are critics on the political right in this country who also blame US policy (or just "Obama") for the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, it certainly isn't a perception shared in the general policy community. A support for democratization does not equal support for the Brotherhood, and there is a generally positive response to the success of secular liberals over Islamists in the Libyan elections.

It's easy to dismiss this as just more conspiracy theorizing; it is that, but it's also an indication of the degree to which the US is perceived as the manipulator behind the scenes in Egypt, and there are many who perceive developments they do not like or understand as the product of a hidden hand. When Egyptians blame "mysterious forces" and "foreign elements" for political developments or just about anything else, they usually mean the US and Israel, which are assumed to act in concert when it comes to Egypt. If you or I protest that the US and Israel are not purusing the same policies towards Arab change, or object that we are not in fact promoting the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, it merely confirms that we, too, are part of the plot. With popular opinion now actually playing a role in choosing the leadership through elections, this long-present but previously neutralized factor will be a challenge (and hardly the only one) for the US in dealing with the new Egypt.

The alienation of the Christian community is, however, unfortunate, since Copts have often looked to the Coptic diaspora abroad as their strategic reserve in defending their rights at home. Morsi's pledge to name a Coptic Vice President is encouraging, but only slightly offsets their worries about the overall growth of Islamist influence in society. That they, too, think the US favors the Brotherhood is most unfortunate.

But the whole incident is a reminder that however much Egypt remains unchanged (SCAF), there have been real and genuine changes, and they will make US-Egyptian relations a much more complex affair than it has been for the past three decades.

A Subtle Saudi Message About Morsi and the MB?

I already commented on the questionable timing and choice of destination of Egyptian President Muhammad Morsi's first trip abroad, since the visit to Saudi Arabia might fuel complaints that the Muslim Brotherhood is under Saudi influence.

I'm a few days late in noticing the Saudis are helping that impression along on their own: the Saudi-owned Al-Sharq Al-Awsat ran a major story (image above left) on the history of relations between the Kingdom and the Muslim Brotherhood. The story is in Arabic at the link, but let's take a closer look at the photo (from 1936) that they chose to illustrate it:

Why yes, that (the man in the fez) is the late Hasan al-Banna, Egyptian founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, bowing and kissing the hand of King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Al Sa‘ud, the man called "Ibn Saud" in the West, the founder of Saudi Arabia and father of all Saudi Kings down to the present time, including King ‘Abdullah, who has welcomed President Morsi, follower of Banna, to Egypt.

No subtle messages there? Or perhaps not so subtle?

Lacroix on Egypt's Salafis

There's a huge literature on the Muslim Brotherhood, but the emergence of Egypt's hardlining Salafi movement has been more of a surprise, with the rise of the Nour Party catching many people off guard.

One of the best analysts of radical Islamist movements, Stephane Lacroix, has produced a new paper for the Brookings Doha Center, "Sheikhs and Politicians: Inside the New Egyptian Salafism," which is worth your attention. An excerpt from the summary:

The rise of political Salafism has reshaped the Egyptian political scene. Though the Muslim Brotherhood still occupies the dominant position, it has lost its hegemony over Islamist politics. The relationship between Salafis and the Brotherhood has evolved since the revolution, from discrete cooperation to fierce competition. The final outcome of this competition remains uncertain. It could end up pushing the Salafis to a more intransigent stance intended to distinguish them from the “responsible” and “pragmatic” Brotherhood. Alternatively, it could convince the Salafis to fully embrace a more pragmatic politics themselves. This question is also closely related to that of the relationship between the Nour Party and its parent movement, the Salafi Da’wa. To what extent will the party manage to assert its political independence? 

 Information page at the link above. Direct links to the PDF report in English here;  or in Arabic here.

Daniel Serwer on Benghazi

A couple of days ago when I was linking to reports on the Libyan elections I included a link to Daniel Serwer's report on his election monitoring, "Benghazi Needs a Hug." But then the article disappeared from the Foreign Policy website. It is now, fortunately, back from wherever it has been,

Online Resources: The Claremont Coptic Encylopedia and the Legacy of Aziz S. Atiya

One thing I like to do here from time to time is mention great research tools now available online. Others specialize in this, like Access to Middle East and Islamic Resources Online (AMIR), but their readers tend to be in academia. What if you're just an ordinary blog reader who, once in a while, suddenly has a question about fifth century Christology, such as, say, the Acacian Schism. Oh, of course you can go to Wikipedia, and get a probably decent enough account of the dispute between Rome and Constantinople. But what if your real question involves the significance of the Acacian schism for the Copts in Alexandria? Not much about that in Wikipedia. What if, in other words, you need this kind of detail:

And it goes on.  Yet hard as it is to believe, the Wikipedia article doesn't even mention Timothy Wobble-Cap!

When you need detail about, well, just about anything relating to the Church of Alexandria, the Coptic language, Coptic art, or, well, anything Coptic, it's time to turn to the Claremont Coptic Encyclopedia, an online resource of value to anyone (including Muslims) interested in Egypt. And given the fact that this summer we are witnessing the election of a new Coptic Pope to succeed the late Pope Shenouda, there will be plenty of reporters, religion columnists, and such looking for a quick source of information on the Church of Egypt. Click the link above.

Aziz S. Atiya

Aziz Suryal Atiya (1898-1988) was the founding father of the Middle East Studies Program at the University of Utah, and a pioneer of Coptic history in the United States, where Coptic specialists had previously tended to focus on linguistics for Bible studies. Atiya also wrote extensively on the period of the later Crusades. After studying in Britain, he taught in Cairo and Alexandria, then came to the US in the 1950s, teaching at Michigan, Indiana and Princeton before going to Utah in 1959.  An Egyptian and, of course, a Copt, he was also the father of the Coptic Encyclopedia, which he initiated and edited, and which was completed after his death under his wife's supervision. The Middle East library at Utah carries his name. He is said to be the man who coined the terms "Coptology" and "Coptologist," now in general use. (Well, at least in general use among persons interested in the subject.)

His role as an interpreter of the Copts was appreciated. Once in the 1970s I was on a bus trip of American Research Center in Egypt (ARCE) fellows to the ancient monasteries of the Wadi Natrun. When the bus arrived a monk informed us that it was Great Lent and no visitors were allowed. Then he saw that Professor Atiya was our guide. Problem solved.

Claremont's site has digitized the original Encyclopedia in a form that allows constant updating and expansion, so it is still growing beyond what Atiya envisioned. You can search, browse, download PDFs of individual articles, etc. While the papal election may be the main area readers will be searching for this summer, you can also find much more obscure material:

Those Were The Days . . . Egyptian Stella Beer as a "Family Drink"

Before the Salafis in Egypt: "The Preferred Drink of the Family: Stella Beer."

Via Liberal Koshari

From some 60 years ago, apparently. They haven't managed to ban Stella yet, but they don't advertise it this way anymore. I can't tell if the little girl is supposed to be partaking. Thanks to Liberal Koshari for the image. (Update: I think they got it from Vintage Egypt, which dates it to 1953,)

Don't forget: Salafis or no, beer is an ancient tradition in Egypt. Beer was buried in tombs to refresh the deceased in the afterlife. Beermaking is shown in pharaonic figurines (also I believe buried in tombs), below:

 Of course, the Salafis wouldn't approve of the outfits, either.

Nasser on the Muslim Brotherhood, This Time With Subtitles

Some time back I posted a clip of Gamal Abdel Nasser talking about his meeting with the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood back in the 1950s (before he crushed the Brotherhood), but at the time couldn't find one with subtitles, so it was a loss for those without Arabic. Here's one with subtitles, still worth watching if only to see how well Nasser could lead an audience. Let's see Mr.Morsi do this.

Morsi in Saudi Arabia: Wrong Trip, Wrong Timing?

Egyptian President Muhammad Morsi has left for Saudi Arabia on his first foreign visit since his inauguration. He leaves right in the middle of a constitutional crisis largely of his own making, and may be sending the wrong message at the wrong time.

On paper, the visit makes sense: Morsi wants to re-forge fraying ties with Riyadh and rebuild a onetime alliance with the Saudis; he also wants to reassure the Saudis about Iran's gestures of friendship to Egypt now that the Muslim Brotherhood has the Presidency.

But the Brotherhood's opponents in Egypt (and remember, Morsi got barely a quarter of the votes in the first round) suspect him of aiming to turn Egypt into something along the lines of the Saudi model, and others believe Saudi funding helped elect Morsi. (Officially, the Saudis have problems with the MB, though it isn't the sort of open propaganda campaign waged by the UAE against the Egyptian Brotherhood. But many private Saudis support the Brotherhood.) Leaving in the middle of a confrontation with the judiciary (and indirectly, SCAF) adds to the sense that Morsi is going to ask for seek support from his Saudi patrons at a difficult time.

Going anywhere in the midst of a crisis is a questionable call. Eleven days after taking office there is still no Prime Minister and not a single cabinet member named, except for the assurance (not really Morsi's call) that Field Marshal Tantawi will remain Defense Minister. The interim Cabinet of Prime Minister Ganzuri is presumably on its way out, the country is in a crisis, and the President is in Saudi Arabia.

I'd say it's the wrong trip, and any trip at this time is shows questionable judgment. His opponents — who may sense weakness right now — are unlikely to miss that.

Nathan Brown Explains the Legal Mess in Egypt (So I Don't Have To)

We no longer have a bumpy airplane ride. Instead we have a train wreck in slow motion. Well, actually, forget slow motion.

That's Nathan Brown on the legal mess in Egypt, in "Train Wreck Along the Nile." I'm not going to claim he clears everything up, but he does provide a sort of guide to the various legal claims the parties to the dispute are making. Since this constitutional-crisis-without-a-constitution appears to be turning into a full employment program for Egyptian lawyers for months to come, Nathan's  knowledge of legal and constitutional issues makes him a good guide.

The Libyan Elections: A First Step

The election results in Libya are still trickling in, but on the whole, the news seems good. There was some violence; there continue to be confrontations among militias; and the future remains uncertain, but the overall verdict seems positive. Western analysts are tending to proclaim that the liberal bloc led by former interim Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril has trounced the Islamists, which may or may not prove to be true, especially since such black-and-white categorizations may have little validity in Libya, where local or tribal considerations may have more weight than the secular/Islamist dichotomy. And, of course, elections are just the first step; the country is a long way from united. But it is a potentially rich and prosperous place, if it can get its act together,

A few, in some ways quite varied, interpretations of the elections from Juan Cole ("Top Ten Surprises on Libya's Election Day,"); Paul Pillar ("Democratic Form without Substance in Libya"); and Daniel Serwer ("Benghazi Needs a Hug"). (Note: the last post has seemingly disappeared from the Foreign Policy site. If the link starts working I'll put it back.)

Heydemann on the Syrian End Game

May I recommend a solid, perceptive, and enlightening post on managing the coming End Game in Syria by Steve Heydemann of USIP, over at Foreign Policy's Mideast Channel.

More on Egypt's Minority Communities

Not long ago I noted that the Egypt Independent had a series on Egypt's minority communities; that post had links to articles on the Armenian and Jewish communities. Since then they have run articles on Egypt's Levantine and Italian communities, both worth a look.

Court Rules Against Morsi Decree on Parliament

This really shouldn't occasion much surprise: Egypt's Supreme Constitutional Court has ruled that President Morsi's executive order recalling the Parliament that the Court had dissolved is unconstitutional. Right now this has deteriorated into a question of jurisdiction and power, mostly at the level of "I do too!" "No you don't!""Do Too!""Don't." But this morning's Parliamentary move by referring its case to an appeals court may have defused the potential for an explosion: if Parliament was still trying to sit in defiance of the Court, the potential for violence might be much greater than in the present situation, where the lawyers will be arguing it out. A Twitter comment:

Egypt's Parliament Meets for 12 Minutes, Refers Fate to Courts. Wait—What Just Happened?

The showdown at the Cairo Corral seemed imminent, the Earps and Clantons facing each other down, and then — everybody went home. Egypt's dissolved Parliament, recalled by President Morsi in what seemed a challenge to both the military and the Supreme Constitutional Court, assembled, voted to refer its fate to the Appeals Court (technically seeking advice on how to implemnet the SCC dissoluton), and dissolved 12 minutes later pending the appeal. Two days of sound and fury, of sturm und drang, ended with — what, exactly?

A prolcedural point made, to be sure: Parliament chose to appeal its own fate, but did noy seek to legislate. Some suspect a more abstruse point may be in play: SCAF having handed over executive power to Morsi in the interim, Morsi may argue that constitutionally the legislative authority now devolves to him, not to SCAF. But that bsttle is one for the courts, not the streets. That seems implicit here:

Speaker Saad al-Katatny chaired a general meeting that discussed means of enforcing the verdict. He said the decision by President Mohamed Morsy to reinstate the assembly did not defy the court's ruling, but rather reversed the consequent decision by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to disband the assembly.

"In all of its activities, the state is bound by laws. The People's Assembly is fully cognizant of its competences, and respects the judiciary," Katatny stressed.

He added that he had consulted the legislative committee to enforce the verdict and its relevant measures, but noted that Article 40 of the Constitutional Declaration, which has governed the country since March 2011, stipulates that the Court of Cassation has jurisdiction over the validity of parliament memberships.

 So who blinked, and who won? I think that Morsi and the Parliament may have made a procedural point for the legal maneuvering ahead, but hardly the daring reclamation of Presidential authority this was being portrayed as over the past couple of days.

Was this the intended scenario all along, or an 11th hour dialing back of the crisis? Morsi's move alarmed many liberals and others who feared the Muslim Brotherhood was making a ploy to get back the Parliament it dominates and thus control the political arena as a whole; the fact that the MB's Shura Council held a meeting shortly before Morsi's move added to fears that, despite his "resignation" from the movement, it is not Morsi but the MB leadership calling the shots. The Brotherhood has frequently overplayed its hand in the past year and a half, and may have done so again.

But that will be hard to judge until it's clear what Morsi intended from the beginning. Was the plan all along to go to the brink and then back off, as seems to have happened? Was the plan all along to make a recondite constitutional point, and then let the courts figure it out? (Meanwhile, pending cases relating to Parliament were postponed to July 17.)

An initial impression is that the MB hurt itself here: it seemed to be flouting the rule of law (even if the SCC is a Mubarak-packed body) and alienating some of its own allies. In the end, it may have backed away from a confrontation it was going to lose. Or perhaps this compromise (if that's what it is) was its goal all along.

Collision Course?

Egyptian President Muhammad Morsi's order yesterday to reconvene the dissolved Parliament certainly appears to throw down the gauntlet in a challenge to the military, though so far the military response has been unclear while the Supreme Constitutional Court has reaffirmed that its decision is binding on all state authorities.

There are a few pundits suggesting that the decree actually represents a compromise with SCAF; Morsi called back the dissolved Parliament but not for a full four-year term; rather he called for new elections as soon as the new constitution is written, But if the decree represented a secret deal with SCAF, that is far from apparent so far, and the simplest explanation seems to be that Morsi has elected to move the presumably inevitable test of strength between the elected President and the military forward to his first days in office.

Yet Morsi and Field Marshal Tantawi appeared together today at a military graduation ceremony without outward indications of conflict.

The election of Morsi was seen by some as avoiding a constitutional crisis if SCAF had been perceived as rigging the election outcome; but another type of constitutional crisis, one involving a head-on clash between the executive and the judiciary with the military presumably siding with the latter. Already some of the legal arguments are centering around whether SCAF was acting in an executive or legislative capacity when it moved to enforce the court decree, since presumably Morsi has now inherited SCAF's executive but not its legislative powers.

Once again Egypt shows its ability to have a constitutional crisis despite the impediment of not currently having a constitution.

And once again Marc Lynch's greatest contribution to political theory, the "Calvinball" model of Egyptian politics, proves to be prescient.

UPDATE: Michele Dunne on "Morsi's Counter Coup."

Bilal Saab with Sitki Egeli: Interview on theTurkish F-4 Downing

Bilal Y. Saab at the Arms Control and Regional Security in the Middle East blog has a Q&A with Turkish defense analyst Sitki Egeli discussing the Turkish F-4 downed by Syria. I found it illuminating, clearing up some questions, though obviously the Turkish and Syrian narratives. It includes this map from Dr. Egeli:

 

The Crescent and the Sun: Japanese in 19th Century Ottoman Istanbul

Yamada Torajiro in Ottoman Garb

I could start the week by writing about the crisis over President Morsi's attempt to restore the dissolved Parliament in Egypt. I'll be writing about that today, but not just yet.

I could start the week with the crisis in Syria, or the elections in Libya. But I won't.

I'm going to start the week with something completely different: 19th Century Japanese in the late Ottoman Empire. From the Istanbul Research Institute's Blog, "A Fin de Siècle Japanese Romantic in İstanbul." 

The narrative is from the catalogue of an exhibit called The Crescent And The Sun: Three Japanese İn İstanbul: Yamada Torajirō, Itō Chūta, Ōtani Kōzui.

After the Ottoman frigate Ertuğrul struck rocks on the Japanese coast after a typhoon in 1890, following a visit to Japan, Japan rallied to provide relief to the families of the hundreds of sailors who died. Yamada Torajiro took the donations to Istanbul, and soon was allowed to open a store displaying Japanese exports and promoting trade. He wrote extensively, introducing Turkey to Japan as well as promoting Japan in the late Ottoman Empire. There's more at the link; he apparently lived into the 1950s and his memoir (in Japanese of course) appeared in 1957.

Election Eve in Libya

Libya's first nationwide democratic elections, for a General National Congress, is tomorrow.Sporadic violence and continuing clashes among militias have plagued the campaign. I claim no expertise on Libya and haven't followed events that closely, but this BBC Q&A backgrounder offers the basics.

After 50 Years, France Still Holds Key Algerian Archives

In conjunction with yesterday's 50th anniversary of Algerian independence, this Reuters report deals with the ongoing dispute over France's continuing to hold key archives from its occupation, including such basics as maps showing underground gas lines and electrical wiring, but also including Algerian manuscripts dating from before the French occupation of 1830 and originating in Algeria. Half a century later, Algeria and France are still trying to disentangle the legacy of 132 years of rule.

The Manaf Tlas Defection

Close families: Bashar and Manaf

Here is why the Manaf Tlas defection matters: Hafiz al-Asad, father of Bashar al-Asad, and Mustafa Tlas, father of Manaf, met at the Syrian  Military Academy in Homs in the early 1950s and became lifelong friends. During the 1958-61 United Arab Republic, when Egypt and Syria were united, the two men were stationed together in Egypt. When the UAR collapsed, the Nasser regime arrested Asad; Tlas accompanied Asad's family safely back to Syria. Asad showed his gratitude for the rest of his career; Tlas served as his longtime Defense Minister, despite a penchant for embarrassing comments to the press. Bashar al-Asad has known Tlas' sons Firas and Manaf all his life. The father, Mustafa Tlas, now 80, is believed to be outside the country; some say he is undergoing medical treatment in Paris. There are reports that Firas, who is a businessman, is also outside the country. But Manaf was a serving military officer, a general. Now he is  in Turkey, a defection, confirmed after a day of rumors, that hits quite close to the Asad family. The elder Tlas, along with former Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam, was one of the two visible high-level Sunnis in the largely Alawite regime of Hafiz al-Asad; Khaddam had left the country and broken with Bashar even before the uprising. Now the family that symbolized the presence of Sunnis in the Asad regime has broken with the Asads.

Joshua Landis, who has been very cautious about writing off Bashar, now says, "The Tlas defection sends the sign that the regime is done for."

Today is Algeria's 50th Independence Day

On July 5, 1962, Algeria became independent of France after its eight year war of independence. They're celebrating their 50th anniversary today. Algeria's half century as a nation has often been turbulent, but its war against the colonial power remains one that many other countries saw as a model. A happy independence day to Algeria at 50.

The Guardian on Libyan Imazighen

In yet another report on the emerging consciousness of the Amazigh (pl. Imazighen, also "Berber") people in Libya since the fall of Qadhafi, The Guardian has this report.. [Note: Link wasn't working; should be fixed now.]

One quibble: before the fall of Qadhafi, "anyone who spoke Tifinagh in public could be arrested." The author means Tamazight, Tifinagh is the ancient script, still used by the Tuareg and revived anong North African Imazighen. Speaking a script is indeed a challenge (do you speak any Cyrilllic, or how about Kufic?)  Otherwise, a useful article.

AJE's Arafat Report: The Longer Version

On Tuesday I reported on Al Jazeera English's investigative report claiming Yasser Arafat showed traces of exposure to radioactive polonium in his last days. At the time I embedded their first short news report and noted that the full report would be broadcast later that day. I'm now embedding the full report. I know some are calling for exhuming the body while others are saying there's no real evidence. Judge for yourselves.

Tomorrow is the Fourth of July . . .

. . . and so I declare my independence of blogging for one day. See you Thursday, and a happy fourth to my American readers. (No hard feelings, British readers. That tax on tea was a long time ago.)

Clayton Swisher on His AJE Arafat Story

I noted earlier today Al Jazeera English's big story today claiming to have documented the presence of radioactive polonium in Yasser Arafat's body at the time of his death in 2004.  At AJE's blogs, reporter Clayton Swisher, who got the story, discusses his experience with the story.

And again full disclosure, as previously noted Clayton is a former colleague of mine from his days at MEI, pre-Al Jazeera English.

Fatal Stabbing in Suez: A Case of Salafi Vigilantism?

The stabbing death of a young man who was walking with his fiancee in Suez when he was approached and rebuked by three bearded men in galabiyyas (the conservative Islamist "uniform") has provoked alarm in Egypt, especially since the killing has reputedly been claimed by a shadowy "Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice," modeled presumably on the Saudi religious police body of that name but unofficial and essentially a vigilante group. I call the group "shadowy" because when it first made itself known some months back through a Facebook page, reporters could not locate any actual members, spokesmen, offices, etc. and it appeared to exist only on Facebook. Although its Facebook page now appears to have been removed, perhaps by Facebook for taking credit for a crime, blogger Zeinobia has an image of their declaration in Arabic, though she clearly suspects old regime elements trying to provoke anger at Islamists, rather than real Islamists. Such provocateurs did operate under the former regime, and the notion is not impossible.

The Muslim Brotherhood has denounced the killing, but it will further serve to raise questions in the minds of many Egyptians about what the future of Egypt may look like. Whether real radical Salafis did this, which seems likely, or provocateurs aiming at blaming them, the young man is still dead and the alarm among many Egyptians is real.

AJE Claims Arafat Showed High Levels of Polonium at Time of Death

Allegations that the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat was poisoned have always seemed far-fetched, the usual Middle Eastern conspiracy theories, despite the fact that his doctors never offered a cause of death and there was no autopsy after his death in 2004. Rumors that he died of AIDS, liver disease, etc. were rampant but unproven.

Al Jazeera English is claiming today to have conducted a nine-month investigation and is reporting that a radiation laboratory in Lausanne, Switzerland, has found high levels of radioactive polonium in Arafat's personal affects (clothing, toothbrush, etc.), suggesting his body contained the radioactive substance in his last days. Polonium was responsible for the death of exiled Russian former spy Alexander Litvinenko, who died in London in 2006. According to the AJE report (a fuller hour-long report will reportedly be aired soon):

Polonium is present in the atmosphere, but the natural levels that accumulate on surfaces barely register, and the element disappears quickly. Polonium-210, the isotope found on Arafat's belongings, has a half-life of 138 days, meaning that half of the substance decays roughly every four-and-a-half months. “Even in case of a poisoning similar to the Litvinenko case, only traces of the order of a few [millibecquerels] were expected to be found in [the] year 2012,” the institute noted in its report to Al Jazeera.

But Arafat’s personal effects, particularly those with bodily fluids on them, registered much higher levels of the element. His toothbrushes had polonium levels of 54mBq; the urine stain on his underwear, 180mBq. (Another man’s pair of underwear, used as a control, measured just 6.7mBq.)

Further tests, conducted over a three-month period from March until June, concluded that most of that polonium – between 60 and 80 per cent, depending on the sample – was “unsupported,” meaning that it did not come from natural sources.

I have no idea if Arafat was really poisoned, but this does at least suggest an agent that was used, which  previous conspiracy theories have not.  Palestinians will of course assume Israel was behind any poisoning plot. Whether it is possible to confirm any of this at this late date is of course questionable. And one must wonder why, given the amount of questions at the time, this was not discovered (or revealed) at the time of his death?

Full disclosure: Al Jazeera English reporter Clayton Swisher, who worked on this story for the past nine months, is a former colleague of mine at the Middle East Institute.

The Al Jaseera English report (again, a longer report will be aired later today):

Heritage Destruction: Salafis Eradicating Timbuktu's Greatness

Somewhere, Ibn Battuta is weeping.

Although usually not within the purview of this blog, the takeover of the northern, Tuareg parts of Mali (the self-proclaimed "Azawad") first by the MNLA and more recently by radical Islamist groups this year, with links across the borders into Libya and Algeria, have forced attention to the ancient Islamic heritage of the reason. I've posted about Timbuktu's glorious past before, but now, following the fall first of Timbuktu and more recently of Gao to radical Salafist rebels of the Ansar Dine and MUJWA movements, that heritage is in danger. After destruction over the weekend of medieval Saint's tombs in Timbuktu, the Islamists have now destroyed an ancient door, kept closed for centuries, on one of Timbuktu's three great historic mosques, Sidi Yahya:

Among the tombs they destroyed is that of Sidi Mahmoudou, a saint who died in 955, according to the UNESCO website. In addition, on Monday they set upon one of the doors of the Sidi Yahya, a mosque built around 1400. Local legend held that the gate leading to the cemetery would only open on the final day at the end of time.

Local radio host Kader Kalil said that the members of Ansar Dine arrived at the mosque with shovels and pickaxes and yanked off the door, revealing a wall behind it. Kalil said that they explained they were doing so in order to disabuse people of the local legend and to teach them to put their whole faith in the Quran.

"Since my childhood, I have never seen the door on the western side of the mosque open. And I was born in 1947," said Kader, a longtime resident of the city. "When we were children, we were told that the door would only open at the end of time. These religious people want to go to the source, to show us that this is not true. .... Of course our population is not happy. The women, especially, are crying a lot."

Slideshow here. They have sworn to destroy every mausoleum in Timbuktu. UNESCO has put both Timbuktu and the Tomb of Askia in Gao on the Endangered List of heritage sites, which is unlikely to have much impact on the Ansar Dine. This French report shows video of some of the early destruction:


Destruction of tombs is often a Salafi demand: particularly in North Africa, where the Islamic cult of local saints is deeply ingrained, though Salafis have attacked Sufi tombs in Egypt and elsewhere, and when the Saudi Kingdom expanded into the Hijaz in the early 20th Century, many ancient tombs were destroyed by committed Wahhabis. While these monuments, and even the great mosques in Timbuktu, may not be as spectacular as the Buddhas of Bamiyan (destroyed by the Taliban), the destruction of Islamic monuments by those claiming to act in the name of Islam seems even more appalling somehow, though the destruction of heritage monuments is indefensible on any grounds.

As usual, one of the more perceptive commentators is kal at The Moor Next Door, whose latest post-fall-of-Gao analysis is here. MUJWA — the Movement of Unity and Jihad in West Africa — is something of a mystery; it seems to be a sort of offshoot from Al-Qa‘ida in the Islamic Maghreb, but with special emphases:

MUJWA’s propaganda during the Battle of Gao displays its intelligent exploitation of local grievances. A video released to regional media (and posted to the jihadist forums) shows the group’s effort to link its narrative to Songhai nationalist feelings; the video bears the name “Askia,” the name of a Songhai emperor with strong symbol power ... MUJWA has moved from former AQIM subcontractors, members and even drug runners to finding tactical support among members of the city other ethnic groups in the city, in the process projecting an image of ‘popular support’ which may or may not reflect sympathy with the Islamist groups per se as much as a perception of a common enemy.

It's a complicated story; two Twitter tweets (one from kal):

All this aside, this is a tragedy for Mali,for Africa, and for Islamic heritage in general.

A Belated Discovery: The Arabizi Blog, Dealing With Issues We Often Discuss Here

Readers are aware that I've posted a lot about the problems of diglossia in Arabic and the debate over the so-called "death of Arabic," usually proclaimed to be imminent. I'm a bit abashed, therefore, to admit that I've only just discovered a highly relevant blog, Arabizi, by Ph.D. candidate Fatma Said, which seems to have been around since 2010 but which I've been sadly unaware of until now. It spends a lot of time devoted to just those issues, among others related to Arabic as it is spoken and used (Arabizi is from Arabiyya and Inglizi, referring to the mixed jargon often heard ins some Arab circles). Don't miss the "Arab Linguistic Imperialism and the Decline of Arabic: Does Anyone Here Speak Arabic?," Parts One and Two, the most recent posts as I post this.

Is the Message Here, "We've Got Your Back," or "We've Got You Surrounded"?

Photo via Zeinobia

Friday's feel-good day in Tahrir Square, when Muhammad Morsi pledged to exercise full Presidential powers, gave way on Saturday to the real inauguration, where he had to take the oath from the Supreme Constitutional Court that had dissolved the Parliament. He's also had the awkward task of meeting with SCAF and seeming to offer obeisance and fealty like some feudal subordinate, though there were gratifying moments, such as when Field Marshal Tantawi saluted Morsi in a symbolic gesture acknowledging his loyalty to a civilian President (though under SCAF's own constitutional declaration, Morsi will not have the title of Commander-in-Chief). The photo above seems particularly two-edged: is this the Egyptian military handing power to a civilian after 60 years, or is this the Egyptian military making certain that the guy in the business suit knows who's in charge?

Later thought: The Air Force and Navy are looking a little lonely, there, too.