The polls just closed in Israel (3 pm Washington time) and thus the television channels were able to publish their exit polling. Now all three exit polls show a narrow Kadima win, with Likud a close second. Very close though, and it looks as if Labor may run fourth, behind Yisrael Beitenu. But exit polls aren't perfectly reliable when things are this closely run, so let's see the final results.
The Jerusalem Post has already envisioned a situation in which the party winning the most seats might not be given the mandate to try first to form a government; ironically Kadima could have the most seats but the right could have enough total seats across several parties to block a majority. Certainly if things are as close as the exit polls suggest, a national unity government might look likelier.
I'll analyze at greater length when the results are clearer.
Tuesday, February 10, 2009
What Does the High Turnout Mean?
One thing about a blog: unlike editing a quarterly, it gives you the power to make a fool of yourself instantly, rather than having to wait for publication. I therefore probably shouldn't speculate about what the turnout in the Israeli elections may mean until the results are in. But I'm going to take a gamble and speculate anyway.
Half of all voters had voted by 6 pm (the polls are open until 10 pm Israel time). Admittedly, the turnout is not exceptional, just higher than in 2006, but there had been predictions of widespread voter apathy.
Generally speaking, low turnout tends to benefit the small parties because they have committed cadres voting special interests; higher turnout helps the bigger parties. When polling stopped late last week Kadima was gaining and Likud weakening a bit, so bigger turnout might be good news for Kadima.
It may also have something to do with the Avigdor Lieberman factor. Lieberman and his Yisrael Beitenu party's surge in the polls may have persuaded voters on the left and center to turn out in order to block him. It's also been suggested that Israeli Arab voters are turning out to vote against Lieberman, who has suggested taking citizenship away and even transferring Arab populations. Only a few weeks ago many Israeli Arabs were urging a boycott of the elections to protest the Gaza operation. If turnout is high in the Arab towns, that may be a direct reaction to Lieberman's rise. There was an incident in the big Arab town of Umm al-Fahm in which a rightist figure was barred from the town where he was to be a poll-watcher, and some of the Arab parties have complained of irregularities, which certainly suggests they are not boycotting.
And, of course, the election is just step one in the formation of a government, whoever comes out head will still be a long way from forming a government. If the results are sufficiently fragmented, we may not know what the government will look like for weeks. Israel's electoral system, with its low threshold for parties to enter the Knesset, gives a lot of power to the small parties, and they drive hard bargains when the coalition-building begins.
Half of all voters had voted by 6 pm (the polls are open until 10 pm Israel time). Admittedly, the turnout is not exceptional, just higher than in 2006, but there had been predictions of widespread voter apathy.
Generally speaking, low turnout tends to benefit the small parties because they have committed cadres voting special interests; higher turnout helps the bigger parties. When polling stopped late last week Kadima was gaining and Likud weakening a bit, so bigger turnout might be good news for Kadima.
It may also have something to do with the Avigdor Lieberman factor. Lieberman and his Yisrael Beitenu party's surge in the polls may have persuaded voters on the left and center to turn out in order to block him. It's also been suggested that Israeli Arab voters are turning out to vote against Lieberman, who has suggested taking citizenship away and even transferring Arab populations. Only a few weeks ago many Israeli Arabs were urging a boycott of the elections to protest the Gaza operation. If turnout is high in the Arab towns, that may be a direct reaction to Lieberman's rise. There was an incident in the big Arab town of Umm al-Fahm in which a rightist figure was barred from the town where he was to be a poll-watcher, and some of the Arab parties have complained of irregularities, which certainly suggests they are not boycotting.
And, of course, the election is just step one in the formation of a government, whoever comes out head will still be a long way from forming a government. If the results are sufficiently fragmented, we may not know what the government will look like for weeks. Israel's electoral system, with its low threshold for parties to enter the Knesset, gives a lot of power to the small parties, and they drive hard bargains when the coalition-building begins.
Israeli Election Day
Israel's election day is finally here, and there are reports that turnout is higher than in the last election. Until the results are known, there's not much to comment on, but one thing did strike me during this campaign: during the Gaza operation, much of the US media, whether supportive of the operation or critical of it, spent very little time discussing the fact that Israel went to war in the midst of a close-fought election. Certainly Israeli commentators always had that fact in mind, but so much of the discussion in the US media dealt with Gaza as if it were completely unaffected by the elections.
I'm not sure why that was; the elections were hardly a secret, and clearly the timing of the Gaza operation was influenced by Kadima's hopes of staying in power. I just thought I'd remark on the fact at this point. Once we have some results it will be easier to speculate about the impact of Gaza on the vote.
I'm not sure why that was; the elections were hardly a secret, and clearly the timing of the Gaza operation was influenced by Kadima's hopes of staying in power. I just thought I'd remark on the fact at this point. Once we have some results it will be easier to speculate about the impact of Gaza on the vote.
Monday, February 9, 2009
Cardinal Sfeir versus General Aoun
It's easy to criticize the Middle East for its lack of Western-style democracies, but I find myself writing the second post of the day about electoral politics: first in Iran, now in Lebanon. The Lebanese will be holding general elections for Parliament on June 7, under a new electoral law recently adopted (actually, a return to an older electoral system). Now the Maronite Patriarch, Mar Boutros Cardinal Sfeir, has stirred up a tempest in the Maronite community by remarks which seemed to denounce the Free Patriotic Movement of General Michel Aoun. The Daily Star's take is here; more on the subject here, here, and here.
Reading these stories will not be very enlightening to those who do not follow Lebanese politics, since the vicissitudes of Lebanon's factions frequently shift. The Maronites, the largest Lebanese Christian grouping, dominated Lebanese politics until the civil war; today, with their influence and numbers reduced, they are divided politically. Sfeir has long been active in politics, as are other Maronite bishops and the powerful Order of Monks.
The main traditional Maronite parties are part of the "March 14" bloc, named for a huge demonstration in 2005 after the assassination of Rafiq Hariri. But in the 2006 Parliamentary elections, the Maronite partry which won the most seats was the Fre Patriotic Movemnt of Genral Aoun.
Aoun's political history is somewhat bewildering to anyone seeking to neatly categorize and pigeonhole a politician's alignment. In 1988-1990 Aoun, as Prime Minister and Acting President of one of two rival Lebanese governments, essentially fought his own war with Syria. When defeated, he fled into exile. Yet, when he returned to his homeland in 2006, his Free Patriotic Movement suddenly took a pro-Syrian tack and allied politically with Hizbullah. It is this "March 8" front that the Patriarch openly criticized.
Based on the press reports, Cardinal Sfeir's message seems to be that Maronites need to be united and that, when they are not, they suffer. The fact that Aoun has more seats in the present Parliament than the traditional Maronite Phalanges (Kata'ib) might suggest uniting behind Aoun, but his current alliances go against the conservative, right-of-center leanings of the Church.
Some have criticized the Patriarch for plunging into politics, but the 88-year-old Sfeir has been politically outspoken throughout his patriarchate, to which he was elevated in 1986. He has clashed with Aoun before. And, as some of his supporters have been quick to note, Aoun's criticism of clerics intervening in politics does not extend to Hizbullah leader Hasan Nasrallah, who is a Shi'ite cleric.
An open breach between the church hierarchy and Aoun could undercut his support among Maronites, which, presumably, is Sfeir's intention.
Reading these stories will not be very enlightening to those who do not follow Lebanese politics, since the vicissitudes of Lebanon's factions frequently shift. The Maronites, the largest Lebanese Christian grouping, dominated Lebanese politics until the civil war; today, with their influence and numbers reduced, they are divided politically. Sfeir has long been active in politics, as are other Maronite bishops and the powerful Order of Monks.
The main traditional Maronite parties are part of the "March 14" bloc, named for a huge demonstration in 2005 after the assassination of Rafiq Hariri. But in the 2006 Parliamentary elections, the Maronite partry which won the most seats was the Fre Patriotic Movemnt of Genral Aoun.
Aoun's political history is somewhat bewildering to anyone seeking to neatly categorize and pigeonhole a politician's alignment. In 1988-1990 Aoun, as Prime Minister and Acting President of one of two rival Lebanese governments, essentially fought his own war with Syria. When defeated, he fled into exile. Yet, when he returned to his homeland in 2006, his Free Patriotic Movement suddenly took a pro-Syrian tack and allied politically with Hizbullah. It is this "March 8" front that the Patriarch openly criticized.
Based on the press reports, Cardinal Sfeir's message seems to be that Maronites need to be united and that, when they are not, they suffer. The fact that Aoun has more seats in the present Parliament than the traditional Maronite Phalanges (Kata'ib) might suggest uniting behind Aoun, but his current alliances go against the conservative, right-of-center leanings of the Church.
Some have criticized the Patriarch for plunging into politics, but the 88-year-old Sfeir has been politically outspoken throughout his patriarchate, to which he was elevated in 1986. He has clashed with Aoun before. And, as some of his supporters have been quick to note, Aoun's criticism of clerics intervening in politics does not extend to Hizbullah leader Hasan Nasrallah, who is a Shi'ite cleric.
An open breach between the church hierarchy and Aoun could undercut his support among Maronites, which, presumably, is Sfeir's intention.
Khatami's Turban in the Ring Again
Former Iranian President Mohammad 'Ali Khatami has announced that he will run in this spring's Iranian Presidential elections. While Iranian reformers had been urging him to do so, Khatami's sometimes Hamlet-like approach to politics had left it uncertain whether he would run. Now he will.
Mahmud Ahmadinejad is arguably vulnerable. The economy is in disastrous shape, and Ahmadinejad has his enemies, including former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, whom he defeated for the job but who still has a great deal of clout, and Parliament Speaker 'Ali Larijani, formerly Ahmadinejad's national security chief. While Ahmadinejad's confrontational style towards the West has its supporters, it has also brought sanctions and a greater isolation of the country than at any time since the hostage crisis 30 years ago.
For Americans alarmed by Ahmadinejad's rhetoric, the prospect of Khatami returning to office is naturally attractive: the detente between the two countries during his two terms in office, though it led to few concrete results, was preferable to the nuclear saber-rattling and anti-Israeli rhetoric Ahmadinejad has come to be known for.
Juan Cole goes so far as to ask "Can Khatami Be Iran's Obama?" The short answer, I'm afraid, is no, if only because the Iranian Presidency is much weaker than the American Presidency, as Khatami himself frequently complained in public during and after his tenure. And there are enormous hurdles. Though Khatami was initially boosted to power by support of young people and college students, many blame him for allowing crackdowns on student protests during his term. Former Parliament Speaker Mehdi Karrubi, another reformer, is running, and many expect Tehran Mayor Mohammad 'Ali Qalibaf to announce as well. The anti-Ahmadinejad vote may well be split, and the incumbent still has a strong base of support in the Guards Corps and the Basij militia, who were his initial political base.
As Cole notes, there are signs that the hardliners are going to try to imply that Khatami is pro-American, which exaggerates the reality, but it is something of which Ahmadinejad will never be accused.
The man with the most important vote of all, Leader Ayatollah 'Ali Khamenei, has supported Ahmadinejad but also had good relations with Khatami.
Iranian Presidential elections are not exercises in Jeffersonian democracy, especially since the Council of Guardians can disqualify candidates virtually on a whim. But within their limitations they are competitive and can produce surprises: both Khatami in his first term run and Ahmadinejad himself were dark horses who beat better-known establishment figures.
I have a vague sense, which I can't really document or feel terribly confident about, that Ahmadinejad is vulnerable. I specifically declined to run articles on Iranian politics in the spring (April) issue of The Middle East Journal because of the real chance that they would be overtaken by events in the May elections. Perhaps it's just wishful thinking. Khatami joining the race does, at least, suggest it will be worth watching, and will tell us whether the reform movement is a spent force or still has some fight left in it.
Mahmud Ahmadinejad is arguably vulnerable. The economy is in disastrous shape, and Ahmadinejad has his enemies, including former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, whom he defeated for the job but who still has a great deal of clout, and Parliament Speaker 'Ali Larijani, formerly Ahmadinejad's national security chief. While Ahmadinejad's confrontational style towards the West has its supporters, it has also brought sanctions and a greater isolation of the country than at any time since the hostage crisis 30 years ago.
For Americans alarmed by Ahmadinejad's rhetoric, the prospect of Khatami returning to office is naturally attractive: the detente between the two countries during his two terms in office, though it led to few concrete results, was preferable to the nuclear saber-rattling and anti-Israeli rhetoric Ahmadinejad has come to be known for.
Juan Cole goes so far as to ask "Can Khatami Be Iran's Obama?" The short answer, I'm afraid, is no, if only because the Iranian Presidency is much weaker than the American Presidency, as Khatami himself frequently complained in public during and after his tenure. And there are enormous hurdles. Though Khatami was initially boosted to power by support of young people and college students, many blame him for allowing crackdowns on student protests during his term. Former Parliament Speaker Mehdi Karrubi, another reformer, is running, and many expect Tehran Mayor Mohammad 'Ali Qalibaf to announce as well. The anti-Ahmadinejad vote may well be split, and the incumbent still has a strong base of support in the Guards Corps and the Basij militia, who were his initial political base.
As Cole notes, there are signs that the hardliners are going to try to imply that Khatami is pro-American, which exaggerates the reality, but it is something of which Ahmadinejad will never be accused.
The man with the most important vote of all, Leader Ayatollah 'Ali Khamenei, has supported Ahmadinejad but also had good relations with Khatami.
Iranian Presidential elections are not exercises in Jeffersonian democracy, especially since the Council of Guardians can disqualify candidates virtually on a whim. But within their limitations they are competitive and can produce surprises: both Khatami in his first term run and Ahmadinejad himself were dark horses who beat better-known establishment figures.
I have a vague sense, which I can't really document or feel terribly confident about, that Ahmadinejad is vulnerable. I specifically declined to run articles on Iranian politics in the spring (April) issue of The Middle East Journal because of the real chance that they would be overtaken by events in the May elections. Perhaps it's just wishful thinking. Khatami joining the race does, at least, suggest it will be worth watching, and will tell us whether the reform movement is a spent force or still has some fight left in it.
Saturday, February 7, 2009
A response on the Berriane Post
This doesn't count as a weekend posting, but Kal at The Moor Next Door has noted and replied online at length to my post on Berriane, Ibadis, Berbers, etc. Admittedly, after the flattering "Michael Collins Dunn, Editor of the prestigious Middle East Journal, wrote an interesting "Backgrounder" on the Berriane violence..." he proceeds to detail what I left out, got wrong, or should have said. I thank him for that since I make no claim to be an Algeria specialist* and the only Ibadis I've ever had contact with (unless some Algerian friends were and I didn't know it) were Omanis. But I'm pleased to learn from him and delighted that the conversation is starting: that ought to be what blogging is about. I'm never too old to learn...
[*Though the man who introduced me to Middle East studies as an undergraduate, and was my primary advisor as a doctoral candidate as well, Professor John D. Ruedy, most definitely is, and is the author of Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation.]
Kal also posted a comment on my original post, but do go read the longer critique on the blog. I learned from it and you will too. I'll be setting up a blogroll sometime soon, and I'm just getting to know The Moor Next Door, but if you're interested in the Maghreb, and Algeria in particular, it is more than worthy of your attention.
And as the old saying goes, as long as they spell your name right ...
One item I want to throw in since I've actually had two posts up on Algeria: on those posts I linked to English-language stories on Algerian press websites that have English pages. Of course the most extensive literature on Algeria is French and Arabic. I don't yet know the audience for this blog, and may post a poll sometime soon to find out if people will be annoyed/or overjoyed if I post links to articles in other languages. I did consult French and Arabic articles on those posts but didn't link to them, assuming many readers would not have an interest. This is an area I'll explore further, especially once more people know the blog is here and thus there's hope for a decent polling sample.
[*Though the man who introduced me to Middle East studies as an undergraduate, and was my primary advisor as a doctoral candidate as well, Professor John D. Ruedy, most definitely is, and is the author of Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation.]
Kal also posted a comment on my original post, but do go read the longer critique on the blog. I learned from it and you will too. I'll be setting up a blogroll sometime soon, and I'm just getting to know The Moor Next Door, but if you're interested in the Maghreb, and Algeria in particular, it is more than worthy of your attention.
And as the old saying goes, as long as they spell your name right ...
One item I want to throw in since I've actually had two posts up on Algeria: on those posts I linked to English-language stories on Algerian press websites that have English pages. Of course the most extensive literature on Algeria is French and Arabic. I don't yet know the audience for this blog, and may post a poll sometime soon to find out if people will be annoyed/or overjoyed if I post links to articles in other languages. I did consult French and Arabic articles on those posts but didn't link to them, assuming many readers would not have an interest. This is an area I'll explore further, especially once more people know the blog is here and thus there's hope for a decent polling sample.
Friday, February 6, 2009
Weekends
Last weekend I posted both days because I thought of something that couldn't wait. Can't say what I'll do this weekend, but it is my declared intention to spend weekends with my family, not on this blog. If I can just get everyone in the region to cooperate . . . If I do post on weekends, understand that it's my choice: nobody at the Middle East Institute is telling me to.
(Actually I'm not even in the office on Fridays, but this is I think my fifth post this Friday. Nobody's holding a gun to my head on Fridays either, but I like to blog.)
Actually, reading the above, it sounds wrong. Nobody's holding a gun to my head other days either. Editors learn to enforce their own deadlines and keep them, and thus hold guns to their own heads.
(Actually I'm not even in the office on Fridays, but this is I think my fifth post this Friday. Nobody's holding a gun to my head on Fridays either, but I like to blog.)
Actually, reading the above, it sounds wrong. Nobody's holding a gun to my head other days either. Editors learn to enforce their own deadlines and keep them, and thus hold guns to their own heads.
Iraq Election Results
Since Juan Cole has a good roundup of the Iraqi election results, I'll refer you there until I have time to comment in more detail. He's sent his best wishes for this blog, so I'll respond in kind by a referral.
Also Marc Lynch is doing some closer analyses of Baghdad's returns, so I, as a brand new blogger (if old hand in other ways) will defer to the Mideast blogging vets for Iraq coverage today, since I posted on other topics.
Also Marc Lynch is doing some closer analyses of Baghdad's returns, so I, as a brand new blogger (if old hand in other ways) will defer to the Mideast blogging vets for Iraq coverage today, since I posted on other topics.
Last Day for Publishing Polls in Israel
Today is the last day political polling results can be published in Israel before Tuesday's election, and the polling seems to show two things: first that Tzipi Livni's Kadima has moved closer to Binyamin Netanyahu's Likud, and second that Likud is losing support not to the center left but to the right, Avigdor Lieberman's Yisrael Beitenu. The Haaretz poll puts Likud only two seats ahead of Kadima, but with Yisrael Beitenu winning 18 seats, making it the third largest bloc, with Ehud Barak's Labor relegated to fourth place at 14 seats.
Lieberman's statements in the past have seemed supportive of population transfer, of transferring Israeli Arab towns to the Palestinian Authority, and he is often seen as promoting an anti-Arab agenda. Hanoch Daum at Yediot Aharanot's website argues he may not really be as bad as he is portrayed, but the surge in support for Yisrael Beitenu -- "Israel is our home," originally a Soviet Union-immigrant party, but now drawing right-nationalist support from other sectors -- seems if anything to be pushing Likud to the right, with Netanyahu saying he can work with Lieberman. A Jerusalem Post analysis here; the Beirut Daily Star's here.
Despite Livni's surge, one has to remember that Israeli governments are always coalitions: never in the history of the state has one party held a true majority. From 1948 to 1977, Labor always dominated, but had to form coalitions with religious parties and others; since 1977, Labor and Likud have usually alternated, until the emergence of Kadima when Ariel Sharon split with Likud. I'll talk more about Israel's political history as the results are known and the deal-making begins.
At this point the rightist parties and religious parties together seem to be polling at about 65 seats and the left including Kadima only about 55. Though Netanyahu might seek to form a centrist coalition or a unity government across the mainstream, he would also have a chance of governing from the right, with Lieberman and the religious Shas party, for example. Whatever the results, unless there is a dramatic shift, the next government is likely to be to the right of the outgoing one. If Kadima and Likud are close together, we could see weeks of coalition maneuvering. George Mitchell's efforts to restart the peace process will have to tread water while Israel sorts out its government.
Kadima's surge suggests this isn't completely over yet, and as I noted in my Gaza post, a truce agreement on Gaza before Tuesday might have an impact; there's also press speculation that a deal might be cut to free Gilad Shalit, the Israeli soldier held by Hamas since 2006.
Lieberman's statements in the past have seemed supportive of population transfer, of transferring Israeli Arab towns to the Palestinian Authority, and he is often seen as promoting an anti-Arab agenda. Hanoch Daum at Yediot Aharanot's website argues he may not really be as bad as he is portrayed, but the surge in support for Yisrael Beitenu -- "Israel is our home," originally a Soviet Union-immigrant party, but now drawing right-nationalist support from other sectors -- seems if anything to be pushing Likud to the right, with Netanyahu saying he can work with Lieberman. A Jerusalem Post analysis here; the Beirut Daily Star's here.
Despite Livni's surge, one has to remember that Israeli governments are always coalitions: never in the history of the state has one party held a true majority. From 1948 to 1977, Labor always dominated, but had to form coalitions with religious parties and others; since 1977, Labor and Likud have usually alternated, until the emergence of Kadima when Ariel Sharon split with Likud. I'll talk more about Israel's political history as the results are known and the deal-making begins.
At this point the rightist parties and religious parties together seem to be polling at about 65 seats and the left including Kadima only about 55. Though Netanyahu might seek to form a centrist coalition or a unity government across the mainstream, he would also have a chance of governing from the right, with Lieberman and the religious Shas party, for example. Whatever the results, unless there is a dramatic shift, the next government is likely to be to the right of the outgoing one. If Kadima and Likud are close together, we could see weeks of coalition maneuvering. George Mitchell's efforts to restart the peace process will have to tread water while Israel sorts out its government.
Kadima's surge suggests this isn't completely over yet, and as I noted in my Gaza post, a truce agreement on Gaza before Tuesday might have an impact; there's also press speculation that a deal might be cut to free Gilad Shalit, the Israeli soldier held by Hamas since 2006.
Bouteflika Third Term Probable
It now looks as if the only thing standing between Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika and a third term is the fact that he has not yet officially announced his intention to run. He has, however, presided over a constitutional amendment dropping the previous two-term limitation. The major chiefs of the opposition parties have all indicated they will not run this time around, and as a result the announced candidates so far are mostly from minuscule parties or independents.
Bouteflika won handily with 85% of the vote in 2004, and challenging him obviously was seen by the main opposition candidates as fruitless. There are some lingering questions about his health, however; he was hospitalized in France in 2005 for a gastric ulcer, remained out of public view for a lengthy period, and reportedly had another hospitalization a year later. Both French and Algerian newspapers have speculated about his health, with rumors of stomach cancer most prominent. Bouteflika will turn 72 on March 2. Whatever the nature of his 2005 illness, he has returned to public view and seems intent on a third term.
The elections are due in April; the Algerian press has reported April 2 and 9 as the likeliest dates, and the date should be announced soon.
Bouteflika won handily with 85% of the vote in 2004, and challenging him obviously was seen by the main opposition candidates as fruitless. There are some lingering questions about his health, however; he was hospitalized in France in 2005 for a gastric ulcer, remained out of public view for a lengthy period, and reportedly had another hospitalization a year later. Both French and Algerian newspapers have speculated about his health, with rumors of stomach cancer most prominent. Bouteflika will turn 72 on March 2. Whatever the nature of his 2005 illness, he has returned to public view and seems intent on a third term.
The elections are due in April; the Algerian press has reported April 2 and 9 as the likeliest dates, and the date should be announced soon.
Progress in Gaza?
Can a Gaza truce that would open the border crossings and end the siege really be close? Certainly the Hamas leadership needs to get aid flowing, and a deal along the lines proposed could give both sides an opportunity to claim victory: Israel to assert that its military operation ended the rocket fire, and Hamas to say that its resistance led to opening the border crossings. But any truce is going to be fragile by definition, so long as one person with a homemade rocket (many of the Qassams are made out of pipes and such) can upset the whole apple cart.
One also has to wonder about reports that the Hamas leadership on the ground in Gaza, around Ismail Haniyya, is awaiting approval by the leadership in Damascus: at what point does the population of Gaza remind Haniyya that he was elected in a popular vote, not appointed by Khalid Meshaal?
On the other hand, I think it's worth remembering that Israel is in the runup to elections on Tuesday, and the polls are showing Likud in the lead, but with narrowing margins. The outgoing Kadima-Labor government would very much like a breakthrough in Gaza just before the election, no doubt, so the leak could also be either political spin or even wishful thinking.
I'll comment more on this as it progresses, and will have more later today on other subjects. Stay tuned.
One also has to wonder about reports that the Hamas leadership on the ground in Gaza, around Ismail Haniyya, is awaiting approval by the leadership in Damascus: at what point does the population of Gaza remind Haniyya that he was elected in a popular vote, not appointed by Khalid Meshaal?
On the other hand, I think it's worth remembering that Israel is in the runup to elections on Tuesday, and the polls are showing Likud in the lead, but with narrowing margins. The outgoing Kadima-Labor government would very much like a breakthrough in Gaza just before the election, no doubt, so the leak could also be either political spin or even wishful thinking.
I'll comment more on this as it progresses, and will have more later today on other subjects. Stay tuned.
Thursday, February 5, 2009
Not Much Today
Today was the first day since I started blogging here that the press of work on the Journal, manuscripts, meetings, etc. kept me from much time to blog. Also, except for the fact that we have more returns in Iraq and it is now clear just how well Prime Minister al-Maliki's coalition seems to have done, especially in Baghdad and Basra, there wasn't anything that clearly called out for a post. I hope to post often enough to keep people coming back here, and incorporate guest bloggers too, but today came up a bit dry. No point in writing boring stuff just to fill space. More tomorrow I hope.
Wednesday, February 4, 2009
An Iraq Election Observation
Earlier I noted that many commentators are referring to the "disappointing" turnout in the Iraqi local elections. It was 51%.
I live in Fairfax County, Virginia, one of the most affluent, educated and politically aware counties in the United States. Yesterday, February 3, we held an election for Chairman of the County Commission -- a job not that dissimilar to some of those Iraqis were voting for -- since the previous Chairman won a seat in Congress in November. When I say "not dissimilar," bear in mind that Fairfax County has a population of over a million, more than eight of Iraq's 18 provinces and about tied with a ninth, so the job is an important one, especially in the present economy.
The turnout was 16%.
No one seems to have called it "disappointing," yet, but it was less than a third of the Iraqi turnout. And yes, I voted.
I live in Fairfax County, Virginia, one of the most affluent, educated and politically aware counties in the United States. Yesterday, February 3, we held an election for Chairman of the County Commission -- a job not that dissimilar to some of those Iraqis were voting for -- since the previous Chairman won a seat in Congress in November. When I say "not dissimilar," bear in mind that Fairfax County has a population of over a million, more than eight of Iraq's 18 provinces and about tied with a ninth, so the job is an important one, especially in the present economy.
The turnout was 16%.
No one seems to have called it "disappointing," yet, but it was less than a third of the Iraqi turnout. And yes, I voted.
Kyrgyz Threat to US Base at Manas
It looks like the "Great Game" in Central Asia may be on again. Suddenly over the past couple of days the President and Parliament of Kyrgyzstan have begun moves aimed at eliminating the US Air Base at Manas near the capital of Bishkek. Manas is a key logistical support base for US operations in Afghanistan, and the threat of losing it could have a profound impact on US and NATO operations there.
For more on Manas consult the air base's own home page here, and/or the Wikipedia write-up here.
The move seems to be a reaction to Russian efforts to oust the US from Kyrgyzstan and may be an attempt to play the US against Russia; an account by a Central Asia-watching website here gives some of the political background.
This definitely bears watching. Loss of Manas, coupled with ongoing uncertaities in Pakistan and a drawdown in Iraq, could pose real challenges to US intentions to ramp up operations in Afghanistan. Military pros have always said "Amateurs talk about strategy; professionals talk about logistics," and Manas is a major player in the logistical tail for the Afghan operation.
For more on Manas consult the air base's own home page here, and/or the Wikipedia write-up here.
The move seems to be a reaction to Russian efforts to oust the US from Kyrgyzstan and may be an attempt to play the US against Russia; an account by a Central Asia-watching website here gives some of the political background.
This definitely bears watching. Loss of Manas, coupled with ongoing uncertaities in Pakistan and a drawdown in Iraq, could pose real challenges to US intentions to ramp up operations in Afghanistan. Military pros have always said "Amateurs talk about strategy; professionals talk about logistics," and Manas is a major player in the logistical tail for the Afghan operation.
Tuesday, February 3, 2009
Backgrounder: Iraqi Election Results, Part 1
Some Things to Keep in Mind in Reading Analyses of the Iraqi Elections
The Iraqi provincial election results will not be official for quite some time and the early returns are still incomplete, but since everyone else is commenting on them, both newspapers and bloggers, I thought I'd express a few early thoughts. I'm not going to post a bunch of links here since anyone can Google the rather widespread coverage and it is a moving target anyway. I really hesitate to draw vast conclusions from early and incomplete returns, and I hate oversimplifications of complex issues, but even so, I'll both have to jump to a few conclusions and oversimplify a bit here. But let me make several points for now:
1) I do not hold myself out as an Iraq expert. So I should explain why I think I have standing to comment here. These explanations, caveats and justifications will also apply to later posts on Iraq and its elections. My only visit to the country was in 1989, and several things seem to have changed since then, as you may well have heard somewhere. On the other hand, in favor of my talking about Iraq: in my newsletter days I followed Iraq pretty closely, and I continue to follow both newspapers (including Iraqi newspaper coverage) and the wide range of Iraq-oriented bloggers from Juan Cole on the leftish side to military bloggers on the rightish side and some key Iraqi bloggers as well, though not daily, and not in enormous detail. (I'll review some of them in time. If you ever read Riverbend, I'm sure you miss her. Read her archive at the site and I think she has a book but can't find it on Google just now.) I've had the good fortune to know several former (and the occasional current) US Ambassador to Iraq; at least two of the Embassy Public Affairs Officers (perhaps more if I think hard about it) were good friends; just today I saw a former boss, David Mack, an old Iraq hand, and former Ambassador (and ex-head of Radio Free Iraq) David Newton to drop two names whose connections with MEI make it obvious; I've known three or four of the most prominent historians and political scientists (both US and British) dealing with modern Iraq as personal friends and have published many of the others, but won't drop names though I guess I just did. Also, because of my interest as a historian in the World War I and post WWI era, I'm probably more familiar than the blogger-in-the-street with the British experience in what they (charmingly) called "Mespot" (for Mesopotamia) back when they had their go at it. I also have a track record on military issues in Iraq and am right now trying to find a link to something I wrote in 2002 which, when I find it, I plan to post. I hope I have standing to comment on the place even if I have only spent about a week there. (And unlike most commentators, I'm glad to state my credentials, and lack thereof, up front.)
2) One headline that has been fairly frequent on both blogs and newspapers is a variant of a) parties supporting the central government have done well and/or b) the parties currently in power have done well. I am trying to think of a good, thoughtful, scholarly and dignified way to say "well, duh!," as my (third grader) daughter would put it, but right now I can't come up with a better comment. In Arab countries (and not just there by any means) the dawla, the folks in power, always do well, even in the most genuinely free and fair elections*, because they have control of the patronage. This is not a complicated concept. Anyone over 35 from Chicago should understand it. I'm not trying to be flip here, but one did not need a crystal ball to predict that the people already in office would do well. [Update: See Ambassador David Mack's note in the comments making the point that it's worth noting this time because the folks in power did not do well in 2005.] A side effect of this is probably going to be that centralization wins big and that those seeking an extremely loose federation (as suggested famously by now-US-VP Joe Biden and supported by most Kurds and some Iraqi Shi'ites) are going to be disappointed. The idea of a unitary Iraqi state is not as evanescent as some came to believe, but the results themselves don't seem surprising.
[*We always say "free and fair" elections. Can they be one but not the other? Maybe so, in fact I might be able to come up with examples each way, but I'd welcome comments for now if anyone is reading this yet.]
3) I've seen some articles suggesting the " Islamist" parties have lost a lot of power. I think this is a question of definition. Many of the commentators seem pleased that the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (ex-Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq) and Muqtada al-Sadr's people seem to have lost at least some of their support. These are certainly Shi'ite Islamist movements, and what I suspect the commentators really have in the back of their minds is that they are pro-Iranian Shi'ite Islamist movements. The Supreme Council's front has also been pushing for an autonomous Shi'ite region on Kurdish lines, and thus runs counter to the general tilt towards centralization. The point I want to make for now is that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's State of Law List (there are alternate translations) is winning, and its two core member parties are the two branches of the Da'wa (Call) Party. Both wings of the Da'wa began as, and remain, Islamist in orientation and ideology (the "Call" of their name refers to proselytization to Islam), though less fully committed to the Iranian political formula than the two previously mentioned. Some of the American commentators I think, when they say that the Islamists lost ground, mean Iran's Islamists lost ground, while the US' Islamists did just fine, thank you. And in some provinces the Shi'ites are losing ground to Sunni groups because this time the Sunnis are actually voting, and some of those Sunni groups are Islamist as well. I think some of these analyses are more influenced by an "Islamist=Iran" equation than a real look at the parties' platforms.
4) Somewhere I saw, or perhaps heard on the radio (sorry, can't find it right now, but I'm not setting up a straw man here: I did hear or read it somewhere), someone saying that the Kurds had done more poorly than in the past. That may well feed into the accepted meme that centralization is winning. But please, folks, consider the context. These provincial elections only took place in 14 of the 18 provinces of Iraq. They did not occur in Dahuk, Irbil, and Suleimaniyya provinces, which constitute the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), nor were they held in the province Saddam Hussein renamed Ta'mim (Nationalization) Province but which most people (and as near as I can tell all Kurds) still call Kirkuk. These are the four provinces with the most Kurdish population, and weren't in play. There are Kurds in some other provinces, most notably Ninawa (Nineveh), Diyala, and of course Baghdad. As far as I can tell, all the "Kurds did poorly" reports relate to Ninawa. Now I may be wrong here: the early numbers are very incomplete. But Ninawa is the province around Mosul (and used to just be called Mosul province, until Saddam started naming things after ancient Mesopotamian sites), and in the previous provincial elections in 2005, the Sunni population mostly boycotted. This time around there were several Sunni Arab parties contending, including one specific to Ninawa called al-Hadba after a famous minaret there, and so naturally the Sunni Arabs (most Kurds are Sunni too, so the real division is ethnic) increased their share vis-a-vis the Kurds. But this may be specific to Ninawa/Mosul. And most of Iraq's Kurds weren't even voting this time, and the real hotbed of Arab-Turkmen-Kurdish conflict, Kirkuk, wasn't either.
5) As near as I can tell no one can really read the tea leaves in Baghdad yet. Perhaps I've missed it. But please keep in mind that the city of Baghdad is about 6.5 million and the Governorate (province) somewhat bigger, and that Iraq's overall population in the last census was something like 29 million. The capital province is a fifth or more of the country. The results will matter. Just as American election reportage always starts with (I think its name is) Dixville Notch, New Hampshire, where the whole town of a dozen or so vote at midnight, so analysts of the Iraqi vote are using what numbers they have so far. But unless Baghdad's numbers are in, we aren't there yet. I'll write more when we are.
That's about it for now. I'll continue to comment as we learn more, and if any true Iraq experts are reading this go right ahead and comment, please. We're slowly letting the world know that this blog exists.
Iran's Satellite Launch
Here's a link to IRNA's pictures of the launch of Iran's first satellite. [IRNA moved the pix from the site originally linked. This link works Tuesday afternoon, but may move again.] The Omid is said to be a "data-processing satellite," launched by a Safir-2 rocket last night, and its launch was intended to mark the 30th anniversary of the Iranian Revolution. (Were they trying to upstage the MEI collection I just posted about?) (UPDATED: Fars has a bit more than IRNA on the details.)
Now I'm no rocket scientist and therefore not the best analyst of this, but have worked on some missile and defense issues in the past, and my wife, an Editor with Air Force Magazine, does their annual Space Almanac, so I'll venture a few comments.
There is really nothing surprising about the launch -- Iran had tested the launcher last year, said it was a satellite launch vehicle, and talked about its plans to launch its own satellite for years. It also claimed a launch last year had put a "dummy satellite" into orbit, but Western reports did not confirm that anything achieved orbit then. (An Iranian satellite was previously launched by a Russian launch vehicle.)
Since not much is known yet about the satellite, and we've come a long way since Sputnik 1 back in 1957, the achievement is real but not particularly alarming. A satellite capability means that a country has reached a certain stage in lift capability and precision guidance, but Iran's well-known ballistic missile program is already evidence of that. But since the satellite launch shows a reasonable level of guidance capability, there will probably be a lot of rhetoric about Iran's missile program as a result of the launch. I'm not sure that the achievement really moves the issue forward, though: the Safir is supposedly derived from the Shahab-3 ballistic missile, which is basically a development of the North Korean Nodong-1, is a known quantity tested a number of times in recent years.
As of this writing there doesn't seem to be a lot of fuss about the satellite on the news, and that's probably a sign that this isn't being blown out of proportion. Basically, we knew they could do it, were planning to do it, and might do it soon. They picked the 30th anniversary of the revolution, also hardly surprising.
Now I'm no rocket scientist and therefore not the best analyst of this, but have worked on some missile and defense issues in the past, and my wife, an Editor with Air Force Magazine, does their annual Space Almanac, so I'll venture a few comments.
There is really nothing surprising about the launch -- Iran had tested the launcher last year, said it was a satellite launch vehicle, and talked about its plans to launch its own satellite for years. It also claimed a launch last year had put a "dummy satellite" into orbit, but Western reports did not confirm that anything achieved orbit then. (An Iranian satellite was previously launched by a Russian launch vehicle.)
Since not much is known yet about the satellite, and we've come a long way since Sputnik 1 back in 1957, the achievement is real but not particularly alarming. A satellite capability means that a country has reached a certain stage in lift capability and precision guidance, but Iran's well-known ballistic missile program is already evidence of that. But since the satellite launch shows a reasonable level of guidance capability, there will probably be a lot of rhetoric about Iran's missile program as a result of the launch. I'm not sure that the achievement really moves the issue forward, though: the Safir is supposedly derived from the Shahab-3 ballistic missile, which is basically a development of the North Korean Nodong-1, is a known quantity tested a number of times in recent years.
As of this writing there doesn't seem to be a lot of fuss about the satellite on the news, and that's probably a sign that this isn't being blown out of proportion. Basically, we knew they could do it, were planning to do it, and might do it soon. They picked the 30th anniversary of the revolution, also hardly surprising.
Monday, February 2, 2009
MEI's "The Iranian Revolution at 30"
Since MEI's website is known to more people than know about this blog, noting events over there may not accomplish much yet, but I wanted to call attention to the recently released Viewpoints special edition, "The Iranian Revolution at 30," which includes contributions by 53 scholars and participants marking the 30 years since the fall of the Shah. The link is here; the full report in .pdf is here (warning: large file); and there is a somewhat related event on the anniversary of the revolution at the Institute on February 11.
Early Iraqi Returns
Since official results won't be in for some time, I won't try yet to analyze the results of Saturday's Iraqi provincial elections; full-time Iraq watchers are trying to read the tea leaves; Juan Cole's wrapup today gives the main early indicators. One preliminary comment I do want to offer, however, is this: some analysts are characterizing the reported turnout of 51% of eligible voters as "disappointing," because it is down from earlier elections. I think we should recall that provincial elections, important as they are, are not national elections, and that many local elections in the US produce far smaller turnouts.
The other immediate point is that as of this morning there appear to be no confirmed deaths, though there was some violence. This would seem to be another indicator of the growing stability, though by all accounts the country was pretty much locked down for the voting.
I'll hold off on further analysis until we have some more reliable results.
The other immediate point is that as of this morning there appear to be no confirmed deaths, though there was some violence. This would seem to be another indicator of the growing stability, though by all accounts the country was pretty much locked down for the voting.
I'll hold off on further analysis until we have some more reliable results.
Sunday, February 1, 2009
Backgrounder: Ibadi-Sunni Violence in Algeria
Okay, I said I won't normally post weekends, and now I've gone and done it both days. But when something catches my interest, I may decide to get my ideas down while they're fresh. While the Iraqi elections seem (on first report) to have gone off fairly well, with decent turnout, there's been an outbreak of violence in the Algerian Saharan Mzab Valley. It's a bit hard to tell from some of the reports what exactly started the trouble, but it seems to have both ethnic and sectarian content. The Mzab area includes one of Algeria's concentrations of Berbers, but the Berbers of Mzab, unlike those of the Kabyle region, are Ibadi rather than Sunni Muslims.
A few of the current reports can be found here, here, and here, to provide some links in English. The troubles have been concentrated so far in the town of Berriane, and there were similar outbreaks there last year, as noted here.
There would seem to be two aspects to the tensions: one an ethno-linguistic one, between Berbers speaking the Mzabi Berber language and Arabs speaking Arabic; and the Ibadi-Sunni religious division. (The "Malekites" referred to in some of the linked articles are followers of the Maliki madhhab or legal rite of Sunnism; Maliki Islam is the dominant form in much of North Africa west of Egypt and, at least formerly, in parts of Upper Egypt.)
The Ibadis are an interesting survival in their own right: they are the only Islamic sect left over from the Khariji (Kharijite) movement of the first century of Islam. The Kharijis broke with both the Sunni and emerging Shi'i groups, insisting that the Imam of the community could come from any background so long as he was pious. At a time when most Muslims were debating whether the Imam had to be a direct descendant of Muhammad or merely o the tribe of Quraysh, the Khariji said the Imam could be any, Muslim, "even an African slave." If that were not politically incorrect enough for the first Islamic century, there are claims that some Kharijis were (according to their enemies, who wrote most of the history) that even woman could serve as Caliph. Today they may seem modern and politically correct, but their tactics and approach to their fellow Muslims made them the radical jihadis of their day.
I must note, at this point, that the Ibadis themselves reject the name "Khariji" because they do not see themselves as outside the greater Muslim umma, and do not share with the mainstream Kharijis (all dead centuries ago) the idea that non-Kharijis are kuffar or unbelievers and must have war waged against them. "Khariji" means "those who withdraw, or go out" and does not apply to the Ibadis, who are prepared to live with non-Ibadi Muslims, whereas other Khariji sects preached jihad against both the Sunni and Shi'a. This is one of those positions that, whatever its religious base, doesn't work well in the real world: all the hard-core Khariji sects, being minorities, fought to the death and, being outnumbered vastly, are no longer out there.
Kharijism started as a sort of "third way" movement in a sense, but like absolutist minority groups anywhere, they vanished. The Ibadi variety (and again they don't call themswelves Khariji) was the only one to survive into our time.
Kharijism in its Ibadi form lasted longest on the peripheries of the Caliphate, particularly in Oman and the Maghreb. Ibadis are still found in both places: Ibadism is the majority faith among Omanis, though the expatriate population and the fact that the Sunnis are concentrated in the cities means that Sunnism is also important there today. In North Africa, Ibadism was once dominant, under the Rustamid dynasty and some earlier Khariji/Berber mountain kingdoms, and there are islands of Ibadis scattered about the Maghreb today: in the Mzab and Ouargla oases of Algeria (these troubles are in Mzab) , the island of Djerba in Tunisia, and the Jabal Nafusa in Libya. They are found virtually nowhere else besides Oman and the former Omani empire, such as Zanzibar and other Indian Ocean ports where Omanis long traded.
The Omani and North African Ibadi groups were out of touch with each other for 1000 years or so, but I understand Oman has sought to create links in the late 20th century and beyond. Today, Ibadism isn't that distinguishable, for most adherents who aren't clerics or theology professors, from Sunnism except in some obscure theological points (such as whether the Qur'an/Koran is created or existed from eternity), and thus doesn't make a lot of difference in most people's day-to-day practice of the faith. In Oman both Ibadis and Sunnis are Arabic speaking (with some asterisks about minor language groups), but in Algeria the split is along the Berber/Arabic line.
Berber-Arab troubles are hardly new in Algeria, where the government's post-independence Arabization program, aimed at eradicating the dominant cultural role of French, was seen as eroding Berber-speaking elements. Ironically, the Berbers, resisting Arabization, became the great defenders of French, and the government became insistent on the dominance of Arabic: in the past Berber radio broadcasts, publications etc. were banned or strictly regulated, though much has been liberalized in recent years under President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. (And of course most educated Algerians, Arab or Berber, are still very comfortable in French. And Arabic is essential for Berbers if they're going to be anything other than rural peasants. But there's also a revival (or first blossoming) of Berber literature, both in Algeria and in France. Trouble in the Kabyle -- or Kabylie, as the area is called in French -- area erupts from time to time, but there there is no added sectarian element, except that most of the Berber population are a bit more secular than their Arab neighbors.
If you want more background, just Google "Tamazight" and follow on from there. "Berber" being just the French variant of the Arabic form (barbar) of the Greek barbaros (non-Greek people all of whose language sounds -- to Greeks -- like bar-bar) and thus related to our "barbarian," the Imazighen peoples would rather not be called Berber, or have their Tamazight language called that, but then it's going to take a long time for the man in the street to start using "Imazighen," or the various tribal/linguistic names, or "Tamazight," even among Arab Algerians (though I think the word "Tamazight" appears in the new Constitution's discussion of national languages).
The Algerian media are not very clear on what started the latest round of troubles in Berriane ("troublemakers" have been mentioned), and there have been allusions to gang elements in both ethnic groups, but I've also seen press reports of attacks on the party headquarters of the Socialist Forces Front (FFS), which is essentially a Berber political party, so the ethnic element may be more important here than the sectarian one.
And a caveat: it's always a little unclear in these incidents whether the rivalry is purely ethnic/religious or something else, and since this seems to involve young men attacking other young men, it may be little more than plain old street gangs that happen to divide along linguistic lines. I know there were cases during the troubles in Upper Egypt in the 1990s where the fighting between the police and the Islamists happened to divide along tribal or family lines and sometimes reflected old vendettas. I don't intend to overemphasize ethnosectarian violence in the region: there is no need to throw oil on already troubled waters, or to encourage ethnic and religious rivalries. But some of these issues, especially those involving Berber-Arab issues, are little known in the West, or at least the English-speaking West. (France, with its large population of Algerian-origin residents, is more familiar with them.)
An Aside on the "Plague" Story
As an aside: there is probably no connection, but the odd story that made the rounds a week or so ago about an alleged "biological warfare" incident which supposedly killed some 40 members of Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) due to an accident (here's one account from Stratfor here or Google will turn up many more), supposedly took place in the Tizi-Ouzo area. Though as far as I know AQIM is almost entirely an Arab organization (the Berbers tend to be more secular), Tizi-Ouzo is also the heart of the Berber Kabylie. (It's also a mountainous region and thus a good place for radical movements to hide.) I have no reason to believe there is any connection, but there are two stories out of two rather different Berber regions of Algeria in a short time.
On the plague story let me empathize, at least for now, with those who think there is something fishy about the story. Though first reported in some (non-government) Algerian papers, it was broken in the West by Britain's The Sun, usually better known for its Page Three Girls (and no, I won't link) than its intelligence connections. The Washington Times claimed to have a confirmation from the US intelligence community, but the original reportage was from unusual sources and the international health organizations have said they've had no reports of an outbreak of plague. And plague, I'm told by those who know something about biological weapons, isn't easy to weaponize. Bubonic plague needs rats or fleas to spread, and pneumonic plague usually requires close personal contact. Plague is native to Algeria though, and a localized outbreak that had nothing to do with weaponization might be more credible than the "experiment gone wrong" version that's making the rounds. But the story may prove to have more to it.
A few of the current reports can be found here, here, and here, to provide some links in English. The troubles have been concentrated so far in the town of Berriane, and there were similar outbreaks there last year, as noted here.
There would seem to be two aspects to the tensions: one an ethno-linguistic one, between Berbers speaking the Mzabi Berber language and Arabs speaking Arabic; and the Ibadi-Sunni religious division. (The "Malekites" referred to in some of the linked articles are followers of the Maliki madhhab or legal rite of Sunnism; Maliki Islam is the dominant form in much of North Africa west of Egypt and, at least formerly, in parts of Upper Egypt.)
The Ibadis are an interesting survival in their own right: they are the only Islamic sect left over from the Khariji (Kharijite) movement of the first century of Islam. The Kharijis broke with both the Sunni and emerging Shi'i groups, insisting that the Imam of the community could come from any background so long as he was pious. At a time when most Muslims were debating whether the Imam had to be a direct descendant of Muhammad or merely o the tribe of Quraysh, the Khariji said the Imam could be any, Muslim, "even an African slave." If that were not politically incorrect enough for the first Islamic century, there are claims that some Kharijis were (according to their enemies, who wrote most of the history) that even woman could serve as Caliph. Today they may seem modern and politically correct, but their tactics and approach to their fellow Muslims made them the radical jihadis of their day.
I must note, at this point, that the Ibadis themselves reject the name "Khariji" because they do not see themselves as outside the greater Muslim umma, and do not share with the mainstream Kharijis (all dead centuries ago) the idea that non-Kharijis are kuffar or unbelievers and must have war waged against them. "Khariji" means "those who withdraw, or go out" and does not apply to the Ibadis, who are prepared to live with non-Ibadi Muslims, whereas other Khariji sects preached jihad against both the Sunni and Shi'a. This is one of those positions that, whatever its religious base, doesn't work well in the real world: all the hard-core Khariji sects, being minorities, fought to the death and, being outnumbered vastly, are no longer out there.
Kharijism started as a sort of "third way" movement in a sense, but like absolutist minority groups anywhere, they vanished. The Ibadi variety (and again they don't call themswelves Khariji) was the only one to survive into our time.
Kharijism in its Ibadi form lasted longest on the peripheries of the Caliphate, particularly in Oman and the Maghreb. Ibadis are still found in both places: Ibadism is the majority faith among Omanis, though the expatriate population and the fact that the Sunnis are concentrated in the cities means that Sunnism is also important there today. In North Africa, Ibadism was once dominant, under the Rustamid dynasty and some earlier Khariji/Berber mountain kingdoms, and there are islands of Ibadis scattered about the Maghreb today: in the Mzab and Ouargla oases of Algeria (these troubles are in Mzab) , the island of Djerba in Tunisia, and the Jabal Nafusa in Libya. They are found virtually nowhere else besides Oman and the former Omani empire, such as Zanzibar and other Indian Ocean ports where Omanis long traded.
The Omani and North African Ibadi groups were out of touch with each other for 1000 years or so, but I understand Oman has sought to create links in the late 20th century and beyond. Today, Ibadism isn't that distinguishable, for most adherents who aren't clerics or theology professors, from Sunnism except in some obscure theological points (such as whether the Qur'an/Koran is created or existed from eternity), and thus doesn't make a lot of difference in most people's day-to-day practice of the faith. In Oman both Ibadis and Sunnis are Arabic speaking (with some asterisks about minor language groups), but in Algeria the split is along the Berber/Arabic line.
Berber-Arab troubles are hardly new in Algeria, where the government's post-independence Arabization program, aimed at eradicating the dominant cultural role of French, was seen as eroding Berber-speaking elements. Ironically, the Berbers, resisting Arabization, became the great defenders of French, and the government became insistent on the dominance of Arabic: in the past Berber radio broadcasts, publications etc. were banned or strictly regulated, though much has been liberalized in recent years under President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. (And of course most educated Algerians, Arab or Berber, are still very comfortable in French. And Arabic is essential for Berbers if they're going to be anything other than rural peasants. But there's also a revival (or first blossoming) of Berber literature, both in Algeria and in France. Trouble in the Kabyle -- or Kabylie, as the area is called in French -- area erupts from time to time, but there there is no added sectarian element, except that most of the Berber population are a bit more secular than their Arab neighbors.
If you want more background, just Google "Tamazight" and follow on from there. "Berber" being just the French variant of the Arabic form (barbar) of the Greek barbaros (non-Greek people all of whose language sounds -- to Greeks -- like bar-bar) and thus related to our "barbarian," the Imazighen peoples would rather not be called Berber, or have their Tamazight language called that, but then it's going to take a long time for the man in the street to start using "Imazighen," or the various tribal/linguistic names, or "Tamazight," even among Arab Algerians (though I think the word "Tamazight" appears in the new Constitution's discussion of national languages).
The Algerian media are not very clear on what started the latest round of troubles in Berriane ("troublemakers" have been mentioned), and there have been allusions to gang elements in both ethnic groups, but I've also seen press reports of attacks on the party headquarters of the Socialist Forces Front (FFS), which is essentially a Berber political party, so the ethnic element may be more important here than the sectarian one.
And a caveat: it's always a little unclear in these incidents whether the rivalry is purely ethnic/religious or something else, and since this seems to involve young men attacking other young men, it may be little more than plain old street gangs that happen to divide along linguistic lines. I know there were cases during the troubles in Upper Egypt in the 1990s where the fighting between the police and the Islamists happened to divide along tribal or family lines and sometimes reflected old vendettas. I don't intend to overemphasize ethnosectarian violence in the region: there is no need to throw oil on already troubled waters, or to encourage ethnic and religious rivalries. But some of these issues, especially those involving Berber-Arab issues, are little known in the West, or at least the English-speaking West. (France, with its large population of Algerian-origin residents, is more familiar with them.)
An Aside on the "Plague" Story
As an aside: there is probably no connection, but the odd story that made the rounds a week or so ago about an alleged "biological warfare" incident which supposedly killed some 40 members of Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) due to an accident (here's one account from Stratfor here or Google will turn up many more), supposedly took place in the Tizi-Ouzo area. Though as far as I know AQIM is almost entirely an Arab organization (the Berbers tend to be more secular), Tizi-Ouzo is also the heart of the Berber Kabylie. (It's also a mountainous region and thus a good place for radical movements to hide.) I have no reason to believe there is any connection, but there are two stories out of two rather different Berber regions of Algeria in a short time.
On the plague story let me empathize, at least for now, with those who think there is something fishy about the story. Though first reported in some (non-government) Algerian papers, it was broken in the West by Britain's The Sun, usually better known for its Page Three Girls (and no, I won't link) than its intelligence connections. The Washington Times claimed to have a confirmation from the US intelligence community, but the original reportage was from unusual sources and the international health organizations have said they've had no reports of an outbreak of plague. And plague, I'm told by those who know something about biological weapons, isn't easy to weaponize. Bubonic plague needs rats or fleas to spread, and pneumonic plague usually requires close personal contact. Plague is native to Algeria though, and a localized outbreak that had nothing to do with weaponization might be more credible than the "experiment gone wrong" version that's making the rounds. But the story may prove to have more to it.
Saturday, January 31, 2009
A Note on George Mitchell
I won't normally post on weekends -- that's family time -- but I thought I'd take a moment to gloat -- um, note -- that today's lead editorial in The Washington Post says pretty much the same thing I said three days earlier in one of my earliest posts. No particular point here: just noting the fact.
Friday, January 30, 2009
More on Daily Star Shutdown
GREAT UPDATE:
(February 1 updating the below): The Daily Star is back after two lost weeks! (See below.) Their own explanation (not very detailed I'm afraid) of their rebirth is here. I would hope that even those who don't like their politics will be glad to see them back.
[Original Post]: I mentioned in passing yesterday that the Beirut Daily Star has been offline and out of print due to financial/legal issues. More on the subject here (IHT) and here (Al-Sharq al-Awsat).
The Daily Star has long been one of the most reliable and balanced English-language newspapers in the Middle East. I think most of us who follow the region from a distance will miss its website in particular. It wasn't just for Lebanese news, either. If it fails to make a comeback it will be a blow to English-language journalism in the region, though newspapers everywhere are suffering.
UPDATE: Just a note on following Lebanon with the Daily Star offline: most of the Lebanese press is online of course, so for those who read Arabic it's no problem, and there are French papers like L'Orient-Le Jour and others, but for English-only readers the lack of new postings at the Daily Star website leaves few options. One however is Naharnet, an English site from the respected Arabic daily Al-Nahar. If that Maronite owned newspaper's too pro-Western for you, there's always the English site of Hizbullah's al-Manar TV, one of the last places to still dateline things "Zionist Entity." I am not urging you to rely upon it for balanced opinion: the fact that I just accessed the site from my home computer probably has enough people checking into me just now.
(February 1 updating the below): The Daily Star is back after two lost weeks! (See below.) Their own explanation (not very detailed I'm afraid) of their rebirth is here. I would hope that even those who don't like their politics will be glad to see them back.
[Original Post]: I mentioned in passing yesterday that the Beirut Daily Star has been offline and out of print due to financial/legal issues. More on the subject here (IHT) and here (Al-Sharq al-Awsat).
The Daily Star has long been one of the most reliable and balanced English-language newspapers in the Middle East. I think most of us who follow the region from a distance will miss its website in particular. It wasn't just for Lebanese news, either. If it fails to make a comeback it will be a blow to English-language journalism in the region, though newspapers everywhere are suffering.
UPDATE: Just a note on following Lebanon with the Daily Star offline: most of the Lebanese press is online of course, so for those who read Arabic it's no problem, and there are French papers like L'Orient-Le Jour and others, but for English-only readers the lack of new postings at the Daily Star website leaves few options. One however is Naharnet, an English site from the respected Arabic daily Al-Nahar. If that Maronite owned newspaper's too pro-Western for you, there's always the English site of Hizbullah's al-Manar TV, one of the last places to still dateline things "Zionist Entity." I am not urging you to rely upon it for balanced opinion: the fact that I just accessed the site from my home computer probably has enough people checking into me just now.
The Stockdale Questions: About the Blogger
The late Admiral James Stockdale, one of the most highly-decorated officers in Navy history and a longtime POW in Vietnam, is unfortunately and unfairly remembered by most Americans for two sentences: while running for Vice President under Ross Perot in 1992, he began his appearance at the Vice Presidential debate with the lines: "Who am I? Why am I here?"
But Stockdale's questions are fair enough, especially for a new blogger. Who am I? Why am I here? Why is this the Middle East Institute's first blog?
Okay. I'm Michael Collins Dunn, PhD (MIchael or Mike will do), Editor of The Middle East Journal since 1998, married and the father of one daughter, and the first Middle East Institute blogger though I'd be delighted to see other MEI scholars and officials join me out here in the blogosphere.
This is not a polemical or partisan blog. I have my biases: sometimes they may show through, but I intend to try to offer intelligence analysis (and intelligent analysis) without heavy prejudgment, which is just another word for prejudice, after all. I have too many friends on all sides of all the various Middle Eastern disputes not to be an advocate for negotiated peace; I have no deep antipathies to any of the peoples, cultures, or nations of the region and considerable experience with most of them; my personal religious beliefs are private and compel no particular stance on any of the disputes in the region; and my politics (I'm a registered Whig) doesn't tell you very much either.
That brings us to who I am and what my standing is to blog here. Sometimes I've been asked to speak to interns at the Middle East Institute about my career path, and I always warn: "Don't try this at home." My doctoral dissertation was a study of Egypt in the period 750-868 AD, so I'm a "medievalist" by European standards, an Early Islamic historian by Middle Eastern perspective, except that since 1980 I've spent all or almost all my time dealing with the contemporary Middle East.My doctorate is in Middle Eastern history from Georgetown University. I taught for nine years or so as an adjunct at Georgetown, teaching both Islam in the theology department and (during Desert Storm), Middle Eastern military issues for the national security studies program there. I lived in Cairo twice: in 1972-1973 in the Center for Arabic Studies Abroad program and as a fellow of the American Research Center in Egypt in 1977-1978. I have visited most of the Arab world, from Morocco to Oman, and at one point was visiting Israel once or twice a year as well. I speak and read Arabic, and have a little bit of asking-directions-reading-roadsigns capability in Hebrew.
I also worked through much of the 1980s for a group of publications specializing in defense issues. I became something of an expert on the military industries of the Middle East (especially Israel and Egypt). In 1989 I started my own company, The International Estimate, Inc., which published a biweekly newsletter called The Estimate from 1989 to early 2007. It was always a small-circulation newsletter, but it had its followers. It ultimately died the fate of dead-tree newsletters generally: the Internet.
All of this combines to say that I've been a Middle East specialist since the early 1970s, and an Editor since 1980 (unless you count my High School Yearbook, which is how I got set on this career path). Along the way I've met a lot of interesting people. I also may be one of the few people who's sat in both Israeli and Egyptian tanks and also taught in a theology department.
By 1998, being one of the few people who had both an extensive experience running publications and academic street cred in the Middle East, I was asked to take over The Middle East Journal. I will, at some point, post or link to the little history of the Journal I wrote for our 60th anniversary; it's in our Winter 2007 issue.
I, like the Journal, am now past 60. We both are converting as quickly as possible to the digital age, even as dead-tree publications are dying around us. I hope this blog is part of that conversion.
I have some personal interests and they will doubtless affect my choices of posting topics. Egypt is my old home and most enduring interest: Misr Umm al-Dunya as the saying goes, "Egypt is the Mother of the World." Since Misr also means Cairo, the phrase is often applied to the city as well, and I share the view. I've spent a lot of time, as noted, on defense and military issues, have skated gingerly around the edges of the intelligence communities of the US and the Middle East (though never served in any) and therefore have some expertise there. I'm interested in both ethnic and religious minorities in the Middle East, though not in a confrontational way. If I blog more about some of these things than, say, oil economics or the impact of the global economic crisis on Gulf sovereign funds, forgive me. I write what I know.
But Stockdale's questions are fair enough, especially for a new blogger. Who am I? Why am I here? Why is this the Middle East Institute's first blog?
Okay. I'm Michael Collins Dunn, PhD (MIchael or Mike will do), Editor of The Middle East Journal since 1998, married and the father of one daughter, and the first Middle East Institute blogger though I'd be delighted to see other MEI scholars and officials join me out here in the blogosphere.
This is not a polemical or partisan blog. I have my biases: sometimes they may show through, but I intend to try to offer intelligence analysis (and intelligent analysis) without heavy prejudgment, which is just another word for prejudice, after all. I have too many friends on all sides of all the various Middle Eastern disputes not to be an advocate for negotiated peace; I have no deep antipathies to any of the peoples, cultures, or nations of the region and considerable experience with most of them; my personal religious beliefs are private and compel no particular stance on any of the disputes in the region; and my politics (I'm a registered Whig) doesn't tell you very much either.
That brings us to who I am and what my standing is to blog here. Sometimes I've been asked to speak to interns at the Middle East Institute about my career path, and I always warn: "Don't try this at home." My doctoral dissertation was a study of Egypt in the period 750-868 AD, so I'm a "medievalist" by European standards, an Early Islamic historian by Middle Eastern perspective, except that since 1980 I've spent all or almost all my time dealing with the contemporary Middle East.My doctorate is in Middle Eastern history from Georgetown University. I taught for nine years or so as an adjunct at Georgetown, teaching both Islam in the theology department and (during Desert Storm), Middle Eastern military issues for the national security studies program there. I lived in Cairo twice: in 1972-1973 in the Center for Arabic Studies Abroad program and as a fellow of the American Research Center in Egypt in 1977-1978. I have visited most of the Arab world, from Morocco to Oman, and at one point was visiting Israel once or twice a year as well. I speak and read Arabic, and have a little bit of asking-directions-reading-roadsigns capability in Hebrew.
I also worked through much of the 1980s for a group of publications specializing in defense issues. I became something of an expert on the military industries of the Middle East (especially Israel and Egypt). In 1989 I started my own company, The International Estimate, Inc., which published a biweekly newsletter called The Estimate from 1989 to early 2007. It was always a small-circulation newsletter, but it had its followers. It ultimately died the fate of dead-tree newsletters generally: the Internet.
All of this combines to say that I've been a Middle East specialist since the early 1970s, and an Editor since 1980 (unless you count my High School Yearbook, which is how I got set on this career path). Along the way I've met a lot of interesting people. I also may be one of the few people who's sat in both Israeli and Egyptian tanks and also taught in a theology department.
By 1998, being one of the few people who had both an extensive experience running publications and academic street cred in the Middle East, I was asked to take over The Middle East Journal. I will, at some point, post or link to the little history of the Journal I wrote for our 60th anniversary; it's in our Winter 2007 issue.
I, like the Journal, am now past 60. We both are converting as quickly as possible to the digital age, even as dead-tree publications are dying around us. I hope this blog is part of that conversion.
I have some personal interests and they will doubtless affect my choices of posting topics. Egypt is my old home and most enduring interest: Misr Umm al-Dunya as the saying goes, "Egypt is the Mother of the World." Since Misr also means Cairo, the phrase is often applied to the city as well, and I share the view. I've spent a lot of time, as noted, on defense and military issues, have skated gingerly around the edges of the intelligence communities of the US and the Middle East (though never served in any) and therefore have some expertise there. I'm interested in both ethnic and religious minorities in the Middle East, though not in a confrontational way. If I blog more about some of these things than, say, oil economics or the impact of the global economic crisis on Gulf sovereign funds, forgive me. I write what I know.
Thursday, January 29, 2009
More About the Blog
People who know blogging (meaning those whose blogs actually get read) say one should keep one's posts to readable length; yet the strength of what we do at MEI and the whole rationale behind this blog is that we're going to provide substance, background, and detail. So occasionally I'll do multiple-part postings. This is the beginning of a couple of posts about what we hope to do with this blog.
In my initial posting I explained a little bit about what we're doing here, but it seems appropriate (now that we're up and running a bit) to say more, and to introduce myself and, for those who got here somehow other than through the Middle East Institute website, MEI, and what this blog seeks to do.
First, why the blog? MEI has been thinking about a blog for some time. In fact, this address at Blogger was claimed back in 2006. Nobody followed through. The philosophy that I and MEI bring to this blog will be discussed in future posts and, I hope, evident from the product.
I'm an old newsletter editor and am therefore pretty good at quick turnaround, fast one-draft writing and concise analysis. I'm an old professor and have some skill at balance and academic objectivity. I'm an Editor who constantly has to deal with academic egos and somehow manage to steer a middle ground, most of the time. And I'm egotistical enough to think someone will read what I have to say, though I have something of a track record suggesting they might. I'll talk more about my background another time.
If you don't know MEI: The Middle East Institute was founded in 1946 by a group of diplomats and scholars to encourage better understanding of the Middle East in the US and of the US in the Middle East. Since January 1947 it has published The Middle East Journal, an interdisciplinary, peer-reviewed journal devoted to the modern Middle East. (Since 1980, it has limited main articles, though not book reviews, to the period since 1945.) Besides the Journal it has an active online publication program at its website, offers accredited language classes (Arabic, Hebrew, Persian, Turkish) and now area studies classes as well, holds an annual conference, other conferences throughout the year, and regular lunchtime speakers, book signings, etc. related to the region. MEI links are over there on the right sidebar.
The Institute has throughout its history not taken positions on policy issues but has encouraged a genuine forum with all sides represented. That, I hope, will characterize this blog as well. It would not be real blogging if I never expressed an opinion, but those opinions are not only not those of MEI (disclaimer's on this page), but also won't be polemic or predictable. Mostly I'll be filling in the background you need to make your own decision. (Forgive me if that sounds like Fox News's "we report, you decide." In my case, I mean it, and so does MEI.) At least that's the intention. The "Backgronder" on Egypt is an example of the kind of information I hope to provide. We'll also provide profiles of key figures, as well as interesting links.
As I've noted, to start with we'll have pretty unlimited commenting. If that gets abused, we may go to moderated comments or limiting comments to registered readers. We'll see.
In my initial posting I explained a little bit about what we're doing here, but it seems appropriate (now that we're up and running a bit) to say more, and to introduce myself and, for those who got here somehow other than through the Middle East Institute website, MEI, and what this blog seeks to do.
First, why the blog? MEI has been thinking about a blog for some time. In fact, this address at Blogger was claimed back in 2006. Nobody followed through. The philosophy that I and MEI bring to this blog will be discussed in future posts and, I hope, evident from the product.
I'm an old newsletter editor and am therefore pretty good at quick turnaround, fast one-draft writing and concise analysis. I'm an old professor and have some skill at balance and academic objectivity. I'm an Editor who constantly has to deal with academic egos and somehow manage to steer a middle ground, most of the time. And I'm egotistical enough to think someone will read what I have to say, though I have something of a track record suggesting they might. I'll talk more about my background another time.
If you don't know MEI: The Middle East Institute was founded in 1946 by a group of diplomats and scholars to encourage better understanding of the Middle East in the US and of the US in the Middle East. Since January 1947 it has published The Middle East Journal, an interdisciplinary, peer-reviewed journal devoted to the modern Middle East. (Since 1980, it has limited main articles, though not book reviews, to the period since 1945.) Besides the Journal it has an active online publication program at its website, offers accredited language classes (Arabic, Hebrew, Persian, Turkish) and now area studies classes as well, holds an annual conference, other conferences throughout the year, and regular lunchtime speakers, book signings, etc. related to the region. MEI links are over there on the right sidebar.
The Institute has throughout its history not taken positions on policy issues but has encouraged a genuine forum with all sides represented. That, I hope, will characterize this blog as well. It would not be real blogging if I never expressed an opinion, but those opinions are not only not those of MEI (disclaimer's on this page), but also won't be polemic or predictable. Mostly I'll be filling in the background you need to make your own decision. (Forgive me if that sounds like Fox News's "we report, you decide." In my case, I mean it, and so does MEI.) At least that's the intention. The "Backgronder" on Egypt is an example of the kind of information I hope to provide. We'll also provide profiles of key figures, as well as interesting links.
As I've noted, to start with we'll have pretty unlimited commenting. If that gets abused, we may go to moderated comments or limiting comments to registered readers. We'll see.
A Note on Al-Hayat and Some Background
In my last post I quoted Juan Cole quoting Al-Hayat, and linked to the Al-Hayat website. After posting it occurred to me that this is an opportunity to do something I hope we will do regularly on this MEI blog: give the necessary background to those of you who may be new to the region or trying to learn more.
Obviously if someone quoted the Washington Post on something and then the Washington Times, the two papers' rather opposite political leanings would usually already be familiar to a US (or at least a Washington) reader. But Western newspapers, bloggers, and others regularly quote the Middle Eastern media without explaining the nature of the source, their political leanings, ownership, etc., which, obviously, are important in interpreting the content. I hope to fill in precisely that kind of background intelligence, when I can, in what we're trying to do here.
Al-Hayat ("Life" in Arabic) today is a London-based international Arab daily. It began life as a Beirut daily after World War II when it was founded by Kamel Mroue (pronounced Muh-ROE-wuh) , a Lebanese Shi'ite. Mroue was assassinated in 1966; the paper was run by his family until the Lebanese Civil War when it and its English sister-publication the Daily Star ceased publication. It was restarted in the 1980s by Kamel's son Jamil Mroue as an international Arab daily with satellite publication throughout the Arab world and in the West. It developed into one of the most intellectually challenging and politically diverse Arab dailies.
In 1990 the paper was purchased by Prince Khalid bin Sultan, son of the Saudi Defense Minister and best known in this country for commanding Saudi Forces in Desert Storm in 1991, and now Assistant Defense Minister for Military Affairs (translation: he runs the military). The purchase did not affect the overall editorial content of the paper although, of course, it doesn't generally criticize Saudi Arabia or praise the Kingdom's enemies. (It has also continued to have solid coverage of Lebanon, though the revived paper has been based in London since its reappearance.)
Al-Hayat's reporting is generally a lot more solid and a lot more reliable than many newspapers in the region, and is very professionally edited. It had at one time and may still have a Jerusalem bureau.
When I cite newspapers or other regional media in this blog, I hope to be able to occasionally offer this kind of introductory background.
A little personal full disclosure here since I've said positive things about the paper: back in the 1980s when Jamil Mroue was resurrecting Al-Hayat he also hoped to restart the Daily Star (though he didn't do so until the 90s I think). He offered me the job of Beirut City Editor. I didn't take it -- he made the offer just before the Marine Barracks bombing as I recall, or perhaps the US Embassy bombing. He didn't restart the Daily Star at that time, and Mroue no longer owns al-Hayat (though I think he still owns the Daily Star, whose website has apparently not been updated for two weeks, apparently due to some sort of legal action). Former MEI President Ned Walker wrote a column for a while for al-Hayat, and one or two of my pieces for the MEI website were picked up by the Daily Star, but I think any conflict of interest is fairly remote. The point is that al-Hayat is a highly respected paper, and that's not just my personal view.
Those of you who read Arabic certainly will already know al-Hayat, but for those who don't the Dar al-Hayat website does have an English language site. The Arabic site is here.
And yes, we'll have a links list and blogroll on this site soon, I hope.
Obviously if someone quoted the Washington Post on something and then the Washington Times, the two papers' rather opposite political leanings would usually already be familiar to a US (or at least a Washington) reader. But Western newspapers, bloggers, and others regularly quote the Middle Eastern media without explaining the nature of the source, their political leanings, ownership, etc., which, obviously, are important in interpreting the content. I hope to fill in precisely that kind of background intelligence, when I can, in what we're trying to do here.
Al-Hayat ("Life" in Arabic) today is a London-based international Arab daily. It began life as a Beirut daily after World War II when it was founded by Kamel Mroue (pronounced Muh-ROE-wuh) , a Lebanese Shi'ite. Mroue was assassinated in 1966; the paper was run by his family until the Lebanese Civil War when it and its English sister-publication the Daily Star ceased publication. It was restarted in the 1980s by Kamel's son Jamil Mroue as an international Arab daily with satellite publication throughout the Arab world and in the West. It developed into one of the most intellectually challenging and politically diverse Arab dailies.
In 1990 the paper was purchased by Prince Khalid bin Sultan, son of the Saudi Defense Minister and best known in this country for commanding Saudi Forces in Desert Storm in 1991, and now Assistant Defense Minister for Military Affairs (translation: he runs the military). The purchase did not affect the overall editorial content of the paper although, of course, it doesn't generally criticize Saudi Arabia or praise the Kingdom's enemies. (It has also continued to have solid coverage of Lebanon, though the revived paper has been based in London since its reappearance.)
Al-Hayat's reporting is generally a lot more solid and a lot more reliable than many newspapers in the region, and is very professionally edited. It had at one time and may still have a Jerusalem bureau.
When I cite newspapers or other regional media in this blog, I hope to be able to occasionally offer this kind of introductory background.
A little personal full disclosure here since I've said positive things about the paper: back in the 1980s when Jamil Mroue was resurrecting Al-Hayat he also hoped to restart the Daily Star (though he didn't do so until the 90s I think). He offered me the job of Beirut City Editor. I didn't take it -- he made the offer just before the Marine Barracks bombing as I recall, or perhaps the US Embassy bombing. He didn't restart the Daily Star at that time, and Mroue no longer owns al-Hayat (though I think he still owns the Daily Star, whose website has apparently not been updated for two weeks, apparently due to some sort of legal action). Former MEI President Ned Walker wrote a column for a while for al-Hayat, and one or two of my pieces for the MEI website were picked up by the Daily Star, but I think any conflict of interest is fairly remote. The point is that al-Hayat is a highly respected paper, and that's not just my personal view.
Those of you who read Arabic certainly will already know al-Hayat, but for those who don't the Dar al-Hayat website does have an English language site. The Arabic site is here.
And yes, we'll have a links list and blogroll on this site soon, I hope.
Early Voting in Iraq
A quick update on my last post: Juan Cole, who's been blogging for a long time while I've just started, notes that al-Hayat has preliminary reports on the early voting results. Those of you who read Arabic can see the original al-Hayat story here. He notes that the sample is skewed since early voting was open to limited groups: he cites the police and the sick (by which I think he means hospital patients, since I've seen them noted as eligible); the Army and prisoners were apparently also eligible for early voting, according to the New York Times.
The problem, of course, is that not only are these highly skewed results (as Cole notes) because of the nature of the groups (the Army and police are clearly stakeholders in the present government; as for the prisoners, I have no idea where they would come down), but just as political polling doesn't work very well in countries where there is no long history of voting, there's really nothing to compare the results to. The 2005 elections were just too different: it was the height of the insurgency, and almost all the Sunni community and substantial numbers of poorer Shi'ites boycotted. (The electoral system has been revised as well.)
Still, these early returns suggest the parties already in power are doing well, which is hardly surprising given the role of patronage.
The problem, of course, is that not only are these highly skewed results (as Cole notes) because of the nature of the groups (the Army and police are clearly stakeholders in the present government; as for the prisoners, I have no idea where they would come down), but just as political polling doesn't work very well in countries where there is no long history of voting, there's really nothing to compare the results to. The 2005 elections were just too different: it was the height of the insurgency, and almost all the Sunni community and substantial numbers of poorer Shi'ites boycotted. (The electoral system has been revised as well.)
Still, these early returns suggest the parties already in power are doing well, which is hardly surprising given the role of patronage.
Iraq's Provincial Elections Under Way
Saturday, Iraq holds the long-delayed provincial elections which are, in many ways, a test of the country's relatively new-found stability. Most importantly, the skewed provincial councils produced by the 2005 elections, which were boycotted by most Sunni parties, key tribal groups and the urban supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr, will be replaced by more representative bodies.
I'll comment at greater length once the results are known, but for background reading on the elections in the meantime, the International Crisis Group has a detailed survey (executive summary here) (full-length report in .pdf here). See also the page on the elections from the Education for Peace in Iraq Center.
Note that the provincial elections are occurring in only 14 of the 18 provinces: the Kurdish region and Ta'mim Province (Kirkuk) aren't involved.
I'll comment at greater length once the results are known, but for background reading on the elections in the meantime, the International Crisis Group has a detailed survey (executive summary here) (full-length report in .pdf here). See also the page on the elections from the Education for Peace in Iraq Center.
Note that the provincial elections are occurring in only 14 of the 18 provinces: the Kurdish region and Ta'mim Province (Kirkuk) aren't involved.
Wednesday, January 28, 2009
Backgrounder: Egypt, Gaza and Omar Suleiman
One of our goals with this MEI Editor's Blog is to provide solid background for analysis of the Middle East; in the cacophany of polemical debate, it is easy sometimes to lose sight of the facts.
In all the reams of commentary about Israel's recent Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, only peripheral attention has often been paid to Egypt's difficult quandaries and efforts to maintain a ceasefire. About a year ago I wrote a commentary for the MEI webpage that touched on some of these issues, at the time of the breach in the Egyptian-Gaza border fence, but the situation has been exacerbated by the Israeli operation and the worsening situation on the ground. Many in the Arab world blame Egypt for not opening the border crossing at Rafah, while many in Israel blame Egypt for looking the other way as arms were smuggled into Gaza through a network of tunnels. The quandary faced by Egypt is a difficult one, since the Egyptian "street" is itself unhappy with the government's position. This is intended as an introduction to the background of the issue, and a look at the man who handles Egypt's security relations with both the Israelis and the Palestinians, Omar Suleiman. It's the first of a series of backgrounder postings I hope to do on this site.
Gaza and Egypt
Historically, Gaza has long had links with Egypt. It is the traditional gateway to Palestine from Egypt, as the Egyptian town of al-`Arish is the historical gateway to Egypt from Palestine. From 1948 to 1967, Gaza was administered by Egypt under the ceasefire agreements ending the Israeli War of Independence, and many Egyptian educational institutions founded branches in Gaza.
Despite the historic links, Egypt has never been comfortable with Gaza. The reasons are simple enough: there are 1.5 million people in Gaza's 350 square kilometers, versus perhaps half a million in the whole of Egypt's Sinai peninsula, with some 60,000 square kilometers. Egypt sees Gaza as a potential threat to the security of the Sinai, and there are suspicions that the terrorist bombings in the "Sinai riviera" resort towns of Sharm al-Sheikh in 2005 and Dhahab in 2006 were carried out by infiltrators from Gaza aiming at Israeli tourists.
Add to this the fact that Hamas's dominance in Gaza has never sat comfortably with the Egyptian government, since Hamas sprang from the Gaza Muslim Brotherhood, itself founded by the Egyptian branch of that group, which the government considers subversive. Leaving aside the judgment on the Egyptian Brotherhood, Hamas' interests in Gaza rarely coincide with Egypt's.
Israeli commentators and their allies sometimes blame Egypt for the arms smuggling that has certainly taken place into Gaza, and the network of tunnels is well known. There are no doubt solid grounds for criticism, and Egypt could probably do better, but it is important to recall that under the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, "Area C," the eastern Sinai, is demilitarized. In 2005, preparing to withdraw from Gaza, the Israeli Knesset amended the peace treaty to allow Egypt to station 750 border guards along the Egypt-Gaza border. Since those guards must sleep and have time off duty, perhaps a third of that number is available on any given watch. Although there are indications that Israel has tacitly allowed Egypt to further increase the numbers, the peace treaty itself limits the forces Cairo can deploy.
Nor can even an authoritarian state like Egypt completely ignore the public opinion of the Egyptian populace. When the barrier wall was breached in early 2008 and hundreds of thousands of Gazans crossed into Egypt, there was much popular support for keeping the crossings open. And during the long siege since Israel blocked most access to Gaza from the Israeli side, there has been growing sentiment in the Arab world for opening Rafah. The pressures are real and create a quandary for the Egyptian government, which fears the impact of an open Rafah crossing on the security of Sinai and perhaps Egypt proper.
Omar Suleiman
The man tasked with dealing with this Solomonic quandary is Lt. Gen. Omar ('Umar) Suleiman, head of Egyptian General Intelligence and Minister without Portfolio in the Egyptian Cabinet. Suleiman is rarely profiled by the Western media, though he is a key player in Israeli-Palestinian security issues. A week ago the Israeli daily Haaretz profiled him in the context of Gaza ceasefire negotiations, and occasionally there have been interviews or profiles elsewhere, but he has not a well-known figure. He gave a briefing here at MEI a while back, but it was off the record, and I respect that here.
The Haaretz article captures the main points about the man: he has been head of Egyptian General Intelligence since 1991, but only since he began to shuttle between Israel and the Palestinians, and between Hamas and Fatah, has he been publicly mentioned in the Egyptian media or had his photograph published.
Since President Husni Mubarak credits him with saving Mubarak's life during an assassination attempt in Addis Ababa in 1995 (Suleiman insisted on using an armored limousine), he has become a senior confidant of the President. He is sometimes mentioned as a possible successor to Mubarak if Gamal Mubarak does not succeed. (On the succession issue, see this piece at the MEI website.)
Appropriately for a intelligence professional, not a lot is known about his military career, as the gaps in his Wikipedia biography indicate; he fought in the 1967 and 1973 wars, but no one seems to know in what capacity. The Haaretz article quotes his Israeli intelligence interlocutors as being uncertain whether he started out in the artillery or another branch. He rose to head Military Intelligence and then, in 1991, became head of General Intelligence, the powerful civilian arm; he is believed to be the first man to hold both (sometimes rival) posts in succession. As a member of the Cabinet he holds a rank not held by intelligence chiefs since the Nasser era. And in a government in which the President and many other senior figures come from the Delta, he is from Qena in Upper Egypt, a traditionally neglected and underdeveloped part of the country (and, often, the subject of regional jokes in the rest of Egypt).
Intelligence Links
The nature of the intelligence field and the natural secrecy of Middle Eastern governments have combined to keep an air of mystery around the intelligence cooperation among governments in the region -- especially when cooperation with Israel is involved -- but it is clear that Egyptian Intelligence, and particularly Suleiman personally, has worked closely with Israel's intelligence services -- Mossad, the General Security Service or Shin Bet, and Military Intelligence -- as well as with the US CIA, DIA and other agencies and, in recent years, with the multiple intelligence services of the Palestinian Authority (which followed the Middle Eastern model of multiple, competing, and often overlapping security agencies). By default, Suleiman has also become the main intermediary between Fatah and Hamas, though he is known to be personally opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood at home and, by extension, no friend of Hamas in Gaza.
If the Gaza ceasefire holds, and that probably depends more on Israel and Hamas than on any Egyptian player, Suleiman's diplomacy will probably be one of the conduits through which deals are made and understandings reached. (It should be acknowledged that, whatever Suleiman's accomplishments in international diplomacy, many Egyptians fear Egyptian General Intelligence and its power at home, where it has wielded much influence since the Nasser era.)
In all the reams of commentary about Israel's recent Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, only peripheral attention has often been paid to Egypt's difficult quandaries and efforts to maintain a ceasefire. About a year ago I wrote a commentary for the MEI webpage that touched on some of these issues, at the time of the breach in the Egyptian-Gaza border fence, but the situation has been exacerbated by the Israeli operation and the worsening situation on the ground. Many in the Arab world blame Egypt for not opening the border crossing at Rafah, while many in Israel blame Egypt for looking the other way as arms were smuggled into Gaza through a network of tunnels. The quandary faced by Egypt is a difficult one, since the Egyptian "street" is itself unhappy with the government's position. This is intended as an introduction to the background of the issue, and a look at the man who handles Egypt's security relations with both the Israelis and the Palestinians, Omar Suleiman. It's the first of a series of backgrounder postings I hope to do on this site.
Gaza and Egypt
Historically, Gaza has long had links with Egypt. It is the traditional gateway to Palestine from Egypt, as the Egyptian town of al-`Arish is the historical gateway to Egypt from Palestine. From 1948 to 1967, Gaza was administered by Egypt under the ceasefire agreements ending the Israeli War of Independence, and many Egyptian educational institutions founded branches in Gaza.
Despite the historic links, Egypt has never been comfortable with Gaza. The reasons are simple enough: there are 1.5 million people in Gaza's 350 square kilometers, versus perhaps half a million in the whole of Egypt's Sinai peninsula, with some 60,000 square kilometers. Egypt sees Gaza as a potential threat to the security of the Sinai, and there are suspicions that the terrorist bombings in the "Sinai riviera" resort towns of Sharm al-Sheikh in 2005 and Dhahab in 2006 were carried out by infiltrators from Gaza aiming at Israeli tourists.
Add to this the fact that Hamas's dominance in Gaza has never sat comfortably with the Egyptian government, since Hamas sprang from the Gaza Muslim Brotherhood, itself founded by the Egyptian branch of that group, which the government considers subversive. Leaving aside the judgment on the Egyptian Brotherhood, Hamas' interests in Gaza rarely coincide with Egypt's.
Israeli commentators and their allies sometimes blame Egypt for the arms smuggling that has certainly taken place into Gaza, and the network of tunnels is well known. There are no doubt solid grounds for criticism, and Egypt could probably do better, but it is important to recall that under the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, "Area C," the eastern Sinai, is demilitarized. In 2005, preparing to withdraw from Gaza, the Israeli Knesset amended the peace treaty to allow Egypt to station 750 border guards along the Egypt-Gaza border. Since those guards must sleep and have time off duty, perhaps a third of that number is available on any given watch. Although there are indications that Israel has tacitly allowed Egypt to further increase the numbers, the peace treaty itself limits the forces Cairo can deploy.
Nor can even an authoritarian state like Egypt completely ignore the public opinion of the Egyptian populace. When the barrier wall was breached in early 2008 and hundreds of thousands of Gazans crossed into Egypt, there was much popular support for keeping the crossings open. And during the long siege since Israel blocked most access to Gaza from the Israeli side, there has been growing sentiment in the Arab world for opening Rafah. The pressures are real and create a quandary for the Egyptian government, which fears the impact of an open Rafah crossing on the security of Sinai and perhaps Egypt proper.
Omar Suleiman
The man tasked with dealing with this Solomonic quandary is Lt. Gen. Omar ('Umar) Suleiman, head of Egyptian General Intelligence and Minister without Portfolio in the Egyptian Cabinet. Suleiman is rarely profiled by the Western media, though he is a key player in Israeli-Palestinian security issues. A week ago the Israeli daily Haaretz profiled him in the context of Gaza ceasefire negotiations, and occasionally there have been interviews or profiles elsewhere, but he has not a well-known figure. He gave a briefing here at MEI a while back, but it was off the record, and I respect that here.
The Haaretz article captures the main points about the man: he has been head of Egyptian General Intelligence since 1991, but only since he began to shuttle between Israel and the Palestinians, and between Hamas and Fatah, has he been publicly mentioned in the Egyptian media or had his photograph published.
Since President Husni Mubarak credits him with saving Mubarak's life during an assassination attempt in Addis Ababa in 1995 (Suleiman insisted on using an armored limousine), he has become a senior confidant of the President. He is sometimes mentioned as a possible successor to Mubarak if Gamal Mubarak does not succeed. (On the succession issue, see this piece at the MEI website.)
Appropriately for a intelligence professional, not a lot is known about his military career, as the gaps in his Wikipedia biography indicate; he fought in the 1967 and 1973 wars, but no one seems to know in what capacity. The Haaretz article quotes his Israeli intelligence interlocutors as being uncertain whether he started out in the artillery or another branch. He rose to head Military Intelligence and then, in 1991, became head of General Intelligence, the powerful civilian arm; he is believed to be the first man to hold both (sometimes rival) posts in succession. As a member of the Cabinet he holds a rank not held by intelligence chiefs since the Nasser era. And in a government in which the President and many other senior figures come from the Delta, he is from Qena in Upper Egypt, a traditionally neglected and underdeveloped part of the country (and, often, the subject of regional jokes in the rest of Egypt).
Intelligence Links
The nature of the intelligence field and the natural secrecy of Middle Eastern governments have combined to keep an air of mystery around the intelligence cooperation among governments in the region -- especially when cooperation with Israel is involved -- but it is clear that Egyptian Intelligence, and particularly Suleiman personally, has worked closely with Israel's intelligence services -- Mossad, the General Security Service or Shin Bet, and Military Intelligence -- as well as with the US CIA, DIA and other agencies and, in recent years, with the multiple intelligence services of the Palestinian Authority (which followed the Middle Eastern model of multiple, competing, and often overlapping security agencies). By default, Suleiman has also become the main intermediary between Fatah and Hamas, though he is known to be personally opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood at home and, by extension, no friend of Hamas in Gaza.
If the Gaza ceasefire holds, and that probably depends more on Israel and Hamas than on any Egyptian player, Suleiman's diplomacy will probably be one of the conduits through which deals are made and understandings reached. (It should be acknowledged that, whatever Suleiman's accomplishments in international diplomacy, many Egyptians fear Egyptian General Intelligence and its power at home, where it has wielded much influence since the Nasser era.)
George Mitchell: Deja Vu All Over Again
Today is George Mitchell's first day shuttling as the new Middle East envoy, and it must seem familiar to him: though a lot of commentary has noted his successes in Northern Ireland some years back, he also headed the Sharm al-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee set up in 2000 and 2001 to study and make recommendations following the collapse of Camp David II and the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada.
Reading the conclusions of the Mitchell group today is somewhat depressing to say the least: eight years later, almost every recommendation to both sides has yet to be implemented. Although his mission is a different one this time, since he is a representative of the US government rather than an international fact-finding group, he's likely to recognize most of the issues: settlements and security, refugees and terrorism and borders. He'll doubtless find better cell phone coverage and more Wi-Fi in the hotels, but pretty much the same problems he had to wrestle with in 2001. It doubtless seems, as Yogi Berra supposedly said, "like deja vu all over again."
Reading the conclusions of the Mitchell group today is somewhat depressing to say the least: eight years later, almost every recommendation to both sides has yet to be implemented. Although his mission is a different one this time, since he is a representative of the US government rather than an international fact-finding group, he's likely to recognize most of the issues: settlements and security, refugees and terrorism and borders. He'll doubtless find better cell phone coverage and more Wi-Fi in the hotels, but pretty much the same problems he had to wrestle with in 2001. It doubtless seems, as Yogi Berra supposedly said, "like deja vu all over again."
Hisham Melhem's Obama Interview Coup
In trying to decide what my first substantive post should be, it seems to me that one of the prerogatives of blogging should be the ability to congratulate an old friend on a remarkable coup. I refer to the journalistic headline of the week: Al-Arabiya TV's interview with President Barack Obama, pulled off by Hisham Melhem, long one of the most accomplished Arab journalists in Washington.
Melhem talks about how they got the interview here; you can read the English-language transcript here; clearly Obama's intention of sending a signal to the Arab/Muslim world explained the timing, and the fact that al-Arabiya is seen in Washington as less "anti-American" than al-Jazeera may have helped them get the story. (I think that al-Jazeera has a generally bad rap among Americans who've never watched it, but that's my own view.)
Hisham and I go back to days studying at Georgetown in grad school a few more years ago than either of us likes to admit, and have known each other through varying identities in the Middle East-related community here for most of the time since. So let me congratulate him on a professional coup and also recommend anyone who hasn't read the interview go over to al-Arabiya and take a look. I plan to call attention to important posts on other websites frequently.
Melhem talks about how they got the interview here; you can read the English-language transcript here; clearly Obama's intention of sending a signal to the Arab/Muslim world explained the timing, and the fact that al-Arabiya is seen in Washington as less "anti-American" than al-Jazeera may have helped them get the story. (I think that al-Jazeera has a generally bad rap among Americans who've never watched it, but that's my own view.)
Hisham and I go back to days studying at Georgetown in grad school a few more years ago than either of us likes to admit, and have known each other through varying identities in the Middle East-related community here for most of the time since. So let me congratulate him on a professional coup and also recommend anyone who hasn't read the interview go over to al-Arabiya and take a look. I plan to call attention to important posts on other websites frequently.
Tuesday, January 27, 2009
Watch this Space: Introducing the Blog
This will be the Middle East Institute's new Editor's blog, in which the Editor of The Middle East Journal -- me, Michael Dunn -- will be blogging on current Middle East affairs with an emphasis on factual background and understanding, not polemic.
Comments policy is going to start off pretty open and liberal -- though you may have to recognize characters in order to avoid robotic spam -- and we'll see what happens from there, given the tendency of the subject matter to generate flame wars. Other guest bloggers from the MEI community may participate, and perhaps someday we'll have a whole family of blogs.
We should get under way shortly, but don't be surprised if the look of the blog changes from time to time. We're likely to tinker with it for a while, but I sense we want to get it up and running and fix the glitches later.
We're beginning on Blogger, but will move it to our new integrated website when ready. Meanwhile you'll be able (at least by the time anyone knows this page is here) to get here through a link on our current website. If you like what you see here, tell your friends. If you don't, tell me.
Comments policy is going to start off pretty open and liberal -- though you may have to recognize characters in order to avoid robotic spam -- and we'll see what happens from there, given the tendency of the subject matter to generate flame wars. Other guest bloggers from the MEI community may participate, and perhaps someday we'll have a whole family of blogs.
We should get under way shortly, but don't be surprised if the look of the blog changes from time to time. We're likely to tinker with it for a while, but I sense we want to get it up and running and fix the glitches later.
We're beginning on Blogger, but will move it to our new integrated website when ready. Meanwhile you'll be able (at least by the time anyone knows this page is here) to get here through a link on our current website. If you like what you see here, tell your friends. If you don't, tell me.
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