From +972 Magazine: "Why Isn't the West Bank Rioting, Too?"

Larry Derfner at the dovish Israeli +972 mag asks and generally answers a question that hasn't gotten much attention: "Why Isn't the West Bank Rioting, Too?."

Gaza's firing rockets, East Jerusalem is seeing riots, but the West Bank is calm.

The Netanyahu government isn't likely to publicly credit Mahmoud ‘Abbas and the Palestinian Authority, which may be why we aren't seeing the question asked more frequently.

(As many of you will know, +972 takes its name from Israel's telephone country code.)

Guest Post: William R. Polk Offers a Grim Assessment of Prospects for Israel and Palestine

Introductory note by Michael Dunn: On several occasions I have linked to articles by William R.Polk, particularly on Iraq. His extensive experience in the region, as Harvard professor, senior State Department official, founder of the Middle East Studies Department at Chicago, and a author of dozens of books on a wide variety of subjects is always worth listening to. Bill Polk has kindly offered this guest post on the Israel-Palestine issue. It is a grimly pessimistic one. I personally still cling to hopes for a two-state solution,  though clearly, doors are closing. Though I am more optimistic than Professor Polk, his views are clearly expressed and deserve a hearing. As with everything that appears here, the views expressed are those of the author nd do not represent the policy of The Middle East Institute or The Middle East Journal.

Palestine Peace Illusions

by William R. Polk

With the killing of three Israeli teenagers and the apparent revenge murder of a Palestinian youth – possibly burned to death – the hatred between Israelis and Palestinian has reached a new level of obscenity, and it looks like it will get worse. Much worse.

 The major Israeli newspaper Haaretz wrote in an editorial:

There are no words to describe the horror allegedly done by six Jews to Mohammed Abu Khdeir of Shoafat. Although a gag order bars publication of details of the terrible murder and the identities of its alleged perpetrators, the account of Abu Khdeir’s family — according to which the boy was burned alive — would horrify any mortal. Anyone who is not satisfied with this description can view the horror movie in which members of Israel’s Border Police are seen brutally beating Tariq Abu Khdeir, the murder victim’s 15-year-old cousin.

Or, as Israeli columnist Gideon Levy wrote about the recent atrocities:

The youths of the Jewish state are attacking Palestinians in the streets of Jerusalem, just like gentile youths used to attack Jews in the streets of Europe. The Israelis of the Jewish state are rampaging on social networks, displaying hatred and a lust for revenge, unprecedented in its diabolic scope. These are the children of the nationalistic and racist generation – Netanyahu’s offspring.

 For five years now, they have been hearing nothing but incitement, scaremongering and supremacy over Arabs from this generation’s true instructor, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Not one humane word, no commiseration or equal treatment. They grew up with the provocative demand for recognition of Israel as a ‘Jewish state,’ and they drew the inevitable conclusions.

My own observations accord with these remarks. Over the years since my first visit to what was then the Palestine Mandate in 1946, I have watched the disappearance of the generation of civilized men of the 1930s. Such great Jewish figures as Judah Magnes and Martin Buber who flourished then are forgotten or, if remembered at all, are thought of (by Israelis) to have been naive do-gooders and (by Arabs) to have been just front men for the real Zionists, men like Vladimir Jabotinsky, the spiritual father of Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Shamir and Benjamin Netanyahu.

The Palestinians now point out that what the most extreme of their spokesmen told the American investigators (in the King-Crane commission that Woodrow Wilson sent to the Levant in 1919), that they feared what has now happened.

In the words of the then senior British intelligence officer (Kinahan Cornwallis), the Palestinians hold "a deeply felt fear that the Jews not only intended to assume the reins of Government in Palestine but also to expropriate or buy up during the war large tracts of land owned by Moslems and others, and gradually to force them from the country."

The British cabinet already thought something like this was inevitable. It was a price the British were willing to have the Palestinians pay since in 1917-1918 they desperately wanted Jewish support in Germany (where they thought much of the Army was under Jewish officers), In Russia (where they thought Jews were the leaders of the Bolshevik movements for a separate peace that would release large German forces to fight on the Western front) and in America (where they thought Jews could provide financing for their war effort). So, they courted Jewish support in the Balfour Declaration.

In careful compromise they stuck in the Declaration two qualifications — as I recount in two of my early books, Backdrop to Tragedy (with David Stamler and Edmund Asfour) and The United States and the Arab World. They specified their objective as being only "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people" and emphasized that this was not to denigrate the rights of the Arabs "it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine."

Qualifications aside, what has happened was precisely what everyone then knew was likely, the transformation of Palestine into a Jewish state.

In a remarkably candid statement on Aug. 11, 1919, Lord Balfour, the titular author of the Declaration, admitted that "so far as Palestine is concerned, the Powers [The Allies, Britain and France] have made no statement of fact which is not admittedly wrong, and no declaration of policy which at least in letter, they have not always intended to violate." (Quoted in my book The Elusive Peace: The Middle East in the Twentieth Century.)

The history of the past century of Palestine can be summed up in a few words: For their own interests, the British and then the Americans just closed their eyes to the developing tragedy; both were content to have a poor, defenseless Near East people pay the price for Western anti-Semitism.

Predictably, the Jewish community grew, appropriated most of the best land (largely by purchase from absentee owners), and benefited from massive infusions of foreign money (now totaling well over $100 billion, or more than all the aid programs for the rest of the world). Meanwhile, the Jewish fate in Europe moved toward the Holocaust.

What did that actually mean? If I were a Jew in Germany in the 1930s, I certainly would have gone to America and if I could not get in — some could not — to Palestine; if I were an Arab at almost any time from 1920 onward, I would have tried to stop the flood of immigrants. The real culprit is neither the Jew nor the Palestinian. It is us. Anti-Semitism is a Western disease.

What we see today is that the people who really agree with the Jewish terrorists are the Arab terrorists — with the religious fanatics among both peoples increasingly taking the lead. Between them, there is little if any room for people of moderation, much less for decency. Tit-for-Tat is a game played with blood and steel in which no one is or will be immune. There is no end in sight.

So how have we viewed these events? I have listened for my whole professional life to a false dialogue. For years, policymakers and opinion leaders have argued over "solutions" that are unreal or at last tangential. We keep chanting the dirge — one can almost put it to music — one state or two states. Neither is realistic and even if feasible would not solve the fundamental problem. But we seem to believe that, if we can say one or the other often enough, one of them might become acceptable.

It is time to drop the nonsense and face the simple facts. They are these:

In the "one state," the Arabs will be the subjugated minority with few rights and little or any security — they will be the "Jews" of an Israeli Germany or the "Jews" of an Israeli Imperial Russia, cooped up in ghettos, imprisoned, driven into exile or subjected to a final partition. They, their children and their grandchildren will sporadically resist. Their resistance will call forth more hatred and more reprisal. The cycle will continue.

In the "two states," those living in the truncated remnants of Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza) will be condemned to perpetual poverty and humiliation. They will have almost no usable agricultural land and virtually no water. They will be cut off from possible markets for what little they can produce. They can have no hope of manufacturing because their draw on electricity will be squeezed. Even the limited money they can earn will be closely controlled and often blocked by the Israeli Central Bank as it now is. They will have limited access to health facilities, educational institutions and even contact with one another, segregated as they are and will be by restricted zones, walls and standing security and military forces. They too would periodically resist or strike out in fury and so draw upon themselves reprisals. And so too the cycle of violence will continue or even escalate.

Even those who think of themselves as "Israeli Arabs" will remain, in the eyes of the real Israelis, just Arabs. They will have marginally better, but still limited, lives as they do today. As hatred grows ethnically they too will be drawn into the struggle. They are likely to lose what they have so far kept.

Is there an alternative? Yes, there are three. Which is worse depends upon who does the evaluation.

The one the Israelis want is for the Palestinians to just leave. To go where? To refugee camps or wherever, the Israelis don't care. A reading of all Israeli policies underlines the Israeli intention to make life as unattractive for the Palestinians as world opinion allows. The Israelis admit that the conditions they are creating are worse than South African apartheid was for the Bantu. And always the threat of ethnic cleansing hangs high.

The second alternative, which of course the Palestinians want, is for the Israelis "to go back where they came from." The Arabs day-dream of their relations with the Israelis in parallel to the Crusades. The Crusaders stayed a long time but finally left. The more recent parallel is to the "French" (many of whom were not French at all) pieds noirs in Algeria. It took a century but they too finally left.

The Palestinians keep track of the immigration statistics and observe that in some years more Israelis leave than immigrants come. They also note that a large part of the Israeli population keeps dual citizenship which gives them the option of leaving. New York is said to have a larger Israeli population than Jerusalem.

The third alternative is Armageddon. Israel has a huge store of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and at least once in the past came close to using nuclear weapons. The Arabs, of course, don't (now) have nuclear weapons, but at least two Arab states are thought to be capable of getting (producing or buying) them quickly. More immediate, the Palestinians, divided and relatively unarmed as they are, have the capacity to inflict pain on Israelis (and so to bring about retaliation). Sooner or later, that capacity will grow.

Here the analogy with the Crusades may make some sense. One can envisage a scenario in which acts by Arabs could either make life in Israel unattractive or, alternatively, cause the Israelis — in frustration, fear or fury — to destroy the Middle East and all its people. They have the means to do so.

Should we care? Forget the pious statements. If the past is any guide, we didn't much care about anti-Semitism when it affected the Jews in Europe and don't much care about it when today it makes life horrible for many Arabs in the Middle East. There is much cynical (but covert) anti-Zionist feeling even among politicians who rush to benefit from Jewish donations. Privately, many admit that much of what the Israelis are doing is illegal and even more is immoral, but it is the rare politician who says anything publicly. And those who have done so have usually paid a politically mortal price.

Meanwhile, as a nation, we Americans keep on doing what we know how to do — giving money and arms. And, in a destructive and self-defeating gesture to "even-handedness" giving them to both sides. It is not so important that we don't incur favor by this policy — neither side is smitten by affection for us and  the Israeli government almost daily goes out of its way to humiliate our government. But it could be, and in my judgment eventually will be, significant that we are moving toward Armageddon.

Even the most hardheaded and cynical among us should be concerned since there is a considerable danger of a spillover of any Middle Eastern war into our lives — both abroad in other areas, particularly Islamic areas, and at home. At minimum it long-term and perhaps escalating hostilities in the Middle East would hurt our economy. Additionally, it they could further damage our already fragile ecology, possibly trigger a wider conflict and certainly damage the sense of law, morality and order by which we live.

Even short of actual war, the contagion of instability, hatred and violence is likely to spread and so affect us in other areas and on other issues about which we care.

Perhaps, if our leaders could even slightly raise their eyes above their immediate interests and pay a little attention to the river of events in which we float, we could grab a handhold and stop before we reach the waterfall.

Does anyone see any such leader anywhere? I confess I do not.

I am afraid, not for me, since I am now 85 years old, but for mine and yours and everyone's.

Telegraph: The Islamic State's Cabinet and Structure

The Telegraph has posted an analysis of ISIS' organizational structure and  useful graphic chart of the Cabinet and Governors. (The version at the Telegraph's site is interactive, unlike this one.)

A Glimmer of Good News: Cairo Synagogue Hosts Ramadan Iftar

So much is depressing right now, here's something that isn't: Cairo's last synagogue has hosted  a Ramadan Iftar meal sponsored by the Egyptian Alliance for Minorities. This photo alone speaks volumes:

Gestures will not end war and intolerance, but they do show hope. It takes a long time for water to erode a Grand Canyon, but here is a promising drop.

Video below: among the speakers are Magda Haroun, head of Cairo's tiny Jewish community, a member of the Amazigh Movement in Egypt, and an Azhari sheikh from a group called Azharis for a Civil Society.  (The English report quotes Haroun as saying "We are all Egyptians," which she does, but note that in her Arabic clip she also mentions Shi‘ites and Baha'is along with other minorities.

Video: The Jihadi and "Hello Kitty"

This has gotten a lot of attention over the past couple of days, but in case you haven't seen it: Zahran Alloush, head of the Syrian Jaysh al-Islam, a non-ISIS jihadi group, is haranguing his troops and denouncing ISIS. What catches the eye rather quickly and made the video go viral, however, is the pink "Hello Kitty" notebook on the desk in front of him. (Still pic followed by video.)

Now, I always found "Hello Kitty" rather unsettling (the cat has no mouth!), but I never associated it with radical jihadism.

As Britain's The Independent commented in one of the many reports on this video:

Wearing combat uniform, with gun holsters strapped on, the commander seems unlikely to have chosen a pink Hello Kitty notebook to enhance his image.

The pink pad could have arrived in aid convoys sent to war-torn Syria or in charity packages, or maybe he is a genuine fan of the Japanese cartoon cat.

The Fanus Lanterns of Ramadan: Folklore and Tradition

Cairo Fawanis Sellers, Early 20th Century

The rapid descent of the region into the lower circles of hell makes it easy to neglect the  social and cultural and historical mission we claim for this blog. I'm particularly remiss this year in Ramadan posts, a third of the way into the holy month.

The Fanus, (also Fanous or Fanoos, Arabic plural fawanis:   
فوانيس, فانوس رمضان ), while primarily Egyptian in its origins, has spread beyond the Valley of the Nile: it is a Ramadan lantern, usually lit by a candle, modeled loosely on a mosque lamp and used to light streets, mosques, balconies and homes during Ramadan.

The word itself is clearly from Greek phanos (φανός, a torch or lantern), perhaps directly or via Coptic which has many loan words from Greek.

Modern Fawanis

Inexpensive and cheaply-made fawanis are often made from scrap metal, and as a 2011 AP story noted, the traditional trade is dying in Egypt, replaced by an influx of Chinese copies:

As a symbol, the fanoos is somewhat similar to a Christmas tree or a menorah. It is hung on balconies during Ramadan and takes the center of dinner tables when families gather to break-fast together.

The history of the fanoos in Egypt stretches back to the Fatimid Empire, which ruled large swaths of the Muslim world from Cairo starting in the 10th century. But, after nearly a century, the future of the Egyptian fanoos is under threat.

Less than a dozen fanoos makers remain in Cairo, as cheap Chinese imports and decades of government corruption have made plying their trade nearly impossible.

“Our great-grandfathers did this work, but our kids won’t,” said Rida Ashour, who stopped making the fanoos about 10 years ago.

Also see this 2009 Al-Ahram Weekly  story, "Lights of Faith."

Mention of the fanus also gives me an excellent reason to refer to my own post from Ramadan 2012: "'Wahawi ya Wahawi Eyaha': Is it an Ancient Egyptian Chant?" This is a traditional chant sung while lighting the fanus lamps at sundown during Ramadan. As my post notes, traditions says this is an Ancient Egyptian chant, and it has no clear meaning in Arabic. In Ancient Egyptian snd Coptic it may mean something like "Welcome, Moon." "Eyaha" is suggestive: iah is "moon" in Coptic, which could be relevant to Ramadan, obviously, though older traditions associate it with the Pharaoh Ahmose ("born of the Moon").(And note the knowledgeable comment on the original post.)

It's interesting that the earlier quote on Fawanis attributes the modern tradition to the early Fatimids, though of course Ancient Egyptians had lanterns,while my link on Wahawi ya Wahawi also attributes the chant to the Fatimid era, despite suggesting Ancient Egyptian origin. Regular readers may recall that many folk etymologies of the ubiquitous Egyptian term أحا (aḥa, a7a), widely considered profane though no one knows why, also attribute its etymology (for various incompatible reasons) to the Fatimids. What is it about the Fatimids that attracts so much folkloric accreditation?

Yes, of course, they founded Cairo (the walled city with its current name), but Fustat and other town were already there. Why is Egypt's only Shi‘ite dynasty credited with so much folkloric tradition?

At times I wish The Middle East Journal wasn't devoted just to the post 1945 Middle East, but it is. Why are the Fatimids so popular as a folk origin for customs ranging from religious rites to profanity  (if أحا  is even profane)?  Comments and suggestions are welcome.

But if you haven't read my 2013 post you may have no idea what Wahawi ya Wahawi Eyaha sounds like. Here it is, from a modern song, embedded in Arabic: Wahawi is accented on the first syllable Unlikely in Arabic) .Eyaha tends to sound like Eyoha.:

 

More Concerns About the Threat to Antiquities in Syria and Iraq

We've dealt many times with the threat to antiquities provoked by  the war in Syria, and more recently in Mosul. Others are ex-pressing those concerns as well, especially since the rapid rise of ISIS.

The Roman and Byzantine city of Apamea was one of the most prominent of the lost cities of northern Syria, and its ruins were a major archaeological site. As this National Geographic piece (free registration required) notes, satellite photography posted on this Trafficking Culture site shows the archaeological site, pristine in 2011, completely covered with looters' holes in 2012:

2011

2012

Amid fears that ISIS is looting and selling antiquities to finance its conquests, museums have already prepared an Emergency Red List of Syrian Cultural Objects at Risk (PDF) to alert border authorities for possible looted artifacts.

Now the concern is about northern Iraq. By taking Mosul, ISIS also took the ancient site of Nineveh, the Assyrian capital. As Christopher Dickey notes at The Huffington Post, some Iraqi officials are urging the US to use targeted drone strikes to hit ISIS without damaging archaeological sites.

That implies a lot more confidence in Predator accuracy than I'm comfortable with.

Given the scale of human lives lost, many may find the threat to heritage sites a minor one, a sort of "First World Problem." But if one adds to the destruction of sites in Syria and Iraq the looting of museums during the Egyptian Revolution and the Iraq War, the toll over the past decade or so is huge: the past is disappearing.

Just Saying: Previous Caliphs Named "Ibrahim" Did Not Leave Stellar Records

So Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi wants to be recognized as "Caliph Ibrahim." There seems no rush, even by fellow jihadis, to offer the bay‘a to him. It may be worth noting that previous Caliphs named Ibrahim have not been well-remembered; for the first, there is some dispute whether he was ever even accepted as Caliph; the second was the Ottoman Sultan known as Ibrahim the Mad. Not great precedents.

Ibrahim ibn al-Walid was named successor to his brother, the Umayyad Caliph Yazid III in AD 744, but was quickly opposed by his relative Marwan II and deposed. At most he ruled for a few weeks, and there's some dispute about whether he was ever fully recognized. Marwan deposed him but allowed him to live peaceably under his protection. Until the ‘Abbasid revolution of 750, when Ibrahim was killed with most members of the Umayyad house. Marwan II also was killed, after fleeing to Egypt.

Ottoman Sultan Ibrahim was Ottoman Sultan 1640-1648. He is known as Ibrahim I as Sultan, but if one accepts the Ottoman claim to the Caliphate, he would have been the second Caliph named Ibrahim. His reign was troubled to say the least, marked by family rivalries, executions, and provocations of neighboring powers. In 1648 the Janissaries revolted; Ibrahim's Grand Vizier was torn to shreds and Ibrahim deposed and executed. He is remembered as "Ibrahim the Mad."

Neither is a very inspiring role model.

For a Day With Bad News Everywhere, a Bit of Nostalgia

Gaza and Israel are escalating the violence; Syria and Iraq remain a mess. Time for some nostalgia. Cairo, Sh. Fuad (later 26th of July), 1930:

From the مصر الان وزمان site.

Mosul, 1950s from this site:

Gaza, 1930s, from palestineremembered.com:

More News from the "Caliphate"

Besides that alleged passport, here is a roundup of news, some more serious than others, from the "Caliphate."

Also note that "Caliph" Ibrahim's official biography now claims he has Qurayshi descent, one of the traditional requirements for the Caliphate.

You may have also heard how he has been criticized for wearing, in his first public sermon, what appeared to be a Rolex or other high-priced watch, though given the fact that the former ISIS is known to have captured a great deal of wealth in the course of its conquests, it may not be surprising.

Some serious readings:

• Thomas Hegghammer, who studies Jihadist movements, at Lawfare:  "The Foreign Policy Essay: Calculated Caliphate."
•  By "Mohammad D" at Syria Comment: The Six Words You Need to Know to Be a Successful Jihadi and Establish Your Own Caliphate

And finally, something in a lighter vein, from Karl Sharro at Karl reMarks: "The Caliph and His Psychiatrist: Exclusive Interview."

The TSA Will Love This: The "Islamic Caliphate" is Issuing Passports

Assuming this story is genuine (which it may not be), the "Islamic Caliphate" passport probably won't get you into very many countries.

The Surrender of Kut, Part III: Siege, Failure of the Relief Expeditions, and Townshend's Surrender

Fast-moving developments on the contemporary scene have slowed down my finishing my three-part series on  the 1916 surrender at Kut in Iraq, the largest British surrender ever at the time it occurred. Part I, devoted mainly to the background and introducing the cast of characters, appeared June 25; Part II, describing the campaign through Townshend's investment bu the Turkish 6th Army and the beginning of the siege, appeared last Friday. This takes the story through the failed relief expeditions,the surrender, and its tragic aftermath, and includes an appearance by a not-yet-prominent T.E. Lawrence aimed at bribing the Turkish commander.

The more I see of this foul country, the more convinced I am that we are a seafaring people, lured to disaster by this river. The River Tigris has been a disaster and a delusion to us. These lines are untenable without two railways, one across to Nasriyah and the other up to Baghdad. At the present moment, we can be cut off if the river falls or if they manage to put in guns anywhere down the river and sink a couple of our boats, or even one, in the narrows, and so block the channel. We have got no policy. We came here and we saw the Tigris and we said: "This is as good as the sea, and up we will go," and now it will dry up and we shall get left.

— Aubrey Herbert, Diary near Kut, April 1916, in Herbert, Mons, Anzac, and Kut

Field Marshal von der Goltz

At the end of Part II, Townshend found himself besieged in Kut in December 1915. German Field Marshal von der Goltz had arrived on the scene to take overall direction. (For profiles and photos of all the commanders, see Part I.) Though Townshend had supplies for a siege of several months, he understated them, hoping for early relief.

After the war, Townshend wrote a memoir,  My Campaign (also called My Campaign in Mesopotamia); the second volume of which, dealing with the material covered in this post, is available free online. Like all generals' memoirs it is self-serving and self-justifying, and at times almost delusional towards the end, when Townshend claims credit for the Mudros armistice.

Aylmer

The British Commander in Mesopotamia, General Nixon, designated Sir Fenton John Aylmer, 13th Baronet of Donadea.
to lead the first relief expedition. Aylmer had won a Victoria Cross in one of the local Indian Wars, but he was no Marlborough or Wellington. He started up the Tigris in January 1916. He fought battles at Sheikh Sa‘ad, "the Wadi," and Hanna, and after taking some 2,700 casualties, finally fell back.

Gorringe

The failure of Aylmer's relief expedition also spelled doom for General Sir John Nixon, who had dispatched Townshend to Baghdad and supported the idea of the siege at Kut to "hold the Turks in place." He was replaced with General Sir Percy Lake, another Indian Army officer who had also been Chief of the Canadian General Staff. To command the next relief expedition, he chose General George Gorringe. That was in March.

Khalil Pasha

In the meantime the odds had shifted considerably. The overall Ottoman area commander, Khalil Pasha (known in modern Turkish as Halil Kut after taking his greatest victory as a surname), took command of the Kut front. He also brought 20,000 or more reinforcements, greatly enhancing Ottoman strength.

Townshend's troops were running low on supplies,and various attempts by British vessels to run up the Tigris by night were defeated by Ottoman artillery. Townshend was suffering from fever; but von der Goltz, ae 70, was also ill and would die of typhus before the end of the siege.

Gorringe's advance made progress, fighting three battles from April 5-17, but were unable to adanc past Sannaiyat. That left Townshend with little hope.What apparently was the first use of air drops of supplies took place in April, but the early aircraft could carry too little relief, and several attempts to run British supply ships upriver to Kut failed.

On April 19, too late to help Townshend, Baron von der Goltz died in Baghdad, reportedly of Typhus.Some sources say typhoid; rumors at thew time said poison; but various fevers were rampant on the Tigris front.) Goltz missed his greatest success by two weeks, but the 70-year old Prussian Field Marshal and military historian who had trained the Ottoman Army had his victory nonetheless.

It was clearly time to treat for terms. Townshend, who had managed to maintain telegraphic contact with the relief forces, was apparently the origin of the idea that a "ransom" might be paid to free his troops under parole. (The idea that this was essentially a bribe, either to Khalil Pasha or to the Ottoman authorities generally, seems obvious.) Townshend suggested £1 million sterling. London upped the ante: it authorized its negotiators to offer £2 million.

The three negotiators, mostly intelligence officers of company rank, would include two who would go on to greater fame:

Aubrey Herbert

Aubrey Herbert, Member of Parliament and a traveler and linguist and a well-known Turcophile who spoke Turkish and other eastern languages, was attached by the War Office to Naval Intelligence in the Mesopotamian campaign, though he had links to other branches. He would eventually be a champion of Albanian independence and was reputedly offered the Albanian throne.

T.E. Lawrence, 1915

T.E. Lawrence,  an intelligence officer attached to the Arab Bureau in Cairo. Later in 1916 he would be closely associated with the Arab Revolt in the Hijaz, and if you don't know who Lawrence of Arabia was, why are you reading this blog?

The third member was Col. Edward Beach, representative of Indian Army Intelligence. By this time London was blaming the Indian Army and the India Office for the debacle in "Mespot," Though Beach outranked the two captains with him, his role is a little vague.

The fullest description of the negotiations is in Herbert's diary, reproduced in his Mons, Anzac and Kut. The Kut material is online here, and the whole book is available here. 

The negotiations failed. Enver Pasha, the Ottoman War Minister, had vetoed the ransom; he wanted Britain humiliated. Townshend, ill and seemingly a bit out of control, had apparently already decided he would surrender unconditionally. Attempts to negotiate for the safety of the Arab population of Kut went nowhere (many were killed after the surrender).

And that was the end. Townshend surrendered unconditionally. In the campaign Britain had lost between 23,000 and 30,000 killed and wounded and surrendered some 12,000.

It was a devastating defeat, worse by far than Gallipoli, though the fact that many of the dead and captured were British Indian soldiers made it less well known. It was the largest surrender of British Empire forces ever (until Singapore 1942); the longest siege on record, longer than Ladysmith in the Boer War or Plevna in the Russo-Turkish War (again until Leningrad in WWII). Townshend got to spend the war in a nice villa on the Prinkipo islands near Constantinople, where the Byzantines used to exile their deposed Emperors. His men were not so lucky. The British officers were treated decently but the Indian rank an file were sent to work on prisoner chain gangs drilling railroad tunnels in he Taurus for the Berlin-to-Baghdad railway. It's been estimated that at least 70% of the Indian Army POWs were dead by the end of the war.

Townshend was released at last during the armistice negotiations; in his memoir he claims a role in making the peace, which is a bit delusional, and he was later elected to Parliament.

His men were not so lucky.

Townshend and Khalil with their officers after the surrender:

Tomorrow is July 4: A Few Relevant Notes

Is it the fourth?

Those were Thomas Jefferson's last words on July 4, 1826: He died on the 50th anniversary of his Declaration of Independence. That would be remarkable enough, but his old rival politically (but friend and avid correspondent in retirement), John Adams, also a member of the Declaration's drafting committee, died on the same day, the 50th anniversary. I have always wondered how America's second and third Presidents managed to do that, one in Virginia and one in Massachusetts.

But they did, and tomorrow is indeed the fourth, and a holiday.

The third and final installment of my three-part account of the 1916 surrender at Kut will go up late this evening, after which I intend to enjoy the long holiday weekend. I thought though that I might remind you of a few past posts that may be relevant for the anniversary of American independence:

From 2011: "For the Fourth: The First to Recognize US Independence: The Sultan of Morocco."  In 1777. The trouble is, the Continental Congress didn't hear about it for some time and responded in 1780.

Also from 2011, since this year the fourth falls during Ramadan: "Thomas Jefferson's Iftar." Jefferson postponed a dinner for the Tunisian Minister until sundown in 1805.

I have not read Denise A. Spellberg's 2013 Thomas Jefferson's Qur'an: Islam and the Founders, but it would also seem to be relevant reading for the Fourth.

And the words of the Declaration itself prompted me last year to note (since Egypt's coup was July 3): "On July 4, May Egypt's New Government Remember What Morsi Forgot."

But I shouldn't preach: my own government often fails to live up to the ideals of Jefferson's truly revolutionary document. (As, of course, did the slaveholder who wrote that all men are created equal.) Yet other colonial peoples have followed our model, all too often without our support.

Kut Part III is coming tonight, and then after that I'll see you Monday.

Barzani Moving Towards Kurdistan Independence Referendum?

A couple of days ago Kurdistan Regional Government President Masoud Barzani told the BBC he hoped to hold a referendum on Kurdish independence "within months,"

Now, Reuters is reporting that yesterday he asked a closed-door session of Parliament to set up the machinery for just such a referendum:

The president of Iraq's autonomous Kurdish north asked the region's parliament on Thursday to prepare the way for a referendum on independence, according to lawmakers who attended the closed session . . .

"The president asked us to form an independent electoral commission to carry out a referendum in the Kurdistan region and determine the way forward," said lawmaker Farhad Sofi, a member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).

Some of the traditional impediments to KRG independence — a landlocked Kurdistan surrounded by potentially hostile states — have been ameliorated by improved relations with Turkey and to some extent Iran, and as the impression that the KRG, after two decades of self-government, is the only part of Iraq that is functional deepens, centrifugal factors are strengthening, reinforced by the KRG's occupation of Kirkuk. If the Arab provinces split on sectarian lines,the Kurds could achieve their dream of independence at last, but that could prove a long and difficult achievement.

 

A Year Since Egypt's "Not a Coup"

A year ago today General Sisi took the action that his supporters continue to insist was not a coup. A good time to rerun this, with apologies to Magritte:

Arabic Phrases With No English Equivalent

Kut Part 3 is coming tomorrow; meanwhile something light for the Arabic speakers and language buffs: "5 Arabic Words That Have No English Equivalent." The five words are pretty obvious though they skew towards the Lebanese (or at least Levantine) colloquial. But the real payoff is in the comments thread, which broadens the scope somewhat.

IISS Says Latest Su-25s in Iraq are Iranian

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London has said that a comparison of registration numbers and tail codes show that the latest shipment of Sukhoi Su-25 ground attack aircraft received by Iraq are in fact provided by Iran, not Russia as was the case with the first delivery of aircraft to arrive. This is based on analysis of video released by the Iraqi Ministry of Defense  (below).

The Su-25 (NATO reporting name Frogfoot) is a close air support ground attack aircraft developed in Soviet days to carry our missions similar to the American A-10 Thunderbolt (better known as the Warthog). Beyond the irony h US helicopters may be sharing airspace with Iranian jets, there is another irony: Some of Iran's Su-25s were originally Iraqi Air Force aircraft flown to Iran in 1992 to escape Desert Storm and subsequently kept by Iran. Iran has since purchased its own, which are flown by the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps.

Lex Talionis

Yet again we are seeing a brutal cycle of retaliation and revenge; the murder of three Israeli teenagers has now been met not only by Israeli bombs but by the apparent revenge killing of a Palestinian teenager. There is simply no justification for killing innocents, for either side. Vendettas escalate; revenge provokes revenge; and all-too-soon the blood proliferate on both sides. Emotions are high; there seems little hope of calming the waters. Deeply tragic for both sides.

Egypt a Year After Morsi

A year ago yesterday was June 30, the date of the now iconic "June 30 revolution," and Thursday will mark the anniversary of the military coup (sorry, military intervention) that removed President Muhammad Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood from power. Over the coming days I hope to offer a number of posts assessing the events of the past year. I'm sure whatever I say will offend someone, given the profound polarization both before and after the events of a year ago. But a few things seem clear to me: 1) Too many people have died in the past year, on both sides; 2) too many people are in prison, and not just Islamists but journalists, revolutionaries and the like; and many of those who supported Tamarrod and the June 30 protests last year are today disillusioned, though others welcome the ascendancy of the military.

We know now that the military leadership cooperated with Tamarrod before and during the demonstrations, and we also know that Sisi has admitted to having had dreams of himself in a leadership role. Just how scripted the events of June 30-July 3 last year were is still a bit fuzzy, but the Army seems to have moved, not reluctantly as it claimed, but with a carefully predetermined scenario.

More to come in the coming days.

What's Wrong With This Picture? 1) ISIS Has a SCUD Now; 2) New Iraqi Parliament Collapses into Chaos

Nero "Fiddles" While Rome Burns

The new Iraqi Parliament was supposed to meet today to choose a new Speaker; instead the session fell apart in rancor, and after a break, Sunni and Kurdish deputies failed to return, denying a quorum. Such legislative paralysis is not unheard of, as those of us here in Washington know quite well, but we don't currently have an enemy armed force almost within artillery range of our capital city.

An enemy force that just paraded captured armor and an apparent SCUD missile in their "capital" at Raqqa in Syria:

Certainly the Parliamentary paralysis is likely to further undermine Prime Minister Maliki's chances for a new term, despite his bloc having the largest number of seats.

But surely the search for an alternative Shi‘ite candidate doesn't need to resurrect Ahmad Chalabi, an idea mentioned recently in The New York Times: "For Iraq, Potential Leader With a Tarnished Past."

As Iraq’s political parties held round-the-clock meetings the past three days to try to agree on the shape of a new government in time to convene Parliament on Tuesday and begin choosing new leaders, Mr. Chalabi’s name was one of two being prominently mentioned to replace the incumbent prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki.

Mr. Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress has only one seat in the Parliament, his own, and it is a measure of his skills as a political operator that he is even under consideration.

Declaring a Caliphate Doesn't Make One a Caliph

Hussein of Hijaz

So Ibrahim al-Badri, AKA Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, thinks he's Commander of the Faithful of a new Islamic Caliphate? Not so fast.There are abundant reasons to fear the murderous Baghdadi and his ISIS (or now apparently just "The Islamic State"),  but fear of the world's Muslims rallying behind a new Caliphate seems misplaced. Juan Cole made the point yesterday in his "The Debacle of the Caliphates: Why al-Baghdadi’s Grandiosity doesn’t Matter," gave the basic argument, but I'd like to elaborate on some of his points.

In 1924, two days after the Turkish Grand National Assembly abolished the Ottoman claim to the Caliphate, the Hashemite King Hussein of the Hijaz, the same Sharif Hussein who had raised the Arab revolt, proclaimed himself Caliph. He met with little enthusiasm, though his sons,  now Amir of Transjordan and King of Iraq, were no doubt polite about it.

Later that year Hussein was driven out of his Kingdom by the Saudis,nd lived out his last years in Amman.

When the Turkish claim to the Caliphate ended (and it had never been taken very seriously outside Ottoman territory, except to a limited extent among some Indian Muslims; the Ottomans were not from Quraysh or even Arab), various other leaders considered following suit. The Saudis did not: they believed (as had been the rule in the Classical era) that Caliphs must come from the tribe of Quraysh, which Hussein did but the Saudis did not.The Ottomans weren't from Quraysh either. King Fuad I of Egypt, though of Turco-Albanian ancestry, reportedly hired genealogist to find him  a suitable Qurayshi ancestor.

In 1924, the newly, at least nominally, independent Arab monarchs were not ready to recognize anyone else as a real Caliph. Scholars still argued that the Caliphate was a necessity; when Egyptian scholar ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Razzaq argued it was no longer necessary, he was rebuked by his superiors at al-Azhar.

But as Cole notes, the Caliphate as a real center of authority ended with the Mongol conquest of Baghdad in AD 1258.

But even before that, it had been weak; the later ‘Abbasid Caliphs depended on a sequence of warlords of Persian or Turkish origin, and a distinction arose between the religious authority of the Caliph and the military/political power of the "Sultan," a word which means simply "power."

From 945-1055 AD Baghdad was under the authority of the Buyids, a Persian dynasty of 12er Shi‘ites who nonetheless accepted the authority of the Sunni ‘Abbasid Caliphs. Soon after their rise to power came the Fatimid Dynasty, who called themselves a Caliphate but were Isma‘ili Shi‘ites, and controlled Egypt and North Africa and contested Syria. Though the Sunni Caliphate survived, much of the real power was in the hands of Shi‘ites. The emergence of Sunni warlords such as the Zangids in Syria, the Ayyubids in Egypt, and eventually the Seljuq Turks, restored Sunni dominance, but only occasionally could the late ‘Abbasids exert any real authority, and then usually only around Baghdad. In 1258 the last Caliph of Baghdad died and the Mongols extinguished the Caliphate.

Tombs of the ‘Abbasid Caliphs of Cairo

Though not quite. In Cairo's great southern cemetery, in the rear of the great shrine-tomb of Sayyida Nafisa, one of Cairo's patron saints, is a much smaller structure, domed, and with a number of cenotaphs. This is the tomb of the "shadow caliphs," the ‘Abbasid Caliphs of Cairo.

A few members of the ‘Abbasid family escaped the fall of Baghdad. The Mamluk Sultans in Egypt, who would eventually stop the Mongol advance in Palestine, gave refuge to a claimant who "ruled," without any real power or broad acknowledgement, outside of the Mamluk realms, and only a token recognition even there. Unlike the popular shrine of Sayyida Nafisa next door, the tomb attracts few other than students of Islamic architecture.

In all there were 18 ‘Abbasid Caliphs in Cairo (one counts twice as he was deposed and restored). At the time of the Ottoman conquest of Mamluk Egypt in 1517, the last of these, al-Mutawakkil III, was carried off to Constantinople; he later returned to Cairo where he died.

In theory, the Ottoman claim to the Caliphate was based on the idea that the title was transferred to them after their conquest of Egypt, though as early as Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror a century earlier, some Sultans flirted with claiming the title.

But the Ottomans, whatever latent claim they might assert, did not seriously emphasize the Caliphate until Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909), who sought to claim a role beyond the Ottoman dominions. During World War I, though the Sultan of that era was a figurehead of the Young Turks, he proclaimed a Jihad in hopes of provoking risings by Muslims in British India. When Turkey was declared a republic in 1923, an Ottoman relative, Abdülmecid II, remained Caliph but not Sultan until the abolition in 1924.

But again, if the ‘Abbasid Caliphs of Cairo were shadows, the Ottoman Caliphate was a phantom, only really asserted from the late 19th century.

Not everyone agrees whether a Caliph has to be from Quraysh, but he does need the consensus of the Muslim umma, needs to be a just ruler with religious knowledge (he is the khalifa or successor of the Prophet , though not to his prophethood, merely his political and religious authority), and of all the potential candidates, I rather doubt that Baghdadi will sway most believers. I suspect, like King Hussein of Hijaz, proclaiming himself Caliph will not make him one.

Have I mentioned I'm the Lost Dauphin of France?

Photos of Ottoman Troops in WWI

I'm working on Part 3 of my post about the surrender of Kut, but in the meantime let me note that last Friday, to mark the anniversary of Sarajevo, Hurriyet Daily News published a slideshow of photos from the Turkish General Staff Archives of Ottoman troops during World War I.

The general caption describes the troops as "defending Anatolia," but a variety of locales seem to be included, including many in snow (the Caucasus front?), but also a number with Arab troops, Arab dignitaries, and camel transport.

I have previously noted that the modern narratives of both Turkish nationalists and Arab nationalists have tended to ignore the large number from the Arab province who served in the Ottoman Army, including the fact that two of the three regiments that served under Mustafa Kemal at Gallipoli had been recruited in Syria.

The total of photos in the slideshow is 45; those that look most like the Middle Eastern fronts are in the last 10 or so.

ISIS and Mosul's Antiquities

ISIS, which has now rebranded itself as just "The Islamic State," and has declared a Caliphate, continues to try to entrench its position. Juan Cole reminds us that declaring a Caliphate does not a Caliph make, But that does not mean that great damage is not being done: ISIS is reportedly destroying statues and some ancient tombs, and has removed ancient manuscripts from display in Mosul,

The Syrian civil war has already had a devastating effect on antiquities. Now Mosul's past may also be disappearing. The deaths and destruction of any war threaten the country's future, but this threatens to rob Iraqis of their past as well.

On the "Caliphate" issue, see also this discussion at Syria Deeply.

Ramadan Karim

Ramadan begins at sundown today. May I wish my Muslim readers a Blessed Ramadan.

The Surrender at Kut, 1916, Part II: Townshend Advances, Retreats, and is Besieged

This is Part II of my post on the British military disaster at Kut in Iraq in 1916. Part I, introducing the various British and Ottoman officers in the Mesopotamia campaign, appeared on Wednesday.

The maps in this post are from the West Point historical series via Wikimedia Commons. For photos and profiles of the participants, see Part I.

Britain had occupied Basra and its oilfields with Indian Army troops in December 1914, after Turkey had entered the war in late October. After taking Basra and Qurna, the British settled in for a while, but after defeating an Ottoman assault at Shaiba on April 12-15, the British became overconfident. Sir John Nixon was named overall commander, while on the Turkish side Nureddin Bey took over after his predecessor killed himself following defeat at Shaiba, (For Nixon and Nureddin, see part I.) Note that the victory at Shaiba was in April 1915. Ten days after it, British and ANZAC forces landed at Gallipoli.

Nixon felt that the ineffective Ottoman resistance might make it possible to advance up the rivers, and turned to General Charles Townshend and his 6th Indian (Poona) Division, ordering him to advance to Kut or, if possible, even to Baghdad.

Townshend set out and on June 3 took ‘Amara; he reached Kut (also known as Kut al-‘Amara) on September 24 and captured it on September 28.

Townshend referred to remain at Kut. But things were not going so well on the Eastern Fronts.The Gallipoli campaign was stalled; in the Balkans Austria had defeated Serbia, and Bulgaria had entered the war on the side of the Central Powers; the Turks had overland links to their allies. German Field Marshal von der Goltz (See Part I) was en route to take over the Mesopotamian campaign but had not yet arrived. Townshend was ordered to advance the less than 100 miles or so to Baghdad; even if after taking it, he had to withdraw, it would be a symbolic demonstration.

Townshend had one Indian Division advancing up the Tigris with some naval and logistical support; Nureddin had four divisions, but under strength (about 18,000 total to Townshend's 12,000-13,000). Two of Nureddin's divisions were recruited in the Arab provinces, and two were ethnically Turkish.

Turkey had belatedly realized the Anglo-Indian threat in Mesopotamia. Not only was von der Goltz dispatched to the theater, but reinforcements were on the way and on October 5, the Turkish 6th Army was constituted in Mesopotamia.

In the meantime, Townshend's push up the Tigris had continued. Near the town of Salman Pak and some 40 miles upriver from Kut, lay the ruins of the ancient Parthian and Sassanian Persian capital at Ctesiphon, al-Mada'in ("the cities") in Arabic. Only 20 miles or so from the outskirts of Baghdad, it was there that Nureddin chose to make his stand. Within a fortified line within a loop of the Tigris, with well-positioned artillery and his freshest division across his front, Nureddin was in a strong defensive position..

The Arch at Ctesiphon

The two-day battle, known to the British as the Battle of Ctesiphon and to the Turks as the Battle of Salman-i-Pak, was tactically indecisive but strategically a defeat for the British. Though Turkish casualties were higher, Townshend lost roughly 40% of his effective fighting strength (4,600 men) in killed, wounded, or captured, and decided to retreat. The wounded were gathered at the great Arch of Ctesiphon, the Taq Kisra or Arch of Chosroes.

On November 24, Townshend, too weakened to continue to Baghdad, withdrew towards Kut.

The Battle of Ctesiphon, though militarily a draw, was a strategic victory for the Turks. British soldiers, puzzled at how to pronounce "Ctesiphon," reportedly nicknamed it "Pistupon."

Townshend reached Kut December 3. Nureddin, and the by now real commander Field Marshal von der Goltz, arrived December 7.

Kut lay in a loop of the Tigris and appeared to be an eminently defensible position (the literal meaning of "Kut" is "fort"), since the British had thus far controlled river access. Townshend decided to await relief there and make a stand.

It was a mistake. Logistics were already an issue, the Ottoman forces were reinforcing, and the campaign was now under the command of a veteran German field marshal and military historian fully at home with Ottoman troops, and Townshend was soon fully encircled by the Turkish Sixth Army, with the river blocked by artillery positions and mines.

Part 3 will address the multiple failed relief expeditions, the failed attempt by British intelligence (represented by T.E. Lawrence and Aubrey Herbert) to bribe the Turkish commander to release Townshend, and finally the surrender itself and the subsequent imprisonment of the garrison.

Turkish 6th Army entrenchments during the Siege of Kut, 1916: 

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Algerians, Other Arabs Celebrate World Cup Advance Across Europe

While Americans are enthusiastic about the fact that the USA team in the World Cup is advancing to the next stage, Algeria on the same day tied Russia to also advance, after a previous rout of South Korea 4-2, reportedly the first time an Arab team has scored four goals in a World Cup game. That was Algeria's first World Cup win since 1982, and the first by an Arab country in 16 years. See this article at the FIFA website.

The celebrations have not just been limited to Algeria; much of the Arab World has joined in. And the huge Algerian population in France have too, and have clashed with riot police in Paris and other French cities:

Speaking of the Great War: 100 Years Ago Tomorrow, "Some Damned Foolish Thing in the Balkans"

Europe today is a powder keg and the leaders are like men smoking in an arsenal … A single spark will set off an explosion that will consume us all … I cannot tell you when that explosion will occur, but I can tell you where … Some damned foolish thing in the Balkans will set it off.

—Otto von Bismarck at the Congress of Berlin in 1878

The second post on Kut is coming later this evening. Meanwhile I thought it worth noting another World War I connection: that tomorrow marks the centenary of the "some damned foolish thing in the Balkans" that the Iron Chancellor had prophesied in 1878, the assassination in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, and his wife Sophie. In a little over a month, much of Europe was at war.

Though Turkey did not formally join the war until October, its tilt towards Germany was already under way in that summer of 1914.

Note too in the famous photo of the Archduke and wife leaving Sarajevo's city hall on the day of the assassination, we see reminders (fezzes, clerical turbans) that it was only in that same Congress of Berlin that witnessed Bismarck's comment in 1878, that Bosnia and Herzegovina had ceased to be Ottoman territory and fell under Austrian control.

Iraq's Assyrian Christians Under (and Near) ISIS

It's well known that Iraq's Christians suffered heavily during the sectarian wars of the past decade, and that large numbers have fled the country. Now, with ISIS in control of Nineveh province, the heartland of Assyrian and Chaldean Christians in Iraq, the news is even worse. Jamie Dettmer at The Daily Beast visits Bartilla, which ISIS hasn't yet reached and is under Kurdish control, but with ISIS a 10-minute drive away, the Christians are getting nervous.

Edessa (now Şanlıurfa just over the Syrian border) was one of the first cities in Upper Mesopotamia to convert to Christianity, and the Anaphora of Addai and Mari, still the Eucharistic liturgy of the Assyrian Church of the East, is considered by liturgical experts to be the oldest Christian liturgy still in use. Because the Church of the East flourished in the lands of the Persian rather than the Roman Empire, and were dismissed as "Nestorians" and heretical by the Western churches, this very ancient history is largely forgotten. Sadly, its modern adherents (and their Chaldean Catholic neighbors) may be feeling forgotten as well.

Could the Return of ‘Izzat Ibrahim Be Somehow a Good Thing?

I'm wrapping up our summer issue; Part II of the post on Kut will be posted tomorrow with luck.

I previously posted on the odd alliance between Saddam's old number two, ‘Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, the Naqshbandi Sufi order, and ISIS, which have few common interests other than all being Sunni.

Now Michael Knights at The New Republic tries to find something positive in this grotesque Hitler-Stalin Pact style Hobson's choice: "Saddam Hussein's Faithful Friend, the King of Clubs, Might Be the Key to Saving Iraq: Assuming, that is, the mysterious Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri is even still alive." 

Eek! If Saddam's old henchman is the "key to saving Iraq" things are even worse than I feared. My previous allusion to the Hitler-Stalin Pact stands.

It reminds me of the old joke about the Pole who is asked, "if you're invaded by Germany and Russia at the same time, who do you fight first?" [Which actually happened in 1939.] To which the Pole responds, "Germany, of course. Business before pleasure."

It also reminds me of the story of the boy who was such an optimist that a psychiatrist introduced him to a room full of horse manure. The boy was overjoyed and started digging. When asked why he wasn't repulsed, he replied, "Isn't it obvious? With all this horseshit, there has to be a pony in here somewhere." It takes that level of optimism to find a silver lining in the return of a butcher like ‘Izzat Ibrahim, though the fact that ISIS' successes include allies with very different goals may undercut their prospects over time.

Despite these doubts, Knights' article is worth your time.

Remembering "Mespot" and an Earlier Military Disaster in Iraq: The Surrender of Kut, 1916, Part I

Note: This is Part I of what will be (at least) a three part post.

Those who do not remember history, it is said, are condemned to repeat it. With Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, Elliott Abrams, and various Kagans telling us why we need boots on the ground, many seem to assume Americans have severe short-term memory loss. One of the big mistakes in the Iraq war was the lack of understanding of Iraq's history. In early 2003, I spoke to a senior Pentagon planner and remarked that if we went in, I hope we didn't make the kind of mistakes that Britain made in 1920. This senior Pentagon official, just weeks before the war started, asked me what had happened in 1920.

I suppose he found out eventually: a widespread insurgency against the occupier, just like happened to us, and in many of the same places.

But 1920 was not Britain's worst moment in the Middle East. Kut was. It was to remain the largest surrender of British Empire troops in history, 12,000, until the fall of Singapore to the Japanese in 1942. (For US readers: Cornwallis had 9,000 at Yorktown.) And it was the Ottoman Army, long derided as corrupt and untrained, representing the "Sick Man of Europe," that took their surrender. (Though earlier in 1915, those perceptions began to change, at least to those British and Anzac troops stuck in Gallipoli.)

The whole Mesopotamian Theater of Operations acquired the soldiers' nickname "Mespot," pronounced "mess pot," and a reminder of the usual perceptiveness of the ordinary infantryman.

There is a frequently quoted (though variously attributed) story of a dialogue by German or other generals about the British: "The British soldiers fight like lions." "Yes, but they are lions led by donkeys." When it comes to British generalship in Mesopotamia in 1915-16, that is a slur on a determined and reliable beast of burden. The main British general in question, Major General Sir Charles Townshend, managed to get his force totally surrounded and cut off, and a succession of other generals, one after the other, failed to relieve him. The story is largely forgotten, but the surrender was a huge defeat, and though Townshend himself would sit out the war in a nice Turkish villa and his officers were also well attended to in captivity, the Indian enlisted men died in huge numbers in less well-appointed Turkish prisons, often of starvation.There are even some celebrity cameos, including T.E. Lawrence (not yet a celebrity and not yet "of Arabia"), as "the Negotiator."

Dramatis Personae

Townshend

Sir Charles Vere Ferrers Townshend came from a military and political family; his great-great-grandfather, George, First Marquess Townshend, had served in the Seven Years' War, was third under Wolfe at Quebec, and after Wolfe's death and Monckton's wounding, took command. He rose to the rank of Field Marshal. Apparently the Field Marshal gene didn't pass down. The younger Townshend's memoir of the war is even more divorced from other accounts than most generals' memoirs, which are always self-serving, but more about that anon.

When Turkey entered the war, the India Office felt that it would be wise to seize the oilfields north of Basra for the war effort. Led by the British Indian Army combined with the Royal Navy's dominance in Gulf and Indian waters, Britain moved to seize Basra and its oil-laden hinterland. It was, to use a term from a later era, a cakewalk.

Basra was taken in November 1914, less than a month after Turkey formally became a belligerent and six months before Gallipoli, and the largely absent Ottoman resistance led to overconfidence and, in time, what a future generation would call "mission creep."

Overlooking the fact that the Royal Navy could hardly operate in force on the Tigris and Euphrates, it was decided to use the Army to take Baghdad. It could have worked; British and Indian troops in the overall theater greatly outnumbered Ottoman; Turkey was preoccupied in Gallipoli, the Caucasus front with Russia, and Sinai-Palestine. But the Turks had interior lines of communication, some decent commanders and experienced troops, and, in this theater, General Feldmarschall Colmar Freiherr [Baron] von der Goltz (Goltz Pasha) of the German Army. Von der Goltz, who had trained the Ottoman Army since the 1870s, had been recalled from retirement at the beginning of the war, and sent to his old Ottoman turf. But he did not get on well with the head of Germany's Military Mission in Turkey, Gen. Liman von Sanders, and also was not a favorite of the Minister of War, Enver Pasha. Von der Goltz was accordingly stuck in what looked initially to be  backwater theater of the war, Mesopotamia.

Field Marshal von der Goltz

But whatever his flaws, Goltz was a Prussian Field Marshal who had joined the Prussian Army in 1861 (over 50 years before), served against Austria in 1866 and in the Franco-Prussian War, taught military history in the Prussian and later Imperial German military academy, and trained the Turkish Army during and after the Russo-Turkish war. And whatever Enver or Liman von Sanders may have thought of this 70-year-old man, a Prussian Field Marshal of the old school was still a Prussian Field Marshal of the old school.

Nureddin Pasha

From April 1915 the Ottoman military commander had been Nureddin Ibrahim Pasha (known as Nurettin Paşa in modern Turkish orthography), who took command of the Iraq Area Command when his predecessor committed suicide. A member of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP, the "Young Turks") and a multilingual figure with experience in the Arab provinces and a command of Arabic, he was the commander when Townshend began his advance.

Khalil Pasha

Nureddin Pasha's superior in Baghdad, and later successor at the front, was Khalil Pasha (later known as Halil Kut in modern Turkish, since he took his greatest victory as a surname).

An uncle of Enver Pasha, Khalil Pasha has also long been accused in complicity and active involvement in both the Armenian and Assyrian massacres. As governor of Baghdad Province and from April of 1916 commander of the Ottoman Sixth Army, he would be the man to accept Townshend's surrender. He would lead an interesting life in Moscow and Berlin until returning to Turkey after the Republic in 1923; he lived until 1957.

Gen. Sir John Nixon, upstaged by his hat

These were the frontline commanders. But Townshend's superiors were hardly Marlboroughs or Wellingtons either. Lieutenant General Sir John Eccles Nixon, Commander-in-Chief of the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force, had gained most of his military experience in the Second Afghan War and other British Indian conflicts around the periphery of the Raj. His experience seems to be all colonial Indian, except for a cavalry command in the Second Boer War. He was not a match for a Prussian Field Marshal van der Goltz, even if Goltz was 70.

Aylmer

Nixon's first effort to relieve Townshend would be led by Sir Fenton John Aylmer, 13th Baronet of Donadea.

He had won the Victoria Cross in a local campaign in India and, as a baronet, obviously had clout in society. He was less impressive in he field, and was soon turned back by the Turks. (The details will be recounted in the future parts of this post.)

Lt. Gen Sir Percy Lake

After Aylmer's failure, Nixon himself was replaced with Lt. Gen. Sir Percy Lake, who had mostly colonial experience and had served as Chief of the Canadian General Staff, though not Canadian. His knighthood dated from early 1916 as he was being posted to save Townshend.

Gorringe

When Lake took command, he tried another relief mission: General George Gorringe replaced Aylmer, and had slightly more military success, but still failed to relieve Townshend. Gorringe may have been a better general, but he still fell short.

In the end, Townshend surrendered, and all these British generals were sacked, kicked upstairs, or otherwise shunted aside. General Maude, who both succeeded to authority and succeeded in the field, is a story for another day.

But while I've introduced the dramatis personae, I still need to tell the tale. Please stay tuned.