Maj. Gen. Israel Tal, Israel's Armored Theorist and Father of the Merkava Tank, 1924-2010

Major General (Reserves) Israel Tal, nicknamed "Talik," the creator of Israel's Merkava tank, Deputy Chief of Staff of the IDF during the last part of the 1973 war, a key military theorist of armored warfare, a tanker's tanker, and a man who famously refused an order to attack Egyptian troops after the 1973 ceasefire, costing him higher rank though he was ultimately vindicated, died yesterday just a week short of his 86th birthday.

Israel is known for its armored prowess, from the 1956 Suez War onward, and some of the biggest tank battles in the post-World War II era (since Kursk) have been fought in the Sinai and Golan in 1956, 1967, and 1973. Tal was Israel's armored prophet, its analog of J.F.C. Fuller, Basil Liddell Hart, Charles de Gaulle, Heinz Guderian, Erwin Rommel, or George S. Patton. He is remembered as the father of Israel's indigenous main battle tank, the Merkava ("chariot" in Hebrew), and he developed armor doctrine that proved dominating in Sinai in 1967, based on mobility, long-range fire, and rapid penetration. When Arab military academies study Israel's tank tactics (and they do), they are studying Tal.

Some have suggested the triumph of armor in 1967 led to a weakening of the infantry arm and the consequent fallback of Israeli forces from the Suez Canal in 1973; but it was armor which struck back across the Canal and turned the tide in the war.

Here's Ha'aretz' obit, here's the Jerusalem Post's, and here's his Wikipedia bio, The Jerusalem Post obit says that "Tal was named one of the top five armored commanders in history at The Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor in Fort Knox, Kentucky, along with Maj.-Gen. Moshe Peled, General George S. Patton, Creighton Abrams and German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel." Two Israelis in the top five seems a bit much (Patton and his protégé Abrams were probably givens at the Patton Museum), and some Brits and Russians might object, but he was in that class.

Tal deserves to be remembered for another matter: after the ceasefire in the 1973 war, in his role as Officer Commanding, Southern Command, he received an order from Chief of Staff David Elazar and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan ordering him to attack Egyptian troops. Viewing it as an illegal order after the ceasefire, he refused to obey, demanding confirmation from Prime Minister Golda Meir and the Supreme Court.

In the aftermath of the war he was vindicated, but the seeming insubordination probably kept him from ever occupying the Chief of Staff's position.

We may not hear any acknowledgment of it, but I suspect many Arab tankers who fought against him will quietly note his passing as one of the great tankers of the 20th century. If he can be criticized, it is probably for making Israel too armored-mobility dependent in its military theory in the 1960s and 1970s, a tactical leaning which would be of limited use in Lebanon in the 1980s or in the far different conflicts which have followed.