They're Off! . . . But Not All of them Are Running

It's November, and the Egyptian Parliamentary elections are November 28. Though hardly free and fair, the Parliamentary runs are competitive and the opposition does have some chance to make their voice heard.

On the first day for presenting candidates, 75 Muslim Brotherhood candidates were able to file thei candidacy but another 57 were barred; (also IkhwanWeb here and an Arabic account here).

On related subjects, Issander El Amrani on repeating patterns of previous elections; and also, Michele Dunne on the competition for NDP nominations, with much on the NDP, the role of NDP independents, the postponement of the Party's Congress, etc.

Egypt's Muslims Rally to Back Copts after Al-Qa‘ida Threat

It's been a rough year for Coptic-Muslim relations in Egypt, as noted previously. Not so long ago, some Islamists were even questioning whether Copts should be citizens. So what does it take to persuade members of the Muslim Brotherhood to pledge to defend the Copts?

If you know Egypt, you may well guess: some non-Egyptians are making threats. In this case it's the Al-Qa‘ida-linked "Islamic State of Iraq." The group claimed responsibility for the hostage taking during Sunday services at an Armenian Catholic church in Baghdad last Sunday; some 60 people died either at the hands of the hostage-takers or during the rescue. The Islamic State of Iraq announced that Iraqi Christians were legitimate targets who would be "exterminated" if al-Qa‘ida militants in Iraq were not released, and also demanded that Egyptian Copts would become a target if they did not release "the Muslim women held hostage in its churches" referring to the Camillia Shehata affair and a similar case, Wafaa Constantine. The church denies that the two women are being held for trying to convert to Islam.

In the wake of the Iraqi threat, Egyptian security forces reportedly stepped up security around churches, and warned that the controversial bishop Anba Bishoi, whose previous comments about Islam stirred protests., might become a target. The head of al-Azhar, members of the Brotherhood, and other senior Muslim officials quickly denounced the threat and pledged to defend Egyptian Christians.

While the threat did remind many of the claimed conversion cases, the fact that much of Egypt's Muslim leadership sprang to the defense of the Church was, as Pope Shenouda III noted in his weekly Wednesday sermon, a positive result of the threat.

And Egyptian Muslim institutions showed that they would support their own fellow citizens against foreign threats.

MEI's 64th Annual Conference Breaks All Records: Some In-House Boasting

Some in-house notes/praise/vicarious boasting. As I noted over the past couple of days, we've been in the midst of the Middle East Institute's 64th Annual Conference. Having gone to college and grad school here and lived in the DC area for all but four or five years of my career, I've been to a lot of these, as a student, an ordinary member, and more recently as Editor of the Journal and a senior staff member at MEI. This was by far the best attended, and I would also say (though I should admit I'm biased) the best in terms of content. Bill Clinton as the banquet speaker drew our biggest-ever banquet crowd, and yesterday's panels were also well attended, with Saeb Erekat as the lunch speaker.

Our Vice President for Programs and Communications Kate Seelye, Director of Development Kelly Davies, and all the staff (let me especially thank my own Journal staff — that's you, Aaron Reese, Rachel Wilson and John Calabrese — who were selling subscriptions and back issues all day) and interns (perhaps most overworked of all) worked full throttle to put this thing together and deserve a lot of credit. Our grossly overworked IT guy (yes, singular), Howard Fleming (take a bow, Howard, when you're able to stand up), was present throughout, working his tech magic, and when the paramedics succeed in reviving him, podcasts will eventually start to appear, so I won't bother to try to abridge or summarize any of the content here. Transcripts and video will take longer, but as soon as something you can listen to is up, I'll be sure to link to it. Or you can just check the MEI website regularly. (You should do that anyway, of course.)

All in all a triumph. Also, of course, I should compliment the folks in charge, our Chairman, Senator Wyche Fowler, and our President, Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin, who presided over the success.

This is starting to sound like I'm accepting an academy award, but to be honest, I probably did the least work of anybody at the conference (so why are my feet sore?), but at least I can thank and acknowledge those who did yeoman service. I don't overdo the in-house ads, I hope, on this blog, but I do want to give credit where it's due. This blog wouldn't exist without MEI and all it does.

As I say, I won't try to summarize, but will link when media is available. More postings on other subjects later today.

Yitzhak Rabin After 15 Years

[Today, November 4, is the day of the Middle East Institute's 64th Annual Conference. It is also the 15th Anniversary of the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. Since I will be tied up at the Conference all day and likely unable to post, I prepared this assessment of Yitzhak Rabin in advance.]

Looking back, it seems increasingly clear that the decline and fall of the Oslo Declaration of Principles, then only two years old, began in earnest with the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin on November 4, 1995. (The Israeli commemoration is held on the 12th of Heshvan in the Hebrew calendar, and occurred last month.) It may not have been clear to the world until the collapse of Camp David II in 2000, but looking back, the vector seems downhill from the Rabin assassination. Last night at MEI's Annual Banquet, former President Bill Clinton, the keynoter, voiced his own feeling that if Rabin had not been killed, an agreement might have been reached in the 1990s. (Needless to say, he speaks with more familiarity with the subject than do I. He was President of the United States at the time.)

Whether you agree with that perception or not, Rabin was a major figure in the modern Middle East, a military man who may be best remembered for his (not terribly enthusiastic, but game nonetheless) handshake with Yasir Arafat at the White House in 1993, a former general who shared the Nobel Peace Prize (with Arafat and Shimon Peres).

Born in Jerusalem in 1922, the man who was to become Israel's fifth Prime Minister would also be the first Prime Minister born in Eretz Yisrael, albeit in Mandate days. David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Sharett, Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir were all European-born (though Meir, born in Kiev, grew up in Milwaukee). And the first sabra Prime Minister fit the traditional sabra stereotype of "prickly on the outside, sweet on the inside" (like the sabra prickly pear cactus). Well, at least he fit the first part of the stereotype, with a reputation for a quick temper. In my days of writing about Israeli defense issues back in the 1980s, during his tenure as Defense Minister, I met him at various receptions, attended some of his press briefings, etc.: while I can't claim I got to know him personally, he always came across as a man with an abrasive edge to his personality, a chain smoker (common among Israelis of that generation) and an intense figure; the stories of his mercurial temper fit his general demeanor, though I never saw it displayed.

His English was good (he'd served as Ambassador to Washington in the late 60s/early 70s and helped forge the US-Israeli defense equipment supply), and his father had lived for some years in the US before going to Palestine.

Rabin was very much part of the independence generation of Israeli figures: forged in battle both before and during the War of Independence. He was a key figure in the Palmach, the elite forces of the Haganah; served in the British invasion of Lebanon during World War II and then rose to be the Operations Chief of the Palmach, finding himself interned by his former British allies. With independence he became a key figure in the Israel Defense Forces. He served in many key roles, including a controversial one in the Altalena affair when the IDF seized the Irgun ship Altalena at Tel Aviv during the first ceasefire, leading to longstanding resentment between himself and the Irgun's Menahem Begin, who would succeed him as Prime Minister after Rabin's first term. Rabin continued to play a key command role in the operations (Operation Danny) around Lydda, Ramla, and Latrun, and in the "Burma Road" construction to find a bypass around Latrun to keep open supply lines to Jerusalem, in which he served under Mickey Marcus, Israel's first general and the American officer who served under the pseudonym of "Michael Stone" (best known today for Kirk Douglas' portrayal of him in Cast a Giant Shadow).

After the War of Independence, Rabin remained in the IDF, and by 1964 rose to the post of Chief of Staff. In that capacity, he led Israeli forces during the 1967 Six-Day War. He had a breakdown of some sort on the eve of the war, however, and its exact nature has always been a bit mysterious. He attributed it to nicotine poisoning, though others thought it some sort of nervous breakdown.

In the wake of the war, Rabin left the IDF and served as Ambassador to the US from 1968 to 1973. Those years marked the real beginnings of the US-Israeli defense supply relationship, and the general turned ambassador played a key role. Returning to Israel, he was elected to the Knesset, and became Minister of Labor. When Golda Meir stepped down in 1974, he won the Labor Party leadership (defeating Shimon Peres) and became Prime Minister. During his term, Israel signed the Sinai disengagement agreement of 1975.

In 1976 he called new elections after a religious dispute brought the government down. When it was learned that his wife had a US dollar bank account in Washington, then technically illegal, he stepped aside as Prime Minister and Labor Party leader, and in the May 1977 elections, Menahem Begin's Likud won, the first time Labor or its ancestors had not led the government.

In 1984, Labor returned to share power in a series of coalitions with Likud, and Rabin became Minister of Defense, serving in that capacity until 1989, including the outbreak of the First Intifada in 1987.

In 1992 he was elected Labor Party leader over Shimon Peres, and led Labor back to power to become Prime Minister a second time, replacing Yitzhak Shamir of Likud. The following year, he signed the Oslo Accords with Yasir Arafat in Washington.

Rabin's long history as a military leader strengthened his hand in taking a risk for a Palestinian settlement, in the classic "Only de Gaulle could give up Algeria/Only Nixon could go to China" pattern, Though Oslo was controversial, it also created one of the most optimistic periods kn the history of Israeli-Palestinian relations. It was soon followed by an Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty.

Fifteen years ago today, Rabin attended a rally for peace in the large square adjacent to Tel Aviv's City Hall, then known as Kings of Israel Square (Kikkar Malkhei Yisrael). Yigal Amir emerged from the crowd and shot Rabin, who died within the hour. It was the first (and so far, only) time an Israeli Prime Minister was assassinated, and it was an Israeli opposed to Oslo who fired the shot.

Rabin's funeral was attended by President Clinton of the US, President Mubarak of Egypt, and King Hussein of Jordan: the presence of Arab heads of state would have been unthinkable when the only previous Prime Minister to die in office, Levi Eshkol, passed away in 1969. The square where Rabin was shot was renamed Rabin Square, and today holds a memorial to him.

Oslo might well have foundered if Rabin had lived, as Clinton suggested and I suspect, but that can't be known for sure: alternative history is a useful exercise, but we can't prove a negative. What is clear is that his assassination set the process back, and the following year Likud returned to power under Binyamin Netanyahu. You know the rest.

Annual Conference

Posting will be light: MEI's Annual Conference is about to begin, with the banquet tonight and the Conference itself all day tomorrow. I have something pre-written for tomorrow and will try to get a short comment up later today if I have anything, but don't count on much.

For my readers here in DC, note it's at the Grand Hyatt this year, not the National Press Club.

This is NOT Mubarak's Granddaughter: Berlusconi Drags Mubarak into His Latest Scandal

Let's get this clear to begin with: the young woman at left, a 17-year old Moroccan belly dancer who calls herself Ruby Rubacuori, or Ruby the Heart Robber, and whose real name may be Karima, is not the granddaughter of Husni Mubarak. Mubarak has one granddaughter, Gamal's daughter Farida, who is less than a year old. Though no photos of Farida have been published, I'm pretty sure we can say that this isn't she. This young (underage in fact) lady is, however, the cause of a flap between Italy and Egypt, since Mubarak's sometime good friend Silvio Berlusconi dropped Mubarak's name in trying to get his young friend (if that's the right euphemism) out of jail.

I pay only peripheral attention to European politics, but sometimes the Middle East gets dragged in. Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi seems to have a penchant for scandal, usually involving women (singular or plural) or money or frequently both, but his latest one, through a particularly impolitic ploy, has embarrassed his good friend Mubarak. You can read the basics here. It's too funny to ignore, frankly. And it makes me feel sorry for Mubarak, which takes some doing.

Berlusconi has been linked to the 17-year old Moroccan belly dancer pictured above (her Facebook profile pic), which is not as shocking, apparently, to his Italian support base as it might be if he were an American politician (though the Moroccan connection alone would be enough to qualify as fodder for this blog), and it's hardly his first trespass, though the fact that the girl is under age adds a bit of flavor. (There are now several Facebook pages devoted to her, some of which, despite my lack of Italian, are clearly bogus or satirical. And many now list her as a "Public Figure" which, given the photos, may be an intentional pun.)

The young lady (to use the polite term) in question is supposedly the mistress, or perhaps I should say a mistress, of Signor Berlusconi, who is known to enjoy female company, sometimes in excess, and in plural. She found herself arrested in Milan on suspicion of theft. According to the authorities, someone not yet identified in the Prime Minister's Office called the police and urged her release, telling them she was a granddaughter of Husni Mubarak. As already noted, Farida Gamal Mubarak is not yet a year old, and he has no other granddaughters. As the Guardian story linked above notes, "According to Italian media reports, a showgirl turned politician close to Berlusconi collected Ruby following her release." You really can't make this stuff up. The "showgirl turned politician" springs the underage belly dancer from the slammer.

This is causing some scandal in Italy because, despite Berlusconi's frequent flaunting of his sexual escapades, this one involved a potential abuse of Prime Ministerial office. And it also has a diplomatic angle, since he, or someone acting in his name, dragged Husni Mubarak into the mix. (He's also of course a good pal of Qadhafi: that would possibly have been even funnier.)

The Egyptian press has been pretty quiet but the Egyptian Embassy in Rome and the MENA news agency went out of their way to emphasize that she is not a granddaughter, niece, great-uncle or any other relative of Mubarak's. So Egypt is clearly annoyed. Berlusconi has brazened his way through a lot of scandals, mostly through sheer gall, but this one with its underage belly dancer and international embarrassment and apparent abuse of office, might prove different.

[NOTE: If one of those Facebook pages is correct, she was born November 1, 1992, and so may have just turned 18. Perhaps Berlusconi has been saved by the calendar.]

Surprise! Baradei Will Not be Next President of Egypt

As most people in the West figured out a while back, and as anyone in Egypt who hadn't been hitting the goza too hard figured out early on, Mohamed ElBaradei's not going to win the Egyptian Presidential elections.

When this whole flurry was beginning late last year, when ElBaradei stated his conditions for running for President as if the government were required to negotiate with him and he were De Gaulle demanding conditions, I noted:

. . . his conditions include an independent national committee to oversee the elections, absolute judicial supervision of the vote, and international observers.

And rainbow-colored unicorns in the inaugural parade, I suspect. Okay, Mubarak senior and junior will surely agree to all that. No problem there. What else? Sorry if I'm so cynical, but has ElBaradei 1) just been out of the country too long, 2) let the whole idea go to his head, or 3) been celebrating getting free of the Iran nuclear issue a little too hard?

That may have been too hard on him, but I'm not so sure. Lately, he's been an absentee candidate, or non-candidate (since under current rules he can't run), spending a lot of time in the US and Europe. Some of his supporters have been disillusioned.

Now he's apparently recognized the inevitable: under present conditions, he won't run. The cards are stacked against him, and he now says he never wanted to run anyway.

Especially in this period of transition, he couldn't have changed the electoral laws without a massive populist campaign. Not a politician to begin with, he'd been out of Egypt too long. As a respected critic of the regime, he can still have clout, but even if someone had found a loophole to let him run, he couldn't have won. He may be a stronger critic from outside the system.

Shin Bet Chief on Internet Dangers

They say when you have a hammer, every problem begins to look like a nail. I suppose when you're an internal security service, everything begins to look like it's helping your enemies.

Israeli Shin Bet Chief Yuval Diskin told a conference on homeland security that Google Earth, the Internet, and smartphone apps have given terrorists access to intelligence they didn't have before. He said:

"The terrorist threat in the future has become more complex," Diskin said. "The world has turned into a 'global village' and everything is available to everyone. The world is smaller and broader and technology can cross continents."

Don't you just hate it when that happens?

The Internet has made it possible for a lot more openness: this blog once had some fun with Google Earth that might not sit well with Shin Bet, but that I would consider liberating, not threatening. On the whole, I think technology has opened things up, because it empowers everyone, not just the terrorists. Arabs can read the Israeli media. Arabs and Israelis quarrel all the time on forums, but at least they're interacting. Technology is opening up the world, and that's for the best. They can have my Google Earth when they pry it from my cold, dead hands.

Oh, yes: those dangerous IPhone apps Diskin mentioned: are they available for Android?

David Broder's Iran Argument and its Critics

David Broder, a normally sane veteran political analyst for the Washington Post, seems to have stirred up a hornet's nest (at least Inside the Beltway) with his Sunday column, which included the following argument:

What else might affect the economy? The answer is obvious, but its implications are frightening. War and peace influence the economy.

Look back at FDR and the Great Depression. What finally resolved that economic crisis? World War II.

Here is where Obama is likely to prevail. With strong Republican support in Congress for challenging Iran's ambition to become a nuclear power, he can spend much of 2011 and 2012 orchestrating a showdown with the mullahs. This will help him politically because the opposition party will be urging him on. And as tensions rise and we accelerate preparations for war, the economy will improve.

I am not suggesting, of course, that the president incite a war to get reelected. But the nation will rally around Obama because Iran is the greatest threat to the world in the young century. If he can confront this threat and contain Iran's nuclear ambitions, he will have made the world safer and may be regarded as one of the most successful presidents in history.

He says he "is not suggesting, of course, that the president incite a war to get reelected." Really? That's certainly what it sounded like. Broder is a savvy political analyst, but here I think he falls into the Washington habit of assessing everything, even a military mission, in terms of electoral result, ignoring human and financial costs. A war against Iran would not be a few airstrikes. Elimination of Iran's hardened nuclear facilities would require a sustained campaign against modern air defenses, with massive collateral damage and, arguably, a ground component. A tanker or two sunk in the Gulf by mines or torpedoes would send insurance rates soaring and with them, the price of oil. Iranian ability to cause trouble in Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan — already a problem — would be unleashed.

Naturally, I'm not the only one to find this suggestion bizarre. Marc Lynch (who has returned to regular blogging after a hiatus) addresses the issue here, and notes that the last person to suggest this was Elliott Abrams, not usually on the same page as Broder. Blake Hounshell asks at Foreign Policy, "Has David Broder Lost His Mind?" Helena Cobban sees it as a symptom of "War Fever in Washington." Andrew Sullivan says simply, "There is so much clinically nuts about this, one doesn't know where to start."

It's disappointing to see a seasoned analyst like Broder making this argument. But the howls of derision (and not just from the left) are somewhat reassuring.

Bahrain Elections Round Two Results

The weekend saw the second round of the Bahrain elections and the final results for Parliament are pretty much those predictable from the first round. Another account here.

Al-Wifaq, the Shi‘ite bloc, won all 18 seats it contested in the first round, so that is unchanged. Two Islamist blocs, one generally Salafi and one with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, garnered only five seats between them, down from 14 in the last Parliament. The leftist Wa‘ad, though two of its candidates survived into the second round, won no seats.

The big winners were the independents, who won 17 seats, up from nine.

One woman alreafdy in Parliament esd re-elected unopposed, and for the first time a woman was elected in the municipal council elections.


King Hamad has asked the Prime Minister, to form a new Cabinet. There are expected to be some changes in the Cabinet, including a new Oil and Gas Minister, according to press reports.

Yemen Army Fails to Find AQAP Even as World Suspects AQAP in Bomb Plot

In an unfortunate piece of timing, Yemen's Saba News Agency announced today that the Yemen Army has ended its operations in the al-Kur Mountains of Shabwa Province, after failing to locate any Al-Qa‘ida in the Arabian Penuinsula (AQAP) elements there. This comes at a time when the US and UK assume AQAP is behind today's interception of explosive devices on cargo flights.

AQAP, which emerged from the merger of the Yemeni and Saudi branches of Al-Qa‘ida, has become one of the most active movements in recent years, with operations ranging from the USS Cole to the attempt to assassinate Prince Muhammad bin Nayef of Saudi Arabia. Lately, they have of course shown a serious interest in striking inside the United States, with reported links to both the Fort Hood shooter and the "underwear bomber" of last Christmas. One reason for the focus on the US may be the presence in Yemen of Anwar al-‘Awlaqi, the New Mexico-born radical of Yemeni descent.

Western intelligence sources reportedly believe ‘Awlaqi is hiding in the mountains of Shabwa, despite the Yemeni Army's aforementioned inability to find any AQAP there. (One reason he will be hard to find: before the British left South Yemen, a major part of what is now Shabwa was called the Sultanate of ‘Awlaq. His tribal roots are there, and if the tribes are protecting him, the government won't find him. So far the Predators haven't found him either, though they've reportedly been given the right to take him out. Usama bin Ladin's ancestral roots, of course, lie in neighboring Hadramawt.)

AQAP is serious about striking the US: earlier this year they published a colorful, English-language jihadi magazine called Inspire, the first issue of which included the article "How to Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom," (a pressure cooker is involved). The second issue was released just a few weeks ago. It offers (in a section it calls "Open Source Jihad") advice to potential Jihadis living in the West on how to conceal their identity, avoid suspicion, and plan their own attacks. (Since it includes bombmaking instructions and other unpleasant — and illegal — stuff, I've linked to the Jihadica analysis, not the magazine itself, but copies are out there, and I've looked the first two issues over.)

I suspect we're going to hear a lot more about AQAP and ‘Awlaqi in coming days.

Asymmetry 101

UPDATE: The President says the packages did contain explosive material. I don't think that changes the basic point below that a limited threat can nevertheless produce asymmetric levels of disruption.

Today's international security alerts still have a lot of unanswered questions attached, so bear in mind that I'm offering some first reactions here, not a considered evaluation. So far it seems that the hard evidence is a few suspicious packages originating in Yemen and reportedly sent to Chicago, perhaps to Chicago synagogues. One is described as a toner cartridge with attached circuit boards. No explosives have been confirmed [SEE ABOVE].

So far, international cargo has been scrutinized at Dubai, East Midlands Airport in the UK, and Newark and Philadelphia in the US, while an Emirates flight origainating in Yemen has been escorted in to New York, first by Canadian and then by US fighter jets.

Now, assuming no explosives turn up, what should we make of all this? Some are suggesting a "dry run," but there isn't much evidence that Al-Qa‘ida believes in dry runs. More likely might be an attempt to test defenses, to judge security by watching the reaction of the security forces in the UK and US.

But I think it's just as likely that the whole purpose was simply to force the security services to spend a lot of time and man-hours coping with these potential threats. If it is, as many seem to be assuming, Al-Qa‘ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and possibly, once again, the long arm of Anwar ‘Awlaqi, it's worth noting that he has talked in the past about emphasizing opreations that produce maximum disruption for limited effort, as opposed to spectacular 9/11-style attacks. This could be an example if, as seems possible, several countries and much of the cargo system has been snarled by a few packages: and packages that might attract attention (if reports that the packages were addressed to Chicago synagogues are true, that would seem to be planting a red flag and waving it).

This could be either a test of defenses or simply a ploy to occupy security forces and force expenditures of effort and money. If so, it may be a classic case of Asymmetric Warfare 101. More later if developments warrant.

If You Build the Burj Khalifa, Hollywood will Come

Don't tell me you didn't see this one coming: now that Dubai has the world's tallest building, the Burj Khalifa, somebody was going to use it as a movie set. Sure enough, Tom Cruise and company have arrived in Dubai for filming of the fourth film in the Mission: Impossible franchise.

Filming will start next week and is likely to last more than three weeks. It will take place in locations across Dubai, including the Burj Khalifa and the Meydan racetrack, said an industry insider, who asked not to be named. Car chases will be filmed on the Sheikh Zayed Road and in Bur Dubai and Deira, the source said.

I guess it's a step up from the last Sex and the City, in which Abu Dhabi was played by Morocco, with lots of CGI. Dubai is presumably playing itself.

Side note: four of my last five posts have dealt with the UAE. That may be a first.

Sheikh Saqr and the Tunbs

When Queen Mary of England learned of the fall of the long-English town of Calais to the French, she reportedly said that when she died and her body was opened, "you will find 'Calais' written upon my heart."

For Sheikh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah, who died yesterday at age 92 (earlier posts here and here), the word would be "Tunbs."

If you're not familiar with the Tunbs, you probably haven't known many Emiratis, since the subject does tend to come up. The Greater and Lesser Tunb Islands (Tunb al-Kubra and Tunb al-Sughra in Arabic; Tonb-e Bozorg and Tonb-e Kuchek in Persian)(pronounced in Arabic as if spelled Tumb) are two tiny islands in the Strait of Hormuz. Since November 1971 they have been occupied by Iran, but claimed by the UAE, along with the island of Abu Musa. Before 1971 the Tunbs were administered by the Emirate of Ras al-Khaimah, ruled from 1948 until yesterday by Sheikh Saqr, while Abu Musa was administered by Sharja. (My sense is the two Wikipedia links lean to the Iranian view of the dispute, but they introduce the subject.)

As the map shows, the Tunbs are located between the main shipping lanes of the Strait of Hormuz, the key outlet for Gulf oil. Abu Musa sits just to the south. They are a strategic planner's delight: potential power bases on a key global chokepoint.

In 1971, as the British retreated from "East of Suez," what had been the "Trucial States" prepared to join together in the UAE, and Iran — Imperial Iran under the Shah, remember — claimed the islands as historically Iranian. The withdrawing British were not prepared for a confrontation and may have felt Iran would be the better steward of the Strait. (After all, Iran would always be a staunch ally of the West.)

Under the gun, Sharja reached a deal allowing Iran sand Sharja to share Abu Musa. Sheikh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah steadfastly refused to compromise on the Tunbs. Iran occupied Abu Musa peaceably, the Tunbs by military force.

Since that time, Iran has been in possession of all three islands (eventually taking full control of Abu Musa in effect) and keeps them well garrisoned (even Lesser Tunb, which historically was uninhabited). The UAE has never relinquished its claim, and has produced a lot of documentation arguing its case, but Iran has refused to take the case to the World Court. Sheikh Saqr never forgot the Tunbs. The UAE has produced reams of documents, but Iran has the islands.

I won't judge the historical claims. Sovereignty has meant different things at different times, and the two sides of the Gulf have traded and fished and pearled since Classical times. There are Arab speakers on the Iranian side and Persian speakers on the Arabian side, and no argument is likely to persuade an Iranian or an Emirati of the merit of the other case. Like the "Persian Gulf" controversy, it is a matter of firm national conviction.

But Sheikh Saqr never lost faith, and never compromised.

UAE Bids Farewell to Saqr; Welcomes Sa‘ud

From the UAE English papers, farewells to Sheikh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah: The National emphasizes his role as the last of the UAE's founding fathers, while Gulf News offers a review of his long life. Certainly in his 92 Hijri years (about 90 Gregorian) he saw his territory grow from a remote pearl fishery to a constituent part of a modern state. (For a somewhat less adulatory appreciation, try The Daily Telegraph.)

Also, two profiles of the new ruler, Sheikh Sa‘ud bin Saqr Al Qasimi, again from The National and Gulf News.

A Useful Guide to the Israeli Press

Blogger Noam Sheizaf offers "The Political Line of Israeli Papers (a Reader's Guide)."

It's a useful introduction, especially for those of us with limited Hebrew, and also reminds those of us in the West that however much we may love to quote Ha'aretz, it has a rather limited market share at home.

Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah Dies at 92

Sheikh Saqr al-Qasimi, Ruler of the UAE Emirate of Ras al-Khaimah, has died at age 92. He was reportedly the world's oldest reigning monarch (though not longest reigning: the King of Thailand holds that title), and died at dawn today.

His presumed successor is the Crown Prince, Sheikh Sa‘ud, though the succession has been disputed by the deposed and exiled Crown Prince, Sheikh Khalid; see my earlier post on the issue, but also be sure to read the exchange of comments by people who know more about it than I do.

Ras al-Khaimah is the northernmost emirate of the UAE, and its name can be translated as "top of the tent," (or Cape of the Tent), though whether that relates to its geography, I don't know.

Carnegie's Egypt Election Guide Revisited

One month from tomorrow, Egypt holds Parliamentary elections, the last before the critical Presidential elections next year. There's no doubt that the National Democratic Party will win the Parliamentary vote, and of course that their candidate will win the Presidency, but who their candidate will be is still shrouded in mystery. And how free the Parliamentary vote will be is also up in the air, though not looking optimal just now.

I've mentioned it before, but this seems to be as good a time as any to again refer you to the Carnegie Endowment's Guide to Egypt's Elections, which includes excellent data on such obscure issues as all the legal parties, some of which are known only to their own limited membership, the non-party opposition movements, one of which, the technically illegal Muslim Brotherhood, is the largest opposition bloc in the present Parliament, details of the constitutional and legal framework, which is sometimes deliberately obtuse, and issues relating to election monitoring.

If they — mostly, I think, Michele Dunne and Amr Hamzawy — had n't done this, I'd have to write a lot more in the coming month. This way I can just link.

Egyptian elections do have some suspense, though not about who's going to run the country; they do matter to local folks in local places, the smaller the better because they are below the government's radar. Let the games begin.

A Couple of Links

A couple of quick links relating to Egypt:

• Brian Whitaker (whose personal blog is here) offers a piece in The Guardian about Egypt's rather problematical lack of reliable statistics. It addresses a problem most journalists and even academics rarely acknowledge: how little reliable data we often have.

• Whitaker, in passing, refers to an Egyptian site that seeks to track the taboo subject of sectarian violence in Egypt, particularly acute with the Coptic-Muslim tensions of recent months. and which of course is a taboo subject in the official media. The site is in Arabic (mostly, with an odd admixture of English in tables and such). It probably deserves caution until it's been read for a while, to make sure it's not just a Coptic propaganda site, but it does seem interesting. It could be a useful tracking device if handled right.
  

Clinton to Keynote MEI Banquet

The Middle East Institute has announced that former President Bill Clinton will be the Keynote Speaker for its Annual Banquet next week. For information about the Banquet and the 64th Annual Conference, go here.

More Thoughts on Another Mubarak Term

Amr El Shobaki in Al-Masry al-Youm ponders, "Will Mubarak Run Again in 2011?"

Rather as I did, he does not take Ali Eddin Hilal's recent expression of confidence that the President will seek a sixth term as definitive. He notes:

Helal's uncertain statements about Gamal’s prospects in fact tell us more about the current political situation than his seemingly conclusive remarks about Mubarak’s re-nomination . Helal’s latest pronouncement will certainly open the door for all kinds of speculation about the future. But of all the possible scenarios that can unfold next year, Mubarak’s re-nomination now seems the least likely.

Now one element, clearly, has been the clear lack of popular enthusiasm for the prospect of a Gamal Mubarak succession. If the recent wave of pro-Gamal posters were a trial balloon, they seem to have been a leaden one. Husni Mubarak may not be the charismatic speaker that Gamal Abdel Nasser was, but Gamal tends to come across as having all the charisma of a banker, which is what he was before he started to dabble in politics. And, since his father has not personally indicated he won't run, Gamal can't seem too eager. So the poster campaigns are done by his allies in the Party leadership, presumably.

Many Egyptian commentators have noted that after his trip to Washington with his father, Gamal stopped making public appearances. Some think this is another sign that the inheritance project has failed. I'm guessing it's a bit early to write Gamal off completely, but note two things:

1. Gamal is by no means the unanimous choice of the entire leadership of the National Democratic Party. The "Old Guard" of the NDP has shown no outward enthusiasm; Gamal's business cronies and younger allies in the Party leadership seem to be the core of his support.
2. As I and everyone else have noted frequently, no one is going to be anointed the successor without the (at least tacit) approval of the Armed Forces and the security services. Yet those bodies, never very talkative to begin with, have been utterly silent on Gamal. A combination of a belief that the country needs a military President (an idea that has appeal to many beyond the uniformed services: see my comments on the ‘Orabi theme) and doubts about a civilian with few obvious qualifications other than his name may be at work here, though no one really is certain. What is clear is there's no bandwagon for Gamal in the uniformed services. (Some have hinted that State Security, in the Interior Ministry, is more pro-Gamal than the Army, but if they have evidence it isn't very visible.)

So, arguably, Gamal's star is fading, or at least refusing to rise, and Hilal's statement may be more a reassurance of continuity than a real statement of probability. Once the Parliamentary elections are past (November 28), the countdown for the Presidential elections will begin.

Lately some Israeli media have picked up on older speculation that ‘Omar Suleiman might be named Vice President, succeed for a year or so, and then hand off to Gamal. That strikes me as a fantasy. If a military man succeeds, even temporarily, Gamal is history. His power base goes when his father goes.

Simon Henderson on Prince Bandar

Over at Foreign Policy's Middle East Channel, Simon Henderson offers his take on the return of Prince Bandar. He sees it as possibly related to other repositionings in anticipation of succession in in the Kingdom. As he himself acknowledges, those who talk as if they know what's going on in the Royal Family, don't (and those that know don't talk), but it's interesting speculation.

Autumn Issue of MEJ is Online

The Autumn issue of The Middle East Journal is now available. The online access is here. (For subscribers wishing to access the electronic edition, instructions are here. You can find information about subscribing here. Non-subscribers can purchase individual articles for a fee.)

The articles (click through to read the abstract) are:

• Yusri Hazran, "The Rise of Politicized Shi'ite Religiosity and the Territorial State in Iraq and Lebanon ."

• Roozbeh Safshekan and Farzan Sabet, "The Ayatollah's Praetorians: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the 2009 Election Crisis."

• Ali Rahigh-Aghsan and Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "The Rise of Iran: How Durable, How Dangerous?"

• Mordechai Nisan, "The Druze in Israel: Questions of Identity, Citizenship, and Patriotism."

• Rami Siklawi, "The Dynamics of Palestinian Political Endurance in Lebanon."

Plus, as always, the Book Reviews, leading with a review of "Exploring and Photographing the Empty Quarter," by Lydia Beyoud, and the Chronology, completing its 64th continuous year.

Egyptian Court Orders Cops Off Campuses

The last few days have been interesting ones for Arab court activism; besides the Iraqi Supreme Court telling Parliament to get serious, Egypt's Supreme Administrative Court has rejected a government appeal of a previous ruling and ordered the Interior Ministry to stop deploying police forces on university campuses, saying the practice violates constitutional guarantees of university independence. Other reporting here, here, and at greater length here.
The power of the police on campuses has been a major issue in recent months, as students have been roughed up and sometimes arrested for attempting political protest. During recent student council elections, candidates were reportedly vetted by the police.

Though the particular court case that led to the ruling is a couple of years old, the issue has been a hot one of late, with Parliamentary elections set for November 28. Police have intensified pressure on student activists, especially the Muslim Brotherhood. Opposition forces recently distributed cell-phone videos showing police beating a young woman from the Islamic Religious Studies faculty at Zagazig University, and then ambulance atrtendants seeming to resist taking her to the hospital due to police pressure:





Again, though that incident only coincidentally was fresh in students' minds when the ruling came down, it shows the increasing tensions over police presence on the campuses, especially at the provincial universities.

So what happens now? There is plenty of precedent for te government and security forces simply invoking the Emergency Law and ignoring court decisions that seek to restrain the Interior Ministry but with those videos circulating and elections imminent, this might not be a time for flouting the court. On the other hand, State Security tends to do what it wants to. For the moment, though, student activists are savoring a victory.

Iraq Supreme Court Tells Parliament to Meet

The Iraqi Supreme Court yesterday ordered Parliament to convene within 14 days and get on with the business of electing a Speaker.

You will recall (at least if you have a long memory) that elections were held last March, and Iraq still has no Prime Minister. Other than one meeting in June, Parliament has failed to reconvene. Electing a Speaker has become just as big an obstacle as electing a Prime Minister,and for the same reason, the even split between the two main Arab blocs, which has made the Kurds rhe kingmakers. Reidar Vissar looks a some of the considerations here, and many of the comments on his post are also worth your time.

Further complicating the math is the recent Wikileaks document dump, which implicated Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki in alleged Shi‘ite death squads, which, as Juan Cole has noted, jeopardizes his bargaining position.

As Vissar notes, there are no guarantees, but there is a possibility that, with the impetus of the court, a decision might finally be within reach.

Shi‘ites Do Well in Bahrain Elections, Round One

I was away over the weekend so I'm a little late for the Bahrain election wrap-up, but here goes: on the whole, despite the arrests of Shi‘ite activists and others in the runup to the vote, the main Shi‘ite bloc Al-Wifaq (sometimes transliterated Wefaq) did well, winning all 18 seats it was contesting and holding its own from the last Parliament, where it had 17 seats and one aligned independent. Only nine of the 40 seats have to go to runoff next weekend.

Salafi and Islamist groups, even some previously allied with the government, did poorly; most of the remaining seats won so far went to pro-business, pro-government elements.

If two candidates of the leftwing Wa‘d movement who made it into the runoff should win seats, Parliament would be divided equally between pro-government forces and "opposition," though that may be a big "if."

On the whole, in the up-and-down drama of Gulf Parliamentary life, the results are more credible than they might have been, given widespread criticism of the recent arrests.

I know some of my regular readers know Bahrain well; if I get highly informative comments I may move some into the post itself, with our permission of course.

Here are some of the main analyses in English:

BBC

Al-Jazeera English

Arab News (Saudi Arabia)

Gulf News (Bahrain) with more election coverage from them here

The National (Abu Dhabi)

For Arabic readers, the main Bahrain papers Akhbar al-Khalij, Al-Watan, Al-Ayyam, and the voice of the Wifaq bloc, Al-Wifaq.

New Website responds to Juan Williams: Muslims Wearing Things

In the wake of the whole Juan Williams/NPR firing episode (in which the commentator was fired for saying seeing someone in Muslim garb when he flew made him nervous), someone has inevitably created a website of Pictures of Muslims Wearing Things. Since humor is usually the best response, bravo. Muslim in NYPD uniform, Rima Fakih, other well known folks.

And do note the picture of King ‘Abdullah II (when he was a Prince) in a Starfleet uniform in a 1996 episode of Star Trek: Voyager. [UPDATE: Go to Page 1 or 2. The site has grown exponentially over the Weekend.]

Have a good weekend.

Waiting for the STL

Though no one is certain when, precisely, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon will issue its long anticipated indictments of Hizbullah members for the 2005 assassination of Rafiq Hariri, everyone expects it to be very soon, perhaps imminent. The STL's Outreach Section has been holding a three day media event in The Hague, to explain to the media the context and how to report on international criminal tribunals, which suggests the coin may be about to drop. (Somehow I don't think Nuremberg did media spin [or needed to], but I could be wrong.)

Obviously this was a major subtext of Ahmadinejad's Lebanon excursion, and is a potential grenade in Lebanon's precarious political situation.

The fact of the matter is the STL's investigation has moved dramatically from Syria (everyone's prime suspect originally) to Hizbullah, and thus has become a major issue for Lebanon's largest communal group, the Shi‘a. The "false witnesses" (in quotes because it'd become a cliche now in Lebanon) who pointed the finger at Syria are seen as discrediting the whole STL process.

We're still not 100% sure who killed Kamal Jumblatt, Rashid Karami, Bashir Gemayel or Danny Chamoun, or what happened to Musa al-Sadr (to cover as broad a spectrum of Lebanese as possible politically). Will a clearer answer — assuming they get it right this time, unlike last time — on Rafiq Hariri be for the good, or will it provoke new conflict? Justice is essential (if all too rare in Lebanon: see list just above), but in the present circumstances, I'm not sure it won't carry a high cost. Is anyone?

Bahrain Election Day Tomorrow

Tomorrow, Bahrain holds Parliamentary elections. The main Shi‘ite opposition group, Al-Wefaq, is urging participation despite pressures against the Shi‘ite opposition. (Human Rights Watch here; Amnesty here; BBC here; The Economist here; Carnegie here. And an editorial (if just a tad patronizing in tone) in Bahrain's English Gulf Daily News here.

It's not looking like the most free-and-fair poll ever, but Bahrain is still fairly new at this, and whether there will be a real result remains to be seen. It is, however, important, for Bahrain of course, for Sunni-Shi‘ite relations in the Gulf, and for the Gulf's nascent Parliaments, few as they still are, generally.

NDP Official: Mubarak will Run for Sixth Term

Ali Eddin Hilal, a senior official of Egypt's ruling National Democratic Party, has told AlHurra that Husni Mubarak will run for a sixth term next year, dismissing the idea that Gamal would succeed him. The BBC reports the story here; but if you read the version at Al-Masry al-Youm, you'll see thsat the goes on to talk about Egypt being a system of institutions not of personalities, that a stable succession system is in place, etc. All of which could suggest — as people quoted in the story do — that this is all for show and that at the last minute Mubarak can step aside if he chooses. We shall see. After the Parliamentary elections, the Presidential issue should start to gather momentum.