The Picture of Dorian Gray

None of us look like we did 42 years ago, but really, this is the Picture of Dorian Gray. The beret worked better, too. What would Nasser say today?

National Unity Government in Yemen?

Al Jazeera English is reporting that President Salih will name a National Unity Government in Yemen within the next 24 hours. This comes, of course, after the big Hashid tribal confederation's leader bailed on him over the weekend, as he continues to lose allies.

If it seems like you've seen this plot before, it's the same pattern we saw with Ben Ali and Mubarak: try to ignore the demands and/or blame the media until the people's anger has reached a boil, and then make a half-measure concession that might have saved your job if you'd made it a month earlier, but is now a day late and a dollar short. (He had also already made the pledge not to run for another term, as had Ben Ali and Mubarak.) Perhaps it's not too late for Salih, but the pattern is familiar and the concessions very late in coming.

Qadhafi, of course, took a far bloodier route, but there are, or until the past few days were, no competing centers of power in Libya.

Bahraini Opposition MPs Quit

Eighteen Bahraini MPs from the opposition, nearly half of the 40-seat Parliament, have resigned. Another reminder that despite the intense focus on Libya, the protests continue elsewhere, with Yemen and Bahrain at the forefront, but with stirrings in Oman and even Saudi Arabia. This roller coaster ride may be just beginning.

Wisdom from Fouad Ajami(!)

Professor Fouad Ajami ( a neighbor of ours since Johns Hopkins SAIS is just across our back alley from MEI) has, in recent decades, been something of a darling of the neocons, since he has long been a critic of certain aspects of the Arab and Islamic worlds. In the neocon pantheon of favorite Middle East experts he hasn't ranked far below Bernard Lewis. But watching him on CNN in recent weeks, his enthusiasm for the revolutionary fervor sweeping the Arab world has been both unmistakable and pretty close to my own. His New York Times op-ed piece, "How the Arabs Turned Shame into Liberty," even contains the following:

There is no overstating the importance of the fact that these Arab revolutions are the works of the Arabs themselves. No foreign gunboats were coming to the rescue, the cause of their emancipation would stand or fall on its own. Intuitively, these protesters understood that the rulers had been sly, that they had convinced the Western democracies that it was either the tyrants’ writ or the prospect of mayhem and chaos.

Amen. Hardly the old neocon argument that we must bring democracy to the Middle East. I'm not sure what the neocons will think of Ajami's recent comments, but I find them refreshing.

Who Dares, Wins: SAS Pulls Oil Workers Out of Libya

Britain has mounted an air rescue of British oil workers from Libyan oilfields, in a mission organized by the Special Air Service (SAS), Britain's special operations elite. If we're to believe the Daily Mirror, it was organized using SAS veterans now working as security guards in the Middle East.

The SAS, whose motto, "Who Dares, Wins" seems appropriate here, is returning to the place of its birth: it came into being in the North African campaign in World War II (early SAS troops at left), raiding deep into Libya behind German and Italian lines, along with the Long Range Desert Group. Pioneers of special operations, they are now serving a much reduced Britain, but they still dare, and seem to have won again.

Meanwhile, Back in Tunis . . . Ghannouchi Quits; Replacement is 84

Tunisian Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi resigned today. Protesters have been demanding he step down almost since the departure of Ben Ali, since he is a longtime staple of the old regime. Protesters reportedly cheered his departure.

Of course, the government promptly appointed Beji Caid-Essebsi to replace him. (Link is in French.) Caid-Essebsi, who is 84 years old, was variously Interior, Defense, and Foreign Minister in Habib Bourguiba's day, having served Bourguiba from independence in 1956. Then he headed the Chamber of Deputies under Ben Ali, till leaving government in the mid-1990s.

In other words, the ideal candidate to represent the youth revolution. I guess they couldn't find anyone left over from the days of the Beylicate.

Yemen: Salih Loses the Tribes

Remember this picture I posted a few days ago? The fourth man there, ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih, is getting even lonelier. Hussein ‘Abdullah al-Ahmar, head of the Hashid tribal confederation and son of a very powerful father until his death a few years ago, has jumped ship. Salih's own native tribe, which is allied with the much more powerful Hashid, is also protesting, and the other big northern tribal confederation, the Bakil, was reportedly present as well. The southern part of the country is already alienated; if Salih loses the big northern tribes, it may be time for that guesthouse in Jidda.

I suspect the news networks now can figure out where they need to deploy as soon as Libya wraps up.

Mixed Signals in Cairo?

With so much attention focused on Libya, it's worth a moment to note the curious events of last night and today in Cairo. Last night the military police — that is, uniformed representatives of the ruling military, not the hated security police — broke up the strikers in Tahrir Square and also dispersed demonstrators around the Parliament and Cabinet building, who have been seeking the ouster of Prime Minister Ahmad Rashid. Protesters were also set upon by masked men as well as uniformed military police. Some were tasered, others hit with sticks or short whips. (No shots, thankfully.) People were vowing to come out in strength today, fearing the military had decided to shut the demonstrators down despite backing them in the past. And then, today, the Army apologized. It said the attacks were unauthorized, and no order had been given or will be given to attack the protesters, and that all those detained would be released.

Al-Ahram Online in English here. Blogger Zeinobia with firsthand accounts, photos, and video here. The Higher Military Council continues to post its communiques on its Facebook page, (but only its communiques: don't look for a list of members, still somewhat mysterious); the key apology communique is here (in Arabic).

At this point I don't know how to read this. A division within the Military Council? A rogue military police commander? A misunderstood order? Something more sinister? It's worth watching as the apology seems very unusual, and its contrite tone puzzling if reassuring.

Historical Ironies: The USS Enterprise

There are many ironies about the present situation; I already noted Libya's place in the history of aerial bombing. With talk of establishing a possible no-fly zone (some of the issues involved are discussed here), one of the problems involved is that the US has no carrier group in the Mediterranean at this time. The one that was there, the USS Enterprise, is being transferred to an Indian Ocean deployment and is somewhere en route, perhaps in the Red Sea. A no-fly enforcement would need a carrier (though France, Italy and Spain could also provide carriers), and the nearest American one would be the Enterprise. It's the second oldest commissioned ship in the Navy and is scheduled for decommissioning. (It's actually the oldest operational ship: the oldest on the commissioned list is Old Ironsides. Enterprise, the first nuclear powered carrier, has been in service since 1961.)

If the Enterprise were to deploy off Libya, it would evoke memories of the first US vessel of that name, which played an important role in the First Barbary War. The picture above is of that original Enterprise capturing the Tripolitan corsair Tripoli off Malta on 1801. There have been many successor ships in the Navy to bear the name, and if Star Trek is any guide, will continue to be.

I have some doubts about how useful military power may be in this situation, and am not sure it's time to return to "the shores of Tripoli." But when I checked on what our nearest carrier group was, I was amused by the historical irony. A similar echo of the Barbary Wars occurred in 2009 when the USS Bainbridge, named for a hero of that war, engaged Somali pirates.

A Troubled Friday

The bloodshed is continuing in Tripoli today, but there is unrest in a lot of other places, including reports of armed men trying to break up the strike in Tahrir Square in Cairo, and the Army is apparently blocking access to demonstrators near the Egyptian Parliament. We may be seeing a new phase of the crisis in Egypt, as demonstrators opposed to Prime Minister Ahmad Rashid may be confronting the Army. The picture is still unclear, but I'll try to post more later when the dust settles.

Qadhafi: Mercurial, Eccentric, or "Just Plain Nuts?"

I really hope I don't get a copyright takedown demand for publishing a favorite Gary Larson Far Side cartoon (used purely for editorial purposes), at left, but Brother Leader's rant on a TV call-in show yesterday raises (and hardly for the first time) the question of the man's grip on reality. His worldview is a bit askew at the best of times, assuming this is his home planet. But as the circle closes on his hill at Little Bighorn, his public statements have grown exceeding strange.

I haven't seen a full English transcript, or even a full Arabic one, of his call-in stream-of-consciousness conspiracy theory, since he tends to defeat translators (it's said the simultaneous translator of his UN address quit at about an hour in). But at one point or another he seems to have asserted ("seems to" since no one ever gets all the points he touches on in any language) that:

• Usama bin Ladin is the instigator of the rebellion.
• In league, of course, with the United States.
• (His earlier speech included Israel and Al Jazeera) so we have the old US-Bin Ladin-Israeli-Al Jazeera axis.
• All the protesters are on drugs, and under 20 years old to avoid legal responsibility.
  
• Bin Ladin and al-Qa‘ida put drugs in Libyans' coffee, in mosques, to drug them into rebellion. One version I saw said he referred to drugging their Nescafe. Nescafe is often Arabic shorthand for Western versus Arabic coffee, but since Qadhafi has a major feud with Switzerland (which sought to arrest one of his sons for felony assault), and Nestle is Swiss, well, who knows? Why is Nescafe served in mosques?
• He is like Queen Elizabeth II. If he'd actually asserted that he was the Queen, the speech would have been only marginally stranger. (A ditty to the tune of "The people's flag is deepest red": The colonel's flag is deepest green/The colonel thinks he is the Queen.) (Sorry: I just couldn't resist that.)
  

Those who have interviewed him through the years have sometimes suggested he is himself using drugs. I wouldn't know, but the man has always seemed extremely strange. I know the Internet rule known as Godwin's law, which says that the first person in a discussion to compare the opponent to the Nazis loses the argument, but aren't we starting to sound like we're in Führerbunker territory here?

Qadhafi Compares Himself to Queen Elizabeth II

In another rambling rant by telephone over Libyan state TV, Qadhafi has blamed everything on Usama bin Ladin, said all the protesters are on drugs, and

Gaddafi argued that he was a purely "symbolic" leader with no real political power, comparing his role to that played by Queen Elizabeth II in England.

Well, maybe. It would be easier to buy the comparison if Queen Elizabeth sent an army of Gurkhas rampaging through London shooting people, but I don't think she ever has. Does anyone know if Qadhafi has corgis?

Historical Note: Hannibal and Qadhafi

Mu‘ammar Qadhafi named one of his sons Hannibal, presumably because he identifies with the greatest military leader North Africa ever produced, the man who so shook Rome that for centuries Roman mothers would threaten their children with Hannibal ad portos: Hannibal is at the gates. Qadhafi is probably the only person who has ever seen much resemblance between himself and the man who crossed the Alps and ran rampant in Italy.

As Qadhafi threatens to "burn" Libya and "cleanse it house to house," he might think a moment about the last years of his presumed role model. After the end of the Second Punic War and Hannibal's defeat at Zama by Scipio Africanus, he rose to political leadership in Carthage, but seven years after Zama, Rome., alarmed by his growing popularity, insisted he be exiled. Rather than risk the security of Carthage, Hannibal voluntarily exiled himself. (Qadhafi would have more problems, given his lack of friends. He had to go out of his way to deny he was in Venezuela a couple of days ago, so Chavez might take him; Daniel Ortega called him with words of support; and of course he's been good pals with Berlusconi, but Berlusconi has problems of his own right now.)

Not only did Hannibal voluntarily exile himself, but after providing military advice to the Seleucids and other eastern Mediterranean rulers, Rome's eastward conquest eventually brought him into their purview once again. As Rome sought to capture him, he took poison, reputedly saying, "Let us relieve the Romans from the anxiety they have so long experienced, since they think it tries their patience too much to wait for an old man's death." Perhaps some encrusted legend has attached, but it is a better exit than burning your own country.

A little more Qadhafi-esque ego, however, turns up in a famous ancient anecdote told by Livy and most likely apocryphal, but which I'm going to tell anyway. According to the story, the victor of Zama, Scipio Africanus, was visiting the eastern court where Hannibal was then employed, and encountered his old nemesis. (There's no other historical record of such a visit by Scipio, but why ruin a good story with fact?) I'm paraphrasing from memory here, but the story is that Scipio supposedly asked Hannibal, military man to military man, who he considered to be the greatest general who had ever lived. Hannibal responded, Alexander the Great. Scipio then asked, who did he rank second? Hannibal said, well, I consider myself second to Alexander. Scipio then said, but, I defeated you. And Hannibal responded, "If you had not defeated me, I would have ranked myself even above Alexander."

Though the anecdote is probably not historical, the ego is the only thing Qadhafi shares with Hannibal. The difference is that Hannibal won the battle of Cannae, while all Qadhafi ever took was the radio station in 1969. Having named a son for Hannibal, he might pay more attention to Hannibal's greatest moment, his graceful exit to save his native country. Instead, it appears to be Qadhafi himself, not his country's foreign foes, whose motto is Libya delenda est.

Wasat: A Challenge to the Brotherhood?

For a great many years a moderate Islamist party in Egypt, the Wasat (center or centrist) Party has sought official recognition, which has been consistently denied. Formed by younger, disillusioned members of the Muslim Brotherhood, it could very well prove the moderate alternative to the Brotherhood that the Mubarak regime always kept from emerging, so as to make the Brotherhood the sole face of Islamist politics. Since the fall of Mubarak, the Wasat Party, which likes to compare itself to Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has finally won recognition.

Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood itself is now preparing to form its own political party, apparently to be called the Freedom and Justice Party.

The MOI Fire in Cairo

There was a fire at the Ministry of the Interior today in Cairo. It apparently caused major damage to a building where evidence was kept. Some reports say it was set by protesting police officers, but needless to say there are conspiracy theories suggesting that the fire was an attempt to destroy records that could incriminate the security services.

Is the Noose Tightening?

While the Libyan authorities and the African mercenary gunmen imported by the regime have been killing indiscriminately in Tripoli, there are indications that, outside the capital, revolutionary forces are gaining ground. If present trends continue, Qadhafi may find himself in control of little beyond the capital, and the capital itself a charnel house of his own making.

Eastern Libya — Cyrenaica — seems mostly under the control of the rebels and their defected military allies. Now the tide appears to be moving west. There were reports today that Misurata had fallen, and that demonstrators were fighting for Sabratha and Zwara. There was heavy fighting at Tajura, just outside Tripoli. An unconfirmed broadcast claimed that the Kufra Oasis was in rebel hands.

All this could swing back in the government's favor.An Al Jazeera reporter said an Air Force major had reported that the Armed Forces balked when 4,000 African mercenaries were imported by the regime to fire on protesters; the presence of armed non-Libyans makes it harder for the Army to step in, as it did in Tunisia and Egypt.

Reports that Qadhafi's daughter ‘A'isha was on a private jet that was turned away by both Beirut and Malta raise questions as to whether the family is running for cover, even as Qadhafi himself was vowing to "cleanse Libya house to house," apparently threatening to kill his own population. His bizarre, rambling diatribe yesterday suggests a man as out of touch as he is out of control, giving orders from his bunker to troops he doesn't have . . . now why does that sound familiar? Add to this reports that he might sabotage the oilfields or pipelines if he falls, bringing down the temple, like Samson, on his own head and his country's, and you have a grim picture.

I'm not entirely sure what the outside world can do. He's already blamed the US and Israel for inciting the uprising (allied as they are, of course, with Al Jazeera); the more outside pressure, the more he will justify his actions as resistance to neocolonialism, and portray the demonstrators as foreign puppets. Still, sanctions and a no-fly zone to bring down the gunships firing on demonstrators might help.

The world is watching with horror. This cannot end well for Qadhafi now, but how many of his own countrymen have to die as he lashes out?

Libya's Flag War

In the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, the national flag was clearly co-opted by the demonstrators, constantly waved to proclaim their loyalty to the homeland, thus defusing any claims by the regimes that these demonstrators were unpatriotic. The ongoing demonstrations in Bahrain, Yemen, and as far as I can tell Algeria, have also adopted the national flag as their symbol.

But something quite different is happening in Libya.The flag used from Libyan independence in 1951 until Qadhafi's revolution of 1969 (above) has been waved by many of the demonstrators, and in the last few days as Libya's diplomatic corps has jumped ship, many Libyan Embassies and consulates abroad have raised the old flag instead of the unadorned green banner of Qadhafi's Jamahiriyya (right).

This is not, presumably, nostalgia for the Sanusi monarchy overthrown in 1969, but for a flag that was distinctively Libyan. The old flag had the star and crescent in a tricolor (sometimes said to stand for Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan). The current flag looks more like a semaphore flag than a national ensign: it's the world's only national flag consisting of only one color and no other insignia.

Between 1969 and the adoption of the Jamahiriyya flag in 1977 Libya used two other flags. The first was a horizontal tricolor in the red, white and black of the old Arab revolt flag (left), which except for its dimensions was pretty much identical to the flag Yemen uses today. Given the latter fact, it isn't a good candidate for revival.

Then from 1972 until 1977, Libya joined with Egypt and Syria in the Federation of Arab Republics, which was pretty evanescent except for the three countries adopting virtually identical flags, with the Falcon of Qureish on each, and differing only in the name under the falcon. (The illustration is actually the version with Egypt's inscription, predecessor to the present Egyptian flag which replaced the Falcon of Qureish with the Eagle of Saladin.)

All three countries later changed their flags, but Qadhafi's solid green banner seems the odd one out. I can only guess why the first flag of independent Libya has become the emblem of the revolt, but I suspect it's the one unambiguously Libyan flag in the lot.

A Historical Note: Libya and Aerial Bombing

The use of combat aircraft against civilian protesters in Libya brings to mind a couple of historical ironies concerning aerial bombing and Libya.

On November 1, 1911, only eight years after the Wright Brothers first flew, the first aerial bomb dropped from an airplane in anger was dropped by an Italian pilot on Turkish positions during the Italo-Turkish war in Libya. At right is a photo of Italian dirigibles dropping bombs on Turkish positions.

After the defeat of Turkey, Italy waged a long counterinsurgency campaign against the Libyan resistance leader Omar Mukhtar. During the long period of pacification (throughout the 1920s), Italy regularly used aerial bombing against Libyan resistance. (Britain also used aerial bombing against Iraqi villages in 1920-21.)

So aerial bombing of civilians in Libya is not new; it's just it hasn't been seen since the fall of Italian fascism.

Why are These Men Smiling?

The Enduring America blog has this great picture and is holding a caption contest here.

Via Twitter

Oh, how I wish I'd said that.

Random Thought

If this is the Arab version of 1989 in Eastern Europe, will there be a an equivalent of Nicolae Ceausescu's fate amid otherwise fairly smooth transitions?

If so, will we remember him with an umbrella?

Another Libyan Resource

Commenter The Familiar Strange suggests a Libyan Resource I hadn't seen, and it's the best I've seen yet: Libya 17 February 2011. That deserves my linking to his blog, which I first became aware of a few days ago. Blogrolling him too.

Great photos there at the Libya link.. Somebody today (CNN? ABC? Al Jazeera?) said the pilots who defected to Malta flew their "Russian-made jets" there. Wonderfully detailed shots at this site. Sorry, M. Sarkozy, but those are French Mirages. F-1s if memory serves.

The Total Qadhafi Speech in All its Glory(?)

Here in all its weird glory is Qadhafi's promised direct address to the Libyan people. If you don't understand Arabic you'll find it a couple of posts down, but watch it anyway: it won't take you long at all.



Question: Since he doesn't get out of the car (or whatever that vehicle is), why does he need the umbrella?

Question: Could "I was going to meet the demonstrators, but it was raining," be the "Let them eat cake" of this revolt?

And a final thought: Could that become the most famous umbrella since Neville Chamberlain's?

Saif''s Speech: "I Will Speak in Dialect," Fails

In the emerging theme of how Arabic diglossia is playing out in the fall of dictators (earlier posts on Tunisia here and Egypt here), the linguistics blogger Lameen Souag caught a great example. In Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi's speech last night, he started out with this:

Today I will speak with you... without a written paper, or a written speech. (N)or even speak to you in the Classical (fuṣħā) Arabic language. Today I will speak with you in Libyan dialect, and address you directly, as an individual member of this Libyan people. And I will speak extempore. Even the ideas and the points are not prepared in advance. Because this is a speech from the heart and the mind.

And then he didn't. Lameen looks at that opening paragraph:

əlyōm saatakallam maʕākum... bidūn waraqa maktūba, 'aw xiṭāb maktūb. 'aw natakallam maʕakum bi... luɣa ħattā ʕarabiyya fuṣħa. əlyōm saatakallam maʕakum bilahža lībiyya. wa-sa'uxāṭibkum mubāšaratan, ka-fard min 'afrād hāða ššaʕb əllībi. wa-sa'akūn irtižāliyyan fī kalimatī. wa-ħattā l'afkār wa-nniqāṭ ɣeyr mujahhaza u-muʕadda musbaqan. liʔanna hāðā ħadīθ min alqalb wa-lʕaql.(YouTube - first minute; conspicuously dialectal bits bolded)

That's right: a prefix here, a vowel quantity there. It's hardly dialectal at all. As he notes:

Now the explicit association between dialect, extempore speech, and speaking as "one of us" is fairly obvious, if interesting. But the odd thing is that this paragraph, like the rest of the speech, isn't very dialectal at all; it seems far closer to Standard Arabic than to any dialect. Some dialectal features are present, but a lot of unambiguously Classical constructions are used; even something as basic as the first person singular oscillates between Libyan n- and Classical 'a-. What it looks more like is some sort of intermediate ground between dialect and standard - or, if you prefer, like the highest level of Arabic that he is capable of extemporising in at short notice.

At least he didn't have powerpoint slides. One of his commenters offers a magnificent parse (mild language warning):

John Cowan said...

Here's my suggested revision of your translation:

Today I'll speak with y'all... without a written document or a written text. I ain't even verbalizing to y'all in the Classical Arabic language. Instead today I will make my oration to you in Libyan colloquial dialect, and address you unmediatedly as an individual member of this Libyan populace. And I will speak out of my ass. Even the conceptualizations and the bullet points have not been prepared in advance. Because this is a presentation directly from the emotional side of me.

(In Ireland, this is called the "cúpla focal", the couple of words in Irish at the beginning of a speech otherwise entirely in English.)

And to think, Saif was the one popular in the West. Until last night.

Rained Out

Most of the Arab world was waiting when word came that Brother Leader Qadhafi was finally going to make a TV appearance.

It lasted about 22 seconds:

"I am in Tripoli and not in Venezuela," he said, under a large umbrella in the rain and leaning out of the front seat of a van.
Reports on Monday said Gaddafi had fled to Venezuela. Gaddafi, in his first televised appearance since protests to topple him started last week, said "I wanted to say something to the youths at the Green Square (in Tripoli) and stay up late with them but it started raining. Thank God, it's a good thing," Gaddafi said in a 22-second appearance.

Other reports say he denounced "dog radios" for their reporting. Someone has tweeted that he beat out even ‘Omar Suleiman for shortest political speech ever.

He may be massacring his own people, but he is still as unpredictable as ever. As is his choice of clothing.

Thoughts on Libya's Carnage

It was probably inevitable that an Arab regime, faced with the revolutionary upheavals already seen elsewhere, would be prepared to go all out in crushing opposition by using all the force at its disposal. Amid reports of use of military aircraft to strafe and bomb protesters, and the use of machinegun and even antiaircraft weapons against the demonstrators, the Libyan regime has thrown down the gauntlet. Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi's pledge to fight to the last bullet shows a ruthless determination that has punctured his reputation as the moderate face of his father's regime.

Although there are many reports of Army officers and units refusing to attack the crowds, and two fighter aircraft defected to Malta rather than strafe demonstrators, the Libyan Army probably lacks the sheer clout to do what the small Tunisian and huge Egyptian armies were able to do: tell the leader his time is up. Qadhafi has relied on special elite units with tribal and family links to himself for his own protection, while keeping regular army forces rather limited. Over the past few days there have been many reports of apparent mercenary troops — sub-Saharan Africans or North Koreans, allegedly — being used against demonstrators. Such outsiders could have little scruple about firing on civilians.

Libya also has few of the institutions of civil society which helped serve as centers of organizing in Egypt, and other than the military there is no obvious institution that could replace the regime. Unlike Tunisia and Egypt, where elements of the old regime continue to hold positions in the transitional government, the decision to wage open war on the demonstrators more or less guarantees there can be no soft landings here. Either the regime will crush the demonstrators and reimpose the strictest controls, or they will sweep it away with little certainty about what might replace it. Either way, the regime's decision to use the most brutal force has made the stakes enormous.

Egypt to Name Interim Cabinet

Egypt is said to be about to name an interim Cabinet containing a number of opposition figures as a transitional body until elections. As leaked so far it would continue to be headed by Ahmad Shafiq, though many supporters of the revolution oppose him. The current Foreign and Justice Ministers weould also be retained. Interestingly, the Information Ministry would be abolished, giving credence to promises of a genuinely free press. Several ministers are from existing opposition parties and there are several Copts.

Still, there is pressure to replace Shafiq. The story is just beginning.

Libya

Today is the US President's Day holiday. Sometime later today, however, I will post on Libya. Given the difficulty of discerning what is really going on (are the horror stories of massacres, snipers, and mercenaries from outside attacking demonstrators true?) versus the government's apparent uncompromising position (Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi's warning that the government will fight to the last bullet — and Saif is the good cop in the regime — suggests they're prepared for a full Tienanmen if need be) we're in one of those rare vacuums in a connected world. Until I have time to post my own thoughts, follow the British blog Enduring America, which (despite its name) is liveblogging news, posting videos from YouTube and stills from Flickr and other sources, and is a good daily resource for the Middle Eastern revolutions ongoing.

And, of course, follow #Libya on Twitter, and of course Al Jazeera's live stream.

Bahrain: the US Dilemma

What to say about Bahrain? Unlike Egypt or Tunisia, my knowledge of the country is superficial. But even more than in Egypt, the growing violence in the country and the bloody response of the authorities produces a dilemma for US policy. Not only is it unclear whether this will end well for US interests; it is unclear whether it can end well. The contradictory elements within the strategic gambles the US has made in the region, but particularly in the Gulf, may finally be coming home to roost, and the fact that Bahrain is in question involves not only critical US interests in the island nation itself (the base of the US Fifth Fleet), but also the elephant in the living room: Bahrain's neighbor at the other end of the King Fahd Causeway. And that goes to the heart of US policy in the Gulf. American sympathy for protesters demanding democracy, unarmed protesters being fired on with live ammunition, is in direct conflict with two countervailing US interests: diminishing Iranian influence on the Arab side of the Gulf, and maintaining the crucial relations with Saudi Arabia, the cornerstone of US Gulf security policy since the fall of the Shah 32 years ago this month.

This is not a partisan US issue. The Saudi relationship was a cornerstone of US policy under both Democratic and Republican Administrations. It still is. Dating as it does from the fact that it was American oil companies (as opposed to British elsewhere in the Gulf) that controlled the Saudi concessions, the Saudi relationship has been sound since FDR's day. That the Bush family, including both Bush Presidents, were close to the Saudis is well known, but it was that human rights crusader Jimmy Carter who, toasting the Shah not long before his toppling, praised Iran as one of the Gulf's twin pillars of stability. The Clinton and Obama Administrations have upheld the centrality of the Saudi relationship to US strategic interests in the Gulf.

But there may be no country in the world — and I explicitly include Israel here — where US and Saudi interests potentially might conflict more than in Bahrain. The Saudis backed Husni Mubarak to the end, but they've had disagreements with Egypt before, especially in the Nasser era. But for the Saudis, Bahrain is literally too close to home. It is both an outlet (where a Saudi can get a drink and enjoy other pleasures unavailable at home by driving across a causeway) and a potential blowback threat: if Bahrain's Shi‘ite majority were to take power from the Sunni monarchy, the substantial Shi‘ite population in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province might become restive, as they did in 1979 after the Iranian Revolution. And the Eastern Province is where the oil, the refineries, the pipeline heads, the oil ports, almost all of the industry, is based. The Saudis are likely to back the King of Bahrain to the hilt, but unless there is some progress towards dialogue and away from bloodshed in Bahrain, the US may face an insoluble dilemma.

If Bahrain's Shi‘ite majority were to actually control the country's policies (with or without continuing the Sunni monarchy), that would not automatically mean it would become pro-Iranian; while some Bahraini Shi‘ites are of Persian origin, the majority are Arab. But implacable Saudi hostility to a Shi‘ite-dominated Bahraini government might give a representative government nowhere else to turn. The Shi‘ite government of Iraq has its own problems. Forced to choose between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, the US would have little choice but to side with the Saudis, however unpopular such a choice would be.

Finding some formula for negotiations and genuine liberalization that does not overtly threaten the Saudis' own security would be the ideal policy to pursue in Bahrain, but little of what has happened in the last 48 hours suggest any eagerness on the part of the King to do so. And he is no doubt hearing frequently from the neighbors across the causeway urging him to hang tough.

This will be a three-day holiday weekend in the US, with Monday off. I doubt if events will wait till Tuesday, but weekend posting will be limited to critical events.

Victory Lap

Unrest continues throughout the region, but demonstrators gathered en masse in Tahrir both to celebrate victory a week ago and to show their continuing strength to the Military Council. TV preacher Yusuf al-Qaradawi led Friday prayers in Tahrir after years living abroad. It looks as if they succeeded in drawing a large turnout.

A Timely Encounter with Kushary

A personal anecdote, if I may, with a bit of fortuitous synchronicity: last night my daughter's school had an "international cuisine night." Parents were urged to share national dishes from their countries of origin, wear native dress, etc., and there was music and dancing from various parts of the world. As we live in a rather multi-ethnic neighborhood in northern Virginia, we expected there to be a good variety, and there was. Though my daughter herself comes from China, none 0f us are good at Chinese cooking, so we toyed with something Middle Eastern, and while I can whip up some good Middle Eastern dishes, it isn't really our cuisine, so we settled on being one of the few families attending to come up with something American, and made my wife's chili. (My own chili is better, in my opinion, but since it causes bleeding gums and requires extensive liquid refreshment afterward, if not resuscitation, we went with the mild stuff.)

It was crowded and chaotic and though the foods were supposed to be labeled, most weren't. I was pleased that among the many flags on the wall, one was Egypt's, since obviously many of us are cheering on Egypt in the first week without Mubarak. When we got to the serving table there was a lot of Middle Eastern, Latin American, and African food, though surprisingly little East Asian since there are many Vietnamese and Korean families in the area, though perhaps not in the school.

Anyway, I filled my plate with lamb couscous and Latin rice, curried lentils and some kind of kifta, and then came to an unlabeled plate.

Hmm. Noodles, macaroni, sauce, lentils, maybe a little rice, and chickpeas on top. Sounds like ... OMG, Kushary!

Now, Kushary is Egyptian street food. Like ful mudammas and ta‘amiyya, (the former is fava beans; the latter is a version of falafel made with fava beans instead of chickpeas), it is a distinctively native Egyptian dish. It can be found elsewhere, but most commonly where there's a big Egyptian expatriate population, such as the Gulf. It is sold in street carts or small, specialized kushary restaurants.

Of course, I took some. To be honest, kushary was never my favorite Egyptian specialty, but it is so typically Egyptian that I couldn't not eat it as we approach the first week since the fall of Mubarak. A nice little bit of synchronicity.

We've Heard of This Facebook Thing the Young Folk Like; Sounds Like a Good Place for Press Releases

Egypt's Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is, whatever else you may say about it, trying to understand the new world in Egypt. Unfortunately, it's sounding more and more like one's aging parents who keep using 50's hipster slang to sound like they're in tune with the times. Its use of SMS messaging to send out uninformative press releases has drawn a lot of complaints, so now they have gone and started up a Facebook page, to show they get it. Unfortunately, they don't. (Website in Arabic.) It's more like, "Hey, now that we're hip to this groovy new thing the young folk like, let's use it to send out what we were sending out on the fax machine."

Points for effort, but a misfire so far. Via Zeinobia.

The Bloodshed in Bahrain and Benghazi

Having been tied up through the afternoon and evening, I haven't said much about the bloodshed in Bahrain and in Benghazi, Libya. The early morning attack on the demonstrators' tents in the Lu'lu' (Pearl) traffic roundabout led to several dead, and the security forces struck when most demonstrators were asleep. Nevertheless, the authorities claim they were ambushed. Sleeping people in tents are the sneakiest kind of ambush when you're an armed security force.





At least 14 are said to have died in Benghazi, which means the real total may be higher. Libya's east, the area around Benghazi (the region called Cyrenaica in the colonial era) has long been the most disaffected region against Qadhafi, but open defiance is unusual.

As we've already seen in Iran, when a regime is willing to shed blood, and is united in its determination, protests can be bloodily crushed. What kept Tahrir Square from becoming Tienanmen Square was the refusal of the Egyptian Army to fire on the demonstrators; even so, the death toll in Egypt officially stands at over 300 and may be higher.

Instinct tells me that Libya will crack down hard and the regime will weather the storm, but instinct told me Ben Ali and Mubarak would survive, too, and those are two countries I know well, while I've never set foot in Libya.

A large number of Libya videos can be found here.

Egypt's Military Sector of the Economy: A Dissenting View

I must confess that I myself, in this blog and in interviews, have contributed to the widespread view that Egypt's military controls its own huge chunk of the manufacturing sector of the economy, with estimates that this could amount to a third of the entire economy. I also must confess that much of my experience in the matter dates from the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Jonathan Wright offers a strong dissent to this received wisdom. I can't say for certain that he's right, but I can say that his information is much more current than mine, or many of the other Egypt hands who've been pontificating. I'll defer to him unless other information is forthcoming.

Farouk al-Baz; Egypt's Youth Deserve Nobel Peace Prize

Farouk al-Baz may be the most famous of all expatriate Egyptian scientists, a longtime stalwart of the US' NASA (in at least one old Star Trek there's a shuttlecraft named al-Baz), and his brother Osama was long Egypt's greatest diplomatic eminence grise (called "Egypt's Kissinger" way back when Kissinger was our Kissinger). Farouk al-Baz has told Al-Masry al-Youm he wants to rally Egyptian intellectuals to nominate Egypt's youth for a collective award of the Nobel Peace Prize.

Farouk al-Baz is 73. I find this encouraging for some reason.

The Spreading Winter of Discontent

With unrest simultaneously in Yemen, Bahrain, Libya and Iran, still simmering in Algeria and starting to stir in Iraq, it is almost amusing to watch how the international news agencies find themselves trying to cover all the bases. Certainly a single blogger can't cover it all. I've primarily specialized in Egypt and know Tunisia pretty well, so paid a lot of attention to those dramas. But I can't cover them all. Even the networks are stretching thin. And I do have a Journal to edit.

As I've said before on this blog, even those of us getting calls to explain it all are at a loss; everything we've learned about the region has been turned on its head. We really don't know what's going to happen, even in Tunisia and Egypt where the old leaders have already fallen. Forty years of experience and I find myself as unsure of the future as the newest student in the field.

I do, however, think it is important to keep the national differences in mind, as well as the potential consequences. We've seen the unrest in autocratic republics (beginning with Tunisia and Egypt), monarchies (Bahrain and Jordan), and a Jamahiriya (Libya's self-proclaimed system); in a wide range of Sunni countries but also in Shi‘ite Iran and mixed Sunni-Shi‘a Bahrain and Iraq. Oil states (Algeria, Iraq, Iran, Bahrain) and non-oil states have been hit.

Nor are the consequences the same across the board. These revolutions and uprisings are not about the United States and the US has limited ability to control events. But the US would welcome a change of regime in Iran and probably not mourn too much a change in Libya, while Bahrain might be another matter, since the US Fifth fleet is based there.

And I suspect the roller-coaster ride is just beginning.

Mawlid al-Nabi

I'm a little late noting the Prophet's birthday this year, which was yesterday.

Shoot the Messenger, Part Three

Ben Ali blamed sinister foreign media, while his controlled press targeted Al Jazeera by name, at a time when Al Jazeera didn't even have a bureau in Tunis. Mubarak's police raided the Al Jazeera offices and forced then nearly underground. Now, between Tunisia and Egypt, in Libya, where major demonstrations and clashes occurred in Benghazi yesterday, state TV has been showing people denouncing Al Jazeera, blaming it for subverting the great Jamahiriyya, and, well, just because.

Shoot the messenger: the first recourse of the trembling tyrant. Having grown up in a border state during the Civil Rights revolution in the US, I'm quite familiar with the line that all the troubles are caused by "outside agitators." Al Jazeera; the Amir of Qatar's plot to spread democratic revolutions? (Now the King of Bahrain, with his island's historic dynastic rivalry, might have a case, but the Brother Leader of the Revolution in Libya?)

A wise man, in fact a Middle Easterner, once said that ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free. Al Jazeera doesn't always get it right, but the more scared you are of a free media, the more we suspect you have to hide.

Tariq al-Bishri

Here's a useful profile of Tariq al-Bishri, the respected former jurist who's heading the committee to propose changes to the Egyptian constitution.

The Most Talked About Man in Egypt

Who has his own Twitter hashtag, several Facebook pages dedicated to him, and is the subject of intense discussion in the social media today? Why, it's the guy behind ‘Omar Suleiman.

In several of Suleiman's last TV appearances, including the brief one announcing Mubarak's resignation, an unidentified man appears behind the Egyptian Vice President. He has the very serious look of a bodyguard or security man, but if so, why did he appear on camera? In the picture at left, it's hard to avoid wondering if he's holding a gun at Suleiman's back or otherwise making sure he says what he's supposed to, after Mubarak's Thursday night fakeout. For the past day or so there's been a lot of speculation and a lot of jokes in circulation ("State TV announces there was no one behind ‘Omar Suleiman").

All the jokes aside, it turns out he's Staff Lt. Col. Hussein Sharif, commander of something called Group 64 of the Egyptian Special Forces. What he was doing there is still unclear. Bodyguard or enforcer?

Ten Days to Revise Constitution?

The committee set up to propose amendmnts to Egypt's Constitution will have ten days to make its proposals. which will later be put to a referendum. That seems a bit precipitate to me: at Philadelphia in 1789 they took all summer and still it's needed amending 27 times. But we'll see.

Linguistic Notes on the Revolution

We had a discussion in the comments a few posts back (see comments to the linked post) about the chant al-sha‘b yurid isqat al-nizam (The people want the fall of the regime) which is literary Arabic as opposed to the Egyptian colloquial al-sha‘b ‘ayiz isqat al-nizam, which would be more natural. We've also spoken recently about Arabic diglossia in the Tunisian revolution, and the etymology of the word baltagi, so it seems appropriate to link to Ben Zimmer's post on Language Log on "How Mubarak was told to go, in many languages" which includes references to diglossia (irhal ya‘ni imshi ya illi ma btifhamshi), (Irhal ("go away" in formal Arabic) means imshi ("go away" in colloquial), you who doesn't understand me"), shown above, which also alludes to Ben Ali's last, "I have understood you" speech in Tunisia, and even a sign in hieroglyphics (so the pharaoh could understand it, naturally). Also see a related column by Zimmer here. He's a linguist rather than an Arabic specialist, but there's some interesting stuff there.

"Our Revolution is like Wikipedia"

Wael Ghonim, the Google executive behind We are All Khaled Said, comes up with a suitanly techie metaphor:

Our revolution is like Wikipedia, okay? Everyone is contributing content, [but] you don't know the names of the people contributing the content. This is exactly what happened. Revolution 2.0 in Egypt was exactly the same. Everyone contributing small pieces, bits and pieces. We drew this whole picture of a revolution. And no one is the hero in that picture.

More Protests

If leaders elsewhere in the Middle East were banking on the idea that what happens in Egypt, stays in Egypt, no such luck. Following weekend protests in Algeria and Yemen, today was the big 25 Bahman demonstration in Iran (with major confrontations), and also protests in Bahrain. I'll have more comment on this later.

Light Posting Today

I'm revolutioned out, and will be working on catching up on the day job today, and taking my wife to a Valentine's day dinner tonight. Things have calmed a bit, and now we have a six-month pledge from the military. I may have more observations late today.

Some Quick Takes from the Day After the Party

The Party's over, and today the partiers cleaned up Tahrir Square and scrubbed the lions on Qasr al-Nil bridge. That's a sign of the new, self-reliant young Egyptian in itself. More importantly, since what happens next is in the hands of the Higher Military Council, we got a few clues about their thinking. The statement that Egypt will honor all international obligations and treaties got most of the coverage in the United States and Israel, but they also promised to move towards genuinely free and democratic elections. That's the good news.

What they did not do is lift the State of Emergency. The generals are naturally security conscious, but until the State of Emergency is lifted, I think there will be a grain of suspicion in the mind of the demonstrators. And while they promised free and democratic elections, they gave no timetable. But whatever the generals may think, I really don't think this could be 1952 all over again, when the Army promises much but keeps power for itself. 1952 was a classic, seize-the-radio-station putsch, while this was a case of the Army refusing to stop a popular revolution. (I suspect the generals doubted a conscript Army would fire on their own.) Secondly, in 1952, you could seize the radio station. Even the complete shutdown of the Internet in Egypt did not stop people from getting posts to Twitter and Facebook, even through methods like using old dialup connections in Europe. It isn't 1952 any more. The Army may end up playing a Turkish-style role as guarantor of the system, but I really think they can't hijack the victory won in the streets. Perhaps I'm overly romantic.

But that raises another question. I keep seeing media backgrounders indicating that the Higher Military Council is headed by Field Marshal Tantawi, Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Enan, etc., but the last picture I saw of them was at the meeting on Thursday that issued "Communique Number 1." Obviously something changed after Mubarak's speech Thursday night and the Army pushed harder on Friday. So far as I can tell, all the statements are being read by a man in the eagle and crossed swords of a Major General. That may seem high ranking for a spokesman, but Egypt has a lot of Major Generals. I once had one serve as my driver, in uniform, and he changed his own flat tire. (Do US Major Generals change their own flats?)

But this Major General (I don't know if he's been identified by name) is the visible face of the Military Council. Here is Communique Number 4:



I haven't seen any TV shots of Tantawi or Enan since Thursday.Why, if they're running the country? Maybe I'm being a little paranoid, but it's a question I haven't seen much commented upon. Perhaps tomorrow.

Note that I won't be posting a lot over the weekend, but will comment as needed.

Al-Ahram, The Morning After

The most common chant in Tahrir in recent days was al-Sha‘b yurid isqat al-nizam (The people want the fall of the regime).

Via Zeinobia, an early edition of Saturday's state-run Al-Ahram. The headline reads, "The people toppled the regime." (Same Arabic verb in both cases.)

Why I Like Qualifying Clauses

One reason I'm not a heavy user of Twitter is because as an Editor, I like nuance, and therefore usually include qualifying clauses, which don't fit in 140-character soundbites. Thank goodness I used some here, back on January 27:

While Tuesday was enormously impressive and yesterday in Suez looked like it was spinning out of control, the regime still has a lot of weapons in its arsenal (and I don't mean that metaphorically). And that's even without turning to the Army, as they did in 1977 and 1986. I can't foresee the future, and Tunisia surprised everyone, but the Egyptian nut will be harder to crack. This won't be over in 29 days. (Always with the proviso that the Army could be a wild card, but probably won't be.)

The Army was the wild card. As for "This won't be over in 29 days" I was technically right: it was over in 18.

Sometimes it feels good to get it wrong, especially when everybody else did, too. (Except, of course, the people of Egypt.)

A Changed Egypt

There's a Twitter campaign afoot to get the protesters to assemble tomorrow to clean up the square. The let-the-government-do-it days may be over. Wael Ghonim is tweeting about trying to organize Egyptians at home and abroad to raise LE 100 billion to rebuild the country. This is real bootstrapping: the New Egyptians want to do it themselves, not rely on the state.

And as for the huge celebration that's still going on at 4 am Cairo time, Chairman Mao was doubly wrong: political power does not grow from the barrel of a gun if you do it this way. And just maybe, a revolution can be a dinner party.

Fi Kulli Shari‘ Biladi, Sawt al-Hurriya Biynadi

"In every street of my country, the voice of freedom is calling!" One of the first folk anthems of the Revolution of 2011. It helps to know Egyptian Arabic, but there are English subtitles.

A Joke from Cairo Today

I hope someone compiles all the jokes flying around about recent events, since Egyptians are geniuses at political humor, for too long their only outlet. One from today:

After the triumphant revolutions of Friday, January 14, and Friday, February 11, Colonel Qadhafi has acted swiftly to avoid the fate of his neighbors on either side.

He's issued a decree abolishing Fridays.

An End to "Ma‘alesh"?

Generations of Egyptians and expatriates living in Egypt have joked about the "IBM syndrome," from the standard phrase " inshallah bukra, ma‘alesh." (Literally, "Tomorrow if God wills, don't worry about it.") Usually accompanied by a shrug, it was associated with the stereotype of an Egyptian people who were passive, fatalistic, resigned to the inevitable. Like all stereotypes, it is both offensive and has a kernel of truth, or has had. (Typical joke: an Egyptian explains to a Mexican friend that " inshallah bukra is like mañana, but without the desperate urgency.")

But the stereotype of Egyptians as resigned to the inevitable, as putting things off until tomorrow, as a people who shrug and say ma‘alesh because there's nothing to be done against an unresponsive state, may be gone forever. Mubarak's speech last night was fatally tone deaf to what has been going on, but never more so than in his condescending remark at the beginning that he was speaking as a father to his children. He clearly didn't get it, and the complete cluelessness of the tone may have done more than anything to bring about today's result. They're not your children, Mr. ex-President, they're your employers.

I hope the Military Council understands that they are temporary stewards of the people in the square, not the new rulers. If they misunderstand, the square will fill again. As so many have said, the fear is gone. The Egyptian people have learned they can control their fate. I do not think they will settle for a change of pharaohs.

A Brief Biography of Tahrir Square

Midan al-Tahrir, Liberation Square, Cairo's great central plaza, has been the center of world attention for the past several weeks, and, nearly 60 years after being named Liberation Square, has earned its name. Of all the central characters in this drama, though, it seems to be the one that hasn't been the subject of profiles in the round-the-clock coverage so far.

My daughter,looking at the crowds on TV, asked the pertinent question, "Why do they call it a square if it's round?" It's not exactly round, either, though a huge traffic circle marks its center. (And "Midan," or maydan,originally referred to any large open space, including sporting fields.)

Tahrir sits at the intersection of several major streets, and is home to the Egyptian Museum, the former Nile Hilton (now owned by Ritz Carlton), the Foreign Ministry, the Arab League, the old campus of the American University in Cairo, the ‘Umar Makram mosque, and the huge monument to bureaucracy known as the Mugamma‘. It is a central bus terminal and the major Metro system hub (Sadat station). It sits east of one of the main bridges across the Nile, the Qasr al-Nil Bridge, whose guardian lions have been seen frequently during the demonstrations.

It owes its beginning to the era of the Khedive Isma‘il, left, who ruled from 1863 to 1879, and who had a grand vision for a construction of a modern, European style city in Cairo, to the west of the old city, on ground that had been periodically flooded by the Nile and had been underdeveloped as a flood plain. Much construction was carried out for the grand opening of the Suez Canal, and the process continued into the reign of his successor, Khedive Tewfiq.

The master planner of all this was an engineer and city planner named ‘Ali Pasha Mubarak, no relation to the former President that I know of, shown at right. Most of downtown Cairo and its various elegant (if now rather faded) squares are a result of his master plan. The square we are now so familiar with he named for his patron, Khedive Isma‘il, as Midan Ismailia.

Isma‘il's grand building plans, among other ventures, were financed by borrowing, to the point that Egypt's debt to European lenders became unbearable, leading to the British intervention of 1882 and the de facto protectorate by Britain.

Midan Ismailia became a center of British authority. Where the Nile Hilton and Arab League now stand, stood the Qasr al-Nil barracks, a military camp and symbol of British power. To the south lay the British Embassy, which ran down to the Nile (there was as yet no corniche).

Only after the military coup of 1952 was the Midan renamed from Ismailia to Liberation Square. To underscore the symbolism, Nasser tore the barracks down and built the Nile Hilton and Arab League; the British Ambassador lost his riverfront access and the corniche was built.

During the Sadat era, there was an unsightly pedestrian walkway built around the Midan; that was mercifully torn down. When the Metro opened, Tahrir became a major hub, as it already was for buses.

And today, Liberation Square finally justified its name.

Some Recent MEI Publications

Pausing a moment from talking about Egypt, MEI has a new Viewpoints on ":The Environment and the Middle East: Pathways to Sustainability. The full PDF is available here.

Other recent publications include Alex Bain's Policy Brief: Israel's Flawed Electoral System.

Back on Egypt, I'd also refer you to Graeme Bannerman's Policy Insights: Inside the Egyptian Army.

Biladi, Biladi

The anthem again, this time in victory: Long live eternal Egypt.




In an odd bit of synchronicity, the chorus is said to be adapted from a speech by Mustafa Kamil, Egyptian nationalist and independence activist, who died on February 10, 1908: 103 years ago yesterday. This anthem has been sung constantly in Tahrir these past weeks.

From Wikipedia, the lyrics in English, Arabic, and transliterated Arabic (compared to the sung version on the video, the second and third verses are flipped and the last verse differs in a couple of lines):

My country, my country, my country.
You have my love and my heart.
My country, my country, my country,
You have my love and my heart.

Egypt! O mother of all lands,
My hope and my ambition,
And on all people
Your Nile has countless graces

My homeland, my homeland, my homeland,
My love and my heart are for thee.
My homeland, my homeland, my homeland,
My love and my heart are for thee.

Egypt! Most precious jewel,
A pearl on the brow of eternity!
O my homeland, be for ever free,
Safe from every foe!

My country, my country, my country,
My love and my heart are for thee.
My country, my country, my country,
My love and my heart are for thee.

Egypt, land of bounties
You are filled with the ancient glory
My purpose is to repel the enemy
And on God I rely

My homeland, my homeland, my homeland,
My love and my heart are for thee.
My homeland, my homeland, my homeland,
My love and my heart are for thee.

Egypt! Noble are thy children,
Loyal, and guardians of the reins.
Be we at war or peace
We will sacrifice ourselves for you, my country.

My homeland, my homeland, my homeland,
My love and my heart are for thee.

بلادي بلادي بلادي
لكِ حبي و فؤادي
بلادي بلادي بلادي
لك حبي و فؤادي

مصر يا أم البلاد
انت غايتي والمراد
وعلى كل العباد
كم لنيلك من اياد

بلادي بلادي بلادي
لكِ حبي و فؤادي
بلادي بلادي بلادي
لكِ حبي و فؤادي

مصر انت أغلى درة
فوق جبين الدهر غرة
يا بلادي عيشي حرة
واسلمي رغم الأعادي

بلادي بلادي بلادي
لكِ حبي و فؤادي
بلادي بلادي بلادي
لك حبي و فؤادي

مصر يا أرض النعيم
سدت بالمجد القديم
مقصدى دفع الغريم
وعلى الله اعتمادى

بلادي بلادي بلادي
لكِ حبي و فؤادي
بلادي بلادي بلادي
لك حبي و فؤادي

مصر اولادك كرام
أوفياء يرعوا الزمام
نحن حرب وسلام
وفداكي يا بلادي

بلادي بلادي بلادي
لك حبي و فؤادي

Bilādī, bilādī, bilādī
Lakī ḥubbī wa fū’ādī
Bilādī, bilādī, bilādī
Lakī ḥubbī wa fū’ādī

Miṣr yā umm al-bilād
Anti ghāyatī wal-murād
Wa ‘alá kull al-‘ibad
Kam liNīlik min āyād

Bilādī, bilādī, bilādī
Lakī ḥubbī wa fū’ādī
Bilādī, bilādī, bilādī
Lakī ḥubbī wa fū’ādī

Misr Anti Aghla Durra
Fawqa Gabeen Ad-dahr Ghurra
Ya Biladi 'Aishi Hurra
Wa Aslami Raghm-al-adi.

Bilādī, bilādī, bilādī
Lakī ḥubbī wa fū’ādī
Bilādī, bilādī, bilādī
Lakī ḥubbī wa fū’ādī

Misru ya Ardi-nna`eem
Sudti bil majdil-qadeem
Maqsidee daf`ul-ghareem
Wa `ala-llahi-`timaadi.

Bilādī, bilādī, bilādī
Lakī ḥubbī wa fū’ādī
Bilādī, bilādī, bilādī
Lakī ḥubbī wa fū’ādī

Misr Awladik Kiram
Aufiya Yar'u-zimam
Nahnu harbu'n wa' salam
Wa fidakee ya bilādī.

Bilādī, bilādī, bilādī
Lakī ḥubbī wa fū’ādī

And Now the Revolution Begins

Go to the previous post and play Biladi, Biladi.

Ben Ali: 29 days.

Mubarak: 18 days.

Of course, this is only the beginning of a long road.

For Egypt Today: The Anthem, Biladi (My Country)

Today will be crucial, and I'll post as things clarify. Until then, I'm not an Egyptian — those who are declaring "we are all Egyptians" are not putting their lifeblood on the line, nor am I. The Egyptians are. We are not Egyptians, though I'm at least mustamsiri, Egyptianized. Because we've drunk from the Nile we may feel this is our fight. It isn't. I'm in a comfortable suburb, though the streets I once walked daily are alive with tension. But for my Egyptian readers, in umm al-dunya and abroad, I can show the flag and play the national anthem, Biladi (my country):

In an odd bit of synchronicity, the chorus is said to be adapted from a speech by Mustafa Kamil, Egyptian nationalist and independence activist, who died on February 10, 1908: 103 years ago yesterday. This anthem has been sung constantly in Tahrir these past weeks.

From Wikipedia, the lyrics in English, Arabic, and transliterated Arabic (compared to the sung version on the video, the second and third verses are flipped and the last verse differs in a couple of lines):

My country, my country, my country.
You have my love and my heart.
My country, my country, my country,
You have my love and my heart.

Egypt! O mother of all lands,
My hope and my ambition,
And on all people
Your Nile has countless graces

My homeland, my homeland, my homeland,
My love and my heart are for thee.
My homeland, my homeland, my homeland,
My love and my heart are for thee.

Egypt! Most precious jewel,
A pearl on the brow of eternity!
O my homeland, be for ever free,
Safe from every foe!

My country, my country, my country,
My love and my heart are for thee.
My country, my country, my country,
My love and my heart are for thee.

Egypt, land of bounties
You are filled with the ancient glory
My purpose is to repel the enemy
And on God I rely

My homeland, my homeland, my homeland,
My love and my heart are for thee.
My homeland, my homeland, my homeland,
My love and my heart are for thee.

Egypt! Noble are thy children,
Loyal, and guardians of the reins.
Be we at war or peace
We will sacrifice ourselves for you, my country.

My homeland, my homeland, my homeland,
My love and my heart are for thee.

بلادي بلادي بلادي
لكِ حبي و فؤادي
بلادي بلادي بلادي
لك حبي و فؤادي

مصر يا أم البلاد
انت غايتي والمراد
وعلى كل العباد
كم لنيلك من اياد

بلادي بلادي بلادي
لكِ حبي و فؤادي
بلادي بلادي بلادي
لكِ حبي و فؤادي

مصر انت أغلى درة
فوق جبين الدهر غرة
يا بلادي عيشي حرة
واسلمي رغم الأعادي

بلادي بلادي بلادي
لكِ حبي و فؤادي
بلادي بلادي بلادي
لك حبي و فؤادي

مصر يا أرض النعيم
سدت بالمجد القديم
مقصدى دفع الغريم
وعلى الله اعتمادى

بلادي بلادي بلادي
لكِ حبي و فؤادي
بلادي بلادي بلادي
لك حبي و فؤادي

مصر اولادك كرام
أوفياء يرعوا الزمام
نحن حرب وسلام
وفداكي يا بلادي

بلادي بلادي بلادي
لك حبي و فؤادي

Bilādī, bilādī, bilādī
Lakī ḥubbī wa fū’ādī
Bilādī, bilādī, bilādī
Lakī ḥubbī wa fū’ādī

Miṣr yā umm al-bilād
Anti ghāyatī wal-murād
Wa ‘alá kull al-‘ibad
Kam liNīlik min āyād

Bilādī, bilādī, bilādī
Lakī ḥubbī wa fū’ādī
Bilādī, bilādī, bilādī
Lakī ḥubbī wa fū’ādī

Misr Anti Aghla Durra
Fawqa Gabeen Ad-dahr Ghurra
Ya Biladi 'Aishi Hurra
Wa Aslami Raghm-al-adi.

Bilādī, bilādī, bilādī
Lakī ḥubbī wa fū’ādī
Bilādī, bilādī, bilādī
Lakī ḥubbī wa fū’ādī

Misru ya Ardi-nna`eem
Sudti bil majdil-qadeem
Maqsidee daf`ul-ghareem
Wa `ala-llahi-`timaadi.

Bilādī, bilādī, bilādī
Lakī ḥubbī wa fū’ādī
Bilādī, bilādī, bilādī
Lakī ḥubbī wa fū’ādī

Misr Awladik Kiram
Aufiya Yar'u-zimam
Nahnu harbu'n wa' salam
Wa fidakee ya bilādī.

Bilādī, bilādī, bilādī
Lakī ḥubbī wa fū’ādī

General Saad al-Shazly, 1922-2011

At a moment of supreme crisis in Egypt, it has ironically lost a war hero and military commander who also became a prominent dissident and spent years in exile. General Saad al-Shazly, (also see this link), Chief of Staff during the 1973 war and architect of "the crossing" — Operation Badr to cross the Suez Canal and breach the Bar-Lev line — but who was removed by Anwar Sadat and named as Ambassador to London, has died, on February 9 in Egypt, at age 88. In the picture above left, he is to the left of Sadat (Sadat's own right) during the war. Later (after Shazly became a dissident) Sadat claimed he was fired for wanting to withdraw troops and that he had had a breakdown. Shazly denied those claims, which were not made at the time, but years later.

Shazly was named Ambassador to London and later, Portugal. (The photo at right is from his diplomatic days.) After the Camp David Accords, Shazly broke with Sadat. He was dismissed and went into exile. His 1980 book The Crossing of the Suez told his side of the story, but led to charges of writing a book without permission (which he didn't deny) and revealing military secrets (which he denied)., and conviction in absentia.

After years in exile, he returned to Egypt in 1992 and served half of his three-year sentence.

Shazly had apparently been seriously ill for some time. If Egypt were not preoccupied by other events, it would be interesting to see how he was remembered. At least, Al-Ahram noted his passing. Though it fudges the exile (saying only that he left Egypt in 1978 and returned in 1992) and fails to mention the jail time, at least it was noted.

Bayan Raqm Wahid

Though military coups are rare lately, they were once common enough in the Arab world that the phrase "Bayan Raqm Wahid" — communique number one — is actually a cliche in Arabic to mean a military coup. So it's not surprising that when the protesters heard that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces had issued "Bayan Raqm Wahid" today, and it appeared to indicate that the Armed Forces were stepping in, it's easily understood why the crowds thought the end was near. The Supreme Military Council rarely meets, and hasn't met publicly since 1973, and quite visibly neither Mubarak nor Suleiman was at the meeting as shown on Egyptian TV. Then Lt.Gen. Sami Enan, the Chief of Staff [clarification: I'm told it was the Cairo regional commander], went to Tahrir, told the protesters the Army supported their legitimate demands, and told a --porter that "it's over," the impression grew.

CIA Director Leon Panetta seemed to think so, too, when he told Congress it was likely Mubarak would go tonight. President Obama seemed to expect more, too. Given tyhe close communications between the US and the Egyptian military, one wonders if the Armed Forces themselves thought Mubarak would do more. That's why everyone is wondering if there will be a communique number two. It certainly does look like the Army thought it had persuaded someone of something, and then Mubarak offered half measures.

For those with Arabic, here's the announcement and scenes of the military council meeting.

Tomorrow Could Be Critical

The clear mixture of disappointment and anger in Tahrir Square when Mubarak only transferred authority but did not resign suggest that tomorrow's demonstrations will be angrier than before. With what amounts to a general strike under way as well, tomorrow could in fact be particularly dangerous. Once again it appears as if Mubarak, and perhaps ‘Omar Suleiman as well, are not comprehending the situation and still assuming they can ride it out. A lot of people are comparing it to Ben Ali's third, "I have understood you," speech. (Ben Ali said he'd leave at the end of his term. He left the next day.)

Mubarak was also rather ambiguous about the delegation of powers. The Egyptian Ambassador to Washington has said that Suleiman has been given all Presidential authority, but that was not clear in the speech, at least not clear to the crowds in Tahrir. (Also, about three or four years ago a new round of constitutional amendments said the President cannot delegate the power to dissolve Parliament or amend the constitution to the Vice President.

The terms of the Military Council's "communique nunber one", and statements made to the demonstrators by senior military officials, certainly led the crowds to assume Mubarak would do more than they perceive him to have done. Now the crowds are furious. What is the Army thinking? Will there be a communique number two?

Tomorrow may hold some answers. People have had their hopes raised and then disappointed. They are angry. I'm reminded of the lines in Herman Melville's poem about the anger over the assassination of Lincoln:

There is sobbing of the strong,
And a pall upon the land;
But the People in their weeping
Bare the iron hand;
Beware the People weeping
When they bare the iron hand.

Not Quite There Yet

Mubarak is delegating power to Suleiman but not resigning. I fear he's still behind the curve. People had come to expect more. It's Ben Ali's third speech. Too little, too late.

The Armed Forces statement earlier today was Communique Number One. Let's see if there's a communique number two.

I'll be away from a keyboard for awhile. More later.

Will He or Won't He?

Now there are reports claiming Mubarak won't step down. I guess we have to wait and hear it directly from the horse's, uh, mouth.

Where Will They Put the February 10 Bridge?

Cairo already has a July 26 Bridge and an October 6 bridge. Where will they put the February 10 bridge, if this turns out to be what it increasingly looks like?

More on the Supreme Council

I'm seeing reports that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces has only publicly announced meeting three times: 1967, 1973, and today.

Note that the official statement said that "the military" convened the Supreme Council, not that the Commander-in-Chief (Mubarak) did.

I think the Army is in the driver's seat.

If Mubarak Goes . . .

If Mubarak really is going to step aside, the first question is to whom will he delegate power? ‘Omar Suleiman has been making statements about how Egypt is not mature enough for democracy and how the State of Emergency cannot be lifted in the present circumstances, which doesn't seem to sit well with reported Army statements that the protesters' demands will be met. This could be a very interesting day.

And since Al Jazeera English is hard to find in the US, here's another window into their streaming coverage.