Will the Scent of Jasmine Spread?

A blogger I admire very much has criticized the use of "Jasmine Revolution" for what is happening in Tunisia: Issandr El Amrani in "Why You Shouldn't Call it the 'Jasmine Revolution.'" But I already had the photo at left of a jasmine seller in Sidi Bou Said, so I'll keep the headline for now anyway. Issandr argues that not only are "color revolutions" a dubious meme, but that Ben Ali himself used "jasmine revolution" for his palace coup of 1987.

On the other hand, there are reasons for grasping at the image. In the warmer months, the scent of jasmine is closely associated with Tunisia, and especially the city of Tunis itself. Little clumps of blossoms are sold by vendors, worn by women in their hair and by young men behind their ears. But whatever you call it (and at this point I think that "revolution" is still in question, not just "jasmine"), virtually every media outlet today has been speculating on whether what happened in Tunisia will spread elsewhere. (Sorry, Southern Sudan. Sorry, Special Tribunal for Lebanon. You timed it wrong. Today's story is whether Tunisia will be emulated elsewhere.)

Bloggers and Tweeters in the Arab world were first in calling for two, three, many Tunisias, to paraphrase an old Che Guevara quote. But if the revolution either descends into violence or the RCD Party retains its grip on power and this becomes another transition like the Bourguiba-to-Ben Ali transition, it may not seem like such a model. It's just too early to tell.

There are, of course, echoes in the Arab streets. There've been demonstrations and even a few self-immolations from Morocco and Mauritania in the West to Oman in the East; a man set himself on fire outside the Egyptian Parliament; there have been serious clashes over housing in Benghazi and less serious trouble in Tripoli, in a Libya where the fact that even word got out of them is news; peaceful sit-ins in Damascus, where nothing usually happens publicly; price demonstrations in Oman, usually pretty undisturbed, and so on. But dissent is not the same as regime change.

I well remember the Iranian Revolution, now 31 years ago, and all the people asking "Is Saudi Arabia next?" It wasn't just Americans, either: lots of Arabs were wondering the same. We know the answer: nobody was next, though the world did change. On the other hand, the similarity of Tunisia to other Arab autocracies backed by the West, (led by autocrats with improbably black hair at advanced age), naturally makes for speculation, as do recent stirrings in Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, and with a bit of stretching, Egypt and Morocco. (Three of those are monarchies, of course, but the difference these days is trivial, especially with the emergence of hereditary republics in Syria and, potentially, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya.) (Excuse me, of course Libya is not a republic, a jumhuriyya, but is a jamahiriyya. Sorry for the error.)

Also, the Amir of Kuwait just announced all citizens would receive about $3500 — 1000 Dinars — to mark 50 years since independence and 20 years since liberation from Iraq. The oil states still remember how to keep the masses happy.

The first clue is going to be what emerges in Tunis. If in the 60 days in which elections are envisioned, things still smell like jasmine, others could indeed seek to emulate the Tunisian achievement. If they smell more like something less pleasant, and only the faces at the top have changed, people could be disillusioned. We'll see.

Will other Arab autocrats take a lesson from Ben Ali? It would be nice to think so, but Ben Ali's "Je vous ai compris" moment came so late in the endgame that it was either too late anyway, or the security services simply ignored his orders to stop firing on demonstrators (I'm not yet sure which). Will the scales fall from the eyes of any other Arab autocrats? Those that can afford to will probably try to reduce food prices, increase housing and employment, and otherwise reduce the obvious provocations. Those who can't afford to will be watching closely.

Everybody is, of course, thinking first of all of Egypt. The parallels hardly need to be drawn. Aging leader, check. No clear constitutional successor, check. Autocrat backed by the West, check. Increasing reliance on the security services, check. Ruler in power since before half his population was born, check. Corruption? Economic distress? Sclerotic bureaucracy? Check and check and check. (Mentioning the improbably black hair again would be piling on, I suppose.)

The parallels are not complete. The corruption is spread a bit more widely than in Tunisia, and in Egypt a large business class benefits, not just the ruling family; and the police state is a lot lighter-handed most of the time, and the press a lot freer by far, since in Tunisia it was wholly tamed, the "opposition" party papers dependent on government-owned publishing plants to appear.

But Mubarak, who'll soon be 84 and a decade older than Ben Ali, is up for reelection and must decide whether to run himself for a sixth term (that would see him in office until age 90 despite doubts about his health) or passing the torch to his son (unpopular with many including, by most accounts, the Army), or somebody else. The succession issue may force things forward. Egypt isn't usually a very revolutionary place, but then, neither was Tunisia.

I don't know if there has ever been another time — surely not since the end of hereditary rule in so many countries — when so many have been in power for so long. Qadhafi since 1969, Qaboos of Oman since 1970, Salih of Yemen since 1978, Mubarak since 1981. At least the Sultan has a hereditary claim; everybody else there has overstayed their shelf life. (And of course, though Syria used to have coups frequently, someone named Asad has been in charge since 1970.) Bashir of Sudan has been there since 1989, but at least part of his country is about to leave him. (Oddly enough, Mubarak, Qadhafi, and Salih all supposedly hope to be succeeded by one of their sons. The hereditary monarch in the list, Qaboos, has no sons and no clear successor.)

We could be approaching a major period of transition. We went through one in the late '90s/early '00s when the Kings of Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the President of Syria, Rulers of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Bahrain, Qatar (deposed), and Kuwait all passed from the scene in a period of about a decade. But the business is unfinished. Tunis may be a harbinger but it will not be an exact model.